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ABSTRACT
Building in Public:
Critical Reconstruction and the Rebuilding of Berlin after 1990
by
Naraelle K. Hohensee
Advisor: Kevin D. Murphy
Reconstructing Berlin’s ruined contours after 1990 was one of the most important ways
that reunified Germany made a public display of its relationship to the violence wrought by both
the Nazis and East Germany during the twentieth century. By integrating historical forms into
new buildings in the city’s commercial center, Berlin’s urban planners hoped to show the world
that the nation had transcended totalitarianism and was worthy of a prominent place in the new
global order. In order to achieve this vision, they adopted an approach called “Critical
Reconstruction,” which required architects to follow rigid design standards based on traditional
building typologies. In doing so, they also sought to rein in a flood of eager international
investors who threatened to turn central Berlin into a landscape of flashy, corporate experiments.
However, because of its strict insistence on historical styles, its ambivalence towards – if
not affinity for – Nazi architecture, as well as its rejection of contemporary movements such as
Deconstructivism, Critical Reconstruction was interpreted by many observers as reactionary and
dangerously conservative. Historians and social scientists commonly refer to it as a controversial,
backward-looking representation of German national identity. In this dissertation, I
fundamentally reassess the discourse of Critical Reconstruction and argue that this so-called
“conservative” turn in Berlin city planning practice was in actuality driven by socially
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progressive planners making a failed attempt to shape a new democratic society through the
regulation of built form. My research thus casts doubt on one of the most central postEnlightenment claims about architecture: that its aesthetic qualities can both directly represent
and influence people and politics.
Critical Reconstruction is mentioned often in recent histories of Berlin, and a handful of
architectural historians have also examined isolated aspects of its deployment in terms of its
relationship to trends in architecture and urban planning. However, without considering how it
functioned discursively on multiple levels and in diverse arenas (professional, economic, and
political), scholarly portrayals of Critical Reconstruction are reductive at best; at worst, these
accounts risk reinscribing the same rigid and simplistic view of Berlin’s planning culture that
they seek to critique. My project offers the first detailed examination of Critical Reconstruction
as both a public discourse and a planning methodology, showing how planners’ endeavors to
revive Berlin’s landscape in a socially responsible way ultimately gave rise to the opposite: a
landscape of homogenous commercial buildings whose construction mainly served corporate
interests, while simultaneously bolstering Berlin’s connections with the worst facets of its own
history. Additionally, as discussions in the national media revealed Critical Reconstruction’s
formal affinities with fascist architecture, suspicions grew amongst the general public that both
this theory’s aesthetics and its authors also harbored authoritarian tendencies. The city that
resulted from Critical Reconstruction’s intervention was thus, ultimately, a hyper-capitalist
landscape that harkened back stylistically to the very moment in its violent history that Berlin
desperately wanted to symbolically supersede.
This research goes beyond one-dimensional depictions of Critical Reconstruction as a
unilateral statement about German identity, revealing its status as a set of planning tactics
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situated within a network of conflicting institutional and political formations. As such, it also
addresses two fundamental problems faced by architects and planners in the global age: how to
productively contend with the forces of capital while advocating for sustainable local growth,
and how to make buildings into legible signifiers of politically acceptable narratives about a
nation’s history and identity without risking public and professional misinterpretation. The case
of Critical Reconstruction, I demonstrate, illustrates just how difficult such a contradictory set of
tasks can be; indeed, the means of architecture and urban planning may be wholly inadequate for
such a monumental undertaking.
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INTRODUCTION
Critical Reconstruction: A Progressive Theory Turned Conservative

It is rare to find a text on Berlin’s post-Wall reconstruction that does not reference the
famous statement by the early Modernist art historian Karl Scheffler: “Berlin is doomed always
to become, and never actually to be.” It is a line from his book Berlin: Ein Stadtschicksal
(Berlin: The Fate of a City), published in 1910, wherein Scheffler portrayed Germany’s capital
city as a fundamentally unique and modern space, as opposed to other, older European capitals,
which were more “harmoniously developed organisms of history.” Berlin, he wrote, arose
“artificially, under all kinds of difficulties, and had to adapt to unfavorable circumstances.”1 To
be sure, Berlin’s urban history in the nineteenth century was a story of tumultuous growth and
difficult adjustment, but Scheffler’s statement is infinitely more fitting for the century that
followed. He could not have known, in 1910, how prescient his words would be: multiple waves
of social, political, and physical destruction characterized Berlin as a space of both utopian
possibility and tragic failure from World War I until the fall of the Wall in 1989. The dramatic
end of the Cold War, and with it, forty years of division for the city and the nation, presented yet
another opportunity for Berlin to “become” something, and the stakes of this transformation were
high. Not only did the city desperately need to recraft its image in order to attract global
businesses and residents who could shore up its weak economy, but, as the nation’s new capital,
its reconstruction was also one of the most important ways that reunified Germany made a public
display of its relationship to its violent past.

1

Karl Scheffler, Berlin, ein Stadtschicksal (E. Reiss, 1910), 267.
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The urban planning philosophy of Critical Reconstruction was one of the most visible
forces at work in Berlin’s new landscape following the country’s reunification in 1990.
Developed by the architect Josef Paul Kleihues beginning in the 1970s and deployed in the postWall era by one of Berlin’s most powerful city planners, Hans Stimmann, Critical
Reconstruction encouraged a return to “traditional” architectural styles and typologies, and
sought to recreate the pedestrian-centered urban street life of the early twentieth-century
European metropolis through the restoration of the inner city’s original baroque-era street plan.
By integrating historical forms into the city’s refashioned commercial center, Stimmann and
other planners in Berlin hoped to show the world that the nation – in spite of, or perhaps even
because of, its particular history – had a unique character and was worthy of its own prominent
place in the new global order. However, because of Critical Reconstruction’s strict insistence on
historical styles, as well as the often ill-considered statements of its proponents, it was seen by
many observers as a reactionary attempt to whitewash Berlin’s traumatic history by rehabilitating
Nazi aesthetics and by selectively excluding important contemporary architectural movements
such as Deconstructivism. Furthermore, planners’ attempts to “remedy” mid-century planning
meant that many East German buildings in the city center, constructed in the 1960s and 1970s,
became the targets of demolition, making it look as if the Critical Reconstructionists were also
purposely erasing significant touchstones for the “collective urban memory” of East Berlin
residents. By analyzing the discourse of Critical Reconstruction from its roots in the 1970s to its
final form in Berlin’s Planwerk Innenstadt (“Inner City Plan”) of 1999, this study demonstrates
that this “conservative” turn in Berlin city planning practice was in actuality driven by socially
progressive planners who hoped to shape a new, more unified democratic society in the formerly
divided city, using the regulation of built form as their tool. Their ultimate failure to achieve
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these ends casts doubt on one of the most central post-Enlightenment claims about architecture:
that buildings and other urban configurations can send clear messages that will directly influence
people and politics for the better.

Literature Review
A number of studies have alluded to the signifying practices at work in the architecture of
the new Berlin, but they have refrained from tackling the thorny question of adequately defining
Critical Reconstruction’s role in the city’s rebuilding. Historian Brian Ladd’s Ghosts of Berlin:
Confronting German History in the Urban Landscape (1997) and journalist Michael Z. Wise’s
Capital Dilemma: Germany’s Search for a New Architecture of Democracy (1998), both written
with popular audiences in mind, were some of the first to introduce the topic to a general
English-speaking audience, and Ladd’s book in particular has become a classic.2 Both examine
the extent to which the scars of history are still visible in Berlin’s urban landscape and look at
how Germany’s identity as a democratic nation was expressed in new buildings and memorials
after 1990.3 Written for a popular audience, however, both works are somewhat general in their
treatment of the city’s recent history, of which Critical Reconstruction is only one facet. Thus
Ladd and Wise do not even satisfactorily define Critical Reconstruction as a theory, much less
2

Brian Ladd, The Ghosts of Berlin: Confronting German History in the Urban Landscape (Chicago, Ill.: University of
Chicago Press, 1998); Michael Z Wise, Capital Dilemma: Germany’s Search for a New Architecture of Democracy (New York:
Princeton Architectural Press, 1998).
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There is quite a substantial body of literature on the general urban, political, and social development of Berlin.
Alexandra Richie’s Faust’s Metropolis is rightfully a classic (Alexandra Richie, Faust’s Metropolis: A History of Berlin (New
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Uwe Rada, Hauptstadt der Verdrängung: Berliner Zukunft zwischen Kiez und Metropole (Berlin: Schwarze Risse, 1997).
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unpack the problematic ways in which it was applied to the built environment; rather, they
provide a point of departure for the research questions that I confront in this dissertation.
My analysis of Critical Reconstruction builds on the groundbreaking work of a handful of
scholars across various disciplines. Political scientist Elizabeth Strom’s Building the New Berlin:
The Politics of Urban Development in Germany’s Capital City (2001) is an invaluable resource
for understanding the city’s complex political and administrative structures – and the challenges
their leaders faced – in the immediate post-Wall era.4 Renaissance der Mitte: Zentrumsumbau in
London und Berlin (2005) by architectural historians Harald Bodenschatz and Uwe Altrock is an
encyclopedic account of new construction in Berlin since the fall of the Wall, which provided a
foundation for many of the case studies that I discuss.5 Architectural historian Florian
Hertweck’s Der Berliner Architekturstreit: Architektur, Stadtbau, Geschichte und Identität in der
Berliner Republik 1989-1999 (2010) supplies a thoughtful set of close textual readings of the socalled “Berlin Architecture Debates,” a series of critical exchanges which were very influential
on Critical Reconstruction’s reception in the mid-1990s.6 Berlin Alexanderplatz: Transforming
Place in a Unified Germany (2010), by anthropologist Gisa Weszkalnys, allows a first-hand
view of the ways in which everyday residents were marginalized in the planning process at that
particular site, and urban historian Stefanie Hennecke’s Die Kritische Rekonstruktion als

4
Elizabeth A Strom, Building the New Berlin: The Politics of Urban Development in Germany’s Capital City
(Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2001).
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Harald Bodenschatz and Uwe Altrock, Renaissance der Mitte: Zentrumsumbau in London und Berlin (Berlin:
Verlagshaus Braun, 2005).
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Florian Hertweck, Der Berliner Architekturstreit: Architektur, Stadtbau, Geschichte und Identität in der Berliner
Republik 1989-1999 (Berlin: Gebr. Mann, 2010).
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Leitbild: Stadtentwicklungspolitik in Berlin zwischen 1991 und 1999 (2010) offers a thorough
documentation of the creation and approval of the Planwerk Innenstadt.7
Two other architectural history studies parallel mine most closely: Karin Lenhart’s
Berliner Metropoly: Stadtentwicklungspolitik Im Berliner Bezirk Mitte Nach Der Wende (2001)
investigates post-Wall city planning in central Berlin in general, and Christina Brichetti’s Die
Paradoxie des postmodernen Historismus: Stadtumbau und städtebauliche Denkmalpflege vom
19. bis zum 21. Jahrhundert am Beispiel von Berlin und Beirut (2009) contextualizes Berlin’s
reconstruction within larger, international discussions and debates about post-modern
historicism.8 Post-Wall Berlin: Borders, Space and Identity (2011) by historian Janet Ward, is a
wider-ranging and more sociological take on post-Wall Berlin and has influenced my thinking
about the city’s global status, as well as its relationship to ideas in the fields of sociology and
geography.9 Despite this relatively large body of literature on Berlin’s reconstruction, however,
none of these authors has looked at Critical Reconstruction’s full historical arc, charting its many
changes and its deployment over time, nor do they successfully relate it to the larger questions of
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German history and identity. My dissertation thus remedies a key missing link among the various
existing works on Berlin’s post-1990 rebuilding.

Research Questions and Methodology
This work offers an account of Critical Reconstruction’s development amidst the shifting
social and political landscape of reunified Berlin and Germany.10 Beginning with an
investigation of Critical Reconstruction’s creation by Josef Paul Kleihues in the 1970s, I track its
transformations under the city planner Hans Stimmann in the early 1990s, as well as the various
public discussions and debates that figured in its reception, and I conclude by exploring its final
flowering in Stimmann’s comprehensive Planwerk Innenstadt (“Inner City Plan”) of 1999. My
study pairs a discourse analysis of primary texts of Critical Reconstruction and its reception,
gathered from architecture journals, government publications, newspapers, and collections of
essays by architects, planners, and critics, with stylistic and formal explications of the key
architectural sites, competitions, plans, images, and construction projects to which this approach
was applied. Images and buildings offer both illustrations of and, at times, telling counterpoints
to, the statements of Critical Reconstruction’s proponents.11
Critical Reconstruction’s preservation and rehabilitation of Nazi buildings, the demolition
of mid-century East German structures, and its use of “traditional” aesthetics to construct highend commercial and residential infrastructure explicitly for bourgeois users, appeared to many as
10

There is a huge literature on German identity and its relationship to history. One of the best-known works in English
is Charles S. Maier, The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1988). Other useful accounts are offered in the following works: Stuart Taberner and Frank Finlay, Recasting
German Identity: Culture, Politics, and Literature in the Berlin Republic (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2002); Mary
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a reactionary take on this new national identity. However, Critical Reconstruction itself was not
an essentially conservative theory. Both Kleihues and Stimmann inhabited positions on the
political and intellectual Left. More specifically, then, my research presents a detailed
explanation of how Critical Reconstruction came to be read as a definitively conservative
approach, despite these progressive origins.
Defining “Identity”
The term “identity” appears throughout this dissertation, and thus it is important to define
my use of the term at the outset. During the late 1980s and 1990s, academic discourse blossomed
in multiple ways around the notion of “identity.” This growth included important conversations
about aspects of personal identity such as gender, ethnicity, and sexual orientation, and their
relationship to larger societal norms and issues; it also encompassed questions of nationalism and
cultural hegemony. Sociologist Anthony Smith and political historian Benedict Anderson, to
name two of the most notable scholars, contributed specific theorizations of how people come to
identify with the construct of a “nation.”12 Alongside these conversations, work was also being
done by philosophers and literary and cultural scholars, many from France, on the ways that
signs and symbols relate to our lived social realities (including our relationship to nations or
nationalities): thinkers like Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault, Jean-François Lyotard, Fredric
Jameson, and Jacques Derrida.13 At this time there was also a growing interest in the relationship
between what was termed “collective memory” and national or community identities, spurred
partly by the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II and the “commemorative fever” that
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See Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991); Benedict Anderson, Imagined
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surrounded it.14 Many looked back to the work of Maurice Halbwachs, whose seminal Le
mémoire collective (1950) had introduced the term into academic discourse; in the realm of
architecture studies, Pierre Nora’s Les lieux de mémoire (1984) also became an important
touchstone for thinking about how space and place related to memory and national identity.15
In reunited Germany after 1989, these many facets of “identity” intersected in a highly
public set of conversations and debates – appearing everywhere from the federal parliament floor
to tabloid newspapers – over questions of what the country’s official history and dominant
cultural outlook should entail. How should the Nazi and East German pasts be remembered,
memorialized, talked about, and theorized? How did this issue relate to Germany’s future as part
of the larger EU and the global West? How should “Germanness” be defined – was it ethnic,
religious, linguistic, cultural, legal, or a combination of some or all of these? These tricky issues
resurface continually throughout the dissertation. Thus, when I invoke the term “identity,” I am
referring to public perceptions about what it meant to be German and to official accounts or
attempts to mold that perception. This perceived identity was often simultaneously cultural,
social, and political, including morals and values, tastes, party affiliations, ethnicity, religion, and
economic class.16
Other Theoretical Frameworks
Critical Reconstruction’s trajectory, as a theory and as a set of built results, must be
understood in the larger context of other discursive realms: the above-mentioned discussions

14
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about German history and identity; marketing efforts to shore up Berlin’s status as a global
metropolis; debates over the relationship of architectural aesthetics to particular political
regimes; and the global theorization of post-modern architecture as an answer to Modernism’s
failed projects. I address these various issues throughout, arguing that, for the most part, Critical
Reconstruction’s proponents failed to successfully negotiate questions of how Berlin’s past
should relate to its present and future. In addition, my analysis of Critical Reconstruction’s
various texts, images, and themes is underpinned at key moments by concepts drawn from
cultural studies and geography. I rely particularly on the work of the geographer David Harvey,
who offers a theorization of public-private partnership in late-twentieth-century city-building, as
well as his work on mapping as a tool of colonialism. These and other ideas from the
transdisciplinary field of post-colonial studies, especially those of Edward Said, also help to
explain how the application of Critical Reconstruction to East Berlin can be read as a colonial
move on the part of Stimmann and others. In tandem with this analysis, I refer to work on the
concept and mechanisms of gentrification by Neil Smith and Sharon Zukin. But while these
theoretical ideas are illuminating, my dissertation is definitively not a reading of Critical
Reconstruction through the lens of Critical Theory, urban theory, or post-colonial studies.
Rather, these concepts are deployed as theoretical models that help to explain my findings, which
are based directly on a close analysis of the discourse and built results of Critical Reconstruction
itself. In other words, the examples of architecture and urban planning that I discuss are not
selected on the basis of their ability to illustrate or conform to a particular critical framework; on
the contrary, Harvey and others provide a useful set of terms and concepts for discussing and
analyzing what actually took place in Berlin under Critical Reconstruction.
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Outline of the Dissertation
Chapter 1, “Josef Paul Kleihues and the Genesis of the Theory of Critical
Reconstruction,” elucidates the fundamentally progressive roots of this method, which was
created and applied by Kleihues during the state-sponsored International Building Exhibition in
West Berlin between 1978 and 1987. Kleihues’s work was responding to the post-modern turn in
professional trans-Atlantic architectural discourse, especially the work of architects such as Aldo
Rossi, who encouraged a return to the dense urban forms of the pre-modern European cityscape,
but in a highly personal and formally reductive manner. Kleihues was also attempting to remedy
the lack of an existing architectural “school” in Germany in the post-war era. His ambitious aim
was to create a strand of post-modernist architectural style and theory that would be appropriate
to the socio-political climate of West Germany, where architects and other intellectuals were
wary of both North American populism and European neo-historicism. As part of the so-called
“skeptical generation” of West Germans who came of age during the 1950s, Kleihues was highly
suspicious of direct statements or overt ideologies.
The specifics of Kleihues’s aesthetics drew heavily on Germany’s classical tradition –
specifically, the work of Karl Friedrich Schinkel and the early Modernists – as well as traditional
nineteenth-century Berlin forms such as the six-story apartment block with an inner courtyard.
However, this return to “traditional” forms in Kleihues’s work risked problematic associations
with Nazi architecture. In order to sidestep this affiliation, he incorporated two other key factors
into his design theory: the use of new materials and technologies that had been eschewed by the
Nazi regime; and the highly personal “poetry” of the individual architect, which injected a strand
of the irrational or romantic into his work and unseated any suspicions that he was resorting to
dogma.

10

In contrast to Stimmann’s application of the theory in the post-Wall period, during the
International Building Exhibition, in particular, this early version of Critical Reconstruction
promoted dialogue, disagreement, and diversity amongst architects. By attracting international
designers and allowing them to publicly debate urban issues, Kleihues aimed to reestablish a
welcoming and open architectural culture for West Germany that displayed its firm emplacement
within the larger, democratic West. Though it was not regarded as the most experimental of
architectural styles, both the West German and the larger Western architectural community
lauded Critical Reconstruction in the 1980s as a forward-thinking way to restore a traditional
European city.
Chapter 2, “International Investment and Berlin Planning in the Immediate Post-Wende
Era,” looks at the failures of two of Berlin’s first big post-Wall projects, which provided the
impetus for the adoption of Critical Reconstruction as a city planning method: the retail and
entertainment center at Potsdamer Platz, and the Friedrichstadt Passagen shopping mall. I situate
these examples within a discussion of the fraught conditions of post-1989 planning in Berlin,
where intense pressure from investors – combined with bureaucratic incompetence, archaic and
divided institutions, and a dizzying array of conflicting property claims – created an
overwhelming situation for city planners. The first projects undertaken with investors in this new
climate resulted in both professional rifts and sadly mediocre designs. Though Potsdamer Platz
and the Friedrichstadt Passagen garnered worldwide attention and are still tourist attractions
today, these projects were seen by planners and architects in Berlin as distinct failures because of
their showy aesthetics and overt links to corporations. This difficult political and administrative
situation led Hans Stimmann, who took office as the city’s Senate Construction Director in April
of 1991 (well after the deals on Potsdamer Platz and the Friedrichstadt Passagen had been made),
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to adopt Critical Reconstruction as his guiding method for planning, despite the fact that he had
formerly been a vehement critic of Kleihues.
Chapter 3, “Critical Reconstruction’s Transformation under Hans Stimmann,” examines
this theory’s discursive transformation and deployment by Hans Stimmann, as head city planner,
between 1991 and 1995. A left-leaning social democrat, Stimmann was dedicated to the idea that
city planning could promote the resurgence of small-scale, middle-class property ownership and
thus give rise to a community of engaged citizens. Though he had previously criticized what he
called Kleihues’s “aesthetic” approach to city planning, Stimmann nevertheless adopted Critical
Reconstruction’s guidelines. Doing so allowed him to regulate buildings’ formal attributes, like
heights, massing, façades, and materials, providing at least a superficial mechanism of control
over eager multinational investors who seemed to want to turn Berlin into the next Las Vegas.
The result was a restrictive and rigid version of Critical Reconstruction that allowed for little of
the open dialogue or stylistic diversity that had occurred under Kleihues in the 1980s.
Unfortunately, because of the limits of his own political and administrative power, Stimmann
was not able to curb large-scale investment, and corporations, rather than middle-class
individuals, quickly became the main property owners in central Berlin. This phenomenon is
exemplified by three large-scale developments in the city center: the Hofgarten am
Gendarmenmarkt and the Kontorhaus Mitte, both overseen by Kleihues, and the Quartier
Schützenstrasse, designed by Aldo Rossi. These designs demonstrate why Critical
Reconstruction quickly garnered a reputation as a tool of capitalist development that was
dangerously reductive in its aesthetics and looked to shut out more experimental approaches to
architecture, especially Deconstructivism.
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Chapter 4, “Critical Reconstruction and the Berlin Architecture Debates,” examines how
the growing negative public perception of Stimmann’s method was also strongly influenced by
discussions in the press. Vittorio Magnago Lampugnani, then director of the German
Architecture Museum in Frankfurt, began the so-called “Architecture Debates” by publishing an
architectural manifesto in the popular national magazine Der Spiegel.17 He called for a “New
Simplicity” (Neue Einfachheit) in architectural design that would reference German history and
even allow Nazi buildings to be appreciated for their calm, rational forms. Though it did not
mention Critical Reconstruction directly, Lampugnani’s declaration was nevertheless interpreted
by many as a direct statement of Stimmann’s goals, and figures such as the Deconstructivist
architect Daniel Libeskind responded with outspoken criticisms of both the New Simplicity and
Berlin’s city planning politics in general. Lampagnuni’s statements were defended by, among
others, the prominent Berlin architect Hans Kollhoff, who was at the time in the midst of two
construction projects that underscored critics’ reading of Critical Reconstruction as highly
conservative: the master plan for Alexanderplatz, for which Kollhoff had just recently beat out
Libeskind in a competition, and the renovation of the Nazi Reichsbank building as the new home
of the German Foreign Ministry. Despite their attempts to justify their return to “traditional”
aesthetics by referencing early Modernist architecture, none of the New Simplicity’s or Critical
Reconstruction’s supporters were able to successfully rebuff the accusation that they looked to
“normalize” or even revive fascist aesthetics, rather than contextualizing or problematizing them.
Yet another dissenting voice in the Architecture Debates was supplied by the critic and
urban theorist Dieter Hoffmann-Axthelm, one of Stimmann’s main collaborators and the
originator of the idea that Critical Reconstruction could enable a return to small-scale property
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ownership. He vehemently opposed Lampugnani and Kollhoff, accusing them of plagiarizing his
own ideas, and, despite the fact that he regularly worked for Stimmann as a contractor, he also
charged Stimmann and Kleihues with leading and architectural “cartel” that was single-handedly
reshaping the city. Thus, this chapter demonstrates not only how critical and theoretical positions
can be subject to misrepresentation and misinterpretation; it also shows how an exchange
between professionals, when undertaken on such a public stage, as the Architecture Debates
were, could fuel the larger negative perception of something like Stimmann’s Critical
Reconstruction. In the public’s eye, Critical Reconstruction came across in these exchanges as
aesthetically conservative, backward-looking, authoritarian, and pro-big business, despite the
fact that is was deployed by a politician who had long been part of the political left and a vocal
critic of capitalist development.
Chapter 5, “Gentrifying the GDR,” looks at the relationship of Critical Reconstruction to
greater East Berlin, which became Stimmann’s focus after 1996. Although it looked very similar
to parts of West Berlin, Stimmann and others routinely relied on a rhetoric of “emptiness” to
describe the landscape of the former East. In this chapter I argue that by proposing infill and
small-scale land ownership as remedies for what were portrayed as spatial, political, and social
“voids,” Stimmann’s plans became tantamount to a colonial move that purported to “educate”
the supposedly helpless residents of the former East about democratic self-governance. In this
context, I examine Kleihues’s renovation of the famous Centrum department store on
Alexanderplatz, which entailed the removal of its memorable aluminum honeycomb façade, as
well as various demolitions of GDR buildings undertaken in tandem with Stimmann’s Planwerk
Innenstadt, or “Inner City Plan,” adopted into law in 1999. This chapter concludes by
demonstrating that, as in his earlier projects in the city center, Stimmann’s policies were unable
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to achieve the small-scale investment that he wanted, and instead resulted in the corporate-driven
displacement of grassroots communities and businesses. Critical Reconstruction failed to achieve
its aims of supporting small democratic communities in greater East Berlin, and it also erased
important touchstones of East Berliners’ “collective urban memory” and marginalized residents’
voices in the process. Given Stimmann’s earlier commitment to participatory planning methods
in the 1970s and 1980s, it is apparent that, over the course of his work as Critical
Reconstruction’s main proponent, he became more and more attached to the idea that only an
elite group could or should be responsible for such decisions. In essence, he became a
conservative in practice, even if his larger aims seemed, to him, to remain progressive. Critical
Reconstruction in its reduced and rigidified form became the cornerstone of this effectively
conservative approach.

Conclusion
In his 1997 essay “The Voids of Berlin,” first published in the journal Critical Inquiry,
cultural critic Andreas Huyssen observed that
once all this construction is completed, the hope is that Berlin will take its rightful
place as a European capital next to its more glamorous competitors. But will it?
… The fact that the city is caught between the pressures of this new urban imagepolitics and the more general crisis of architectural developments in these last
years of our century makes any such hope appear simply misplaced, if not
deluded. Indeed, Berlin may be the place to study how this new emphasis on the
city as cultural sign, combined with its role as capital and the pressures of largescale developments, prevents creative alternatives and thus represents a false start
into the twenty-first century. Berlin may be well on the way to squandering a
unique chance.18
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Indeed, rather than a global exemplar for the future of architecture, Critical Reconstruction in
Berlin became, I argue, a lesson in how to alienate both local constituents and professional
colleagues while favoring and benefitting only two groups: global real estate interests and a
limited cadre of architects. As such, it reflected poorly not only on the development of German
identity vis-à-vis the nation’s troubled history, but also on the status of the profession as a whole.
Critical Reconstruction’s historical trajectory, I demonstrate, reveals a city grappling with
architecture’s power, promises, and limits in the post-modern age. Since the Enlightenment,
Western architects and theorists have sought various ways of influencing social and political
realities through urban design. This effort reached a climax during the Modernist era after World
War II, which saw the rise of pre-fabricated, car-friendly communities on a massive scale.
Although the “post-modern turn” in the architecture of the 1970s meant a return to traditional
urban aesthetics – a preference for pedestrian-friendly, mixed-use communities and historical
styles – these aesthetic shifts masked a continued insistence on architecture’s ability to directly
influence human relationships. Critical Reconstruction is one example of this tendency in postmodernist design, and its story demonstrates many of the problems with overarching
architectural theories that champion the power of built forms to shape society.
Viewed in this context, the case of Critical Reconstruction also points to two larger conclusions
about this kind of “building in public”: first, that certain strands of post-modern architecture
theory still, in many ways, embodied the Modernist project in terms of its hopes to represent and
construct a new and better world; and, second, like Modernism itself, they ultimately failed at
this project. Instead of promoting productive dialogue that acknowledged Berlin’s central role in
the symbolization of German national identity, or creating an urban landscape that adequately
answered the needs existing residents while attracting new ones, this approach became a tool of a
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small, paternalistic elite who ultimately caved to corporate interests, while still believing that
they were doing the opposite. By offering a foundational investigation of Critical
Reconstruction’s complex history as both a theoretical approach and as a collection of built
results, my research looks past blanket accusations that would paint this method simply as a
dictatorial and conservative attempt to wield power over city planning politics or to favor
capitalist interests. Rather, I argue, it must be seen as the outcome of a network of interactions
between city planning policies, development pressures, and professional architectural discourse
that affect not just Berlin, but also countless other cities in the global age.

17

CHAPTER 1
Josef Paul Kleihues and the Genesis of the Theory of Critical Reconstruction

Critical Reconstruction was adopted by city officials as the guiding concept for the
rebuilding of Berlin in 1991. However, its application to reunified Berlin differed significantly
from its original formulation, in the work and writings of the West Berlin architect Josef Paul
Kleihues in the sixties, seventies, and eighties. This chapter discusses the genesis of the idea of
Critical Reconstruction in Kleihues’s work during the Cold War period, examining how he
authored it as a response to both disciplinary and larger socio-political questions. His own
designs and writings, as well as the exhibitions and conferences that he organized in the 1970s,
culminating in West Berlin’s ambitious International Building Exhibition (1978-1987), all
addressed issues central to the practice of architecture in West Germany at the time: namely, how
to deal with the legacies of both Modernist planning and the nineteenth-century urban fabric, and
how this engagement with the past related to the emerging post-war identity of the nation. If
historical forms were to be preserved and revived, then which ones were worthy of such
treatment? Were there buildings or styles that were still too tainted by the legacy of Nazism, and
if so, how should they be handled?
Kleihues’s ideas sat firmly within the landscape of Western European thought on
urbanism and architecture from the 1960s on, constituting what might be called a German neorationalism that sought to differentiate itself from both the populist and historicist strains of
trans-Atlantic post-modern architecture. Architectural references to the pre-Modernist past were
considered taboo in West Germany during the fifties and sixties, when historicism tended to be
equated with fascism; by the early 1970s, historicism was also seen as symbolic of a dangerous
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and intellectually heedless decadence that was all too easily coopted by capitalism. On the other
hand, the vehement critique of International Style Modernism within the architectural
community required that young architects take a stand with regards to it as well. Kleihues
attempted to cut a path between these various stylistic approaches. At first, on the level of
individual buildings, he attempted to reconcile historicism and Modernism with an approach that
he called Poetic Rationalism, which combined a highly structured aesthetic and industrial
materials with traditional urban typologies and an openness to what he called “poetry” – an
acknowledgement of the inherent and necessary subjectivity of the architect. Later, as head of the
International Building Exhibition, Kleihues further developed these precepts into the urban
theory of Critical Reconstruction, which rested on the idea that the “historical” (i.e. nineteenthcentury) ground plan of the city should be adopted as the basic framework for a complementary
and contrasting set of architectural designs that, in a manner similar to Poetic Rationalism, took
tradition and context into account, but utilized contemporary materials and methods in
sometimes playful or experimental ways.
Kleihues’s approach was perfectly suited to this mid-twentieth-century moment in his
professional, political, and social context in West Germany. He managed to create an
architectural theory that was historically oriented, but remained comfortably distanced from
direct statements about German history, which would have been too controversial and explosive
at the time. Furthermore, rather than propounding his theories as the only possible solution,
Kleihues promoted dialogue within the architectural community about the relationship between
design and history, and he supported a diversity of approaches to architecture that often diverged
from his own. Because he believed that architects should be sensitive to historical and
geographical context, rigorous and purposeful in their response to the requirements for a design,
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and yet add something formally “poetic” to it as well, Kleiheus managed to offer solutions that
could be simultaneously read as regionalist and global, personal and general, exacting and
accepting, potentially value-laden and yet, when needed, comfortably apolitical. Most
importantly for this study, he saw himself as reestablishing an architectural tradition within West
Germany that drew on the best moments of its history: the Enlightenment and the Weimar years
(1919-1933) – times, in other words, before the violence and destruction wrought by the Nazis.

A Brief History of Berlin City Planning and Architectural Traditions
As political scientist Elizabeth Strom notes, there is no true “zero hour” in Berlin
planning history.1 Since its earliest beginnings, the city’s landscape has been in continual flux.
The original kernel of the city comprised two medieval fishing villages, Cölln and Alt-Berlin. It
became the capital of the surrounding territory of Brandenburg when the Hohenzollern family
was appointed to rule by the Holy Roman Emperor in the fifteenth century, and it grew into a
garrison town in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as successive rulers conquered and
acquired more lands, notably the kingdom of Prussia, which stretched into present-day Poland.2
In Prussia’s capital city of Berlin, successive city walls were built and then exceeded, often
before they were completed, and a massive Baroque palace was constructed at the eastern end of
what became the city’s via triumphalis, the avenue of Unter den Linden.3 Especially important
1
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for Critical Reconstruction was the gridded street layout introduced in the city center in the late
seventeenth century as part of a plan to house Prussia’s rapidly growing army. This new method
of urban organization presented an ordered contrast to the winding streets and jagged walls of the
medieval town (fig. 1.1), and this “original” traffic plan is often referred to by Kleihues and other
twentieth-century city planners as the “baroque street plan” of the central inner city.4
Enlightenment and Industrial Berlin
Following the occupation of the city by Napoleon’s army in the early nineteenth century,
the Hohenzollern ruler Friedrich Wilhelm III commissioned the architect Karl Friedrich Schinkel
with a number of projects that effectively reimagined the central area surrounding Berlin’s royal
palace as an urban expression of particular political and philosophical ideals. Though the ruler
himself was somewhat conservative, even repressive, Schinkel’s public architecture emphasized
the liberal, reformist ideals of figures like his contemporary Wilhelm von Humboldt, who
believed in a society of free, educated individuals. Most famously, Schinkel created a royal art
museum (now called the Altes [“Old”] Museum because several more such structures have
subsequently been added to the area) that was open to the public: a true innovation and a radical
statement concerning the role of public aesthetic education at the time. With its impressively
long, horizontal façade of fluted columns and its seemingly endless iconographic allusions to
various classical figures and narratives in the decoration, Schinkel’s museum constituted a
radical reinvention of the language of classicism, drawing on influences from French
Enlightenment architects and putting these in conversation with the most current philosophical
and aesthetic movements in Prussia (fig. 1.2).5 The museum was part of a larger urban ensemble
4
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around the palace’s pleasure garden (the Lustgarten) that included a new cathedral (demolished
and replaced in the late nineteenth century), a guardhouse, a church, a theater, and the famous
Bauakademie (fig. 1.3). Together, these structures symbolized the importance of the education
and involvement of the individual in the making of society, and they are still often invoked today
as a touchstone – if not a blueprint – for the planning of the city center.
However, Schinkel’s sleepy, low-rise Berlin was very soon subsumed by a burgeoning
industrial metropolis. With a population of 150,000 in 1800, the city’s growing railroad and
manufacturing businesses soon drew factory workers from the neighboring countryside, and by
the 1870s, when it became the capital of Bismarck’s German Empire, it had grown to house over
a million people, with many surrounding suburbs. Thus the original royal capital found itself at
the booming center, or Mitte (the name given this district in 1920), of a gigantic urban
agglomeration.6 Unlike those in other cities, such as Paris, where such growth was aesthetically –
and often ruthlessly – controlled, officials in Berlin never sufficiently wielded their power over
the nineteenth-century city.7 Minimal zoning in the form of Fluchtlinien (building alignments,
including height limits) allowed property owners to build almost anything they wished, with
limited safety restrictions, and as a result, high-density buildings quickly arose as close to one
another as possible, with up to 90% site coverage.8 To appeal to residents and maximize rent,
developers tended to adopt the popular Parisian building type that arose from Baron von
Haussmann’s replanning measures, with commercial space on the ground floor and elaborate
stucco decoration. Typically the best, most spacious and expensive apartments were located in
6
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the front, and behind these were successive “Hinterhöfe” (“back courtyards”), populated by the
working class (figs. 1.4-1.5) The use of coal stoves for cooking and heating meant that the
interiors of these courtyards quickly turned black with soot, and the stifling, overcrowded rear
apartments received little light or ventilation. These spaces soon became associated with a
declining birth rate, repugnant social mores, and epidemics like tuberculosis. They were so
notorious for their bad conditions that they earned the name “Mietskaserne” (“rental barracks”) –
a name still used for them today, though they are now considered Berlin’s most desirable
dwellings.9
Berlin and Weimar Modernism
The city’s population continued to grow through World War I and the following era of
the Weimar Republic (1919-1933), reaching a high point of four million after the annexation of
the city’s surrounding suburban districts in 1920.10 At the same time, Germany saw the birth of a
range of new approaches to architecture and planning.11 One of the most influential of these
movements was Neue Sachlichkeit (“New Objectivity”), expressed specifically in the profession
of architecture by the term “Neues Bauen” or “New Building.” “New” with a capital “N”
signified the jettisoning of all the trappings of the decorative, aesthetically decadent nineteenth
century: a new focus on simplicity, practicality, usefulness, and efficiency. The members of
Germany’s preeminent Modernist design school, the Bauhaus, are undoubtedly the best-known
proponents of the Neues Bauen. Though it began in 1919 as a handicraft-oriented school, by
1925, its leader, Walter Gropius, had turned the school from a medieval guild model toward a
9
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model of cooperation with industry and the use of modern, mass-produced, industrial materials.
These design tactics were seen not just as a means to improve the life of modern human beings,
but also – at least in part – to educate and mold them into modern subjects, good citizens, and
efficient workers.
In already densely-built Berlin, these Modernist precepts were expressed mainly through
slum-clearance measures, especially in the old medieval city surrounding the royal palace (figs.
1.6-1.7), rather than extensive new construction. However, the Weimar government’s
expropriation of lands formerly held by nobility did allow for the construction of a handful of
notable Modernist housing projects on the edges of the city.12 These included the iconic
Grosssiedlung Britz (1925-1933), also known as the Hufeisensiedlung because of its horseshoe
(“Hufeisen”) shape. Designed by Bruno Taut, it combined the modern approach of Neues Bauen
with “traditional” elements, including serious consideration of the existing features of the
landscape such as ponds and streams, the inclusion of private garden space for each dwelling,
and brightly-colored façades. In 1929, the Siemens corporation also began construction on a
housing project called Siemensstadt in northwestern Berlin, involving, among several other
designers, Gropius himself. Some of Berlin’s 1920s commercial architecture also reflected the
Modernist turn, notably in Erich Mendelssohn’s glass and steel Columbushaus on Potsdamer
Platz (fig. 1.8, later destroyed by a fire), and the stone-clad Modernist buildings of Max Taut
(figs. 1.9-1.10). As will become clear in Chapter 4, these Modernist precedents supplied the
fodder for various arguments made by both Critical Reconstruction’s proponents and its critics in
the debates over Berlin’s post-Wall reconstruction. However, in the early 1930s, these
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developments were overshadowed as the Nazi party took power, followed by wartime
destruction and the country’s division.

Architecture Theory and the Post-Modern Turn in Europe and West Germany
Post-war Global High Modernism and West Germany
As Hitler and Albert Speer began their massively overscaled, neo-classical project of
remaking Berlin into “Germania,” the capital they envisioned for Nazi Germany, architects such
as Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, Walter Gropius (both German émigrés to the United States), and
the Swiss-French Le Corbusier were leading what would become a global movement under the
general heading of “Modernist” architecture. Although their individual approaches differed
considerably, their common traits were codified as the “International Style,” a concept
popularized through a 1932 exhibition and catalog of the same name at the Museum of Modern
Art in New York, authored by Henry-Russell Hitchcock and Philip Johnson. This term came to
denote buildings with simple rectangular volumes, flat roofs, planar surfaces with a lack of any
ornament or decoration, and industrial materials like aluminum for finishes. Equally influential
was the idea, put forward most forcefully by Le Corbusier in his book Towards a New
Architecture (Vers une Architecture, 1923) but echoed by Hitchcock and Johnson, that such an
aesthetic had affinities with the functional aspects of the architecture, and was thus – to some
extent – scientifically and technically justified, as well as universally applicable around the
globe.13 Architectural historian Sigfried Giedion took these ideas one step further and attempted
13
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to prove that this new architecture expressed not simply a new style, but a fundamentally new
relationship between humans and their world: one based on totally new conceptions of space and
time, fueled by the availability of advanced technologies and theories such as Einstein’s
relativity.14
These ideas were promoted and disseminated through the international organization
known as CIAM (Congrès International d’Architecture Moderne), which, under the leadership
of Le Corbusier and Giedion, brought together a diverse group of prominent architects, critics,
and historians from around the world in regular meetings between 1928 and 1959. One of the
most important outcomes of the meetings was a document known as “The Athens Charter,”
formulated at their 1933 session. Based heavily on the ideas of Le Corbusier, the charter
expressed many of the precepts that would come to constitute Modernist city planning practice,
such as the separation of urban functions, the building of residential tower blocks within parklike green spaces, and the addition of large thoroughfares for traffic. All of this, of course, meant
the implied demolition of historical (mostly nineteenth-century) city centers with their densely
packed buildings and mixed zoning. The Athens Charter was presented as an antidote to these
supposedly unhygienic urban environments, which, in the authors’ view, constituted “the very
image of chaos: they do not at all fulfill their purpose, which is to satisfy the primordial
biological and psychological needs of their populations.”15 If buildings were of historical
importance, they might be protected from demolition, but only
if they are the expression of a former culture and if they respond to a universal
interest … and if their preservation does not entail the sacrifice of keeping people
in unhealthy conditions … and if it is possible to remedy their detrimental
14
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presence by means of radical measures, such as detouring vital elements of the
traffic system or even displacing centers hitherto regarded as immutable.16
Modernist architectural and city planning discourse thus essentially saw the existing historical
fabric of cities as obsolete, and promoted an approach to design that relied solely on so-called
“functional” logic, new industrial materials, and abstract geometry.
As will be discussed further in Chapter 4, the Nazi regime never officially settled on a set
of state-sanctioned tenets for design, but it did, for the most part, reject Modernist aesthetics. In
the post-war era, the architecture mostly closely associated with the regime was considered that
of the “Führerbauten” – buildings in Munich and Berlin commissioned by Hitler himself. The
Chancellery, the Haus der Deutschen Kunst, the Air Force Ministry, and the Reichsbank
exemplified a form of stiff classicism that related most closely to the Nordic or Romantic
Classicism of architects like Gunnar Asplund.17 The end of World War II saw the rise of the
United States as the world’s political and economic superpower, and therefore also the new
epicenter of International Style Modernism. As a supposedly universal style without strong
regional connotations, Modernism now became the accepted language of global democracy.
Though Germany had lost almost all of its pre-war Modernist architects to the United States
during the war, in West Germany, the formal language of International Style Modernism was
embraced wholeheartedly in the late 1940s and early fifties as the antidote to Nazi classicism.
High-profile projects like the 1958 German pavilion at the Brussels World’s Fair and Sep Ruf’s
Chancellor’s Bungalow in Bonn helped shore up West Germany’s image as committed to the
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project of democracy and integration with the West.18 Berlin was no exception. As architectural
historian Michael Hesse contends, continuing to “destroy” the former Nazi capital after the war
through Modernist planning measures “was also a kind of symbolic denazification,” since the
International Style stood for “freedom, democracy and the Western way of life.”19 This style had
the added benefit of being easy to differentiate from the Eastern Bloc socialist realism of the
1950s, although, as will be discussed in Chapter 5, by the 1960s “Eastern” and “Western”
Modernism became effectively indistinguishable.
As Hesse notes, post-war building in West Berlin was largely opposed to earlier
traditions, going “against the remains of the baroque grid plans and the nineteenth century
geometrical urban ground plans, against symmetry, axiality and hierarchic order, against clearly
defined urban spaces with street- and square-forming walls, against block development and
traditional building typology.”20 In fact, many planners began to suggest that the only way to
return to Berlin’s true essence was to remove the vestiges of the late-nineteenth-century city,
leaving Schinkel’s Berlin intact but removing the ubiquitous Mietskaserne.21 The “crusade
against the nineteenth-century tenement city” even extended to “purifying” the facades of these
buildings by hacking off their ornamentation. (fig. 1.11) The 1957 Interbau (short for
Internationale Bauausstellung, or International Building Exhibition) (figs. 1.12-1.13), wherein a
section of the bombed-out and formerly dense city center was completely rebuilt, also
exemplified the tenets of Modernist architecture and planning with its large tower blocks
18
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sprinkled throughout a park-like, auto-friendly landscape. This style of construction became the
model for mass housing construction in West Germany: until the 1970s, the state sponsored the
construction of over 500,000 dwellings per year nationwide.22
Given the precepts of the International Style, which offered a convenient prescription for
new construction, there was little impetus to promote a unique, local West German architectural
culture in the immediate post-war era. As architectural theorist Ullrich Schwarz notes, the
increase in globalization and the advanced technical knowledge of architects elsewhere coupled
with a “certain sense of inferiority” that affected West German clients and politicians, leading to
the professional and discursive marginalization of German architects in general.23 It would fall to
the next generation – that of Josef Paul Kleihues – to reinvent the language of West German
architecture in a way that could appropriately and definitively represent their young nation.
The Post-Modern Turn in Europe and Its Influences on Critical Reconstruction
While the International Style was undoubtedly the language of global democracy in the
1950s and 1960s, it was quickly becoming the cipher of global corporate capitalism as well, with
glass-and-steel skyscrapers popping up everywhere from Asia to Latin America. By the late
fifties, a significant generational shift was also occurring: young architects, especially in Europe,
were becoming highly critical of the promises made by Modernist design and theory – not so
much because they disagreed with its basic aims, but because, in their eyes, Modernism had
failed to meet its stated objectives. The most visible examples of this critique were the vehement
clashes at the final two CIAM conferences in Dubrovnik (1956) and Otterlo (1959), between the
22
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older generation of architects, including Le Corbusier and Gropius, and a group of young
architects who called themselves “Team 10.” This group critiqued the Athens Charter as brittle,
technocratic, and insensitive to the actual social needs of users, and their protests ultimately led
to the disbanding of the organization.24 In their manifesto, Team 10 demanded that urban
solutions be based on local context, emphasizing “place and occasion” rather than Giedion’s
universal “space and time.”25 These conflicts, and others, led to the sea change that has been
characterized as the “post-modern turn,” though the term would not become part of common
parlance until the late 1970s.26 As architectural historian Jorge Otero-Pailos observes,
To accomplish this change of direction, they had to replace the piloting concepts
of Modernism, from the abstract ideas of space and form, toward new notions of
history and theory. Out went the conviction that technology drove history, and in
came the sense that architectural history was driven by the search for authentic,
original human experiences. … They conceived contemporary experience in
terms of historical continuity rather than rupture.27
The term “post-modernism,”28 despite its ubiquity, is notoriously hard to define. It is
alternately used to denote an era, a style, a movement, and a “condition” across many disciplines,
including literature, the visual arts, and philosophy, as well as architecture and city planning.29
Even within the discipline of architecture itself, there are many different definitions of the term.
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Charles Jencks, who claims to have been the first to utilize the term to denote a style, defines it
as the use of “multiple or oppositional codes”; Umberto Eco, who was influential on Jencks,
defines it as the “ironic play of real and fake”; others, such as Robert Venturi and Jean-François
Lyotard, describe it as embracing a “plurality of truths.”30 A useful definition for this study is
offered by architectural historian Mary McLeod, who asserts that the unifying characteristic of
post-modernism is its “search for meaning.” “For most,” she states, “this has meant an attempt to
acknowledge architecture’s own history, including the Modern movement, through
transformation and selective quotation of earlier designs in their own work.”31 This
preoccupation with meaning has meant a greater emphasis on context, as well as on the symbolic
qualities of architecture. Urban historian Nan Ellin also writes,
Against the universalism of the Modern movement, these [post-modern] reactions
featured a renewed interest in the specificity of regional and historical styles along
with a respect for the diversity of urban subcultures. … These reactions have also
tended to presuppose many meanings (multivalency) or many “readings,” rather
than only one “truth,” and have sought to express this through the symbolic
dimension of built form.32
As Ellin explains, the European expression of these sentiments differed from the American one,
which tended to focus on individual buildings and vernacular landscapes such as the suburbs.
Instead, “the European critique proceeded directly to formulate another urban vision,” a tendency
which Ellin attributes to “the deeply engrained historical and cultural attachment to cities among
Europeans along with the continued desirability of an investment in central cities, as well as
political economies which – in contrast to the American one – subsidize large-scale plans.”33
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Thus, “European urban designers began turning to the pre-industrial past for inspiration and
legitimation. The closed book on ancient, medieval, renaissance, baroque, and vernacular
townscapes was reopened and closely studied.”34
The search for “meaning” in a general sense, and a return to the historical European
urban landscape in particular, were major driving forces behind Kleihues’s theoretical
formulations.35 His work also has significant affinities with several other, closely interrelated
threads within post-modern architectural thought and design. The first of these is commonly
termed “Critical Modernism” or “Critical Regionalism,” a viewpoint supported by Jencks,
Kenneth Frampton, Alexander Tzonis, Liane Lefaivre, and others who discuss the architecture of
the post-modern movement as constituting a critique or revision, rather than a complete erasure
or rejection, of Modernism, as well as an emphasis on regional styles and contexts.36 This
tendency was already visible in Team 10’s work in the late 1950s: while they remained highly
critical of the failures of the Modern movement to solve society’s ills, they retained much of its
embrace of technology. Similarly, the circle of Italian architects around Ernesto Nathan Rogers
and the journal Casabella-Continuità in post-war Italy were also opposed to strict, CIAM-based
Modernism.37 They promoted an even more formally varied approach to building than Team 10,
one that more explicitly incorporated local forms, materials, and histories, an approach
exemplified in BBPR’s Velasca Tower in Milan (1956-8). (fig. 1.14) This Italian group saw the
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need, in the words of the Italian architect Giancarlo De Carlo, for “pliant and adjustable plans
which must proceed, not from abstract ideological rules, but from a detailed knowledge of
historic realities which vary from country to country,” i.e. they identified the need for a
regionalist approach to design.38
Along with an attention to local historical styles and typologies came an interest in the
phenomenological aspects of architecture. Rogers, especially, emphasized the “experiential”
qualities of the urban environment as being of prime importance. As Otero-Pailos explains,
Rogers understood the city as representing an accumulation of “historical presents”:
the physical environment produced by a culture’s activity over time … contained
all of that culture’s experiences and therefore all of its history. … To be a socially
responsible architect meant creating new forms out of existing traditions, to add
new experiences harmonious with existing ones. … Rogers argued that the only
socially ethical way forward for Modernism was to refound itself in tradition, to
return to its historical roots, as a way to participate in the general advancement of
culture.39
The notion of historical contextualism gained further and more pointed expression in the
so-called “neo-historicism” of, among others, the Luxemburger brothers Rob and Léon Krier.
Unlike Team 10 or the Italian Critical Modernists of the immediate post-war period, the Kriers
attempted to more directly and literally revive the architectural forms of the industrial nineteenth
century and earlier, as well as – problematically – the architecture of the Nazi period.40 Although
their approach was much more ideologically conservative than Kleihues’s, they contributed
significantly to the idea of Critical Reconstruction in the 1970s by promoting the revival of the
urban form of the European perimeter block (fig. 1.15).41
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Finally, a slightly different, but related, strain of Italian design and theory provides the
most visible parallel to, and influence on, Critical Reconstruction: the neo-rationalism of a group
of architects, hailing mainly from Italy, who made their entrée onto the global architectural scene
in 1973 at the Milan Triennale.42 Though sometimes classified as a separate movement from
post-modernism,43 neo-rationalism emerged during the 1960s as an approach that attempted to
identify the roots of architecture in a set of prototypical forms or “typologies” within the
historical urban landscape.44 Aldo Rossi’s monumentally influential Architecture of the City
(1966) is a prime example of these sentiments.45
In this four-chapter treatise, Rossi presented a “theory of urban artifacts” that defines
architecture both synchronically (as “the visible image of the city and the sum of its different
architectures”) and diachronically (“the construction of the city over time”).46 This view allows
him to propose two important theses. First, because a given building’s use will change over time,
it will accrue various meanings that may or may not directly be expressed through its form.
Therefore, he argues, architecture cannot be understood as being simply functional, but must be
seen as serving aesthetic, semiotic, or symbolic purposes as well. Rossi calls this “the critique of
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naïve functionalism.”47 Second, the purposes and significations of structures may indeed
transform with time, but because they exist in a specific place, they have the potential to embody
the traces of this history, or, in Rossi’s sociologically-based terminology, “collective memory”:
In an urban artifact, certain original values and functions remain, others are totally
altered … We contemplate the values that remain – I am also referring to spiritual
values – and try to ascertain whether they have some connection with the
building’s materiality. … At this point, we might discuss what our idea of the
building is, our most general memory of it as a product of the collective, and what
relationship it affords us with this collective. … There are people who do not like
a place because it is associated with some ominous moment in their lives; others
attribute an auspicious character to a place. All these experiences, their sum,
constitute the city.48
The city, for Rossi, is thus “a great, comprehensive representation of the human condition.”49
Based on his understanding of architecture as arising from both functional needs and aesthetic or
symbolic ones, Rossi then develops a theory of the “type,” referring to the work of Quatremère
de Quincy and relying on the logic of structuralist thinkers such as Claude Lévi-Strauss. The
“type,” for Rossi, consists of those elements that cannot be further reduced – structures that
underlie, but do not necessarily dictate the precise physical forms of, architecture.50 Thus, unlike
the CIAM Modernists, Rossi’s solution to the problem of urban design is based in architects’ and
users’ subjective experience rather than in a set of universal rules. As architectural historian
Helmut Geisert observes, a typology in Rossi’s terms should not be understood as something to
be imitated, but as a model: an “imaginative process in which the hidden idea has first to be
decoded so that it can be transformed aesthetically, making it a construction rather than a
47
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reconstruction, and definitely not a copy.”51 Like the critique of functionalism, typology, too,
allows for an understanding of built form as separate from – though possibly linked to – its
practical function. Rossi’s theory therefore allowed for a thoughtful historical rehabilitation of
the city, without precisely dictating its outward appearance.
By incorporating the idea of collective memory into their work, the neo-rationalists
demonstrated an attention to the everyday users of their structures. In trying to speak beyond the
insular avant-garde, however, they also risked cooptation by political or economic systems. This
generation of architects therefore tended to shy away from directly tackling larger social and
political problems, as their predecessors in the Modern movement had done.52 Furthermore, in
Europe, both historicism (especially neo-classicism) and Modernism were seen as tainted styles:
historicism because of its association with fascism, and Modernism because it represented both a
failed set of architectural theories and the rise of global capitalism. Architects in Europe needed
to differentiate themselves clearly from these two stances without running afoul of new
ideologies, especially the rising Marxist sentiments of the student movement in the late 1960s.
Suspicion vis-à-vis the potential assimilation by the market or by political systems was shored up
by the important influence during this period of the critical theorist Theodor Adorno, who had
emigrated to the United States during the war but returned to West Germany in 1949 and later
headed the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research. His theories of the avant-garde gelled
perfectly with the anti-capitalist sentiments of many young Continentals: he emphasized the
importance of art’s (and architecture’s) aesthetic and conceptual autonomy, while simultaneously
recognizing the practical impossibility of such a thing. The result was that architects like Rossi
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adopted an attitude towards both historicism and Modernism that pulled freely from both without
relinquishing a critical stance toward either. The justification for such aesthetic and functional
decisions was a highly personal – even at times mystical – attitude toward the ways in which
architecture was allowed to signify. As McLeod noted, “meaning” in the most general sense
became one of the major goals of post-modern architecture, but the specificity of that meaning
was left consciously in question.53 However, the unwillingness of the neo-rationalists, as well as
Kleihues, to put a finger directly on the nature of that meaning meant that their architecture was
easily coopted by the very political and corporate interests that they abhorred.54
Post-Modernism in West German Architecture and Urbanism
A turning point for West Germany’s post-war architectural culture was the summer
institute at the Technical University of Berlin, headed by the German neo-rationalist Oswald
Matthias Ungers between 1963 and 1968. Ungers’s work in Berlin, as well as his time as head of
the architecture school at Cornell University in the 1970s, promoted a discussion of
contextualism, traditional urbanism, and historicism on both sides of the Atlantic.55 In the words
of architectural historian Vittorio Magnago Lampugnani, this marked the discovery of “tradition”
as having “progressive potential.”56 The founding of the journal Arch+ in 1968 also opened up
the German-language conversation amongst architects about these ideas. Most importantly,
Ungers’s seminar took Rossi’s The Architecture of the City as one of its primary topics and
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helped introduce its ideas into the German-speaking community (the book was not translated into
German until 1973).57
Several other popular books also increased public awareness of the destruction of the
historical city fabric by both the bombs of World War II and Modernist planning. Kevin Lynch’s
The Image of the City (1960), Jane Jacobs’s The Death and Life of Great American Cities (1961),
and Robert Venturi’s Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture (1966) were all widely read
by architects in Germany.58 In the German-speaking milieu, these sentiments were echoed by
Wolf Jobst Siedler and Elisabeth Niggemeyer’s The Murdered City (Die Gemordete Stadt,
1964). This book dialectically paired images of pre-Modern city fragments with ones of
Modernist urban landscapes, as well as essays on the destruction of the historical city.
Psychologist Alexander Mitscherlich’s The Inhospitability of our Cities (Die Unwirtlichkeit
unserer Städte: Anstiftung zum Unfrieden, 1965) added to this conversation, followed by Ulrich
Conrads’s Architecture – Space for Life (Architektur – Spielraum für Leben, 1972), which
directly pleaded for a renewal of the historical city “from within” and suggested a strategy of
“critical re-production” of urban quality.59 Importantly, Conrads encouraged a return to thinking
about the various constituent elements of the “traditional” urban landscape, such as squares,
streets, trees, courtyards, passages, and blocks.60 In 1975, the International Design Center
(Internationales Design Zentrum) in West Berlin staged an exhibition on “Designing the Historic
Street,” along with a conference and design competition that took a street in central Berlin as its
object. Invited architects included such international figures as Vittorio Gregotti, Alison
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Smithson, and Charles Moore, as well as Ungers and Hardt-Waltherr Hämer, who would later
head the 1987 International Building Exhibition with Kleihues.61
The growing student movement in the late 1960s gave new impetus to the renewal of
historic city centers as well. In West Berlin, students at the Technical University organized an
exhibition, accompanied by a manifesto, titled “Diagnosis of Building in West Berlin”
(“Diagnose zum Bauen in West Berlin”) in 1968, as a reaction to the more official “Berlin
Building Weeks” (“Berliner Bauwochen”), an exhibition meant to show off new city-sponsored
infrastructure projects.62 Staged in the shell of a building designed by Scharoun, the “Diagnosis”
exhibition constituted an anti-capitalist critique of the city’s Modernist development policies, and
the manifesto was signed not only by students but by many practicing architects, including
Kleihues.63 Outside of the discipline of architecture, the occupation of tenements by squatters
was becoming another important way that young people showed a renewed interest in the
historic city fabric, and along with existing citizens’ groups, these residents began to restore
nineteenth-century buildings.64 These activities paralleled and intersected with the growing
preservationist movement, which was also taking hold on both sides of the Atlantic.65 Such
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projects contrasted sharply with the Modernist mega-housing projects of the Gropiusstadt
(completed in 1960) and the Märkisches Viertel (completed in 1974) in West Berlin, both of
which became notorious for their low standards of living.66 The press also participated in the
growing public critique: in 1974, the Tagesspiegel, West Berlin’s centrist newspaper, ran a
seven-part series by Günther Kühne titled “Is Berlin losing its face?” (“Verliert Berlin sein
Gesicht?”), aimed at raising awareness of how Modernist development was making incursions
on the historical city fabric.
Thus, by the end of the 1970s, the time was ripe for the large-scale renewal of West
Berlin’s historical inner city (which, because of the Berlin Wall, now lay along its eastern
border) (fig. 1.16). Though urban renewal programs took place at this time across West
Germany, Berlin was an especially appropriate place for large-scale, politically-charged
experiments. On the one hand, it was not officially part of West Germany: legally, it remained an
exceptional zone. It was also not a capital city for the West and therefore did not carry with it the
pressure of officially representing the nation.67 On the other hand, as the site of the Berlin Wall
and a tiny island of democracy in the midst of a Communist state, it was also a highly visible
space in which to wage the cultural Cold War by demonstrating democratic-capitalist superiority.
West Berlin could function, therefore, historian Janet Ward contends, as a “threshold site,” or, in
the words of architectural historian Matthias Schirren, as a “nexus point for reimagining lines of
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cultural force.”68 Kleihues’s theory of Critical Reconstruction became one very important way in
which these lines were drawn in the 1980s.

Kleihues’s Early Years in West Berlin and His Theory of Poetic Rationalism
West German Identity and the Holocaust: Jürgen Habermas and the Historians’ Quarrel
Born in 1933, Kleihues was part of what has been called the “skeptical generation.”69
Having grown up under the Nazis, this generation had experienced a total collapse of its worldview at the end of World War II. In West Germany, their resulting disillusionment translated,
argues historian Frank Brunssen, into a “deeply skeptical and anti-ideological outlook.”70 For
them, the aporia of the Nazi period, including the crimes of the Holocaust, formed the basis of a
“negative form of identification” with being German. As the writer Christa Wolf famously put it,
she wished fervently “not to have to be German” (“keine Deutsche sein zu müssen”).71 Any
direct, public discussion of a positive West German national identity was out of the question;
instead, the focus was on integration with the larger Western international community, and on
the post-war re-founding of the nation based on a democratic constitution.
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The public attitude of the majority of West Germans toward their history was expressed
succinctly by president Richard von Weiszäcker in his speech to parliament on the fortieth
anniversary of the Allied victory, in 198572:
All of us, whether guilty or not, whether old or young, must accept the past. We
are all affected by its consequences and liable for it. The young and old
generations must and can help each other to understand why it is vital to keep
alive the memories. It is not a case of coming to terms with the past
(Vergangenheitsbewältigung). That is not possible. It cannot be subsequently
modified or made not to have happened. However, anyone who closes his eyes to
the past is blind to the present. Whoever refuses to remember the inhumanity is
prone to new risks of infection.73
Weiszäcker’s choice of words here is telling: the collective guilt shouldered by West Germans
with regards to Nazi crimes was seen as a necessary prophylactic against future “infections” by
such destructive ideologies. In speaking against the idea of “Vergangenheitsbewältigung” (often
translated as “coming to terms with the past” but also connoting a “completion” or “mastering”
of the past, i.e. its closure and comprehensibility) Weiszäcker was also countering the notion that
the history of the Holocaust could be “normalized,” i.e. narrativized and therefore understood as
a historical fact, or that a “closing line” (“Schlusstrich”) could be drawn under it. Instead, the
incomprehensibility of the Holocaust, Weiszäcker argued, echoing the sentiments of the so-
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called “skeptical generation,” should be constitutive of the German nation: a “negative founding
moment” on which the idea of their collective identity and purpose as a nation was based.74
However, there was a move in the 1980s by some public intellectuals and politicians,
including Chancellor Helmut Kohl (in office from 1982 to 1998), to create a new national
identity for West Germans as both victors (through post-war rebuilding and integration with the
West) and victims of the violence and destruction of the Second World War.75 Writing in the
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in 1986, historian Ernst Nolte spurred a vitriolic public debate
known as the “Historians’ Quarrel” (“Historikerstreit”), by suggesting that the Holocaust could
be relativized as a reaction to the Stalinist gulags, and that Nazism had simply been a natural
response to the rise of Bolshevism in the Soviet Union.76 The philosopher Jürgen Habermas, a
student of Adorno and his successor at the Frankfurt Institute, became Nolte’s immediate and
aggressive opponent. In a rebuttal in the national newspaper Die Zeit, Habermas voiced the
concern that this kind of logic would lead to a problematic “cancelling out of damages” that
would absolve Germans of their status as perpetrators under the Nazis and result in the very kind
of conception of national identity that would sever their hard-won ties with the West.77
Habermas was an extremely important public figure for West Germans of Kleihues’s
generation. In his first major work, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1962),
he argued that the Enlightenment had constituted an era of rational and critical discussion of
public affairs, and that this sense of civic participation had been gradually undermined in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries by the rise of industrial capitalism and the growth of the
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welfare state. To combat this tendency, Habermas advocated for a restructuring of the public
sphere based on a democratic model where important matters are discussed and debated publicly
by engaged citizens.78 Sometimes called “communicative rationality,” because he located the
concept of rationality not in abstract or ideal structures, but in the linguistic communication of
human beings, Habermas’s philosophy clearly provided a model for Kleihues to approach the
questions of molding a new German architecture through discussion and dialogue during the
IBA.
Kleihues’s Early Projects
Kleihues began his training at the Technical University of Stuttgart in 1955, where the
faculty was dominated by pre-World War II proponents of German Modernism.79 Before he
could fully assimilate their teachings, however, Kleihues was recruited by the Berlin architect
Hans Scharoun, and he transferred to the Technical University of Berlin in order to study with
the Expressionist-Modernist master.80 During the late fifties, in addition to completing his
dissertation on Scharoun’s work, Kleihues interned in the office of Peter Poelzig, then professor
of hospital-building (Krankenhausbau) at the Technical University.81 As opposed to the more
strictly Modernist legacy of the faculty in Stuttgart, Scharoun and Poelzig both exhibited more
willingness to experiment – Scharoun with a biologically inspired Expressionism, and Poelzig
with traditional regional forms. These two diversions from the hard line of functionalist
78

See Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois
Society (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1989); and Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1984).
79

Thorsten Scheer, “The Necessary Diversity,” in Josef Paul Kleihues: Works 1966-1980, ed. Thorsten Scheer, trans.
Geoffrey Steinherz, vol. 1 (Ostfildern: Hatje Cantz, 2008), 8.
80

Kleihues worked on Scharoun’s Stuttgart “Romeo and Juliet” drafting floorplans. Following his move to Berlin, he
worked as a guide at the Interbau exhibition, spent time at the Ecole des Beaux-Arts in Paris, and married his wife at Le
Corbusier’s church at Ronchamp in 1961. See ibid., 9.
81

See the “Peter Poelzig Collection,” Architekturmuseum, Universitätsbibliothek at the Technische Universität Berlin,
accessed March 21, 2014, http://architekturmuseum.ub.tu-berlin.de/; and “Poelzig, Peter,” NRW Architekturdatenbank, accessed
March 21, 2014, http://www.nrw-architekturdatenbank.tu-dortmund.de/ for examples of his work.

44

Modernism had a profound effect on the budding Kleihues, who graduated in 1959 and
established his own West Berlin firm in 1962 with Hans Heinrich Moldenschardt. Although
Berlin in the late 1950s and early 1960s, as discussed above, was hardly a hotbed of architectural
experimentation, it was, by the same token, a space of possibility where Kleihues had the
freedom to try out new formal approaches and novel ways of relating to the city’s architectural
legacies.82
It was undoubtedly Scharoun, who, having acted as head city planner for Berlin
immediately following the war, encouraged Kleihues’s interest in urbanism. Early on, he entered
competitions for neighborhood renewal projects, where his penchant for historical forms often
shone through. His 1967 design for the neighborhood of Ruhwald in West Berlin incorporated
rowhouses, which had, since the end of the war, been rejected as too conservative (fig. 1.17).83
Similarly, his 1969 design for a building straddling Lewishamstrasse in Charlottenburg, also in
West Berlin, demonstrates an attention to the historic shape of the city block.84 Kleihues was no
neo-traditionalist, however. His 1969 competition entry for rebuilding the neighborhood of
Perlach in Munich (fig. 1.18) is staunchly Modernist, with separation of functions and linear
rows of buildings. One of his first large commissions was for the main workshop of the Berlin
Department of Sanitation (1969) (fig. 1.19). This clearly Miesian design demonstrates Kleihues’s
early strategy of synthesizing traditional and Modernist forms.85 His design for Neukölln
Hospital (1973) (fig. 1.20) also illustrates a focus on seriality and geometrical abstraction as
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means of aesthetic expression, as well as an early interest in the playful, even decorative nature
of functional materials that would later become hallmarks of the global High Tech style.
The First Manifesto and Kleihues’s Theory of Poetic Rationalism
These early projects demonstrate some of the key facets of Kleihues’s emerging personal
theory of architecture, which he called “Poetic Rationalism,” laid down formally for the first
time in his “First Manifesto” of May 1976. The text, fittingly, takes the form of a poem86:
Unwittingly,
For the most part humorlessly,
Sometimes even angrily,
Architecture is discussed to death and nothingness,
With mediocre consensus the case is made against architecture.
Architecture is seldom:
Architecture as exhortation
Against an increasingly violent world in which builder and architect relieve themselves of
responsibility and engagement.
Architecture as protest
Against apolitical technism and instrumental thinking that pervert the act of building into
routine.
Architecture as example
Against superficial faith in research and function and a utilitarian rationalism which
negates all poetry.
Architecture as poetry
Against the blind order of functional-rational arrogance.
Architecture looking back
Timid and ardent.
Architecture as learning
From classical landscapes, from villages in Nepal and from Las Vegas.
Architecture as renewal
In dialogue with Alberti, Palladio, Schinkel, and all that we hold sacred.
Architecture as a possible category of the new
Acknowledging the eternally constant, under ever-new cladding.
Architecture in search of broader autonomy
86
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Lovingly singing out of tune, collecting characteristics
Breaking away from the moral terror of pure reason and empirical realities,
Eluding the market and wastefulness.
Architecture as desire
Boundless.
Architecture
For pleasure on the part of the viewer as well,
Offering tendencies and possibilities up for discussion.87
As the first lines of the poem suggest, Kleihues’s Poetic Rationalism confronts the
problems articulated by post-war critiques of Modernist architecture. Modernism’s critics,
however, in Kleihues’s view, have not simply argued against a single approach to building, but
have denounced and undermined architecture’s entire political, social, and aesthetic value,
leading to an unhealthy, nihilistic complacency. This was a natural sentiment for a young
architect in West Germany at the time, where most building done quickly and cheaply in the
mode of the globalized International Style, without any philosophical or societal aspirations. As
Ungers later observed, the goal of Kleihues’s generation of West German architects thus became
to revive – and to carefully situate themselves within – the Western humanist tradition, defined
by “reason, openness, variety and freedom,” as well as a reliance on dialectical thinking,
whereby their techniques and strategies could continually evolve.88 In basing his architecture on
the notion of the “rational,” Kleihues inserts himself into a long line of Enlightenment thinkers
87
“Nichtsahnend, / Zumeist humorlos, / Zuweilen wohl auch böse, / Wird Architektur in Nichtigkeit zerredet, / Wird
mediokrem Konsens das Wort geredet gegen Architektur. / Architektur ist selten:/ Architektur als Ermunterung / Gegen eine
zunehmend verwaltete Welt, in der Bauherr und Architekt aus Verantwortung und Engagement sich entlassen. / Architektur als
Widerspruch / Gegen unpolitischen Technizismus und eine instrumentelle Art zu denken, die das Planen und Bauen zur Routine
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and architects, beginning with the French theorists of the late eighteenth century (Laugier,
Soufflot, and others, especially Durand), as well as the German tradition following Kant. The
lineage, Kleihues writes elsewhere, then moves to Gilly and Schinkel, Semper, and finally the
early rationalism of Behrens, Taut, Mies van der Rohe, and Hilbersheimer.89 Reviving the
humanist tradition implied not only an Enlightenment worldview based in reason, but also meant
shouldering, as these earlier architects did, some kind of obligation toward society at large.
However, in order to propose an architecture of political and intellectual engagement, Kleihues
had to be careful, for, as Adorno and other thinkers had clearly demonstrated, cultural products
and processes are all too easily coopted by economic and political systems, and used to facilitate
the exploitation – or, in the case of Germany under the Nazis, the extermination – of human
beings.
Kleihues thus proposes, in the next few lines of the manifesto, an architecture of social
and political “responsibility” and “protest.” But, the manifesto argues, this cannot be done with
“superficial faith” in the capabilities of rational thought to solve human problems; rationalism
must be qualified. This demand means rejecting the ideas of pure functionalism and economic
determinism that underlay much of the Modernist thinking of the 1920s. Instead, for Kleihues,
rational principles are to be applied to the creative process itself as a way to remain selfreflexive.90 Though he still dedicates himself to function, construction, and economy, Kleihues
does this, as he states elsewhere, “in freer ways” (“auf freiere Weise”):
We must attempt to expand rationalism, to interpret it anew … I wanted to make
clear with this concept that I am concerning myself with a contradictory
expansion of classical rationalism: with a conception that allows me to involve
89
Thorsten Scheer, “Poetic Rationalism,” in Josef Paul Kleihues: Themes and Projects, ed. Andrea Mesecke and
Thorsten Scheer, trans. Michael Robinson (Basel: Birkhäuser, 1996), 15. See also Josef Paul Kleihues, “Kritische
Rekonstruktion: Südliche Friedrichstadt - Rudiment der Geschichte, Ort des Widerspruchs,” in Ausgewählte Texte, ed. Gerwin
Zohlen (Berlin: Internationale Bauakademie, 2004), 14–30.
90

Scheer, “Poetic Rationalism,” 17, 19.

48

experimentation more heavily and to mobilize not only the mind, but also the
emotions as a part of the design process.91
The way to achieve this expansion, Kleihues argues, is through the characteristic of the poetic.92
When put in conversation with rationalism, as Kleihues’s biographer Thorsten Scheer explains,
both elements become “equally justified components of a tension field they produce, which
always includes the possibility of mutual criticism.”93 Kleihues himself calls this the principle of
“coincidentia oppositorum” – the coincidence of opposites.94
The fact that Poetic Rationalism incorporates emotions, but does so within the framework
of a rational geometry, in turn guarantees architecture’s autonomy. As Kleihues suggests in the
manifesto, his architecture thus resists the “moral terror” of both “empirical realities” and the
market economy. It cannot be coopted by either politics or capitalism, because it resists any kind
of overt symbolism. According to Scheer,
Kleihues’s notion was based on a logic of geometry and dimension…which if it
does not prevent, makes a rhetorical and narrative interpretation more difficult, a
result that is characterized by restraint and which refrains from obvious
assignment of meaning. In this respect Kleihues understood his concept as a
guarantee of aesthetic ambiguity instead of the dogmatic limitation of a geometric
formula masquerading as a panacea.95
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In other words, as architecture historian Fritz Neumeyer writes, “Modernism’s fascination with
seriality is definitely shared, but certainly not as a result of convictions about social and moral
superiority of the mechanical over the beautiful, but as a result of architectural insight into the
essential necessities and natural laws of architecture as a discipline.”96 The result is a “pragmatic
openness” that relies on an emphasis on geometry to achieve a highly abstract appearance, the
renunciation of narrative connections and personal expressions,97 and, yet, a strong orientation
towards philosophy and history.98 This outlook, Kleihues hopes, allows him to avoid both
“fashionable experiments” and rigid functionalism.99
Poetic Rationalism as Valuing History and Context
Kleihues’s position differs from that of Greenbergian High Modernism, which claimed
autonomy for art based on faithfulness to the medium itself, in that Kleihues’s architecture is not
just about architectural form. Such strict formalism would make his work just as susceptible to
political or market cooption as an architecture that overtly sells itself to the masses. Kleihues
balances his rational, poetic geometry with two other ideas: history and context. In this respect,
Kleihues was clearly influenced by Rossi, as well as Christopher Alexander and Robert Venturi,
both of whom Kleihues indirectly references in his poem (“Architecture as learning / … from
villages in Nepal and from Las Vegas”).100 Kleihues’s designs cannot just be plopped down on
any site; they reference their environment, take its memory and history into account, and create
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the possibility for new histories to be written within them. Architecture must, he argues in the
manifesto, be willing to learn from the past: not by simply copying the great architecture of
preceding eras, but, in a dialogical manner, presenting “the eternally constant, under ever-new
cladding.”101 Rather than revivalism, an attention to history or memory can offer architects a way
to critique and improve upon past experiments. As Scheer writes, “Kleihues’s call for memory
should be defended against the reproach that he is concerned about assuring his aesthetic position
by tradition, and thus a return to the principles of tradition. The concept of ‘memory’ should
rather be seen as a critical category applied to contemporary architectural practice directed
merely at fulfilling function.”102
Architecture as poetic geometry arising from an analysis of the site and a confrontation
with memory and history, for Kleihues, means that built form should be intimately bound up
with the idea of the “genius loci” – the “spirit of the place”:103
I believe that every place, in addition to its specific reality, also possesses a
unique atmosphere, which can be very different. Paris is not London, New York is
not Berlin, Dresden is not Vienna. The atmospheric character of a city opens itself
to us only through the agile correspondence of intellect and feeling. Atmosphere
itself is a mixture of spirituality … and the utterly concrete rhythm of life.104
Clearly Rossi, who also wrote about the genius loci, is a major influence on his thinking about
these matters, but Kleihues is careful to distinguish his own approach from the one presented in
The Architecture of the City. While Kleihues admits that Rossi ushered in a new era of
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architectural thought that allowed for a new way of thinking about the relationships between
politics, economics, history, and aesthetics, he feels that Rossi’s approach is too formally limited.
“The idea of the critical reconstruction of the city, in contrast to the reductive, the traditionally
oriented, theory of Rossi, is more open and ready to experiment. In the sense, not of an obviously
harmonious, but rather of a diverse totality, we want to and must accept the contradictory and
antithetical as goal and method.”105
An attention to the genius loci surfaced most visibly in Kleihues’s project for the
restoration of Vinetaplatz in the neighborhood of Wedding, begun in 1971 and completed in
1977.106 Here, Kleihues revived the form of the nineteenth-century perimeter block – the first in
Berlin since 1945 – leaving the center of the building open as a residential courtyard (figs. 1.211.23).107 The beveled corners of the building, as well as its tripartite façade, also reference the
surrounding nineteenth-century buildings. The use of a perimeter block design that alluded to the
historical city was a bold move: up until this time, any discussion of so-called “traditional” (i.e.
nineteenth-century or neoclassical) forms in West Germany had been viewed with utmost
skepticism.108 Nevertheless, though in plan the building looks traditional, its reductive geometry,
abstract seriality, and attention to such functional issues as sunlight (the balconies all face south
so that residents can have maximum access to light) also refer directly to the Modernist tradition.
In addition, Kleihues openly referenced German Modernists such as Walter Gropius and
105
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Scharoun in his writings about Vinetaplatz, focusing on their responses to local conditions in
various small-scale projects. Thus, with his Vinetaplatz design, Kleihues reintroduces the notion
of the traditional to the West Berlin and West German architecture scene, while also reviving a
strand of German Modernism that avoided the problematic legacy of International Style
megaprojects.
Another design from around the same time demonstrates that Kleihues was dedicated not
only to reviving traditional forms, but also to reimagining how West Berlin was planned on a
larger scale. His competition entry for an urban design for Wittenbergplatz-TauentzienstrasseBreitscheidplatz (in the historic shopping district near Zoostation in West Berlin – the new
“heart” of the West) (1975-1977) further illustrates Kleihues’s commitment to both tradition and
Modernism. In this six-block “city within a city,”109 the massing of the buildings and the use of a
pedestrian-friendly boulevard with lavish plantings to tie them together, Kleihues revives the
nineteenth-century ground plan of the area. However, this plan is then overlaid with structures
that, though they reference nineteenth-century massing110 and utilize contemporary materials and
abstract, repetitive geometries. Kleihues thus avoids the reactionary neo-historicism of revivalist
architects such as the Kriers or Quinlan Terry; his reference to tradition looks at the deeper
structures of the city and overlays these with modern forms and materials, utilizing rational
geometries accented with personal touches.111
Further impetus and visibility for the renewal of historical city forms was provided by the
designation of 1975 as “European Architectural Heritage Year” by the Council of Europe.112 In
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West Berlin, Kleihues became involved in related architectural renewal and preservation projects
through the “Berlin-Atlas” project commissioned by the city senate (Berlin-Atlas für Stadtbild
und Stadtraum, 1973). This work compiled not only zoning and property data on the West Berlin
neighborhoods of Charlottenburg and Kreuzberg, but information about the states of structures
and facades on each block.113 As did many of the theoretical texts of the 1970s, the Berlin-Atlas
drew on the cartographic conventions of the “Nolli Plan,” a baroque map of Rome that became
popular amongst post-modernists as a way to demonstrate “figural voids” in the urban landscape
in stark black and white (fig. 1.24).114 The Berlin-Atlas became the first of many Berlin maps to
rely on this visual rhetoric to argue for the renewal of the historic cityscape, and to argue against
Modernist planning that proposed to do away with the original street plan.115
Thus, with Poetic Rationalism, illustrated through his projects of the 1960s and 70s,
Kleihues developed a theory that attempted to reclaim an architectural legacy for Berlin and for
West Germany that would avoid the pitfalls of Modernism (with its “naïve functionalism”) and
historicism (with its ties to Nazism), while also remaining regionalist – i.e., being German.
Poetic Rationalism allowed him to knit these needs together under the rubric of intellectualized
emotion rather than pure personal expression, with an eye towards distanced social engagement
that refused, at the same time, to become overtly politicized or subject to pure economic needs.
Unfortunately, the ambitious nature of such a project, and the theoretical gymnastics that such a
position necessitated, made it, as will be demonstrated below, very difficult to successfully
translate into a set of clear tenets for building.
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The Formalization of the Theory of Critical Reconstruction in the IBA
The Formation of the IBA and the “Kleihues Plan”
Kleihues wrote and talked about the idea of Poetic Rationalism throughout the late 1970s.
However, as should be clear from his early work, his ambitions, and his ideas, were larger than
individual buildings: he was interested in thinking about the city as a whole, and in influencing
the disciplinary conversation about urban issues in a significant way. Beginning in 1973, through
his position as head of the newly established architecture faculty at the University of Dortmund,
Kleihues directed the organization of a years-long series of symposia, exhibitions, and
publications that invited architects from around the globe to contribute to a discussion about the
future of architecture. Inclusive in their stylistic scope (the first show, for instance, allowed
architects who were otherwise at odds, such as Rossi, Venturi, Moore, and Ungers, to live side
by side in the same exhibition), these events allowed for a conversation to begin about how to
knit together elements of the traditional with the critique of the Modern, without resorting to
dogma.116 Symposium themes included “The Principle of Sequencing in Architecture” (“Das
Prinzip Reihung in der Architektur,” 1975), “Grid and Module in Architecture and City
Construction”117 (“Raster und Modul in Architektur und Städtebau,” 1976), and “Axis and
Symmetry in Architecture and City Construction” (“Achse und Symmetrie in Architektur und
Städtebau,” 1977). This last conference coincided with another, Kleihues-led show titled Five
Classical Architects in Germany (“Fünf Architekten des Klassizismus in Deutschland,” 1977),
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featuring the work of Friedrich Weinbrenner, Leo von Klenze, Georg Ludwig Friedrich Laves,
Friedrich Gilly, and Karl Friedrich Schinkel.118
Even at this time, such topics were considered controversial, especially in West
Germany. In the same year, the jury decision to accept James Stirling’s design for the Neue
Staatsgalerie in Stuttgart, a playful post-modern take on a number of neo-classical motifs, was
met with public furor; some even called it “fascist.”119 As Siedler wrote in the West German
periodical Die Zeit,
[Kleihues] took the risk of giving talks and arguing about the still slightly
disreputable subject of “symmetry and axis in architecture and town planning”: on
the one hand, this courts the danger of coming into disrepute for propagating a
fascist system of rule, but it does take the opportunity of at last helping to liberate
a terribly neglected and yet natural principle for constructing and ordering from
ideological persecution.120
Siedler soon became Kleihues’s ally in the reintroduction of the idea of the historical city to the
wider German public. Together, in 1977, they launched what became known as the “Morgenpost
campaign” (Morgenpostaktion). This endeavor consisted of an extended series of articles titled
Models for a City (Modelle für eine Stadt), published in the Berliner Morgenpost newspaper by
Siedler and Kleihues. Other contributors included a wide-ranging group of international
architects, planners, and critics (including Charles Moore, James Stirling, and Heinrich Klotz,
who founded the national German Architecture Museum in 1979). Taking two specific areas in
West Berlin as examples, the articles demonstrated and debated how these could be restored in a
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way that did justice to both the historical identity of Berlin and to the contemporary state of the
architectural discipline.121 Siedler and Kleihues’s ultimate aim was to gather public support for
another large-scale building exhibition, along the lines of the 1957 Interbau.
They succeeded. Approved by the Berlin Senate in 1978, the International Building
Exhibition (Internationale Bauaustellung, commonly referred to as “the IBA”122) consisted not
only of building competitions, but countless informational sessions, guided tours, exhibitions,
and publications. Originally planned to open in 1984, it was delayed for political reasons and
was finally officially completed in 1987.123 The exhibition had two main components: a set of
urban restoration projects (“Stadterneuerung”), led by Hardt-Waltherr Hämer; and a massive
number of new building projects (“Neubau”), headed by Kleihues. (Already geographically
separated from one another, the two halves ended up becoming quite isolated in their approaches
and rhetoric, due to disagreements amongst the leading figures of the IBA.124) For the new
building portion of the exhibition, the senate approved six aims, utilizing clearly Kleihuesian
rhetoric: 1) to create an urban center for West Berlin; 2) to develop various neighborhoods and
their character as “cities within a city”; 3) to take the historic structure of the city as its basis; 4)
to redefine “the relationship between social norms and freedom for the individual” (i.e. “the city
as a constant, the building as a variable”); 5) to thematize the inner city as a place to live; and 6)
to do all this by creating a “productive state of tension” between social needs and individual
artistic responsibility – that is, with public discussion, involvement of local business and
121
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residents, but also following the “individual intuition” of architects and planners.125 The senate
bill also set out the goal of creating 9,000 dwellings within the 250-hectare exhibition space in
West Berlin.126
One of the most lasting images to come out of the IBA was a map, known as the
“Kleihues Plan,” which hung in the stairwell of the Martin-Gropius-Bau in 1984 during an IBAsponsored exhibition titled Idea, Process, Result (Idee, Prozess, Ergebnis) (fig. 1.25). Drawn in
india ink in Kleihues’s studio, this five-by-six-meter plan shows the designated development
areas for the IBA in brilliant color, emphasizing both the “historical” (i.e. nineteenth-century)
street grid with planned buildings (in red), emphasizing its proposed (re-)completion through the
efforts of the exhibition. Surrounding these color sections are black-and-white renderings of the
existing ground plan and buildings in the rest of West Berlin, stressing their incompleteness; East
Berlin on Kleihues’s map, though showing the street grid, remains almost ghostly –
conspicuously devoid of any buildings at all.127 Thus, as the map suggests with its emphasis on
the dense, historical inner city, the IBA became yet another platform for Kleihues to promote
discussion within the architectural community about the shift towards historically-oriented urban
planning and construction. It also gave him a chance to further develop his thinking on
architecture and urban design, resulting in the theory he called “Critical Reconstruction.”128
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Projects in the Southern Friedrichstadt as Examples of Critical Reconstruction
The Friedrichstadt,129 one of the IBA demonstration areas, became the ideal place to
experiment with this approach. Originally planned as part of an expansion of the garrison town
of Berlin in the eighteenth century and built up into a banking, newspaper, and entertainment
district in the nineteenth,130 then slightly reshaped as part of Hitler’s plans for Germania, it was
heavily bombed during World War II and was now split along its East-West axis by the Wall,
becoming home to the notorious Checkpoint Charlie (fig. 1.26). The approach of Critical
Reconstruction meant returning the southern (i.e. West Berlin) section of this neighborhood to its
pre-Nazi and pre-Modernist ground plan, retaining and integrating old building stock, promoting
a mix of urban functions, and dividing large blocks into smaller units that supported the
expression of diverse styles while adhering to a relatively uniform typology.131 Kleihues did not
have any interest in enforcing harmony in the sense of a historical stage-set:132
The city as a living system should be conceptualized as a kind of menotactic133
whole, which under normal circumstances carries with it the guarantee of
necessary changes in order to enrich and carry forward its identity. The concept of
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a backward-looking, historicizing reconstruction is not only inappropriate, but
suggests a totally different goal from that set by the IBA.134
Rather than dictating exactly how everything should look, attention to the idea of the genius loci
would allow for various forms of new architecture to arise out of the existing layers of history at
the site. Kleihues focused on the street plan as the basic city structure, on which all other
elements should be based:135
The ground plan in particular bears witness to the spiritual and cultural idea of the
founding of a city. The ground plan of the city predetermines the relationship
between the requirements of economy, trade, and traffic and defines the
“foundational” (grundlegende) character of the place for many years. Finally, it is
the fundamental elements of the city that, even after their deterioration, still give
clues to their previous development in the form of hidden traces.136
Working from the ground plan, a Critical Reconstruction-based approach would, according to
Kleihues, create “possibilities for unfolding” (Entfaltungsmöglichkeiten) for the urban
environment through “renewal, enrichment, cultivation,” and also by allowing architects to add
“something individual.”137 Attention to history also meant seeing it through fresh eyes and
making any modifications necessary in order to suit the needs of the contemporary city. So, for

134

“Stadt als lebendiges System sollte aber al seine Art menotaktisches Ganzes begriffen werden, welches unter
normalen Bedingungen die Gewähr dafür bietet, daß notwendige Veränderungen seine Identität fortzuschreiben und zu
bereichern vermögen. Der Begriff einer rückwärtsgewandten, historisierenden Rekonstruktion wird dem nicht nur nicht gerecht,
sondern suggeriert ein ganz anderes Ziel, als die Internationale Bauaustellung es sich gesetzt hat.” Josef Paul Kleihues,
“Poetischer Rationalismus,” in Ausgewählte Texte, ed. Gerwin Zohlen (Berlin: Internationale Bauakademie, 2004), 58.
135

“Die historische Grundstruktur der Stadt muß als Konstante zur Grundlage der Stadtentwicklung werden.” (“The
historical ground-plan of the city must become the constant foundation for city planning.”) Kleihues, “Kritische Rekonstruktion,”
2004, 51.
136
“Speziell der Grundriss gibt Zeugnis von der geistigen und kulturellen Idee einer Stadtgründung. Der Grundriss der
Stadt präjudiziert das Verhältnis der Bedingungen von Wirtschaft, Austausch und Verkehr und definiert den ‘grundlegenden’
Charakter des Ortes für viele Jahre. Schließlich sind es die Fundamente der Stadt, welche auch nach deren Verfall noch als
verbürgte Spuren auf ihre einstmalige Entwicklungen hindeuten.” Kleihues, “Städtebau ist Erinnerung,” 18.
137
“Es ging mir auch dabei um einen Weg … die Gewährung einer möglichst freien (in gewisser Weise autonomen)
Entfaltungsmöglichkeit der einzelnen Elemente der Stadt und zugliech um deren Einbindung in erkennbare, im Hinblick auf den
‘Genius loci’ des Ortes wiedererkennbare Ordnung…. Daneben gibt es den legitimen Anspruch … nicht nur der Rekonstruktion
oder einer vorsichtigen Interpretation, sondern auch der Erneuerung, Bereicherung und Kultivierung das Wort zu redeen. Die
kulturellen Werte und Erkenntnisse sollen respektiert werden, aber man ist als moderner Architekt herausgefordert, etwas
Eigenständiges hinzuzufügen.” Kirchbaum, Lampugnani, and Meseure, “Joseph Paul Kleihues im Gespräch,” 74.

60

example, the renewal of the Southern Friedrichstadt entailed the creation of streets that were not
exactly the same as the pre-war plan, but respected its “spirit.”138
From this ground plan, the “stereometry,” or construction of buildings, and the
“physiognomy,” or design of the facades, which Kleihues referred to as “the image of the city,”
would arise.139 However, architects were not to have too free a hand. Stereometry and
physiognomy should be based on the same principles of careful contradiction (“coincidentia
oppositorum”) that underlay Poetic Rationalism. With this insistence, Kleihues clearly
distinguished himself from the idea of a superficial (American) post-modernism, with its free,
often cheeky play of forms and – most importantly – its acceptance, or at times even its
wholehearted embrace, of consumerism. In contrast, Kleihues associated his approach with the
more sober idea of the “European city,” a catchphrase that had been in use since at least the early
1970s, which, for him, meant an urban environment that was highly planned and ordered – not
an “anything goes” approach, in which architects or developers had free rein.140 Kleihues
promoted a thoughtful and careful synthesis of historicism and Modernism, not a bombastic
display of either one. The idea of the Critical Reconstruction “seeks a path of dialogue between
tradition and Modernism, seeks the contradiction of the Modern not in the sense of a break, but
visible development throughout moments of time and place.”141 The two sides must be put in
conversation and allowed to critique one another without resorting to bold, overly personal or
subjective statements.
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The “critical” element in Critical Reconstruction was meant to extend past the level of
styles. It was a way for architecture to acknowledge and respond to the larger societal problems
that arose in modernity. Kleihues wanted the contemporary city to be approached as
“immanently dialectical,” not in the sense of Hegel’s dialectics, with its implied faith in
teleological progress, but in the Adornian sense of moving forward with the awareness that no
one solution will ever solve society’s ills.142 This awareness meant recognizing the “moments of
crisis” to which the Modern tried to respond, as well as those to which it ultimately led:
Modernity is the living consciousness of crisis. In no way should the expiration of
the classical belief in a universal regulative be interpreted as a temporary political
symptom. The Modern has lived out and thought out crisis. We cannot unbind
ourselves from the responsibility to interrupt its work and its sorrow. The step that
we can attempt to make is conceivably small – and I mean “conceivably” in this
case in the literal sense: that the step can even be conceived of. Critical
Reconstruction is only trying, not to resignedly flee back towards an ideal world
out of the consciousness of crisis, but rather to strengthen, in opposition to the
classical Great Unity, the virulent uniqueness of each single part as part of a
living whole.143
So, while remaining aware of the pitfalls of both classical and Modernist forms, as well as their
status as signifiers and carriers of the history of various crises, Kleihues sought a dialectical
relation between the two that would generate a “contradictory and complex grammar.”144 In this
way, architects would be encouraged to retain a critical distance toward these strategies, while
utilizing the best of both:
This cannot be about a fight wherein one or the other side – tradition or
Modernism – is put down – and is put down possibly only as a kind of Phyrric
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victory – but rather, to reveal the possibilities that the reductionism of the
previous epoch of the Modern had kept hidden, to open to the Modern an
additional decisiveness (Entschlossenheit). To freely adapt the last paragraph of
Adorno’s Negative Dialectics: our attempt is in solidarity with the Modern, even
in the moment of its downfall.145
These ideas are borne out in various ways in the competition winners for the Southern
Friedrichstadt. One of the most lauded designs was, in fact, one by Aldo Rossi: a residential and
office building built along both side of the corner of Wilhelmstrasse and Kochstrasse (figs. 1.271.28). It references the history of the neighborhood in two ways. First, in its response to the
historical ground plan: flush with the street on two sides, it also integrates a semi-public
courtyard on the interior of the block – hallmarks of the “block-edge development”
(Blockrandbebauung) typical of nineteenth-century Berlin. Second, it also refers to nineteenthcentury Berlin typologies in its massing and decoration. Matching, for the most part, the height
of the surrounding buildings, Rossi’s design belies its massive character by breaking up the
façade into bays of varied heights and materials, a reference to the small individual parcels that
formerly existed in the area. However, the building’s forms and materials are clearly modern.
Glass curtain walls alternate with soaring, abstracted gables, and a distinctive, overscaled column
at the corner references the typical Berlin “corner-house” (Eckhaus) in a playful and
contemporary manner.146 Rossi thus fuses nineteenth-century city forms with strikingly up-to-
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“Es kann nicht um einen Kampf gehen, bei dem die eine oder die andere Seite, die der Tradition oder die der
Moderne, schließlich unterliegt – und möglicherweise nur im Sinn eines Pyrrhussiegs unterliegt - , sondern darum, die
Möglichkeiten, die sich im Reduktionismus der zurückliegenden Epoche der Moderne verdreckt gehalten haben, freizugeben, um
der Moderne ein Stück zusätzlicher Entschlossenheit zu eröffnen. In freier Verwendung des Schlußsatzes aus Adornos Negativer
Dialektik,: Unser Versuch ist solidarisch mit der Moderne noch im Augenblick ihres Sturzes.” Ibid. Note that in the original text
by Adorno, he is referring is not to the Modern, but to metaphysics. See Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics (Routledge, 2003),
408.
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Dietmar Grötzebach, Günter Plessow, and Reinhold Ehlers, “Wohn- und Geschäftshäuser, Wilhelmstrasse 3638/Kochstrasse 1-4,” in Internationale Bauausstellung Berlin 1984/87: die Neubaugebiete  : Dokumente, Projekte, ed. Josef Paul
Kleihues (Stuttgart: Gerd Hatje, 1993), 84.
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date ones, and uses this tension to produce a welcoming space for both the tenants and
passersby.147
A design by Rem Koolhaas and OMA for the “Haus am Checkpoint Charlie” (fig. 1.29)
confronts history in a totally different way: as a story still in the making. While the building does
conform to the typical height of the surrounding nineteenth-century structures, and Koolhaas
references the fin-de-siècle paintings of Ludwig Kirchner in his description, its materials and
details are distinctly Modernist, with rows of ribbon windows topped by a gridded glass curtain
wall and a flat, geometric roof cantilevered over the top. For Koolhaas, the most pressing aspects
of the genius loci are in its status as a Cold War border. Thus, he integrates “temporary” (in the
sense that he hopes the Wall will someday be removed) structures and services for border
personnel, and sees the building as a potential future memorial to the division of the Cold War:
From Friedrichstrasse, the semi-permanent pavilion on the ground floor signifies
the border-character of the building. One day, when the pavilion is no more and
the ground floor is turned into a supermarket, the projecting roof over
Friedrichstrasse will remain as a remembrance of the Wall. At present, however,
it corresponds with the physical reality of this dividing line between East and
West.148
Critical Reconstruction, in this example, allows Koolhaas to confront contemporary politics in a
practical way, by simply providing spaces for history to unfold.
A design by Zaha Hadid on Stresemannstrasse (figs. 1.30-1.31) demonstrates yet another
way of understanding Critical Reconstruction as embracing “possibilities for unfolding.” In plan,
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One big problem with the design is the large column, which attracts graffiti and is now used for garish advertising
(see fig. 1.27).
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“Von der Friedrichstrasse aus deuten die semi-permanenten Pavillons im Erdgeschoss den Grenzcharakter des
Hauses an. Eines Tages, wenn es die Pavillons nicht mehr geben wird und das Erdgeschoss in einen Supermarkt umgewandelt ist,
wird das auskragende Dach über der Friedrichstrasse als Erinnerung an die Mauer bleiben. Im Augenblick jedoch korrespondiert
es noch mit der physischen Realität dieser Trennungslinie zwischen Ost und West.” Rem Koolhaas, Elia Zenghelis, and Matthias
Sauerbruch, “Appartementhaus am Checkpoint Charlie, Friedrichstrasse 207-208,” in Internationale Bauausstellung Berlin
1984/87: die Neubaugebiete: Dokumente, Projekte, ed. Josef Paul Kleihues, trans. A. Bleininger (Stuttgart: Gerd Hatje, 1993),
74. The bottom floor of the building now serves as a museum about Checkpoint Charlie – it has not yet become something as
mundane as a grocery store.
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the building completes a triangular block by filling in one edge, and it responds to traditional
Berlin architecture in its height and in the gridded distribution of the windows. Its massing and
materials, however, are hardly traditional: it includes a highly expressive corner element and the
whole façade is sheathed in brilliant, anodized sheet metal.149 Rather than referencing history,
Hadid sees her design as responding to the needs of current and future residents:
[My designs] actually react to the new life and work requirements of our time.
Behind the flowing and exploding spaces stands the conviction that our
environment, our work- and life-forms, are changing ever faster and will continue
to do so. All things have a certain dynamic and change their quality with use.… In
this way architectural spaces can arise that no one has seen before; in these new
spaces, people will move in totally new ways…and the perception of the city will
be totally different. This newly achieved freedom can also be seen in a greater
context: as spiritual freedom.150
As illustrations of the theory of Critical Reconstruction, these three examples
demonstrate the flexibility inherent in Kleihues’s thinking.151 Though he had a role in shaping
competition briefs, building guidelines, and jury decisions, Kleihues did not use his position in
the IBA as a bully pulpit from which to control every detail of the designs. Rather, his ambitious
goal was to attract leading architects from all over the world, let them vie with one another in
competitions, involve them in discussions about the fundamental problems of architecture and
149

This whole block was actually designated as being for “women’s needs” (“frauenspezifischer Belange”) because
Hadid and another woman, Myra Warhaftig, were chosen as architects. See Corinna Tell, “Wohnhof Block 2,”
Forschungsinitiative IBA 87, accessed March 21, 2014, http://f-iba.de/wohnhof-block-2/. For details on the façade material, see
Zaha Hadid, “IBA Housing,” Zaha Hadid Architects, accessed March 21, 2014, http://www.zaha-hadid.com/architecture/ibahousing/.
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“Meine Entwürfe … reagieren tatsächlich auf die neue Lebens- und Arbeitsbedingungen unserer Zeit. Hinter den
fliessenden und explodierenden Räumen steht die Überzeugung, dass sich unsere ganze Umwelt, auch unsere Arbeits- und
Lebensformen, immer schneller verändern und weiter verändern werden. Alle Dinge haben eine gewisse Dynamik und wandeln
ihre Qualität im Gebrauch … So können Architekturräume entstehen, die man nie vorher gesehen hat; in diesen neuen Räumen
wird man sich auf eine völlig neue Art und Weise bewegen, … und die Wahrnehmung der Stadt wird eine ganz andere werden.
Diese neu zu gewinnende Freiheit kann auch in einem grösseren Zusammenhang gesehen werden: als geistige Befreiung.” Zaha
Hadid, “Wohnhaus - Block 2 - Stresemannstrasse/Dessauer Strasse,” in Internationale Bauausstellung Berlin 1984/87: die
Neubaugebiete: Dokumente, Projekte, ed. Josef Paul Kleihues (Stuttgart: Gerd Hatje, 1993), 47.
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Critical Reconstruction itself was not the only way Kleihues saw of tackling the problem of the city. Rather, it was
presented as one of three different possible strategies, which were to be used in tandem as deemed appropriate for each specific
site. One alternative strategy was the idea of renewal or preservation; the other was “conscious contradiction,” where elements or
buildings would be retained or inserted in order to create contrasts or, in Hesse’s words, “points of refraction” in the city. See
Hesse, “Identity through Critical Reconstruction,” 43; Josef Paul Kleihues, ed., Internationale Bauausstellung Berlin 1984/87:
die Neubaugebiete: Dokumente, Projekte (Stuttgart: G. Hatje, 1993).
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urban development, and draw conclusions from these discussions that could be implemented as
policy.152 Under his leadership, the IBA became a global forum for a conversation between
architects of very different persuasions, all responding to a call for a thoughtful engagement with
both the evolving history and the current needs of the neighborhood. And although Kleihues
himself did not always agree with the aesthetic choices of the competition winners, he
nevertheless allowed their designs to be built.
In combining the threads of neo-rationalism, post-modernism, and his own brand of
typological historicism that rested on the idea of the historical city plan as a generative form,
Kleihues was also positioning himself, as he had done with Poetic Rationalism, as part of the
lineage of the best German Enlightenment and Modernist architects. “What would be more
obvious,” he wrote, “than to orient these theoretical claims on examples that stand for the better
side of Berlin and Prussia: the time of the Enlightenment and humanism and that of the
[nineteen-]twenties[?]”153 Between deaths of Frederick the Great (1786) and Karl Friedrich
Schinkel (1841), Prussia and Berlin had, in Kleihues’s opinion, been blessed with a special
quality that gave rise to intellectual and artistic innovation. Presaging Poetic Rationalism, it was
a time when the “tendencies of rationalism were playfully relativized through the dimension of
poetry and a metaphysically renewed ideal of nature and world.”154 In the 1920s, as well,
Kleihues claimed that certain architects proved that strongly rationalist architecture and urban
design did not have to be diametrically opposed to history. Hilbersheimer, Taut, Behne, and
Scharoun (preceded by Behrens and Messel) had all created architecture that, while utilizing
modern materials and forms, also took tradition into account. Thus, as a synthesis of these two
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Neumeyer, “Poetry and Reason,” 39.
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Kleihues, “Städtebau ist Erinnerung,” 14.
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Ibid.
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moments that carried them forward into the present and future, Critical Reconstruction could
function as a rehabilitation of the German architectural tradition that avoided directly addressing
the problems of more recent German history, and positioned itself strategically with regards to
the critique of CIAM. The “democratic” nature of Modernism could be retained and enriched
through a global dialogue, and traditional forms could be carefully renewed and updated through
the same process.

Conclusion
As both a Cold War flashpoint and a local backwater, West Berlin held a special status as
a place of experimentation for Kleihues from the 1960s until the end of the 1980s. Because it did
not directly represent German identity, and yet had distinct global visibility, it was the perfect
setting in which to make the controversial move of reviving a form of traditional German
architecture while still making use of the methods and materials of Modernism. His theories and
his process, influenced heavily by Rossi, Adorno, and Habermas, connected directly to the
architectural and philosophical discourse in West Germany and Western Europe at the time.
Because they allowed for a rational approach to design problems, but used this rationality as a
tool to incorporate those parts of life – memory and human emotion – that often elude rational
analysis, Poetic Rationalism and Critical Reconstruction presented ways of tackling the biggest
questions of Kleihues’s generation, without ever presenting direct, dogmatic solutions that might
fall prey to cooption by political or economic forces.
The ultimate problem with all this theorizing, however, was that it proved difficult to
translate into, and to transmit through, actual built forms. Thus the results of the IBA were often
interpreted very differently from what Kleihues intended. He was pegged as a rigid, staunch
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traditionalist who was opposed to anything post-modern.155 And, as will be discussed in the
following chapters, Kleihues’s openness to dialogue, diversity, and disagreement was a key
component of Critical Reconstruction that unfortunately did not carry over into the post-1990
era. In the hands of his successors in reunited Berlin, Critical Reconstruction, for all Kleihues’s
careful positioning with regards to history and philosophy, was ultimately coopted as a cipher of
both global capitalism and conservative European historicism – the very things Kleihues had
worked so hard to avoid.
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Because of Kleihues’s ties to rationalism, as well as his critique of the more decorative styles of Venturi and others,
some still attempted to paint the IBA as a war between the popular, market-friendly North American and historicist, conservative
European factions of post-modernism. (See, for example, Josef Paul Kleihues - der Architekt und seine Stadt, dir. Ralf Lange,
Jörg Plenio, and Meyen Wachholz, DVD (Berlin: Nicolai, 2003).) Kleihues worked hard to dispel this notion: “I have strived to
increase the number of qualified opinions and engaged combatants. The spectrum of architects involved is one of the signs of
this.” Kleihues, “Kritische Rekonstruktion,” 2004, 55. Elsewhere, he contends that “It’s clear that the frequently insinuated
“architectural-political” (architekturpolitisch) onesidedness can only be called absurd. Aside from the protagonists (Abraham,
Eisenman, Grassi, Hejduk, Rossi, Ungers) from the beginning of the IBA, among others, the names Brenner/Tonon,
Bangert/Jansen/Schloz/Schultes, Frowein/Spangenberg, Ganz/Rolfes, Kollhoff/Ovaska stood for a new generation of architects
who, with social as well as artistic engagement, set themselves the task of updating the Modern with individual statements.”
Kleihues, “Städtebau ist Erinnerung,” 20. Indeed, with over 150 architects involved, he told Vittorio Magnago Lampugnani, it
would be impossible to micromanage every project. Kirchbaum, Lampugnani, and Meseure, “Joseph Paul Kleihues im
Gespräch,” 74.
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CHAPTER 2
International Investment and Berlin Planning in the Immediate Post-Wende Era

The era immediately following the fall of the Berlin Wall set the stage for the application
of Critical Reconstruction to the reunited city. This period was characterized by rampant
development and investment in Berlin’s city center, driven by astronomical – and, ultimately,
erroneous – predictions of economic growth. Berlin’s designation as Germany’s new capital in
June of 1991 fueled even more expectations for growth, putting increased pressure on city
officials to sell off and develop historically significant sites in the city center and to seek out the
most notable global corporate brands as buyers in order to add to the city’s prestige. Planners
recognized that attracting such investment entailed the promotion of Berlin as having a “local”
identity in the midst of a competitive global market, and they were thus quick to jump at
opportunities that they felt would help reinvigorate the city’s economy while adding to its unique
flavor.
This situation posed two interlinking problems for Berlin’s leaders: on one hand, they
needed to attract multinational investment to the city in order to shore up its reputation as an
emerging “global metropolis”; on the other, in the midst of a difficult political and administrative
sea change, they needed to guide this investment into channels that would be politically,
aesthetically, and practically workable for the future of the city. This challenge meant that new
developments should add to Berlin’s distinctive look and feel and embody a “local” character of
some kind. But the complexity of Berlin’s administrative structures and the absolute chaos
brought about by conflicting property ownership and restitution claims in the former East made it
exceedingly difficult to make wise decisions about land sale and use (when, that is, officials

69

could even discern which administrative department should be responsible for the property in
question). Furthermore, early property deals with powerful international firms, some made even
before the two Germanys were officially reunited in October of 1990, quickly demonstrated just
how much influence corporate interests could wield over city policy. One eventual answer to
these issues was found in a rigid and reductive application of the method of Critical
Reconstruction under Senate Construction Director Hans Stimmann, beginning in late 1991.
This chapter unpacks the complexities of the city’s administrative situation and examines
two key cases in Berlin’s early post-Wall development (1989-1991) that contributed to the
perceived need for a more rigid application of Critical Reconstruction as a city planning
philosophy after 1991. These sites in the formerly glittering commercial center of Weimar Berlin
had, for the previous forty years, been wasting away in the no-man’s-land along the Berlin Wall,
and they were now the most sought-after addresses for multinational companies and real estate
investors. The first, and most prominent, of these projects was Potsdamer Platz, a massive, multiuse site housing two corporate headquarters as well as retail, residential, and entertainment
spaces. The debates that unfolded between 1989 and 1992 over the development of this site
garnered international attention, not only because of the multitude of internationally-renowned
architects who flocked to take part in the master plan competition, but because of the highly
contentious nature of the proceedings, which generated international scandals in the architectural
community. Observers in the media were also particularly critical of the idea that real estate
investors, rather than planners or designers, were calling the shots. In order to keep the city from
becoming a physical catalog of trendy, commercial starchitecture chosen solely by investors, the
various constituents involved in Berlin planning temporarily buried many of their disagreements
and cooperated. Whatever their other differences, they agreed on the idea that Potsdamer Platz
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should retain something of its historical “identity,” however loosely defined, in the face of
globally-driven development. The end results, however, were widely recognized as disappointing
from both architectural and urban planning perspectives. The second example discussed in this
chapter is the less conspicuous Friedrichstadt Passagen project, a set of three block-sized retail
developments along the historically important avenue of Friedrichstrasse. While it did not attract
the same level of attention as the Potsdamer Platz competition, it also helped shape later
development by setting the scale – that of the entire urban block – for new projects in the city
center. Officials were unable to adequately steer the mechanisms of planning at either Potsdamer
Platz or the Friedrichstadt Passagen in such a way as to prevent the investors from wielding
considerable influence over the process, and the results were, in both cases, compromises that
were neither architecturally groundbreaking, nor recognizably “historical” in character. Rather,
the competitions resulted in trendy, commercial designs that amounted to little more than
ostentatious shopping malls.
This chapter thus provides a detailed picture of the conditions affecting city planning in
newly reunited Berlin – conditions that subsequently led Stimmann to adopt and adapt Critical
Reconstruction as a planning model for the city’s reconstruction, as will be discussed in Chapter
3. Unlike the hermetic world of Josef Paul Kleihues’s IBA, where just a few people planned and
adjudicated a series of state-sponsored construction and rehabilitation projects involving the
world’s most prominent and talented designers, the contentious, conflict-ridden, and exceedingly
public kick-off to the rebuilding of the new Berlin was subject to what historian Janet Ward calls
the “Stimmann Effect”: a fraught and failed attempt at fabricating a post-modern, historicallyoriented urban landscape, that ended, paradoxically, in the creation of a series of large-scale,
consumer-oriented, and ultimately very “American” projects. In fact, however, these outcomes
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had nothing at all to do with Stimmann. On the contrary, his late entrance onto the planning
scene in April of 1991 allowed him a first-hand view of the outcomes of these first forays into
Berlin’s redevelopment, but with very limited power to change them. These experiences
convinced Stimmann that the city would have to be as strategic in its dealings with investors as it
was about zoning, land prices, or design competitions, leading him to adopt Critical
Reconstruction as, among other things, a means to set developers’ expectations.

Knitting Berlin Back Together
The world watched as the Berlin Wall fell on November 9th, 1989, ushering in a new era
for Germany. Over the next year, the government of East Germany was gradually subsumed
legally, financially, and administratively by West Germany, and the two countries officially
united on October 3rd, 1990. This period of reunification is referred to in German as the Wende,
or “turning point”1: a word that, as opposed to the more triumphant idea of “reunification,”
encompasses the many problems the merge entailed – not only bureaucratic ones, but cultural
and social ones as well. Scholars often refer to the lasting “Wall in the head” between former
citizens of the two countries.2 In addition to the pronounced lifestyle differences between the
Western European, American-influenced, democratic, and consumerist society of West Germany
(the Federal Republic of Germany, or FRG), and those in impoverished, Communist East
Germany (the German Democratic Republic, or GDR), the two societies had historicized and
memorialized the Nazi period, World War II, and the Holocaust in very different ways. Thus the
work of bringing the two halves of the country together took place at multiple levels.
1

It is common usage to simply call it “the Wende” in English texts; I will follow this convention here.

2

This phrase was coined by author Peter Schneider in his novel The Wall Jumper. See Peter Schneider, Der
Mauerspringer: Erzählung (Darmstadt: Luchterhand, 1982).
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Whereas the post-Wall years were a challenging turning point for the larger nation of
Germany, the period between 1990 and 1992 has been dubbed Berlin’s “real estate gold rush.”
Major companies and banks flocked to open offices there: 119 businesses with over 8,000
employees relocated to the city in the first half of 1993, including, most prominently, Daimler
Benz and Sony. Bolstered by the city’s bid for the 2000 Olympics, on which East and West
Berlin began cooperation in late 1989, the message of politicians was “growth, growth, growth.”3
Berlin was billed as the new node in the network of the Central European economy, a nexus
between East and West, the “gateway to the East” or, as the head of the German national railway
put it, the “turntable between East and West.”4 Exorbitant predictions circulated: Berlin was
going to need six million square meters of new office space and would have to house up to two
million new residents, necessitating up to 800,000 new dwellings.5 The engine for this growth
was to be the service sector, which would, such was the hope, bloom as companies relocated to
Berlin in order to be closer to Europe’s new geographical center. The official designation of
Berlin as the new capital of reunited Germany in June of 1991 only added to the fervor.6

3

Elizabeth A Strom, Building the New Berlin: The Politics of Urban Development in Germany’s Capital City
(Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2001), 119. Even in 1998, long after these hopes had been dashed, Chancellor Gerhard
Schröder, in his inaugural speech, expressed the hope that “Berlin,” which to him sounded “too Prussian,” would become the
cosmopolitan “New Berlin” and take on an identity as the new center of Europe. Janet Ward, Post-Wall Berlin: Borders, Space
and Identity (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 286; Harald Bodenschatz and Uwe
Altrock, Renaissance der Mitte: Zentrumsumbau in London und Berlin (Berlin: Verlagshaus Braun, 2005), 198.
4

These characterizations had actually circulated before the Wall fell, as the climate of détente in the 1980s fueled
increased cooperation between East and West. In the post-Wall era, Walter Momper and Tino Schwierzina were two main
proponents of this discourse of growth. Bodenschatz and Altrock, Renaissance der Mitte, 198, 214; Ward, Post-Wall Berlin, 282.
5

Bodenschatz and Altrock, Renaissance der Mitte, 198. See also “Grundlagen und Zielvorstellungen für die
Entwicklung der Region Berlin, 1. Bericht – 5/90” in Siegfried Reibetanz et al., Potsdamer Platz, Leipziger Platz:
Informationsband zur Ausschreibung des städtebaulichen Wettbewerbes (Berlin: Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung und
Umweltschutz, 1991), 130–131.
6

The capital remained in Bonn until a controversial and narrow parliamentary vote in June of 1991 designated Berlin
as the new seat of government, and the government did not officially make the physical move until 1999. The decision came as a
surprise to many: historian Giles MacDonagh notes how no one in Berlin actually believed, at the time of the vote, that it would
become the capital of united Germany. See Giles MacDonogh, Berlin (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), x–xi; see also
Strom, Building the New Berlin, 160–163.

73

Observers predicted 100,000 additional new jobs as a result.7 Such dramatic speculative growth,
as political scientist Elizabeth Strom notes, is relatively uncommon in Germany, and the
situation was made infinitely more complex by the administrative and political structures of the
two former halves of Berlin.8
Government and Administrative Structures and Roles
Just as they were at the federal level, the laws and governing structures of the western
half of the city were expanded into East Berlin upon reunification in October of 1990.9 As a citystate, Berlin has its own Parliament (the Abgeordnetenhaus) with 149 seats, which functions
much like the federal Parliament, with many committees and sub-groups who hash out decisions
behind closed doors. With a few small exceptions, the parties represented in the Berlin
Parliament tend to mirror those in the federal government: the two largest are the left-centrist
Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, or SPD) and the rightcentrist Christian Democratic Party (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands, or CDU).10
Smaller, but still influential, parties include the Green Party,11 the post-communist Left Party
(die Linke or die Linkspartei),12 and the classically liberal Free Democratic Party (Freie
Demokratische Partei, or FDP).13

7

Strom, Building the New Berlin, 122.

8

Ibid., 119.

9

Ibid., 23.
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The Bavarian CSU (Christian Social Union) party cooperates with the CDU to form one party at the national level,
but they are not active in local Berlin politics.
11

In Berlin the Greens are referred to as Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, in reference to the union of the Green parties from
both East and West Berlin at the time of the Wende. The western Alternative Liste (AL) party was also part of this union for a few
years.
12

This party was formed in 2007 as a merger of the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), successor to the East
German Communist Party, and a left-wing breakaway from the SPD.
13

Other smaller parties have played roles over the years as well, notably the Pirate Party, which entered parliament in

2009.

74

The executive body of the Berlin Parliament is the Senate, whose members are voted in
by parliament.14 With the exception of the mayor, who leads as “first among equals,” the
members of the Senate are each responsible for overseeing a particular city administrative
department, such as finance, employment, education, and, of course, city planning.15 This
structure means that with each new election or change in government, the heads of these
departments are also subject to change, creating potential inconsistencies with regards to policy.
Further complicating Berlin’s rebuilding in the early 1990s was the fact that, at the time, two
different Senate departments with overlapping aims and jurisdiction oversaw urban development:
the Department of Construction and Housing and the Department of Urban Development and
Environment.16 From 1991 to 1996, i.e. the years of the most intense urban development in
Berlin, these two planning departments were headed by Senator Wolfgang Nagel (SPD) and
Senator Volker Hassemer (CDU), respectively.17 Though they often cooperated, these two
offices had the potential to put roadblocks in each other’s way if politically necessary or
advantageous. In addition, from November 1989 until reunification, the governing body of East
Berlin, the Magistrat, also took part in decision-making. Despite these various complexities,
there has been considerable continuity within the Senate over the years, as is apparent from the
following table:

14

The Berlin mayor actually thus holds the title of “Lord Mayor,” or Regierende Bürgermeister.

15

In the late 1990s the administrative departments were consolidated, reducing the number of senators from 15 to 8.
See “Senatsgalerie: Magistrate Und Senate 1945 Bis 2013,” Berlin.de, accessed July 18, 2014,
http://www.berlin.de/rbmskzl/regierender-buergermeister/senat/senatsgalerie/.
16

These departments have since been consolidated into one administration, whose current name is the Department of
City Development and Environment.
17

At the time of the Wende, the Department of Construction and Housing, the Department of Urban Development and
Environment, and the Department of Transportation were separate entities; in 1995 the functions of the Transportation
department were absorbed by Construction and Housing, and in 1999 all of these were combined into a “superbureaucracy.” See
Strom, Building the New Berlin, 101. Also note that at the time of the Wende Senator Hassemer was not in office; Michaele
Schreyer and Norbert Meisner headed the Department of Urban Development and Environment until 1990.
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Table 2.1: Berlin Governments and Important Senate positions, 1981-200118
Mayor

Senator for Culture

Senator for Construction
and Housing

Richard von Weizsäcker
(CDU)
1981-1984

Ulrich Rastemborski (CDU)
until August 1983
Klaus Franke (CDU)

Eberhard Diepgen (CDU)
1984-1985

Wilhelm Kewening
(CDU) until March
1983
Volker Hassemer
(CDU)
Volker Hassemer
(CDU)

Senator for Urban
Development and
Environment
Volker Hassemer (CDU)
until March 1983
Horst Vetter (FDP)

Klaus Franke (CDU)

Horst Vetter (FDP)

Eberhard Diepgen (CDU)
1985-1989

Volker Hassemer
(CDU)

Walter Momper (SPD)
1989-1991
Eberhard Diepgen (CDU)
1991-1996
Eberhard Diepgen (CDU)
1996-1999

Anke Martiny (SPD)

Klaus Franke (CDU) until
April 1986
Georg Wittwer (CDU)
Wolfgang Nagel (SPD)

Ulrich Roloff-Momin
(no party)
n/a (seat no longer
existed)

Wolfgang Nagel (SPD)

Horst Vetter (FDP) until
April 1986
Jürgen Starnick (no party)
Michaele Schreyer
19
(Alternative Liste /Greens)
Volker Hassemer (CDU)

Eberhard Diepgen (CDU)
1999-2001

n/a (seat no longer
existed)

n/a (seat no longer existed)

Jürgen Klemann (CDU) (as
“Senator for Construction,
Housing, and
Transportation”)

Peter Strieder (SPD) (as
“Senator for Urban
Development,
Environmental Protection
and Technology”)
Peter Strieder (SPD) (as
“Senator for Urban
Development”)

In addition to the Senate and Parliament, Berlin also has local districts (Bezirke), which
are run by elected councils, but which cannot operate autonomously from the larger Berlin
government. They rely on funds allocated by the Senate, have no revenue-generating capacities,
and any decisions they make are subject to veto by the state.20 However, the districts do wield a
fair amount of power over urban development, because all plans for building or renovation must
gain their approval in order to proceed. As Strom explains, especially in the eastern districts
where most of the immediate post-Wende development was focused, district building directors
tended to become spokespersons for citizens’ movements and other groups who felt their views
18
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on city building policy were being ignored by the state. In order to sidestep potential long-term
conflicts with such groups, district officials were almost always included in state-sponsored
competition juries so that the “public interest” could be said to be duly represented.21 In areas
such as Potsdamer Platz, which were effectively uninhabited after the Wall fell, there were no
residents to form interest groups in the first place.22
Another important force in Berlin politics is comprised by the various administrations
themselves. For any given task, Strom explains, there are usually multiple agencies responsible
at both the district and state levels: “For example, although the sale of public land is technically
the responsibility of the Finance Department, in fact the Urban Development, Construction, and
Commerce departments as well as each Bezirk all have sections concerned with public real
estate.”23 In addition to decisions being spread amongst multiple agencies, the agencies
themselves also play multiple and sometimes contradictory roles. For instance, in the immediate
post-Wende era, the Department of Construction and Housing under Senator Wolfgang Nagel
was responsible for, on the one hand, selling off huge chunks of land to investors (with no public
input whatsoever), and then for heading the effort, with public input, to convince these investors
to build appropriately.24 Adding further confusion to this already complex network of actors and
roles was that fact that, in Strom’s words, “the rejoining of the two Berlins (as well as the two
Germanys) resembled the takeover of a bankrupt firm more than the formation of a
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partnership.”25 Many East German administrators were laid off or forced to retire because they
were not able to fulfill their duties, either due to their political leanings or to a lack of the
technical expertise needed for their new positions.26 Those who did remain had to learn a whole
new set of rules in the midst of an intense speculation bubble. Beginning in 1989, Western
“advisers” were placed in East Berlin administrations to help guide them toward reunification,
and this had a palpable effect on the ways that land sales and development were handled at such
sites as the Friedrichstadt Passagen.27 As will become clear from the discussion below, the
design, function, and aesthetics of these buildings cannot be understood apart from the complex
administrative and governmental apparatuses that guided their development.
The Problem of Land Sale and Restitution in East Berlin
The Wende brought mass confusion to Berlin’s administration over how to manage the
large swathes of unbuilt or uninhabited property in the former East Berlin, which lay largely in
the central district of Mitte (fig. 1.16). According to Strom, “district planning offices were
inundated with building applications, creating pressures that would be daunting to even the most
experienced bureaucrat. To those in the East, who were just mastering German planning laws as
well as the principles of the private real estate market, the workload was truly overwhelming.”28
Just before reunification, in 1990, the government of the GDR had established an agency called
the Treuhand (Trust Agency),29 which was responsible for holding and selling the properties in
Berlin that had formerly belonged to East Germany, including state-run businesses and other
government holdings. Meanwhile, the federal government claimed rights over certain areas of
25
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former East Berlin, such as the “death strip” (“Todesstreife”) that surrounded the Wall, as well as
lands that had belonged to the military.30 All of these properties, as well as East Berlin properties
that stood under private ownership (of which there were many), were subject to West German
restitution laws, requiring the return of property to any former owners who laid claim, going
back as far as 1933. Multiple claims could be made on any given property, and these could also
be bought and sold by other representatives.31 For instance, the claims of Jewish property owners
whose lands had been seized by the Nazi regime were often represented not by individuals, but
by an agency that used the claims money to support Holocaust survivors.32 Speculation also
occurred, with claims being bought up privately by potential property investors. In all, about
170,000 restitution claims for real estate were made in Berlin, and ninety percent of these were in
Mitte.33
Amidst this administrative chaos, agencies did not cooperate well on setting pricing
strategies for land sale, nor was any one agency able to clearly articulate development policies or
set a guiding plan for the city. Observers have called this “policy schizophrenia”: different
agencies worked at odds with one another, each trying achieve its own goals and represent its
own particular interest groups. For instance, the Commerce Department wanted to promote
industry, and thus looked to develop land quickly and attract investment, while the Finance
Department wanted the maximum returns on land. One of the most prominent actors in Berlin
planning turned out to be the Department of Transportation, since traffic and public
30
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transportation issues were of great interest to residents and politicians alike.34 Meanwhile, local
officials, especially those in Mitte, were interested in small-scale growth, affordable housing, and
the preservation of existing buildings, but were hampered by the inexperience of their
administrators and by their limited negotiating power.35 Rather, the larger Berlin city government
and large private investors became the main guiding forces of development.
Two administrative-legal means helped the city government grease the wheels of
investment. One was a federal act allowing “those willing and able to create economically
important development projects to acquire land even if property claims are pending.”36 This
came to be known as the “Berlin model,” where investors who could promise to build quickly
were given preference over property claimants, who were instead compensated monetarily.
Secondly, an institution called the “Coordinating Committee for Inner City Investment”
(Koordinierungsausschuss für innerstädtuscher Investitionen, or KOAI) was established at the
behest of the Senate Construction and Housing department to deal with conflicting claims,
guarantee investors a clear title, establish which planning guidelines were applicable to the site,
and, ultimately, choose a developer. As a relatively invisible institution (its minutes were not
made available, there was no press coverage of meetings, and it was rarely mentioned by the
media), the KOAI was able to skirt much of the red tape and steer, to some degree, large-scale
development without hindrance by other agencies or by the public.37
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Though the decisions to sell to large-scale investors met with criticism from many fronts,
it is important to remember that they were undertaken largely by centrist politicians who were,
despite the predictions of growth, concerned with the financial viability of Berlin. Accustomed to
its status as a “free-democratic bulwark” against the Communist state, with special status and
generous subsidies from the federal government, former West Berlin now had to contend with a
global market and, beginning in 1993, a drastically reduced federal support. Now, as Senator for
Urban Development Volker Hassemer put it, they had to “ride the tiger”: in other words, try to
make the best of the unruly international investors and do their best to guide the city’s rebuilding
into channels that would be aesthetically and economically appropriate for the new German
capital.38
Planning and Competition Practices in Berlin
Land use plans in Berlin are, technically, subject to somewhat extensive review.
However, planners and investors in the post-Wende years often relied on shortcuts in order to
speed up the process. According to Berlin’s planning laws, a land use plan must be approved by
the state parliament after being prepared by the Department of Urban Development and
Environment.39 Construction plans must then be submitted for all projects, and they are subject
to approval by both local districts and, ultimately, the Senate Department of Construction and
Housing. At the behest of the Berlin planning departments and the KOAI, many developers
ended up utilizing an exception to this rule: the so-called “loophole paragraphs”
profile projects. As architectural Lenhart notes, “The more spectacular the projects, the more famous the architects and more
financially strong the investors, the more they were welcomed.” Ibid., 78. Klein was assassinated by letter bomb in 1991, and Eva
Schweitzer points to evidence that Klein was killed by someone from the Berlin building industry who was angry that too many
foreign companies were receiving contracts. See Eva Schweitzer, Grossbaustelle Berlin: wie die Hauptstadt verplant wird
(Berlin: Nicolai, 1996), 63.The KOAI was not the only agency responsible for doling out contracts behind closed doors; the
Berlin Economic Development Corporation and the Landesentwicklungsgesellschaft or BLEG were also both supposed to link
investors with properties. See Strom, Building the New Berlin, 102, 107–109; Ward, Post-Wall Berlin, 292.
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(Lückenparagraphen) of the construction code (§ 34 and § 36), which state that building done for
the purposes of infill can be subject to a much less extensive review.40
Even utilizing these shortcuts, though, does not absolve developers of the requirement for
state input regarding what is to be built. Berlin is famous for its culture of architectural
competitions. All major public buildings, and many private ones, require competitions as part of
the planning process, and the Department of Construction and Housing and Urban Planning can
require that private investors hold competitions in exchange for being able to build on public
land. Thus competitions are a major way in which Berlin officials have strived to steer
development from an architectural standpoint.41 Usually overseen by the Berlin Architects’
Chamber (Architektenkammer), with juries chosen by the sponsoring public authority, these
competitions are often limited to a small group of invited architects.42 Developers do not have to
accept the winners of these competitions, but it is clear to them that things will go more smoothly
if they do so, and this expectation has only rarely led to tensions, most notably, as will be
discussed below, at Potsdamer Platz. Partly based on this negative experience, the Berlin
government has since learned to pick investors who will be likely to follow their lead
architecturally.43 Conversely, investors have recognized that it behooves them to pick architects
that are already approved by the Senate departments, and have tended, according to Strom, to
invite “the same local notables” to serve as jurors as the public authorities have done.44 As will
become clear over the course of the remaining chapters, this elitism became one of the main
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reasons that Stimmann and others came under fire for their planning decisions, and it also helps
to explain why so many buildings in Mitte today share a similar look and feel.
Though it may seem laborious, the competition process actually helps to speed decisionmaking. Where design-by-consensus might take a very long time, competitions offer concrete
outcomes that also shift responsibility for these choices away from single elected officials and
onto juries (which often, it should be noted, include those same officials). But another reason,
Strom surmises, that Berlin planning culture has come to rely so heavily on competitions has to
do with the overall reliance on supposedly “neutral” specialists in political decision-making
processes in Berlin and Germany generally. Strom calls this the culture of “expertocracy”
whereby the “expert public” (Fachöffentlichkeit) (including, in the case of city planning,
architects, planners, university professors, critics, civic group leaders, and intellectuals) is
utilized in order to legitimize decisions and ensure support from professional organizations and
the media. Germans tend to look on capital investment with skepticism, believing that experts
should be the only ones entrusted with the job of deciding what should be built, an attitude that
stems from a more general attitude, prominent in both East and West German societies, that the
state, rather than any private entity, is the most worthy representative of public interest.45 For
Germans, “ownership of land,” Strom says, “doesn’t imply the right to build anything you want
on it … wealth doesn’t entitle one to leave an indelible mark on the collective built environment
without the approval of those experts considered as guardians of the public’s space.”46
The importance of the “expert public” means that another key group of actors in Berlin
planning is consultants, who often work under contract with the city. Panels, advisory
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commissions, and written expert opinions (Gutachten) are common.47 This arrangement can be
politically advantageous, not only because these individuals and groups contributed muchneeded professional expertise, but also because, in this way, as Strom notes, potential critics
become paid participants in the political process.48 The participation of experts in decisionmaking processes can be seen in two opposing ways. On the one hand, one can view the experts
as “guarantors of the public good,” doing jobs that no layperson could do, or would be interested
in doing. On the other hand, in Strom’s words, “These processes grant the illusion of public
participation while in fact further insulating decision making.”49 While the public is informed
about things like architectural competitions, they have no way to participate in them directly.
Even the two public forums sponsored by the Senate, the “City Forum” (Stadtforum, sponsored
by the Department of Urban Development, which began in 1991 and continues to meet today)
and the “Architecture Talks” (Architekturgespräche, 1991-2006, sponsored by Stimmann from
within the Department of Construction and later in the Department of Urban planning), which
supposedly functioned as spaces of debate and discussion about planning decisions, were, most
agree, simply well-crafted, staged events featuring a handful of participants selected from
amongst the “expert public.”50 Furthermore, such events and competitions focus public attention
on the superficial, rather than the political or economic, aspects of planning. While newspapers
feature arguments over design decisions, few people, even amongst city officials, actually know
how or to whom land has been sold.51
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Together, these various relationships and roles have the effect of making Berlin planning
policy appear inattentive to public input. The case is not quite that simple, though; rather, the
German preference for paternalistic governance and reliance on experts constitutes a form of
representative democracy that is somewhat removed from everyday voters, but which
nonetheless takes their concerns into account through close cooperation with interest groups.
However, as will become clear in the examination of Potsdamer Platz, this system, at the time of
the Wende, was ill-equipped to deal with large multinational corporations and the quick
development of large plots of land.
Local Identity and Image in a Global Economy
On a conceptual level, much of what Berlin’s planners were grappling with at the time of
the Wende was increased pressure to create a unique, marketable identity for Berlin in the face of
global competition. As sociologist Saskia Sassen has argued, growing cities in the so-called
“global age” must fulfill a paradoxical double role: on the one hand, they must be networked –
physically and virtually – with the rest of the world, presenting themselves as totally
interconnected “cities without walls” that will function as key nodes in the flow of global capital.
On the other hand, no matter how interconnected they may be in terms of telecommunications,
finance, or the shipment of goods, successful metropolises have, from a physical standpoint,
tended to recentralize services, with finance, banking, law, and advertising firms clustered within
easy reach of multinational headquarters. Thus, in contrast to the capitals of empires in previous
centuries, global cities now distinguish themselves through their ability to compete on a
worldwide level for business, “branding” themselves in unique ways in order to attract
companies and workers.52
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Geographer David Harvey has called this situation the rise of “urban
entrepreneurialism.”53 In an essay published right at the time of the fall of the Wall, in 1989,
which no doubt had effects on the ways that cities such as Berlin handled city planning, Harvey
identifies several key trends in city planning practices in the global age. His observations help to
explain some of the decisions made by Berlin officials, which may now look to us somewhat
naïve, hackneyed, or even corrupt. First, Harvey points out, cities are not themselves actors, but
things arising from a “spatially grounded social process in which a wide range of different actors
with quite different objects and agendas interact.”54 In Berlin, as explained above, a dizzying
array of institutions, officials, interest groups, and political forces had to cooperate in order to
further development. The centerpiece of this interaction in the global age, according to Harvey,
is often public-private partnership, in which in “traditional local boosterism is integrated with the
use of local governmental powers to try and attract external sources of funding, new direct
investments, or new employment sources.”55 Always speculative in nature, this type of
partnership tends to focus on what Harvey calls the creation of “place,”56 by which he means the
construction of business-centered infrastructure (in the form of, for example, office parks, “civic
centers,” or shopping malls) which has little to directly contribute to the welfare of local
residents:
The construction of such places may, of course, be viewed as a means to procure
benefits for populations within a particular jurisdiction, and indeed this is a
53
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primary claim made in the public discourse developed to support them. But for
the most part, their form is such as to make all benefits indirect and potentially
either wider or smaller in scope than the jurisdiction in which they lie. … City
leaders can look upon [such] spectacular development as a "loss leader" to pull in
other forms of development.57
In other words, while the effects of building a new mall, for instance, might be to bring a few
hundred more jobs to a neighborhood, or might benefit local businesses by attracting new
customers, such effects are marginal, indirect, and often uncertain, as opposed to public money
directly spent on services such as schools, hospitals, or housing. With the promise of bringing
jobs to Berlin, as well as acting as magnets for relocation by other attendant service industries,
Berlin’s leaders entered into exactly these kinds of public-private partnerships with large
companies, with the aim of building precisely such “places.”
Harvey also notes that this type of speculative development relies on the creation of
“urban imagery,” both in order to attract investors, and to sell such ideas to the public. The word
“imagery” here can mean a number of image-based practices, from exhibitions and publications
of plans, maps, and drawings, to descriptive verbal imagery, or the imagery of the constructed
built environment itself. All of these tactics were used in Berlin’s planning. Indeed, the discourse
on Berlin’s redevelopment is shot through with the concept of “image,” from statements by
potential investors who desired “postcard-worthy” buildings, to the rhetoric of planners, who
often invoked the terms “Leitbild” (“guiding image”) or “Stadtbild” (“urban image”) when
speaking of their plans.58 The creation of numerous city-sponsored marketing firms and the
construction of tourist attractions aimed at making a spectacle of Berlin’s reconstruction, such as
the famous “Info-Box” at Potsdamer Platz (1995-2001), were directed, in part, towards potential
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investors.59 But, Harvey points out, this kind of image-based marketing is also meant for a local
audience:
The production of an urban image of this sort also has internal political and social
consequences. It helps counteract the sense of alienation and anomie that Simmel
long ago identified as such a problematic feature of modern city life. It
particularly does so when an urban terrain is opened for display, fashion and the
“presentation of self” in a surrounding of spectacle and play. The orchestrated
production of an urban image can, if successful, also help create a sense of social
solidarity, civic pride and loyalty to place and even allow the urban image to
provide a mental refuge in a world that capital treats as more and more placeless.60
So, although the development itself, from an economic standpoint, may only marginally benefit
those who already live in a particular place, urban images are used to appeal to residents on a
conceptual level, bolstering feelings of collective belonging and identity and promoting political
support for public-private projects. This effect has the added benefit of creating the “branding”
that the cities now need in order to attract new business. Berlin officials often relied on imagebased language that presented the new city center as the potential intersection of local and global
life. For instance, in an editorial in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Mayor Eberhard
Diepgen envisioned Berlin’s new city center thus:
It is a summer’s day on the cusp of the new century, and the new square between
the Lustgarten, the foreign ministry and the city library has the character and
charm of a cityscape like the ones we know from old black and white
photographs. On park benches and the chairs of a street café, casually dressed
students from the nearby Humboldt University sit drinking espresso and leafing
through books from the library. Well dressed visitors and officials from the
foreign ministry stroll by; tourists from all over the world seek free tables in
restaurants or buy international newspapers. An ideal resting place after a long
walk down Unter den Linden, before one turns off down Berlin’s most delirious
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stretch on Oranienburger Strasse, where hip bars, theaters, or the nexus of new
Jewish life around the synagogue awaken their curiosity.61
As Ward points out, an irony of cities’ need to compete on a global level is that they must
become ever-more local in their image-making, presenting themselves as unique and desirable
places with their own special character. Especially for European cities, such localized marketing
tactics often come to rely on historical (some would say “nostalgic”) imagery, a logical choice,
given the various layers of centuries-long historical development in typical European urban
landscapes.62 The emphasis on history, furthermore, is not necessarily an overtly superficial
marketing strategy, but a key part of the larger post-modern turn towards traditional urban forms
in architectural and urban design. By focusing on history as part of Berlin’s identity, then,
officials were able to make the most of the intersection between local and global city dynamics
by fostering both a sense of local distinctiveness, and becoming part of a larger global trend with
regards to urban design and architecture that they hoped would appeal (though it did not always
do so) to investors.
As will become clear in the examples below, the focus on the local also made sense in
terms of Berlin’s many actors in city development, many of whom felt threatened by the
influence of global capital. With large, international firms calling the shots, critics and planners
across the spectrum feared that Berlin might turn into a Disneyland of architectural experiments,
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which would work against the idea of a unique city identity, and would also potentially take
away jobs from Berlin architects and contractors who hoped to profit from the influx of
investment. Thus, Harvey’s observation that “the ideology of locality, place and community” can
often become central to a “political rhetoric of urban governance which concentrates on the idea
of togetherness in defense against a hostile and threatening world of international trade and
heightened competition” rings true with regards to Berlin.63 It was just such a defensive
mechanism that was triggered by the city’s first large-scale “place-making” project, the
redevelopment of Potsdamer Platz.

Learning from Potsdamer Platz
Most of Berlin’s “gold rush” happened in the central district of the city, Mitte (fig. 1.16),
which was, until 1989, situated right up against the Berlin Wall on the East Berlin side. Many of
the projects for West Berlin’s International Building Exhibition (IBA) in the 1980s were built
directly to the south of this area, around the famous Checkpoint Charlie, the most conspicuous
border crossing into Mitte. Potsdamer Platz, historically a gateway leading out of Berlin towards
the city of Potsdam, lay just a couple of blocks southwest of the checkpoint. Prior to World War
II, this area had been a major commercial and entertainment hub, with department stores,
theaters, clubs, cafés, and, famously, Europe’s first traffic light. Potsdamer Platz also has a
storied architectural history: the adjoining Leipziger Platz, notable for its distinctive octagonal
shape, had been the site of Friedrich Gilly’s famous paper monument to Frederick the Great
(1797, fig. 2.1). In the nineteenth century, Karl Friedrich Schinkel, as well as the renowned
landscape designer Peter Joseph Lenné, had built here, and Erich Mendelsohn’s famous
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Modernist Columbus Haus had also once stood on Potsdamer Platz (fig. 1.8).64 The site is also
just a few blocks from Hitler’s Chancellery and the remains of his bunker. In 1989, the square
was utterly empty, bisected by the Wall, and cleared of the rubble of World War II, the largest
and best-known piece of “no-man’s-land” along the Berlin Wall. (figs. 2.2.-2.3).
Potsdamer Platz had therefore become a potent cultural symbol: films such as Wim
Wenders’s Wings of Desire poetically featured this void as a symbol of the tragedies of recent
German history and the division of the Cold War. In the film, the character of Homer wanders
the outskirts of Potsdamer Platz along the Western side of the Wall, searching in vain for his lost
memories: “I cannot find Potsdamer Platz. No, I think right here … Yet it can’t be here.”65 As
cultural historian Jonathan Bordo notes, in 1987, when the film was made, Potsdamer Platz
constituted one of Berlin’s most charged landscapes:
If “Platz” means place, public space, commons, even square where people gather
… Potsdamer Platz wasn’t such a place. It wasn’t a place, at all. Potsdamer Platz
circa 1987 was a wasteland, a ‘zone of exception’ extricated from the everyday
circulation of life and the ‘no-man’s-land’ between East and West Berlin in the
partition of the city by the Four Powers after World War II. Potsdamer Platz was
no-man’s-land, to recall the space between the entrenched armies on the Western
Front in World War I, an interdicted space devoid of human presence. …
Wenders’s Homer searches in vain for the lost Potsdamer Platz of the era before
the rise of National Socialism. His song is of a vanished Potsdamer Platz,
Potsdamer Platz perdu.66
To planners and investors, after November 1989, the rise of both Potsdamer Platz and Berlin as a
kind of phoenix from the ashes – the creation of a “place” amidst what was currently a space
connoting loss and emptiness – thus seemed not only fitting, but inevitable. Bordo’s “Potsdamer
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Platz perdu” was exactly what they immediately hoped to rebuild, reviving the area as a center of
commerce and entertainment, drawing on – some would say, exaggerating – associations with
the glittering culture, commerce, and nightlife of Weimar Berlin.67 In the words of Daimler Benz
head Edzard Reuter, the goal was to create an “identity-forming calling card” (identitätsstiftende
Visitenkarte) in the form of a recognizable and easily digestible architectural image.68
International Investors and Land Sale
The development of Potsdamer Platz had already started with negotiations by West
Berlin in 1988 to reclaim a small swath of East German land known as the “Lenné-Triangle”
along the Wall, in order to build a highway thoroughfare.69 Though they had managed to get the
land, their plans were held up by protests from an environmental citizens’ group. In the summer
of 1989, before anyone knew that the country and city would soon be reunited, Daimler Benz
became interested in developing the site, and with the fall of the Wall in November of 1989, it
quickly became a hotbed of investment, with Daimler Benz as the premier tenant. The land –
owned mostly by the city – was quickly sold to the firm at a low price, with the added promise
that infrastructure would be subsidized by the government.70 City officials were so keen on
having world-class investors at the site that, as Nagel later stated, “We would have given them
the land [for free] if they had said, ‘We will come to Berlin and open our new subsidiary, debis
[sic], here.’”71 Nevertheless, the sale did meet with some criticism, especially from left-leaning
parties within the Berlin parliament, who rightly feared that this move signaled a trend toward
67
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investor-driven, rather than state-driven, development. Nevertheless, with the promise of
bringing 8,000 new jobs to the area, Daimler Benz was welcomed.72
Sony became the second large-scale investor at the site in early 1991, along with a
handful of other companies.73 Meanwhile, parliamentary debates over how to handle traffic in
the area, as well as a change in government, held up plans for a public architectural competition
(Mayor Walter Momper (SPD) was succeeded by Eberhard Diepgen (CDU) in January of 1991,
and Volker Hassemer (CDU) replaced Michaele Schreyer (Greens) as Senator for Urban
Development and Environment).74 Finally, just three weeks after a master plan competition for
the site was announced in the professional journal Stadtbauwelt in March of 1991, Daimler Benz,
Sony, and the other investors, fed up with the slow pace of politics, contracted British architect
Richard Rogers with a separate site study. This put increased pressure on the Department of
Urban Development, under Senator Hassemer, to use the competition to come up with a design
that would please the investors, while also staying true to the history and symbolic importance of
the site. Hassemer also faced hefty criticism from the Architects’ Chamber, the Association of
Architects and Engineers, and the Association of German Architects, for not allowing an open
competition.75
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Berlin Morgen: IBA-style Discourse, Continued
Meanwhile, the first rumblings of the aesthetic conflicts to come were discernible in an
architectural exhibition at the German Architectural Museum in Frankfurt in 1990-1991,
sponsored by one of the country’s largest national newspapers, the Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung, titled Berlin Morgen: Ideen für das Herz einer Groszstadt (“Berlin Tomorrow: Ideas for
the Heart of a Metropolis”).76 The show featured designs for the central district of Mitte by
seventeen invited architects. As Vittorio Magnago Lampugnani, then director of the German
Architectural Museum, stated, the goal of the exhibition was to provide ideas for an overall
guiding plan for the development of the district:
It is true that cities, with very few exceptions, are not designed by architects, but
build themselves: their motor is land speculation, … and there will be no lack of
that. But to guide this dynamism onto the right tracks, and to make it useful to the
city, a plan is needed. More specifically: an overarching idea to which the various
projects, out of which the new city will coalesce, can be subordinated.77
The list of architects was impressive, including Mario Bellini, Coop Himmelb(l)au, Norman
Foster, Giorgio Grassi, Vittorio Gregotti, Zaha Hadid, Jacques Herzog and Pierre de Meuron,
John Hejduk, Josef Paul Kleihues, Hans Kollhoff, Daniel Libeskind, Jean Nouvel, Manuel de
Solà-Morales, Aldo Rossi, Oswald Mathias Ungers, Barnard Tschumi, and Robert Venturi and
Denise Scott Brown. Although this pool was international, all of the invitees had, according to
the organizers, palpable ties to Berlin, and represented, in Lampugnani’s view, “all of the

Tagesspiegel, called it a “cabinet of horrors,” and advised that the association bury the competition as quickly and quietly as
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important currents” in contemporary architecture.78 Thus the exhibition could feature Daniel
Libeskind’s radical reimagining of Unter den Linden, Berlin’s famous East-West boulevard, as
an elevated network of negative spaces (fig. 2.4), alongside Giorgio Grassi’s much more
conservative neo-rationalist gridded designs for Leipziger Strasse (fig. 2.5) and Hans Kollhoff’s
vision of a downtown clustered with skyscrapers (fig. 2.6-2.7), as a means of fostering visual and
verbal dialogue about the future of the city.
Architectural historians Harald Bodenschatz and Uwe Altrock argue that the exhibition
was regarded by Berlin architects and planners “as competition with the Berlin Scene – it was
presented in the ‘wrong’ place (in Frankfurt), initiated by the ‘wrong’ institution (the Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung) and supplied by the ‘wrong’ architects (especially non-Berlin architects).”79
This is, I would argue, not at all the case, for two reasons. First, the Berlin Morgen exhibition
had palpable connections to Kleihues’s IBA. Not only did many of the same architects
participate, but, in much the same manner as the IBA, the exhibition brought together different
threads of post-modernism – Deconstructivism, high-tech, and neo-rationalism – in the hopes of
fostering a professional conversation about planning and design. Second, several of the same
designs were directly submitted to the Potsdamer Platz master plan competition, including those
by Kleihues and Kollhoff, and many of the same architects, such as Libeskind and Foster, were
also invited to enter. Rather than constituting a threat from outside Berlin, then, the Berlin
Morgen organizers represented the “old way” of doing things, imagining that competitions for
prominent sites would go forth in much the same manner as they had during the IBA, with the
same group of architects and jurors running the show, and with the easy cooperation of the city
and investors. What they had not understood was how the complexities of the political and
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administrative situation in reunited Berlin, paired with the pressure from investors, could push
development into wholly different channels and utilize forces outside their purview.
The Master Plan Competition: “Blockrand-bouletten” versus “Hochhaus-spargel”
Although the term “Critical Reconstruction” was not used, some of its most basic
principles informed the Department of Urban Development’s Potsdamer Platz competition.80 The
competition brief called for designs that would take into account the “structures of the
nineteenth-century city”: a geometrical street plan, closed blocks, a functional mix, and
“appropriate heights” (though specific limits were not named).81 Part of the goal was to remedy
the open, Modernist planning of the so-called “Kulturforum” to the south, a cluster of structures
built in West Berlin from the 1960s-80s which included the West Berlin state library and the
philharmonic concert hall by Hans Scharoun, as well as an art gallery by Mies van der Rohe.82
The new Potsdamer Platz was to represent, in contrast to this open model of the Scharounian
“Stadtlandschaft,” with monumental buildings strewn throughout a park-like landscape, the
model of a dense, “traditional” urban landscape, full of pedestrian-friendly spaces and
commerce. Relying on the same kind of visual rhetoric discussed above, the competition brief
emphasized the relationship between this model of urban design and the new identity of the city:
The urban character will be primarily formed through central plazas and street
spaces for strolling and lingering, which will represent the city as focal points of
metropolitan life, and with which the residents will be able to identify. The
leisure, consumption, and entertainment-oriented society of today needs, for the
staging of public life, spaces of the highest visual and social quality.83
80
It should be noted that work on some IBA buildings continued through the early 1990s, so that IBA-style Critical
Reconstruction was actually still taking place right next door to Potsdamer Platz, as well.
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Ultimately, seventeen firms were invited to take part in the competition, including Foster,
Kleihues, Kollhoff, and Libeskind, as well as Günter Behnisch, Oswald Matthias Ungers, and
Vittorio Gregotti.84 As the competition proceeded, the concepts of the critique of Modernist
planning and the return to the pre-Modernist city that were implicit in the brief were the subject
of much critical debate, crystallizing specifically around the issue of skyscrapers. Kollhoff, a
protégé of Ungers and a close associate of Rem Koolhaas, wanted to design clusters of towers on
each side of the center of Berlin, forming “gateways” to the East at Alexanderplatz and West at
Potsdamer Platz (figs. 2.6-2.7). This concept reaches back to the idea of the city as “green
archipelago” – an idea stemming from Scharoun and others, and taken up by Ungers and
Koolhaas in the 1970s during their Summer Institutes in Berlin and at Cornell.85 From a land use
standpoint, this idea was in direct opposition to Kleihues’s Critical Reconstruction, which
demanded a return to the traditional street plan, block-edge development, and, to some degree,
height limits (though Kleihues himself was also a proponent of tower blocks in particular
contexts), and this had been a subject of debate throughout the IBA as well.86 But in the
Potsdamer Platz competition, critics did not necessarily divide along expected lines: for instance,
Wolf Jobst Siedler, who had co-authored The Murdered City, the famous late-1960s polemic
supporting the idea of the traditional city, and who had been a strong force for the creation of the
IBA as well as a close friend of Kleihues, wrote in favor of Kollhoff’s design for the Potsdamer
Platz competition. Other architecture critics in Germany’s major publications tended to favor this
Lebens Orte von hoher visueller und sozialer Qualität.” Berlin, Potsdamer und Leipziger Platz, Internationaler engerer
Wettbewerb: Aussschreibung, 25–26.
84
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idea as well, and even Kleihues’s own design for Potsdamer Platz included two towers for
Daimler Benz.87 On the other hand, urban critic Dieter Hoffmann-Axthelm and new Senate
Construction Director Hans Stimmann both strongly supported the idea of height limits, and
Hoffmann-Axthelm denounced competition as whole, saying it promoted “cosmetic” planning
without first delineating the small-scale plots and careful zoning which he considered to be at the
basis of good city planning. As the summer of 1991 progressed, the critical discourse concerning
the Potsdamer Platz competition coalesced around these two competing ideas for the image of
the city: the low-rise, block-edge development of traditional nineteenth-century Berlin versus a
green, ecological landscape strewn with high-density towers. As Michael Mönninger wrote in the
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, “one doesn’t yet know if block-edge-meatballs
(Blockrandbouletten) or skyscraper-asparagus (Hochhausspargel) are being grown here” – a
cheeky play on two typical Berlin foods.88
International Pressure and the Turn Towards Conservatism
In late September, the jury, which included Nagel, Hassemer, architectural historian Kurt
Forster, architect Rem Koolhaas, and Stimmann, awarded first prize to a design by the Munich
firm of Heinz Hilmer and Christoph Sattler. The design (figs. 2.8-2.10) features rows of highly
regular, almost cubical six-story blocks radiating out from the central node of Potsdamer Platz,
where a cluster of diminutive towers, projecting only slightly from the low-rise blocks, frames
the entrances to each of the avenues. The jury highlighted the design’s preservation of the
historical street plan, its low building profiles, and block-edge development as its winning
87
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characteristics. “This design,” the architects stated, “is based on the compact, spatially complex
European city rather than the American urban model of an accumulation of skyscrapers, which is
used all over the world. Urban life should be seen in streets and squares, not hidden away inside
huge building complexes.”89 But while the design does allow for a mixed-use, pedestrianoriented streetscape, it provides few “postcard-worthy” moments; rather, the height, distribution,
and massing of the various structures seem aimed at blending seamlessly in to the existing city
fabric of the Friedrichstadt to the north, and at drifting off without fanfare into the park-like
landscape of the Kulturforum to the south. In terms of creating a unique, historically oriented
architectural identity for Berlin, the design could be seen as moderately successful, but its
unremarkable character was a clear disappointment for most critics. As John Welsh observed in
the British architectural periodical Building Design, “The city planners have made it clear that
the existing centers of the old West and East Berlin are sufficient. The new Potsdamer Platz is
not intended to revive its prewar pivotal role in creating a third city center. Hilmer/Sattler’s plan
provides this low-key response.”90
Besides being almost universally denounced by critics as an unfortunate compromise, the
decision also ignited a brief scandal. In a dramatic continuation of the decades-long opposition
between the models of Critical Reconstruction and the “urban archipelago,” Rem Koolhaas, who
was displeased with the outcome of the competition and had, according to some, stormed out of
the proceedings early in protest, penned a letter of complaint to the Department of Urban
Development which he then published in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. His text excoriated
Stimmann for his supposedly “tactless” participation in the selection process, and called the
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outcome a “petty bourgeois, old-fashioned, reactionary, unrealistic, banal, provincial and above
all dilettantish image of the city.”91 As a proponent of experimental, dense urban design that
embraced the dissolution of traditional forms, Koolhaas was especially disappointed that the
design by Kollhoff had been rejected and that the question of skyscrapers had not been given
adequate attention.
While Koolhaas clearly had a deeply personal investment in these debates, especially
because of his ties to particular architects, the investors had money on the table, and they, too,
rejected the outcome of the competition. In early October of 1991, Daimler Benz’s Berlin
representative, Matthias Kleinert, in an interview with the Berlin newspaper Die Tagesspiegel,
called the Hilmer and Sattler design “something between Berlin and Podunk.”92 Daimler Benz
and the other investors were disappointed with the outcome of the competition, not only because
it did not provide them with the adequate square footage to establish their respective
headquarters, but also because it did not represent the striking image of “bustling urban life” that
had been their explicit goal, and which had been promised in the competition brief. They threw
their weight, instead, behind the newly finished Rogers plan (figs. 2.11-2.12), which the architect
had personally presented to city officials in early October. Rogers’s design centered on the idea
of Potsdamer Platz itself as what he called a “people’s place”: a pedestrian-friendly area with
bright neon signs, beckoning users into the shopping and entertainment district along the
radiating avenues. The building heights, contrary to Hilmer and Sattler’s design, were lower
around Potsdamer Platz itself, and were allowed to rise gradually toward the edges of the plot,
91
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allowing for a ring of corporate office towers that create a striking skyline and set off the
complex from the neighboring Kulturforum.
Quite suddenly, the various factions in Berlin aligned in opposition to the Rogers design,
which they saw as a threat from the outside: as Rudolf Stegers notes, an “umbrella coalition”
(“Maxicoalition”) including everyone from the CDU to the PDS flocked around Volker
Hassemer.93 The Architects and Engineers Association, the Association of German Architects,
and the Architects’ Chamber, who had previously heavily criticized the competition process,
“now unilaterally defended its "mediocre result.”94 Although they almost universally admitted
that the Hilmer and Sattler design was technically and aesthetically inferior to Rogers’s, German
critics also affirmed that the city could not give in to this pressure from investors and still save
face. In the Berliner Morgenpost, for example, the renowned architectural historian and critic
Julius Posener wrote: “the fact that the investors allowed in their own architect against the
official competition is a travesty, even if I like Rogers’s design better.”95 Some reacted even
more strongly: architect Jürgen Sawade, another student of Ungers who had been on the
competition jury, publically suggested banning Rogers from the city.96 Nagel and Stimmann,
whose department would be taking responsibility for the site thereafter, used every chance to
express their wholehearted support for the winning design. The main theme of conversation in
the media and amongst officials was therefore not the question of skyscrapers, but rather on the
pressure of private investment versus the democratic or “public” (i.e. state-driven) planning
process.
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In November, the city had a breakthrough: in a meeting of the Parliamentary Committee
for City Planning and Urban Development, in which all the interested parties, including the
investors, were present, they agreed to a compromise: they would sit down and hash out a plan
based on the Hilmer and Sattler design that would nonetheless satisfy the needs of the investors.
A 35 meter height limit for most of the site, with allowances for taller buildings around
Potsdamer Platz itself and along the Landwehrkanal to the south, was agreed upon, and in
December the Senate officially approved the plans. The “bluster over Potsdamer Platz,” Nagel
declared, “is now over.”97
Americanization by Mistake
However, it was a Pyrrhic victory. Competitions were soon held for each of the four
investors’ particular sites, and the winning designs can only be said to conform to the letter of the
Hilmer and Sattler plan, rather than the spirit. The competition for the Daimler Benz property
was won by Renzo Piano, including a triangular tower along Potsdamer Platz, backed by a
lower-rise shopping mall, movie theaters, and a musical theater, with a tower for Daimler Benz’s
new headquarters on the southernmost end (figs. 2.13-2.14). This plan, in turn, was used as an
“optimized” master plan for the site, on which competitions for individual buildings were then
based. Integrating the small-scale street plan of Hilmer and Sattler, the design was supposedly
“European” in flavor and was lauded by critics, as well as by Stimmann, who was on the jury.
However, as contracts for the designs of individual buildings on the site were awarded to various
architects, including Kollhoff, Rogers, and Arata Isosaki, and compromises were made allowing
for one of the streets to be covered over and turned into a shopping arcade, the complex began to
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lose more and more of its supposedly “European” flavor.98 In Hilmer and Sattler’s original plan,
the buildings were supposedly based on the traditional Berlin inner-courtyard or “Hof” typology
(fig. 2.10), but the results of the ensuing competitions and adjustments to the Daimler plan
rendered this idea ineffective. The massing of the buildings, and the way they are grouped,
comes across as monolithic and quasi-private rather than differentiated and lively (fig. 2.15).
With the covered, inner retail area as the main focus of the development, the outer spaces along
the streets are seemingly relegated to “back sides” of the complex which are uninviting to
pedestrians: here, the ground floors are, as Bodenschatz and Altrock observe, “mostly walls that
are broken only by garage entrances or air vents.”99 This deficiency is most noticeable on the
southern side of the development, where the much-lauded water feature – harkening back to the
Green party’s calls for more park space at Potsdamer Platz around the time of the Wende –
combines strangely with parking entrances, the Daimler Benz office tower, and the back side of
Scharoun’s state library. The result is a seemingly desolate landscape that does little to remediate
the Stadtlandschaft of the Kulturforum.
Helmut Jahn won the competition for the Sony property, with a design regarded by critics
as somewhat “American.” Here, a showy, circus-tent roof of steel and glass covers an inner plaza
surrounded by retail spaces and restaurants, as well as a movie theater (figs. 2.16-2.17).
Although it achieved the aim of preserving several fragments of historical buildings on the site,
Mönninger called it a sell-out to “American entertainment architecture,” and Falk Jaeger, in the
Berlin paper Der Tagesspiegel, called it a loss for Stimmann.100 Like the Daimler development,
the Sony Center also turns its back to the street, creating an interiorized space which, though
98
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heavily trafficked, feels private and isolated from its context. The Sony Center has been a
success, however, in terms of “image”: with its trio of towers and its signature roof lit by colored
lights, it has indeed become one of the most recognizable “postcard” images of Berlin,101 and it
is one of the most-visited areas of the city.
Peppered with fast food restaurants and global retail chains, Potsdamer Platz as a whole
is, in Bodenschatz and Altrock’s terms, a place where the “mass public is at home,” but where
the international architectural community – supported by the educated middle class – missed its
chance to build something special.102 In terms of commercial success, the investors and the
notion of “corporate identity” (as opposed to city identity) can be said to have won out here, but
actual profits themselves have been marginal. Daimler Benz and Sony have since sold these
properties to other firms.103 As Stimmann observed after the first master plan competition,
because the sales were made to investors without any stipulations as to what would be built, the
city had to “live with” the mediocre results.104 It was this backwards approach to city-driven
planning – trying to rein in investors, rather than assuring their cooperation from the start – that
meant that, despite the Hilmer and Sattler plan and the city’s attachment to the idea of the
“European city,” “Americanization” happened anyway through a series of seemingly small
compromises. Critic Fritz Neumeyer wrote in Der Tagesspiegel:
Under the protectorship of the traditional European city, which was invoked in
defense of the American city, all of a sudden American commercial architecture
of the first water is being built: not in the form of skyscrapers, which have
something to offer the life of the street, but in the shape of a shopping mall, which
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turns the functions of the street inward and thus, as in an aquarium, removes city
life into a closed-off, glass-covered space.105
Ward calls this the “Stimmann Effect”: Berlin’s planners, she contends, “let the American
bogeyman in by mistake” through the involvement of private investors.106 As will be explored
further in Chapter 3, Stimmann and other planners were keen to avoid what they saw as
“American” urban forms – by which they meant the overly showy, populist commercial
architecture of typical American structures like malls. But in fact the “Americanization” of
Potsdamer Platz was due not simply to investor involvement, which is perhaps an inevitable and
necessary fact of urban development under capitalism, but to the administrative confusion and
woefully inadequate urban planning measures in place at the time. In fact, since Stimmann did
not even take office until April of 1991, he had little effect on the sale of the land or the original
terms – all he could do was try to exert his influence as a jury member in the competitions. As
Strom argues, although investors were a key driver of construction in Berlin, the city’s model of
planning is significantly more paternalistic than any American city: for Germans, ownership of
land does not come with the rights to build whatever the owner wants.107 After the experience at
Potsdamer Platz, Nagel, Stimmann, and others became much more careful about how they
handled planning in tandem with corporate interests.
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Learning from the Friedrichstadt Passagen
Not far from Potsdamer Platz lies the North-South axis of Friedrichstrasse, which had
been bisected by the Berlin Wall and the famous Checkpoint Charlie. The southern (i.e. West
Berlin) section of this avenue had been rebuilt as part of the IBA, and the northern (East Berlin)
end had also experienced considerable redevelopment during the 1980s. This famous commercial
artery, the center of the financial and press industries of Weimar Berlin, was, like Potsdamer
Platz, an immediate draw for investors. Officials such as Nagel and Hanno Klein (employed by
the Department of Construction and head of the KOAI before his murder in 1991) did what they
could to increase this interest by fostering the image of Friedrichstrasse as a future luxury quarter
that would include high-end retail, office, and residential space. One key site along this avenue
was a row of three large blocks on its eastern side, between Französische Strasse and
Mohrenstrasse, which had already been partially built up by the East German government as a
retail and entertainment center called the “Friedrichstadt Passagen” (in reference to the
nineteenth-century retail typology of the passage) (fig. 2.18).108 As at Potsdamer Platz, a large
international investor showed interest in one of the properties even before the two Germanys
reunited: Galeries Lafayette, a French department store chain, was already in talks with the
interim East Berlin government in January 1990 with the intention of gaining ownership of the
northernmost block in the trio.109 Unlike at Potsdamer Platz, there was little debate amongst
investors and planners as to what the guiding outlines for the development of the Friedrichstadt
Passagen should be: historical height limits and block-edge, courtyard-centered development
were never in question. Still, this project was yet another learning experience for Stimmann
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because of its sheer size, and because of the somewhat showy nature of its architecture. Based on
the critical failure of this project, as well as the debacle at Potsdamer Platz, he could, in 1992,
propose stricter guidelines for rebuilding the city with the cooperation of investors.
Land Sale and Architectural competition
Over one hundred investors flocked to buy the Friedrichstadt Passagen parcels from the
Treuhand, and preliminary selections were made in October 1990, right as reunification was
officially taking place, helped along by the fact that Klein had been appointed as the East Berlin
representative for the property.110 Hardly a diplomat, he was quoted in the national magazine Der
Spiegel as saying that Berlin needed a new “Gründerzeit” with “distinction and brutality,” and
that city planning was simply “well-organized repression.”111 The magnitude of proposals
allowed him to wrest power from the over-inundated Bezirk officials, allowing prominent
projects to be pushed through and certain investors favored.112 Klein already had close ties to
Galeries Lafayette, and rumors circulated that the French President François Mitterrand had even
contacted Chancellor Kohl on behalf of the French department store chain. However, Berlin’s
tricky property laws won out: German developer Roland Ernst was able to buy up a property
claim to a parcel included in the block, and was ultimately awarded the sale, with Galeries
Lafayette as a tenant rather than an owner.113
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However, although Ernst was already all but guaranteed the rights to build, property sales
and development were technically made contingent on a city-sponsored design competition
wherein investors paired with architects to vie for each parcel. Requirements for the competition
were set by the East Berlin Magistrat in late 1990, embodying, like the competition at Potsdamer
Platz, many of the principles of Critical Reconstruction: mixed use, adherence to the baroque
street plan, height limits of 22 meters with setback attic ridges of 30 meters, and respect for the
“historical context.”114 Because they did not yet own the property, the investors could not take
issue with the design brief, and, as opposed to those at Potsdamer Platz, they had very different
motivations for building on this site, whose main focus was luxury retail spaces. The defining
“postcard image” here would not be that of a flashy, new corporate identity, but of “history” as
an element of the experience of capitalist consumption. With the help of “loophole” Paragraphs
34 and 36 in the Berlin planning code mentioned above, the development was predicted to go
speedily.
By April 1991 – the same month that Stimmann came into office – the Friedrichstadt
Passagen jury, headed by Kleihues, announced its decision: the three blocks would each be
designed by a separate firm under a separate investor, allowing for a diversity of facades along
the street.115 Jean Nouvel would build for Galeries Lafayette at the northern end (though, it
should be noted, because of the earlier dealings with Klein, this was actually a “done deal”
before the competition even took place), Pei Cobb Freed and Partners would build the middle
114
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block, funded by the French firm Bouyges Immobilier, and the American firm Tishman Speyer,
with Ungers as architect, would be responsible for the southernmost plot. Because of existing
landmarked structures, only Ungers’s building would be able to fill the entire block; the others
were limited to the majority of the western sides of their respective plots. However, the very idea
of “block-sized” development alludes to the massive size of all three complexes.
Although in their details the three designs differ somewhat, with the high-tech
modernism typical of Nouvel, Ungers’s trademark rationalism, and a playfully abstracted, stoneclad take on the Berlin Mietskaserne by Pei, the three buildings are typologically similar, with
setback attic stories, street-level retail spaces, and clearly discernable entrances. The original
brief had called for an overground passage between the three, in the manner of the famous turnof-the-century pedestrian malls, but this passage was moved underground in order to preserve the
traditional shape of the baroque street plan.116 Retail is not the only attraction: the middle block
features a central piano bar and café, and the lower level of Galeries Lafayette houses a gourmet
food court. In a barely-perceptible nod to history, the central, glass-covered “courtyards” of the
buildings on their lower, interconnected floors, each take the shape of one of Berlin’s
historically-important plazas (the square Pariser Platz, octagonal Leipziger Platz, and circular
Belle-Alliance-Platz).
Joined together thematically and physically by the galleries, each building in the
Friedrichstadt Passagen nonetheless takes a unique architectural approach to historical forms.
Ungers’s design attempts to solve the problem of its massive, block-size footprint with the
concept of an eight-story “core building” enclosing two atriums, surrounded by six protruding
blocks that project out of it at even intervals and create separate, recessed entrances (figs. 2.19116
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2.20).117 Though its typically Ungersesque matrix of square, symmetrically-organized windows
appears monolithic in renderings, the reflectiveness of its windows allow it to blend into the
streetscape by mirroring the surrounding structures. As Paula Winter comments in Bauwelt
Berlin Annual, the building “threatens to disappear as soon as one looks away,” and it is clearly
the most conservative of the three.118
Its neighbor, Pei Cobb Freed and Partners’ Quartier 206, creates a more striking
impression by abstractly referencing nineteenth-century façade décor with strong horizontal
profiling and a “prism” design on the exterior (fig. 2.21).119 Covered in light limestone with
narrow, horizontally oriented windows, up close the façade appears both more conspicuous and
more daring than Ungers’s. It is not until one sees the building from a distance that the complex
façade resolves itself into a jagged decorative motif that recalls the plaster-adorned buildings of
the previous century. The triangular tops of each prism, which from street-level appear to create
a sharply delineated and uneven skyline, appear from a distance like dormers in a mansard roof.
The interior also recalls the splendor of the previous century with its black-and-white checker
motif and atrium, with a piano bar and a sweeping spiral staircase, given a starkly modern touch
with the addition of an escalator through the center of the gallery (fig. 2.22).
Jean Nouvel’s Galeries Lafayette building is the most explicitly modern of the
Friedrichstadt Passagen trio, with an imposing and modern glass façade that curves around the
northwestern corner of its block and originally allowed for ticker-tape-style digital displays,
which have in recent years gone unused (figs. 2.23-2.24). The interior “courtyard” area
comprises two giant, transparent glass cones, one rising up from the ground floor and one
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extending down from the ceiling, shedding colored rays of light into the lower café and
gastronomy level, while providing a space for seasonal displays on the main level (figs. 2.252.26).120
Critical Reception
The result of these designs amounts to three interconnected shopping centers with
additional retail space facing the street – in some ways the “luxury quarter” that planners and
investors had hoped for. But, as Bodenschatz and Altrock observe, like the developments at
Potsdamer Platz, the Passagen are massive and somewhat inward-looking. By the time
construction was well underway in 1993, the beginnings of the burst of the Berlin bubble were
starting to be felt. Two of the properties had already been partially or totally resold, and there
were well-placed fears over the profitability of all three.121 Because the amount of residential
space built into the blocks was in actuality well under the required 20%, the area felt empty for
several years.122 As developers pulled out, there was at first not even enough money to keep
Nouvel’s building lit up at night, adding to the sense of vacancy along the street.
Critics were luke-warm about the designs, originally bristling at Nouvel’s high-tech
design, and writing off Pei’s contribution as kitschy.123 However, nothing about the specific,
aesthetic qualities of these buildings goes against the idea of Critical Reconstruction; it is their
size that ultimately made them negative examples. What Stimmann regretted about these projects
was the fact that they “not only vastly exceeded the dimensions of the [individual] historical lots
but also … the scale of the blocks of the historical Friedrichstadt district. They set the stage, and
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unfortunately also the scale, for an entire series of project ideas from private investors for the
area of the historical center.”124 Such massive projects went directly against Critical
Reconstruction’s call for varied, mixed-use streetscapes, and, as will be discussed in the
following chapter, Stimmann spent the next few years campaigning for an overall development
plan that would not only reinstate the historical street and building codes, but would require
small-scale investment in individual parcels.

Conclusion: The Conservative Turn in Berlin Planning
The urban planning process, Harvey contends, is often conflictual, as well as “delicate
and difficult” – so much so that a charismatic leader with a clear vision and political skill can
often steer this process to his or her own ends.125 Such a leader was found in Senate Construction
Director Stimmann, who was appointed under Senator Nagel in April of 1991. Chosen, in the
wake of Klein’s inflammatory statements about a new Gründerzeit, as a “soft” diplomat,
Stimmann turned out to be anything but. Having learned quickly from Potsdamer Platz and the
Friedrichstadt Passagen that investor-driven development needed to be tightly controlled from
the outset with clear building guidelines, he began the project of not only expanding his own
political and administrative power, but also of establishing a new version of Critical
Reconstruction as a guiding image for the city. Stimmann’s adoption – and, perhaps more
importantly, his adaptation – of Kleihues’s theory after 1991 cannot be understood apart from
these early projects, or from the administrative and political structures that informed their
development.
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By using Critical Reconstruction as a model, Stimmann hoped to resolve many of the issues that
had cropped up in the experiences at these two prominent sites in Mitte. First, based on
contemporary perceptions regarding urban competition in the global age, such as those discussed
by Harvey and Sassen, Berlin needed, in the face of rampant economic expansion, a way to
define itself as a unique place. From a planning standpoint, this meant the need for a distinctive
typology that would be marketable and recognizable as “Berlinisch.” Second, Stimmann needed
to ensure that local institutions and architects who had long-term relationships with – and
investments in – the city going back into the 1980s and earlier would feel included in the
planning process. The threat that architects, such as Rogers, could be chosen privately at the
whim of large investors helped these various factions band together and created the impetus for
the formation of a cartel of architects, planners, critics, and intellectuals in Berlin that some have
called “incestuous.”126 Finally, from a political standpoint, the city had to assert its power over
capital, ensuring that the tradition of state-, rather than investor-, controlled planning would be
preserved. The “Stimmann Effect,” then, actually constituted not an “Americanization” of Berlin
through the participation of large investors, but a highly conservative and autocratic turn in the
city’s planning culture. The details of this “effect” will be explored at length in the following
chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
Critical Reconstruction’s Transformation under Hans Stimmann

This chapter looks at the changes to, and implementation of, Critical Reconstruction in
Berlin’s central district of Mitte between 1991 and 1994. Having been closely involved in the
debacle at Potsdamer Platz and witnessed the emerging mediocrity of the Friedrichstadt Passagen
project, Berlin’s new Senate Construction Director Hans Stimmann, who took office in April of
1991, decided to adopt Josef Paul Kleihues’s theory of Critical Reconstruction as the guiding
concept for the work of his department in Mitte. Though Stimmann’s department (Berlin’s
Department of Construction and Housing) was by no means the only planning body with
jurisdiction over this neighborhood – Berlin’s Department of Urban Development and
Environment and the federal government were also both in charge of large and often overlapping
swaths of the city center – Stimmann did his best to expand both his own actual power to
influence planning decisions, and the public perception of that power. The result was that Critical
Reconstruction was one of the most publicly discussed facets of Berlin city planning in the
1990s.
Critical Reconstruction was in many ways a logical choice as a guiding strategy for
Mitte’s redevelopment, having already gained worldwide attention in the 1980s through its
deployment in the same neighborhood during the International Building Exhibition
(Internationale Bauaustellung, or IBA), led by Kleihues. However, Stimmann’s adoption of
Critical Reconstruction was also puzzling, since he had been a vocal critic of Kleihues and the
IBA up until 1989. As a long-time, far-left member of Berlin’s Social Democratic Party (SPD),
Stimmann wanted to curb large-scale commercial development and car-friendly traffic plans, and
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to support the middle class by fostering small-scale property ownership. After seeing what had
transpired at Potsdamer Platz and the Friedrichstadt Passagen, he decided that Critical
Reconstruction was his best option for achieving these ends. However, he did not adopt
Kleihues’s approach wholesale, nor did he enter into the types of heady theoretical
rationalizations that characterized Kleihues’s work. Stimmann was both immanently practical
and intensely political in his application of Critical Reconstruction. His implementation, for
instance, of Kleihues’s plan to restore the original baroque-era street plan in Mitte was not only
geared towards the creation of a post-modern, pedestrian-friendly landscape, but, more
importantly, aimed to carve out new plots of land that could, Stimmann hoped, be sold off in
small parcels, thus creating much-needed revenue for the city and allowing him control over
what was built on these new plots. By adopting and codifying Critical Reconstruction’s pareddown, rationalist architectural style, he also hoped to rein in multinational investors whose
preferred designs, as had been seen clearly at Potsdamer Platz, only served to bolster corporate
identities and threatened to turn Berlin into a landscape of overly showy façades covering
mundane shopping malls. Thus, instead of using it as a platform for promoting carefully curated
dialogue within the global architectural scene, as Kleihues had, Stimmann reduced Critical
Reconstruction to a rigid set of aesthetic guidelines that real estate developers could easily
understand.
On the global architecture scene, the early 1990s were, in many ways, the moment when
the ideas of post-modern architects and theorists that had been avant-garde in the 1970s and
1980s were gaining widespread adoption. Across the United States, for instance, low-rise
shopping centers and big-box stores began to ape some of the strategies of New Urbanism,
refashioning themselves aesthetically to capture “local” flavor or to appear as “historic” town
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centers, with clock towers, lush landscaping, and pedestrian walkways. However, the large-scale
commercial application of such an approach to urbanism inevitably meant that the loss of some
of its key theoretical facets, such as the strict regulation of traffic, the careful mix of urban and
residential functions, and the consciously post-modern mix of traditional and experimental
architectural styles. The same was true for Critical Reconstruction: what had been a smallerscale, intellectually rigorous endeavor under Kleihues necessarily lost much of this depth when it
was applied wholesale to commercial developments across the city.
The notion of “history,” in particular, which, as discussed in Chapter 1, Kleihues had
made such an effort to sidestep or reframe as “memory,” became a particularly potent example of
how Stimmann’s Critical Reconstruction differed from that of his predecessor. Stimmann
attempted to publicly legitimize his aesthetic preferences by tying Critical Reconstruction to the
concept of the “European city” and abstract notions of “history,” discussed at length below, as
the ideal conceptual bases for Berlin’s development. However, it is my contention that Stimmann
actually had very little interest in a theoretical engagement with history, either in terms of an
architecture of memory (as Kleihues or other post-modern theorists like Rossi had proposed) or
in terms of discussions about national identity and the Historikerstreit. His brash manner and
bold statements exemplify a kind of anti-intellectualism that saw every decision as stemming
from a supposedly “practical” need or leading to a necessary political end. His reliance on the
ideas of “history” and the “European city,” therefore, was a strategic move calculated to take
advantage of the larger context of intense international focus on Berlin as a symbol of the
reunited country’s relationship to its troubled history, as well as Berlin’s need to differentiate
itself as having a “local” character amidst a global market. Stimmann deployed this logic in
tandem with Critical Reconstruction’s strictures because, ultimately, he thought it would help
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him create the socio-economic and political landscape that, since his time as a member of the
radical 1970s SPD, he had long desired: an urban fabric that was tightly-knit, multifunctional,
and filled with educated residents who would want to be involved in planning and advocate for
themselves.
Unfortunately, Stimmann’s use of Critical Reconstruction failed to help him achieve his
various goals, and his attempt to connect it to “history” backfired in an especially unfortunate
way. Due to investment pressures and political limitations, land in Mitte was sold off in huge,
block-sized plots to large-scale investors, and Stimmann was criticized as a tool of capitalist
interests. Meanwhile, his reliance on a set of rigid design standards – discussed at length below –
that referenced “history” when convenient, but did away with the nuance and theoretical
complexity of Kleihues’s approach, opened him up to critique by critics and architects who saw
him as dangerously dictatorial, even fascist, in his aims to control the look of new buildings. As
will be discussed in more depth in Chapter 4, Stimmann’s reductive deployment of Kleihues’s
ideas dovetailed in calamitous ways with larger conversations about the conservative tendencies
in Berlin’s new architecture. The result was that Stimmann’s Critical Reconstruction came to be
seen as conservative, backward-looking, authoritarian, and pro-big business, despite the fact that
it was authored by a politician who had long been part of the political left and a vocal critic of
capitalist development.
Stimmann’s failure to successfully garner positive attention through these efforts points
to one of the difficulties with the political dimensions of post-modernism, especially as it
entailed historicism: it is difficult to ensure that buildings (let alone an entire urban landscape)
will “mean” something to a public that includes constituents from outside the field of
architecture. Even if Stimmann had succeeded in fostering the creation of a cityscape that
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reflected the city’s history in a meaningful way, it is not clear that the users of the city would
interpret it correctly as such. Considered alongside the complications that Stimmann faced with
the city’s politics, economics, and institutions (discussed in Chapter 2), as well as the ways that
contentious architectural discourse was filtered and re-interpreted through the popular media
(discussed in Chapter 4), it is no wonder that Stimmann’s Critical Reconstruction was unable to
achieve his ambitious ends.

Stimmann and the Reintroduction of Critical Reconstruction
Stimmann’s Early Years
Born in the northern German town of Lübeck and trained as a professional builder,
Stimmann arrived in Berlin in 1970 to study city and regional planning at the Technical
University, a program that focused heavily on theory and sociology rather than the raw technical
or aesthetic aspects of planning. While there, he became deeply involved with the local SPD,
working for SPD Building Senator Harry Ristock and publishing numerous essays on city
planning issues. As part of a young, radical far-left movement within the SPD, Stimmann was
especially critical of the party’s inability to successfully counteract slum clearance and freeway
building measures – planning tactics that represented the then mainstream, post-war Modernist
approach to city planning (discussed in Chapter 1).1 However, although he was deeply engaged
in discussions of architecture and planning, Stimmann focused less on the technical or stylistic
aspects of architecture and urbanism, and, influenced by his time at the Technical University, he
preferred to look at the socio-economic issues that provided the context for that urbanism.
During this period in his education, he had been especially drawn to Marxist, anti-capitalist
1
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theories – to the point of stating, later, that he earned his diploma “without hearing one thing
about city planning.”2 His days as a student, write Michael Mönninger and Jürgen Düwel, were
spent in the contemplation, rather, of “abstract information about planning and politics under
capitalism,” and “about all possible thoughts on the transformation of the system.”3 Thus
Stimmann was not a part of the discussions about post-modernist architecture that were taking
place simultaneously at the Technical University under Oswald Matthias Ungers and others.4
This major rift between his training and interests and those of European post-modernist
architects, historians, and planners who were his contemporaries became especially apparent
during the public debates over Critical Reconstruction in the 1990s, which are discussed in detail
in Chapter 4.
Stimmann’s eschewal of mainstream architectural discourse continued into the following
decade, when, in the mid-1980s, he became involved with the Internationale Bauaustellung
(International Building Exhibition, or IBA) through its Altbau (urban renewal) projects, headed
by the architect Hardt-Walther Hämer. As opposed to Kleihues’s Neubau (new construction)
projects, the IBA-Altbau focused on working directly with communities, most notably in the
West Berlin neighborhood of Kreuzberg, to improve and rehabilitate existing buildings and
streets. During this time, Stimmann wrote several essays criticizing Critical Reconstruction as
applied by Kleihues as head of the Neubau section of the IBA. In his essay of 1985, “Between
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Instead of taking the traditional university track through his engineering and doctoral work, as figures such as Kleihues did,
Stimmann rose up through the vocational, engineering track of university education. This background, I argue, is probably what
gives him much of his anti-intellectual bent. See ibid., 9.
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City Planning, Politics, and Architectural Styles: The IBA,” for instance, he delved into the long
history of post-war Berlin planning politics to argue that the IBA-Neubau was doomed to failure.
Created in the context of an already internally contradictory and broken political and planning
culture, he argued, the IBA’s planners did not have the power to put through their overambitious
plans. The disappearance of various SPD politicians from the planning leadership of the
exhibition also meant that its progressive, socio-political goals had been lost. This issue came to
a head with the unveiling of the famous “Kleihues Plan” (fig. 1.25, discussed Chapter 1), a map
of Kleihues’s intended reconstruction of the city center, at the 1984 IBA exhibition titled “Idea,
Process, Result.” Stimmann wrote,
With this framework … Kleihues set himself over and against all previous legally
required building plans, but also other types of planning such as district planning.
With the creation of this plan Kleihues instead used an urban design method that,
consciously or unconsciously, was closely related to Camillo Sitte’s 1889 artisticaesthetic ideas about city construction.5
Stimmann is referring here to Sitte’s famous treatise, City Planning According to Artistic
Principles. Sitte viewed late nineteenth-century city planning in his native Vienna as much too
focused on issues of engineering, and sought to refocus planners’ attention on the aesthetic and
stylistic aspects of city design that would create pleasant spaces for users.6 Such ideas, in
Stimmann’s mind, emphasized the wrong facets of planning, attempting to prettify the urban
landscape without paying attention to its social conditions. Kleihues’s designs therefore
constituted, Stimmann wrote,

5

“Beim Entwurf des Planes benutzte Kleihues statt dessen eine städtebauliche Entwurfsmethode, die sich, bewusst
oder unbewusst, auf Camillo Sittes 1889 entwickelte künstlerisch-ästhetische Städtebauvorstellungen.” Hans Stimmann,
“Zwischen Stadtplanung, Politik Und Architekturmoden. Die IBA,” in Von Der Sozialutopie Zum Städtischen Haus, by Hans
Stimmann, ed. Jörn Düwel and Michael Mönninger (Berlin: DOM, 2011), 86–89.
6

It should be noted that Sitte was much more focused on the psychological rather than stylistic aspects of city planning.
His work sought to make urban spaces more comfortable, and thus he pulled together examples from many different places and
time periods in order to achieve these ends. Stimmann is therefore quite reductive in his reading of Sitte. See George R. Collins
and Christiane Crasemann Collins, Camillo Sitte: The Birth of Modern City Planning, Dover ed. (Mineola, NY: Dover, 2006),
48; see also Camillo Sitte, City Planning according to Artistic Principles (New York, Random House, 1965).
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the aesthetic – but not the social – critique of the results of the capitalist urban
development of the late nineteenth century. … In his plans for the Southern
Friedrichstadt, Kleihues also ignored questions of the societal requirements for
the planned production of city construction and architecture – the land ownership
relationships, the land prices, the financing, the legal requirements for
participation by citizens, etc. The ambivalence and the non-binding quality of the
plans in terms of the social results made them, conversely, into an instrument of
completely non-artistic financial and power interests.7
As a planning model, Stimmann praised the methods of Hämer’s IBA-Altbau, where “instead of
the traditional planning methods there were one-on-one discussions, building meetings, citizens’
groups, seminars,” and a “working group for renewal” which included IBA representatives,
planners, housing associations, and residents.8 To Stimmann, this was the antithesis of
Kleihues’s “aesthetic” approach: instead of concentrating on how buildings looked, Hämer
worked to support healthy social, economic, and political relationships between residents and the
city government, allowing architectural reconstruction (which, in this case, was mostly
remodeling or renovation) to arise out of these needs. Stimmann’s critiques were, in many ways,
correct, as he would later find out: his desire to emphasize the structural relationships that would
give rise to a healthy city fabric became a point of serious tension when he decided to adopt
Critical Reconstruction as his own planning method.
Stimmann as a Leading Figure in Berlin City Planning
In 1986, Stimmann accepted the post of Construction Director in his hometown of
Lübeck, where he spent five years before returning to Berlin.9 His appointment as Berlin Senate
7

“… die ästhetische, nicht jedoch die soziale Kritik an den Ergebnissen des kapitalistischen Städtebaus des
ausgehenden 19. Jahrhunderts … Ähnlich wie die [Berlin] Planer von 1910 ignoriert auch Kleihues bei seinen Plänen für die
südliche Friedrichstadt Fragen nach den gesellschaftlichen Bedingungen für die beabsichtigte Produktion von Städtebau und
Architektur – den Bodenbesitzverhältnissen, den Bodenpreisen, der Finanzierung, den gesetzlichen Anforderungen an
Bürgerbeteiligung, etc. Die Gleichgültigkeit bzw. die Unverbindlichkeit der Planungen etwa gegenüber den sozialen Folgen
macht sie anderseits zum Instrument durchaus unkünstlerischer Macht- und Geldinteressen.” Stimmann, “Zwischen
Stadtplanung, Politik Und Architekturmoden. Die IBA,” 86–89.
8

Ibid., 90.

9

There, he worked to refurbish the city center, with an emphasis on traffic quieting measures. See Stimmann, Von der
Sozialutopie ..., 29.

121

Construction Director under Senator Wolfgang Nagel in 1991 came as a surprise to many
observers, first, because the position had been vacant for almost a decade, and second, Senator
Nagel’s close associate Hanno Klein had expected the appointment himself.10 Nagel may have
been nervous about Klein’s well-known tendency toward hyperbolic statements and autocratic
dealings: as mentioned earlier, he was infamous for stating that Berlin needed a second
Gründerzeit “with prominence and brutality.”11 Journalist and critic Rudolf Stegers has
suggested that Nagel may have thought he was getting a softer politician in Stimmann – someone
who could smooth things over in a way that Klein had been unable or unwilling to.12 If this is
indeed the case, Nagel was in for a grave disappointment. Though at the time some thought
Stimmann a laughable, provincial nobody, from the moment of his taking office, he proved
himself to be a brash, autocratic, and controlling figure in Berlin building politics. As illustrated
by his heated exchanges with Rem Koolhaas in the jury discussions about the Sony Center
designs for Potsdamer Platz (discussed in Chapter 2), which gave rise to a longstanding feud
between Koolhaas and the city of Berlin, Stimmann gave no thought to offending either his
colleagues or others in the architectural or planning professions.
Upon taking office in April of 1991, Stimmann’s first big move was to restructure the
office of Senate Construction Director. Since World War II, this position had functioned chiefly
as the “aesthetic arm” of the Construction Senator, a “city architect” who might draw up
potential plans or make recommendations about development, but whose aims and suggestions
were mainly aesthetic – rather than political – in nature. Stimmann attempted to gain more
10

The position had been vacant due to political upheavals within the Berlin Senate in the early 1980s, partly over the
future and management of the IBA, and many thought it should be done away with entirely. See Stimmann, “Zwischen
Stadtplanung, Politik Und Architekturmoden. Die IBA,” 81–82.
11

“Markant Und Brutal,” Der Spiegel, no. 14 (April 1, 1991): 113.

12

This explanation seems unlikely to me, given that he was acquainted with Stimmann already and would have seen
him in action; my suspicion is that Nagel hoped that Stimmann, with his left-leaning ideals, might be able to rein in investors in
the right ways.
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decision-making power than previous directors by changing his position into one of a State
Secretary, which gave him more authority and a stronger political connection to the Senate, and
by establishing his own department, “Section III,” with a large team of architects and
administrators, as well as its own architecture workshop.13 Thus he became not just an
aesthetically oriented “city architect,” but a planner in the more general sense, and one with
much more political sway than previous directors. Though in reality his power to make decisions
and influence planning was still somewhat limited, especially since the Construction Department
was only one of three major planning powers with jurisdiction over the city center, the public
persona he crafted broadcasted the opposite.14 In an oft-quoted 1991 interview in the national
architectural journal Baumeister, Stimmann boldly asserted, “I’m a powerful man. … I can tell
each of my employees: we’re going to do it this way – as long as my Senator doesn’t throw me
out. Then we are simultaneously the state building commission, ministry, and president of the
government.”15 This commanding public persona worked along with his reductive aesthetics and
rigid planning rules to earn Stimmann a reputation as a highly conservative planner.

13

See Hans Stimmann and Wolfgang Bachmann, “‘Ich Bin Ein Mächtiger Mann’: Gespräch Mit Senatsbaudirektor,
Hans Stimmann, Berlin,” Baumeister 90, no. 7 (July 1993): 48–51.
14
As discussed in Chapter 2, the Department of Urban Planning and the federal government both also had authority
over overlapping swaths of Mitte. The Department of Urban Planning, in particular, was equally influential over most planning
decisions.
15

In the original text he relates the “powerful man” statement to the position of State Secretary: “Weil ich aber als
Staatssekretär ein mächtiger Mann bin, kann ich alle Projekt an mich ziehen. Ich zwinge damit meine eigene Verwaltung, über
Gestaltung nachzudenken. Die hat ja sonst keinen Gesprächspartner. Ich kann jedem meiner Mitarbeiter sagen: Jetzt wird das
aber so gemacht – so lange mich mein Senator nich rausschmeißt. Dann sind wir gleichzeitig Landesbauamt, Ministerium und
Regierungspräsident.”Stimmann and Bachmann, “‘Ich Bin Ein Mächtiger Mann,’” 48. In truth, he didn’t actually see himself as
particularly powerful: eighty percent of the new buildings in Berlin, he admitted, were created outside of his control. See ibid.,
49.
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Stimmann’s Reductive Version of Critical Reconstruction
The Concept of the European City and the Idea of the “Guiding Image”
As noted above, Stimmann had been highly critical of Kleihues’s use of the map format
as a publicity tool during the IBA; however, after his adoption of Critical Reconstruction in
1991, he followed suit. Along with his many verbal and written statements, images were a key
way in which he disseminated his message and presented arguments about what should be done
with the city. The importance of images for Stimmann’s Critical Reconstruction is underscored
by his frequent invocation of this method as a Leitbild or “guiding image.” The Leitbild is a
concept with a fairly long history in German planning, having come to the fore particularly in the
1980s as a popular instrument of democratic governance.16 Formed primarily, as the term
implies, by images (drawings, plans, and examples of existing buildings), but reinforced
rhetorically, a Leitbild acts as a kind of “branding strategy” intended to make complex planning
tactics easily comprehensible to the public, and to win their support.17 Comprised of his many
statements and numerous publications that included historical photographs, plans, and maps,
Stimmann’s Leitbild for the city center touted the vision of six-story, stone-clad, block-edge
commercial developments topped by luxury residences and fronted by cafés and shops that
would draw the bourgeois flâneur to stroll along its stately avenues: the very image long touted
by continental architects and theorists as the post-modern answer to mid-century, International
Style Modernist development. Stimmann regularly referred to this Leitbild as stemming from the
model of the “European city.”

16

Hennecke, Die kritische Rekonstruktion als Leitbild, 21.

17

See ibid., 55 and; Harald Bodenschatz and Uwe Altrock, Renaissance der Mitte: Zentrumsumbau in London und
Berlin (Berlin: Verlagshaus Braun, 2005), 8.
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Used widely by post-modern theorists and designers from the 1960s on, including other
proponents of Critical Reconstruction like Vittorio Magnago Lampugnani, a key figure in the
Berlin Architecture Debates (discussed in Chapter 4), the idea of the “European city” is
essentially a conservative one which suggests not only the need for the preservation of
historically-important architecture, but for a certain “social” (connoting political, economic, but
also cultural) way of life. Sociologist Walter Siebel describes the concept in terms of five
characteristics: the city as holding the promise of political and economic emancipation in the
form of bourgeois, democratic society; social regulation in the form of a welfare state; the city
giving rise to special, urban ways of living (Lebensweise), formed especially by a unique kind of
division of public and private space; the “image of the form of the European city,” inherited from
ages past; and the tangible presence of history (architectural, political, and social) in the daily life
of citizens.18 Siebel describes the traditional European form of the Stadtkrone, with its city hall,
market, and church, as the “symbol for the political, economic and cultural centrality of the
city.”19 This form is typically embodied in the Altstadt, or medieval city core.20 Drawing on the
theories of Max Weber to argue for the socio-economic underpinning of urban forms and
lifestyles, Siebel claims that the traditional “European city” is today being undermined by the
shifting values of contemporary society.21
The “European city” model can be seen as part of a larger trend towards “historical”
forms of one kind or another in post-modern architecture and urbanism. Beginning in the 1970s,

18

“… das überkommene Bild von der Gestalt der europäischen Stadt.” Hartmut Häussermann and Walter Siebel, Die
europäische Stadt (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2004), 18.
19

“… das sinnfällige Abbild der politischen, ökonomischen und kulturellen Zentralität der Stadt.” Ibid., 16.

20

Dirk Schubert, “Mythos ‘Europäische Stadt’: Zur Erforderlichen Kontextualisierung Eines Umstrittenen Begriffs,”
Alte Stadt 28, no. 4 (2001): 282–283. Bodenschatz and Altrock note that this trend is also present in the United States, but is
generally talked about as a “compact” or “liveable” city. See Bodenschatz and Altrock, Renaissance der Mitte, 8.
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architects and planners all across Western Europe (and some behind the Iron Curtain, as well)
began to focus on the notion of the historical city as a planning model. These trends were most
notably expressed in events such as the international designation of 1975 as “European
Monument Preservation Year,” which popularized the idea of “careful urban renewal”
(behutsame Stadterneuerung), as well as Kleihues’s various efforts through the Dortmund
Architecture Conferences from 1975 on (discussed in Chapter 1), and, famously, the
architectural exhibition titled “The Presence of the Past” at the 1980 Venice Biennale, which was
widely regarded as the entrée of historically-oriented post-modernism onto the global scene.22
The ubiquity, by the 1990s, of the “European city” model as a way of updating
continental urban landscapes presented a dire problem for Stimmann and other planners in
Berlin, however. Not only had Berlin’s Altstadt already been subject to slum clearance measures
in the late nineteenth century, but the remains of this tiny kernel had later been completely
obliterated by World War II bombings, then divided and left empty by the city’s physical Cold
War division. Any new Stadtkrone would have to virtually be fabricated from scratch (indeed,
East Berlin’s planners in particular had already made attempts at this in Mitte during the 1980s
with the creation of the Nikolaiviertel, a faux-medieval quarter centered around a reconstructed
thirteenth-century church).23 Furthermore, Berlin has always been a fundamentally polycentric
space, consisting of numerous incorporated towns and villages, and this quality was enhanced by
the forty years of division by the Wall, which encouraged the East and West to create their own
commercial centers along their respective edges of Mitte. Thus, in reunited Berlin, the recreation

22

See Katharina Brichetti, Die Paradoxie des postmodernen Historismus: Stadtumbau und städtebauliche
Denkmalpflege vom 19. bis zum 21. Jahrhundert am Beispiel von Berlin und Beirut (Berlin: Schiler, 2009), 142–144; and Harry
Francis Mallgrave and David Goodman, An Introduction to Architectural Theory: 1968 to the Present (Malden, MA: WileyBlackwell, 2011), 58–62.
23

For an in-depth discussion, see Emily Pugh, “The Berlin Wall and the Urban Space and Experience of East and West
Berlin, 1961-1989” (Ph.D. diss., CUNY Graduate Center, 2008).
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of the “European city” type of centralized area in Mitte meant, on a practical level, simply
refabricating much of the city center, and positing it as a Stadtkrone or Altstadt that had, in
reality, barely, if ever, existed.
I argue that Stimmann’s employment of the term “European city” or “historical city” in
conjunction with the Leitbild of Critical Reconstruction was thus strategic on multiple levels. It
allowed him not only to draw on a set of easily comprehensible visual tropes, but, in numerous
ways, to present his plans as architectural answers to pressing issues of emergent German
identity. First, casting Critical Reconstruction, and, by association, Berlin, as fundamentally
“European” tacitly implied that Berlin was now fully integrated into the West: that it was
embracing its Western rather than its Eastern connections and roots – both in terms of
democratic governance and its cultural disposition, thus landing on the “right” side of the end of
the Cold War. Second, the idea of the “European city” implied a significant difference from –
even opposition to – the populist or high-tech trends in the United States.24 As Stimmann argues,
Catchphrases such as ‘anything goes’ or, in the context of American cities,
theories such as ‘Learning from Las Vegas,’ are not only out of place but
destructive in a city such as Berlin which is so firmly rooted in the European
architectural tradition, and one which has had such a decisive influence on
modern town planning at the end of the last [i.e. nineteenth] century and
beginning of this. … We need only to look at the catastrophic legacy of the
destructivist theories of Futurism in European architecture and the [mid-century]
Modernist view of the city. In a city such as Berlin, with its history of
psychological trauma, architecture must surely revert to norms, to composition
and – in the tradition of the one-time solid “stone city” of Berlin – to the physical,
the material and the tectonic; only in this way can architecture fulfill its dual role
as a factor in the urban image of the city and as a social and working
environment.25
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See Schubert, “Mythos ‘Europäische Stadt,’” 282–283.
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Annegret Burg, Berlin Mitte: die Entstehung einer urbanen Architektur, ed. Hans Stimmann (Berlin: Birkhäuser
Verlag, 1995), 211.
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As architectural historian Katharina Brichetti observes, the “European city” concept also
implies the ideal of a desirable “leisure-urbanity,” a space for the urban pedestrian to enjoy street
cafés and public plazas. It is a place where life proceeds at a slower pace, with that slowness
acting as “a synonym for heritage, history, and continuity.”26 Stimmann was thus able to utilize
this concept as a bulwark against the potential “mallification” of Mitte:
In general the guiding principle of the “European city,” with its strict division
between public streets, squares and parks on one hand and private lots on the
other, was a central requirement. This is contradicted by the wish of many
investors for semi-public shopping malls. The risk of this building type becoming
the basis for new developments was especially great because the urban property,
as the smallest operative unit of urban construction, was largely absent in the
areas subject to re-organization.27
Finally, Stimmann saw the “European city” model as a way for Berliners (and, because it
was the capital city, presumably Germans in general) to connect with and experience their
“history” as part of the project of finding an identity. Stimmann argued,
In the fifties the Berliners started to search for their [architectural] identity: some
in America, some in the Soviet Union, later wherever. In any case it was terribly
international. That was the wrong way. Berliners need to take their own themes
seriously again. There is not just Schinkel and Messel, but the regular Berlin
tenement.28
Stimmann’s portrayal of global Modernism as exemplifying the “wrong way” of doing things,
and his reliance instead on an indigenous tradition based on not only on work of great German or
Berlin architects, but the “everyday” architecture of the nineteenth century, connects directly to
Kleihues’s project of building on the best parts of German architecture and reviving “traditional”
Berlin typologies. But whereas Kleihues carefully sidestepped direct questions of how
26

Brichetti, Die Paradoxie des postmodernen Historismus, 95.
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Hans Stimmann, “New Berlin Office and Commercial Buildings,” in Berlin Mitte: die Entstehung einer urbanen
Architektur, by Annegret Burg, ed. Hans Stimmann (Berlin: Birkhäuser Verlag, 1995), 17.
28
“In den fünfziger Jahren haben sich die Berliner aufgemacht, ihre Identität zu suchen: die einen in Amerika, die
anderen in der Sowjetunion, später in Richtung Was-weiß-ich-wohin. Auf jeden Fall musste es furchtbar international sein. Das
war ein falscher Weg. Die Berliner müssen ihre eigenen Themen wieder Ernst nehmen. Das sind ja nicht nur Schinkel und
Messel, sondern das normale Berliner Wohnhaus.” Stimmann and Bachmann, “‘Ich Bin Ein Mächtiger Mann,’” 51.
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architecture related to society, Stimmann utilized the notion of the “European city” to make more
explicit claims about how architecture would exemplify the identity of the new city and nation,
claiming that a “stone Berlin” was what was needed in order to restore to Berliners a sense of
normalcy and historical continuity. The underlying assumption in this endeavor, of course, is that
architecture itself necessarily represents the social, cultural, or national identity of those who live
and work in it. Though Stimmann himself staunchly refused to see this rhetoric of the “European
city” as anything other than a means of achieving particular practical, concrete planning goals,
the Leitbild of Critical Reconstruction as a return to “European” urban forms meant, in essence, a
turn towards the conservative position within the Historikerstreit: an invocation of German
history as a thing to be understood, emulated, and normalized in the cityscape.29 And
Stimmann’s reductive standards for Critical Reconstruction reinforced this problematic position
through their reliance on neo-classical materials and styles, which had been shunned in post-war
West Germany (and also, as discussed in Chapter 1, carefully avoided by Kleihues) because of
their association with the Nazi regime. Now, it seemed, these forms were not only to be revived,
but celebrated.30
Aesthetic Categories: The Façade as Flashpoint
Stimmann’s formulation of Critical Reconstruction changed what had been a relatively
open and dialectical theory of urban design into a particular aesthetic recipe that was relatively
rigid in terms of its guidelines and requirements. Stimmann stated that the “diversity” of

29

An emphasis on “Europeanness” also tied to the contemporary formation of the EU in a post-Cold War climate, the
creation of a shared currency, and thus to questions of Germany’s integration with the continental “West.”
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Though I call it “neo-classicism” throughout this and the next chapter, the style supported by the Critical
Reconstructionists under Stimmann was more specifically a revival of a particular form of pre-war Modernism that incorporated
neo-classical and traditional regionalist elements. It had much in common with the Scandinavian and German Modernism of the
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architecture supported by his department (he cites 150 architects from 11 countries as active in
Berlin between 1994 and 1995)
should not be confused with randomness, and experimentation should not become
equivalent to the destruction of the urban planning structure. … New architecture
must relate to the city, to the historical and urban planning context and to
architectural tradition, in order to reinforce the density of the city. Architectural
progress evolves from the continued development, and not from the complete
renunciation, of traditions, typologies, and technologies.31
In order to ensure the continuance of this “tradition,” Stimmann reduced Critical Reconstruction
to just a few rules. First, he stated, “the historic street network and the associated historic
frontage lines of the streets and squares should be respected or restored.”32 This rule was a direct
adoption of Kleihues’s attempt to restore the baroque-era street plan in Mitte, in order to reduce
auto traffic, promote pedestrian life along the street, and, in Stimmann’s case, to win back
valuable land by reclaiming usable building space from multi-lane boulevards. Second, in terms
of zoning, unlike the IBA, where the construction of housing had been the main goal, “under the
changed conditions of [national] unity, the main use in the affected areas is … rather typical
inner-city uses: office buildings, hotels, department stores, ministries, university buildings.”33 In
terms of density and use, then, only twenty percent of the gross floor area in Stimmann’s plan
was stipulated for housing. Single buildings were limited to a maximum size of one block,
hosting a mix of uses. Third, on the level of individual buildings, heights were restricted to
twenty-two meters at the eaves and thirty at the ridges, referring back to the Berlin city building
codes of 1897 and 1929.34 This echoes, albeit in a more utilitarian manner, Kleihues’s call for a
diverse “physiognomy” of the street and his revival of the traditional Berlin typology of the six31
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story courtyard block, though in Stimmann’s case there was much less emphasis on the courtyard
itself. Stimmann focused instead on building heights, hoping that by limiting investors in terms
of potential square footage, he could keep land values low enough that rents would remain
affordable: “Here my love for the engagement with the European city happens to meet with my
thoughts about limiting the use of land in terms of height. … The limits of height are an
instrument of limiting speculation. There aesthetics and economics meet.”35
Stimmann routinely claimed that his rules for Critical Reconstruction did not include
stipulations on formal elements like façades and materials.36 Nonetheless, he often followed up
his discussions of general city planning guidelines with statements about what kinds of
architecture he felt were stylistically appropriate for Mitte. For instance, in a 1995 essay,
employing the grammatical passive voice that is so common in academic German, Stimmann
referred vaguely to a contemporary “demand” for “stone” architecture (though who was making
this demand is unclear)
based on the conviction that an urban atmosphere derives from the emphasized
materiality of the city. High-tech buildings consisting solely of glass or displaying
all their structural elements cannot allow the creation of a city in the traditional
sense. A European city needs walls and openings that mark the transition between
building and city.37
Furthermore, “architecture as a social art,” he stated, “needs rules as the expression of society’s
ideas of the city.”38 This objective meant a return to what he characterized as “Berlin
architecture”:

35

“Da trifft sich meine Liebe zum Umgang mit der europäischen Stadt zufällig mit Überlegungen, die Ausnutzung von
Grund und Boden nach oben zu begrenzen. … Die Begrenzung der Höhe ist auch ein Instrument zur Begrenzung der
Spekulation. Da treffen Ästhetik und Ökonomie zusammen.” Stimmann and Bachmann, “‘Ich Bin Ein Mächtiger Mann,’” 49.
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My idea is the winning back of a Berlin tradition. I am a constituent of threedimensional architecture, stone Berlin. … Wherever I can influence the
architecture, I try to do so under the motto: disciplined, Prussian, conservative in
its colors, stone, more straight than curved. That goes naturally also for the choice
of architects: rather [Hans] Kollhoff than a big American office.39
With this Stimmann not only implied a dedication to a particular style, based on forms and
materials, but to supporting specific architects who met his aesthetic demands – all supposedly in
service of creating an appropriate landscape for Berlin.40 Stimmann defended this position by
claiming that the tradition of stone is intimately linked with the work of early German
Modernists such as Peter Behrens, Alfred Messel, Hermann Muthesius, and Max Taut, and thus
with the “historical” character of Germany and Berlin. The “architectural expression” of the
early Modernists’ commercial buildings was, he stated, “as a rule, that of a building with a
clearly readable entrance, with serial window formats and façade materials typical of Berlin,
such as yellow-gray sandstone, shell limestone and limestone, as well as travertine or ceramic
facing, or, more rarely, fired clinker brick.”41 These architects, he said, designed commercial
architecture for a city “whose modernity they wanted to express in up-to-date architecture,” but
they eschewed the “radical alternatives” of expressionist architects like Bruno Taut or Hans
Scharoun.42 As a result, he admitted,
There are architects who feel excluded. … The whole Scharoun School is
definitely part of that. Or definitely the Deconstructivists. … They feel
themselves terribly threatened. Before I came they had a lot more leeway. I
believe that there are many people in the architecture scene who don’t like me
39
“Meine Idee ist die Wiedergewinnung einer berlinischen Tradition. Ich bin ein Anhänger der körperhaften
Architektur, des Steinernen Berlin. ... Wo immer ich Architektur beeinflussen kann, versuche ich das unter der Überschrift:
diszipliniert, preußisch, zurückhaltend in der Farbigkeit, steinern, eher gerade als geschwungen. Das gilt natürlich auch für die
Auswahl der Architekten: Lieber Kollhoff als ein amerikanisches Großbüro.” Stimmann and Bachmann, “‘Ich Bin Ein Mächtiger
Mann,’” 48, 51.
40
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42

Ibid., 17.

132

because of that. For the others, who favor my ideas of building continuity and my
architectonic positions, it’s going even better than before.”43
Stimmann’s clear preference for stone façades is illustrated by two controversies over
new buildings in the city center. Planners Rainer Emenlauer and Christine von Strempel relate
how Stimmann impertinently lambasted a design by Richard Meier for a new building along the
main east-west boulevard of Unter den Linden:
Wrong interpretation of the location, wrong building alignment, wrong
distribution of the façade, too much glass, the entrance in the wrong place, etc.,
etc. Richard Meier listened to all this with perfect calm, stood up, told his
assistant to pack up the model, and said to Hans Stimmann, “If you need an
architect for the nineteenth century, I’m not your man.” Silence all around and
dismay on the part of the developers. For it was clear: there could be no
compromise, the positions were diametrically opposed.44
The contract for the building was eventually given to the German rationalist Jürgen Sawade.
Another conflict erupted over the design decision for the Academy of Arts (Akademie der
Künste) on the southern side of Pariser Platz, perpendicular to the Brandenburg Gate. The
Academy’s pre-war home, a baroque palace remodeled around the turn of the century by the
early Modernist architect Ernst von Ihne, had been destroyed in the war, and only few exhibition
rooms were still extant on the site in 1945. With the division of the country, the institution, too,
was split into Eastern and Western components, and each half moved elsewhere in the city until
the fall of the Wall, when it reunited and was able to reclaim its former plot on the iconic square.
The Academy, which had full jurisdiction over the site, sponsored a competition in 1993,
43

“Es gibt Architekten, die sich mit ihren Positionen ausgeschlossen fühlen. Die ganze Scharoun-Schule gehört
bestimmt dazu. Oder erst recht die Dekonstruktivisten … Die fühlen sich furchtbar bedroht. Die konnten sich, bevor ich hierher
gekommen bin, viel mehr austoben. Ich glaube daß es viele Leute in der Architektenszene gibt, die mich deshalb nicht mögen.
Die anderen, die von der Baukonjunktur und meinen architektonischen Positionen begünstigt werden, denen geht es natürlich um
so besser.” Stimmann and Bachmann, “‘Ich Bin Ein Mächtiger Mann,’” 51.
44
“Falsche Interpretation des Ortes, falsche Gebäudeausrichtung, falsche Fassadengliederung, zuviel Glas, der Eingang
an der falschen Stelle usw., usw. Richard Meier hörte sich das in aller Ruhe an, stand auf, bedeutete seinem Assistanten das
Modell einzupacken und sagte zu Hans Stimmann: ‘If you need an architect for the 19th century, I’m not your man.’” Rainer
Emenlauer and Christine von Strempel, “Als Richard Meier kein Architekt des 19. Jahrhunderts werden wollte,” in Kritische
Würdigung der Kritischen Rekonstruktion: 71 Beiträge von Wegbegleitern und Widersachern des Hans Stimmann (München:
Deutscher Kunstverlag, 2006), 33.
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choosing a striking, glass-fronted design by the well-known West German Modernist Günter
Behnisch (figs. 3.1-3.2).45 Behnisch’s design preserves the extant core of von Ihne’s structure,
adding office, archival, and meeting spaces above and below. The façade is a gridded, layered
composition of glass panels and metal filigree that echoes the asymmetrical abstraction of earlier
Modernist designers like Gerrit Rietveld, and its transparency allows a view into the interior,
where multiple angles and layers of original and new construction create an almost Cubist
compositional effect. The choice of this transparent, almost Expressionist design, was an
intentional reversal of Critical Reconstruction’s call for disciplined stucco or stone façades: as
architectural historian Matthias Pabsch observes, the jury found it
necessary to do justice to the function of cultural leadership that became
incumbent upon the Academy and its members during the public discussion about
the rebuilding of the city center. For this reason, it was important for them to find
their own position and to represent it convincingly. For the [city’s] efforts to
create strictures [requiring] historical reconstruction were targeted at the
limitation of artistic freedom and thus also meant an attack on the institution
whose duty was to defend this freedom.46
The Academy, then, saw itself as a defender of artistic freedom against figures such as
Stimmann, who wanted to strictly limit the formal language of new building façades, especially
at historically significant sites such as Pariser Platz in Mitte. The choice of Behnisch’s design
kicked off several years of vehement debates between various planning constituents, and the
cornerstone for the building was not laid until the year 2000.47 Though Stimmann’s own
45
The design was completed in collaboration with partner Manfred Sabatke and architect/historian Werner Durth. See
Matthias Pabsch, Pariser Platz, Architektur und Technik: vom manuellen zum digitalen Zeitalter (Berlin: Reimer, 2002), 173–
179; Bodenschatz and Altrock, Renaissance der Mitte, 238–241.
46
“Es galt der kulturellen Vorbildfunktion gerecht zu werden, welche der Akademie und ihren Mitgliedern in der
öffentlichen Diskussion um die Neubebauung des Stadtzentrum zukam. Aus diesem Grund war es wichtig, eine eigene Position
zu finden und überzeugend zu vertreten. Denn die Bestrebungen nach Regelungen für einen historisierenden Wiederaufbau
zielten auf die Einschränkung künstlerischer Freiheit ab und bedeuteteten somit auch einen Angriff auf die Institution, deren
Aufgabe es war, diese Freiheit zu verteidigen.” Pabsch, Pariser Platz, Architektur und Technik, 173.
47

Ibid., 177. Architectural historian Matthias Pabsch argues that “the attempt to guarantee ‘cultural-historical
continuity’ for city planning at this important site failed solely because the analysis was based solely on a snapshot, namely one
of the state right before its destruction” (149). However, Pabsch’s argument that the square’s historical “contradictions”
throughout its past means that planners should embrace the “digital” in the form of Deconstructivism is likewise a misuse of
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department did not put up the main opposition to the glass façade (the main disagreements
happened after Senator Nagel was replaced),48 Stimmann was an outspoken critic of Behnisch
and of his strain of Modernism, because of their presumed relationship to expressionism:
I am not a defender of the expressionist line from Scharoun to Behnisch and also
not of technoid, structural construction. My architecture must fall into the
tradition that reaches from Gilly, Schinkel, Messel, Behrens, Mies van der Rohe,
… to Kleihues … I want to connect back to the twenties. And to the time right
before that, that is Max Taut, Hoffmann, and Blankenstein.49
The problem with Stimmann’s aesthetics, however, is that it is impossible to see how this
preferred formal language links back simply to Weimar Modernism, and not to the restrained
neo-classicism of the Nazi architecture that succeeded it. Though he repeatedly tried to connect
his preferences to the tradition of 1920s commercial Modernism, his stylistic choices – due in no
small part to the influence of the Architecture Debates, as will become clear in Chapter 4 – were
most often interpreted by critics not as Modernist, but as “New Teutonic,” i.e. as reviving the
conservative, neo-classical strand of Modernism that was adopted as the preferred architectural
language of the Nazis. Here Stimmann became trapped by his own logic: if architecture’s formal
traits were meant to represent society, then any allusion to neo-classical forms or materials (such
as stone or axiality), which in post-war West Germany had been associated directly with the Nazi

history as a stylistic legitimation. Pabsch erroneously claims to be using the ‘actual’ history as a way to legitimate continued
experimentation, when what the controversy was really about was the identity of Germany and its perceived relationship to its
history.
48

See Jürgen Tietz, “Geschichte Aus Glas - Baubeginn Am Pariser Platz,” Der Tagesspiegel, June 12, 2000,
http://www.tagesspiegel.de/kultur/geschichte-aus-glas-baubeginn-am-pariser-platz/141258.html.
49
“ … ich bin kein Verfechter der experssionistischen Traditionslinie von Scharoun bis Behnisch und auch nicht des
technoiden, strukturellen Bauens. Meine Architektur muß sich in die Traditionslinie von Gilly, Schinkel, Messel, Behrens, Mies
van der Rohe, Taut bis Kleihues einordnen lassen … Ich will damit an die zwangziger Jahre anknüpfen. Und an die Zeit, die noch
davor liegt, also Max Taut, Hoffmann und Blankenstein.” Stimmann and Bachmann, “‘Ich Bin Ein Mächtiger Mann,’” 48–49. In
“not being a defender of the Scharoun line,” Stimmann reveals one point of extreme divergence from Kleihues’s Critical
Reconstruction, whose aesthetics – however traditional in some respects – were also heavily influenced by Scharoun and other
expressionists. Stimmann’s turn toward a more conservative and literal interpretation of history was mirrored in the shifts of
architects like Kollhoff, a student of Ungers who also, as the 1990s progressed, moved further and further from the neo-rationalist
or expressionist model of the “urban archipelago” towards a conservative and historicist position that had more in common with
American New Urbanism and the conservative neo-historicism of Leon Krier. Kollhoff’s contributions to Critical Reconstruction
will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
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regime, implied a dangerous return to those politics as well. Given his lack of training in
traditional architectural discourse, Stimmann was apparently either not couth enough or not
interested enough to wield these historical allusions to his advantage, or to shore up his choices
with clear examples of how they linked specifically to Weimar Modernism, and this problem
was exacerbated by the inability of the popular media to parse the discipline-specific language of
architectural theory and style. Instead, Stimmann relied on the power of his personality and
position to achieve and justify his planning aims. Thus, despite Stimmann’s claims to the
contrary, architecture critic Paul Goldberger could write in the New York Times in 1995 that he
was deliberately ignoring the Modernist tradition:
While Stimmann hesitates to admit it, much of Berlin was shaped by the very
Modernist architecture that he is now trying to fight. … He is nothing if not a
brilliant rhetorician, taunting architects with antimodernist sloganeering. And they
have no choice but to listen. … To be an architect on Stimmann's good side is to
get plenty of work in Berlin; otherwise, you might as well be in Helsinki.50
Clearly, if the nuances of Stimmann’s position with regard to Modernism and its legacies were
lost on Goldberger, a seasoned architectural critic, then they would also be completely lost on the
larger public, who neither knew nor likely cared about the finer points of the Modernist
architectural legacy. Again, as mentioned above, Stimmann’s difficulty in clearly positioning
Critical Reconstruction in relation to Nazi aesthetics points to the larger problem of
architecture’s ability to communicate and “mean” something to a large, diverse audience,
especially when it connects to big ideas like “history” and “identity,” which themselves are often
unclear.

50

Paul Goldberger, “Reimagining Berlin,” The New York Times, February 5, 1995.
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The Failed Goal of Small-Parcel Development
Despite this autocratic and stylistically restrictive attitude, Stimmann managed to remain
true, in letter, at least, to his social-democratic roots in that his stated goal was to make the inner
city accessible to a rising middle class:
The special problem … with the historical center of the city … is unfortunately
that we have no more middle class. Right here in Berlin the very important Jewish
population was, as is well known, in 1933 and in the following years, forced into
emigration and then systematically murdered in the concentration camps. The
typical state-centered politics of the GDR gradually forced the remaining shop
owners, hoteliers, middle class property owners, and tradesmen to give up. So
especially in the former East of the city a hole has been created that is going to be
hard to fill.51
But these socially progressive goals were undermined by Stimmann’s stated faith in the power of
public-private partnerships to achieve his ends. In distinct contrast to his earlier critiques of
capitalism, he now claimed that
a city cannot be a city without private investment. My problem is more in
organizing private capital so that it leaves behind a beautiful city. The private
investors or architects as the trustees of the builders who come here with abstruse
commercial imaginings – high-rises for the Friedrichstadt [neighborhood of
Mitte], all kinds of malls – they ruin the foundations of the city. Most of my time
is spent trying to convince them to utilize their long-term capital investments as a
constitutive building block for Berlin and not for Houston, Texas. … Whoever is
against private investment in the city, is against the city. How should these holes
be filled? Big investment – department stores, offices – those are the places for
new jobs. I’m for the investors. I am trying to rein them in with aesthetic
categories.52
51

“Das besondere Problem von Ost-Berlin mit dem historischen Zentrum der Stadt – partiell gilt das natürlich auch für
West-Berlin – ist aber leider so, daß wir keinen Mittelstand mehr haben. Der gerade in Berlin sehr bedeutende jüdische Anteil ist
bekanntlich 1933 und in den Folgejahren erst in die Emigration getrieben und dann systematisch in den Konzentrationslagern
ermordet worden. Die DDR-typische Verstaatlichungspolitik hat die verbliebenen mittelständischen Hausbesitzer,
Geschäftsleute, Hoteliers und Gewerbetreibenden nach und nach zur Aufgabe gezwungen. So ist besonders im ehemaligen Osten
der Stadt kulturell und ökonomisch eine Brache entstanden, die nur schwer wiederzubeleben ist.” Stimmann and Bachmann,
“‘Ich Bin Ein Mächtiger Mann,’” 49–50. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, Stimmann was heavily influenced in this regard by
the urban theorist and critic Dieter Hoffmann-Axthelm, who was a vocal proponent of the small-scale, privately-owned parcel of
land as the basis for democratic city governance.
52

“[Ich bin] der festen Überzeugung, daß eine Stadt ohne privates Investment gar keine Stadt ist. Mein Problem ist
eher, das private Kapital so zu organisieren, daß es hinterher eine schöne Stadt gibt. Die privaten Investoren oder Architekten als
Treuhänder der Bauherren, die hier mit irgendwelchen abstrusen kommerziellen Vorstellungen ankommen – Hochhäuser für die
Friedrichstadt, jede Menge Malls - , die ruinieren die Grundlagen der Stadt. Ich verwende die meiste Zeit darauf, mit denen zu
diskutieren, daß sie mit der langfristigen Verwertung ihres eingesetzten Kapitals einen Baustein für Berlin schaffen und nicht für
Houston, Texas. … wer gegen privates Investment in der Stadt ist, der ist gegen die Stadt. Wie sollen denn diese Löcher
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This approach did, in fact, fail in the very way that he had predicted for Kleihues’s
approach in the 1980s: he was unable to use aesthetic categories to change the economic
foundations of real estate investment. Pressure from investors and the complexities of
coordinating land sales between the dizzying array of agencies involved meant that Mitte ended
up with, as Stimmann admitted, “many large, multi-lot buildings with relatively homogenous
uses.”53 To help mitigate this situation, he focused on working with developers to try to diversify
block-sized plots in order to artificially recreate the physical, if not the economic or social,
conditions of small-scale property ownership. Therefore, I argue, whereas his goal was to
achieve small-scale urban development through an awareness of “traditional” approaches to
Berlin’s architectural forms and typologies, what Stimmann actually helped produce in central
Berlin was simply the outward image of such development, backed by international investors. As
Düwel and Mönninger note, “This was continually denounced as Berlin’s dilemma: the
disciplining of building rather than planning, the confusion of city planning and architecture.”54
Viewed in its larger context, Stimmann’s insistence that regulated stone façades
represented the ideal form of the “historical” or “European city,” a theoretical position that he
was unable – or unwilling – to uncouple from the heritage of Nazi neo-classicism or from the
conservative side of the Historikerstreit, as well as his outspoken denunciation of anything that
deviated from this strict aesthetic norm, ultimately amounted to much more than just a strategy
for reining in developers. Whether or not Stimmann himself would openly admit it, his
deployment of Critical Reconstruction as a Leitbild sought to have it both ways: he wanted
aufgefüllt werden? Große Investionen – Kaufhäuser, Büros – das sind die neuen Arbeitsplätze. Ich bin für die Investoren. Ich
versuche sie zu ‘deckeln’ mit ästhetischen Kategorien.” Ibid., 49.
53

Stimmann, “New Berlin Office and Commercial Buildings,” 11.

54

“Das wurde immer wieder als Berlins Dilemma angeprangert: die Disziplinierung des Bauens statt des Planens, die
Verwechslung von Städtebau und Architektur.”Stimmann, Von der Sozialutopie ..., 34.
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Berlin’s new architecture to mean something for society, to represent Berliners and Germans,
and to help them find a new identity in the post-Wall era by helping them recognize – or rewrite
– their own history. At the same time, he refused to acknowledge that this history was laden with
violence, and that a simple return to pre-World War II forms could be read as a revival of
reactionary or fascist political tendencies. Furthermore, the reliance on the idea of the “European
city” itself, in the context of Berlin stone architecture, signifies a problematic ethnocentrism that
links formal architectural traits with the idea of indigenous “Germanness.” Deeply involved in
trying to control land sales and development, however, Stimmann was uninterested in fully
tackling such questions; his reliance on a historicist Leitbild, it seems, was for him simply a
means to a (failed) end.

Post-Wall Critical Reconstruction in Practice
Kleihues’s Role in Post-Wall Critical Reconstruction
Stimmann’s reliance on Critical Reconstruction as a planning concept would appear to
imply that Kleihues was given a central role in the re-planning of Berlin in the post-Wall era.
Indeed, as will become clear by the number of examples discussed in this and the following
chapter, Kleihues was involved – as either a jury member or as architect – in a staggering
number of construction projects in Mitte in the early 1990s, thus allowing him to leave his stamp
on almost every famous square and street.55 However, his public, discursive role in the planning
process was minimal, and, in comparison to his prolific writing during the IBA in the 1980s, he
published relatively few essays or other commentaries on Berlin’s new architecture. Rather,
Kleihues chose to step back from the public eye and focus instead on shaping the new Berlin
55

Stimmann sets Kleihues’s projects at thirteen in process in 1994. See Bornhöft and Mönninger, “Heimatkunde Für
Neuteutonia,” 116.
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through his work as head of a highly successful architecture firm. This retreat from his former
position of public visibility, in tandem with the rise of Stimmann as the new figurehead of
Critical Reconstruction, also worked to change public perception about this method.
Kleihues’s statements, in the handful of interviews and articles that he did publish in the
early 1990s, were in general not about what Berlin should look like, but about the process by
which he thought Berlin should be planned. Berlin, he contended, direly needed both a master
plan and a master planner to guide its development.56 He was highly critical of the tactics of
Senator Volker Hassemer, head of the Department of Urban Development and Environment,
whose Stadtforum meetings brought together the so-called “expert public,” as well as invested
local constituents, to discuss and debate planning decisions. For Kleihues, this approach valued
the “process in itself” over the result, a kind of “contemporary media-ism” (neuzeitlich
Mediumismus) that could only lead to unfortunate compromises.57 He saw this weakness as one
of the main reasons for the failures at Potsdamer Platz:
I have always pleaded that at Potsdamer Platz there would be no public
competition, but rather a [semi-private] planning process. Already in January of
1991 I recommended to Senator Hassemer that he might bring together the
investors on Potsdamer Platz, certain politicians, and perhaps a maximum of five
to eight architects in seminar discussions, where they would discuss the whole
problem – maybe two discussions a week for four to six weeks. After that the
architects would be sent into private sessions. They would lay their designs on the
table; then we would come either to a decision or ask them to work further. I
believe that Potsdamer Platz deserves these types of discussions, in other words it
deserves an elite process.58
56
William J.V. Neill suggests that the idea of a master plan was in general feared to be fascist in itself in Germany,
given that the last person to put through a master plan for Berlin was Hitler. William J.V. Neill, “Memory, Spatial Planning, and
the Construction of Cultural Identity in Belfast and Berlin - an Overview,” in Urban Planning and Cultural Inclusion: Lessons
from Belfast and Berlin, ed. William J.V. Neill and Hanns-Uve Schwedler (Houndmills [England]; New York: Palgrave, 2001),
3–22.
57

Josef Paul Kleihues, “Die Selbstdisziplinierung Des Städtebaus. Das Neue Berlin (VI): Plädoyer Für Einen
‘Masterplan’ Als Künstlerisch Wegweisendes Grossstadtmodell,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, November 15, 1990; Josef
Paul Kleihues, “Kritische Rekonstruktion: Auf Dem Wege Zur Metropole Berlin,” Deutsche Bauzeitung 127, no. 5 (May 1993):
76.
58
“Ich habe immer dafür pladiert, dass am Potsdamer Platz kein offener Wettbewerb, sondern ein Planungsverfahren
stattfindet. Ich habe Herrn Senator Dr. Hassemer bereits im Januar 1991 empfolhen, er möchte die Investoren am Potsdamer
Platz als Bauherren, einige Politiker und vielleicht maximal fünf bis acht Architekten zu seminaristischen Gesprächen
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As political scientist Elizabeth Strom has shown, Kleihues’s viewpoint represents an attitude,
typical in Germany, that the “expertization” of the political process guarantees a better outcome
than a referendum.59 In keeping with this conviction, Kleihues firmly argued for the
professionalization of planning decisions. “In my view there is only one … method that can lead
to success: namely, that we entrust the necessary decision-making to single, professionally
qualified persons.”60 In this context, he gave his blessing to Stimmann, despite their differences:
Although I, for example, do not agree with the new Senate Construction Director
Mr. Stimmann in many areas, he has, for now, earned this leap of faith
(Vertrauensvorschuss). Perhaps Mr. Stimmann would be well advised to revise
his rigid eschewal of high-rises or his general call for parcel-sized construction a
bit. But still, Mr. Stimmann is following a program. That is unfortunately very
seldom seen.61
Kleihues also stated that the changed conditions of Berlin after the Wall, as a space of rampant
economic development, meant that Critical Reconstruction’s former “tolerance toward very
different types of architectural directions” during the IBA years might be better left behind in
favor of a “more precisely formulated requirements” in order to protect Berlin from too many
competing desires. The more strict ordering that is Stimmann’s goal, Kleihues stated, was still

zusammenführen, wo das ganze Problem diskutiert werden sollte – vielleicht vier bis sechs Wochen lang zwie Gespräche
wochtentlich. Danach würde man die Architekten in die Klausur schicken, nicht gemeinsam, sondern einzeln. Sie würden dann
ihre Entwürfe ganz offen auf den Tisch legen; man käme dann entweder zu einer Entscheidung oder man arbeitet weiter. Ich
glabue, der Potsdamer Platz hätte diese Art von Gesprächen, also durchaus einen elitären Prozess, verdient.” Josef Paul Kleihues
and Werner Oechslin, “‘Der Potsdamer Platz Hätte Einen Elitären Prozess Verdient!’: Ein Interview Mit Prof. J.P. Kleihues,”
Archithese 22, no. 2 (March 1992): 30.
59

Elizabeth A Strom, Building the New Berlin: The Politics of Urban Development in Germany’s Capital City
(Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2001), 146.
60
“Meines Erachtens kann nur eine … Methode zum Erfolg führen: nämlich, indem man einzelnen, fachlich
qualifizierten Persönlichkeiten ein grosseres Mass an Vertrauen entgegenbringt und mit den erforderlichen
Entscheidungskompetenzen ausstattet.” Kleihues and Oechslin, “‘Der Potsdamer Platz Hätte Einen Elitären Prozess Verdient!,’”
26.
61
“Obgleich ich z.B. mit dem neuen Senatsbaukirektor Berlins, Herrn Dr. Stimmann, in vielen Bereichen nicht
übereinstimme, hat er zunächst einmal einen Vertrauensvorschuss verdient. Vielleicht wäre Herr Stimmann gut beraten, wenn er
seine apodiktische Ablehnung von Hochhäusern oder seine generelle Forderung nach parzellengerechter Bebauung ein wenig
relativieren würde. Immerhin verfolgt Herr Stimmann ein Programm. Das ist leider selten genug.” Ibid.
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Critical Reconstruction, “but more restrictive and for a short time and for certain parts of the city
more appropriate: for instance, in the Friedrichstadt [in Mitte].”62
On the level of what he called “urban physiognomy,” i.e. the way buildings appear from a
stylistic point of view, Kleihues had little to say, except for a brief reference to the same ideas he
had been propounding over the previous two decades: “Berlin is the city of the Enlightenment in
Europe, Berlin is also the city of the Modern in Europe. We should acknowledge the stiffness
(Sprödigkeit) and rational clarity which characterized the great building culture of Berlin’s better
eras.”63 And elsewhere, Kleihues stated that the best Berlin architecture was always “very
rational, very economical, very disciplined, ‘Prussian’ in a good sense.”64 As will be discussed in
Chapter 4, these statements were construed, in tandem with Stimmann’s reductive application of
Critical Reconstruction, as a return to a dangerously rigid type of stone-clad neoclassicism that
some critics even suspected of fascist tendencies. However, a brief look at two of Kleihues’s
own building projects in Mitte and greater Berlin at the time belie such a reductive reading of his
statement; clearly “stiffness” and “rational clarity” were, for him, still to be combined with the
playful, abstracted poetry that he espoused in his earlier writings.
A good example of this nuance is Kleihues’s “Triangel” building at the southern end of
Friedrichstrasse (1994-1997) (figs. 3.3-3.4). Set along a diagonal street profile that arose from
the removal of the baroque-era “excise wall” (a city wall created in the eighteenth century to
support the enforcement of import-export taxes), the building features two exceedingly different
62
“Dies ist letztlich der immanenter Anspruch auch der Kritischen Rekonstruktion, aber restriktiver und für einen
Kurzzeitraum und in bestimmten Stadtbereichen vielleicht sogar richtiger: zum Beispiel der Friedrichstadt.” Kleihues, “Kritische
Rekonstruktion,” 78.
63

“Berlin ist die Stadt der Aufklärung in Europa, Berlin ist auch die Stadt der Moderne in Europa. Wir sollten uns zu
der Sprödigkeit und rationale Klarheit bekennen, welche die grosse Baukultur der besseren Zeiten Berlins ausgezeichnet hat.”
Kleihues and Oechslin, “‘Der Potsdamer Platz Hätte Einen Elitären Prozess Verdient!,’” 29.
64

“… in die besten Zeiten, die Berlin erlebt hat, sehr rational, sehr ökonomsich, sehr diszipliniert, in gutem Sinne
‘preußisch’ gedacht worden ist.” Josef Paul Kleihues and Claus Baldus, “Der historische Stadtgrundriss von Berlin ist noch
Realität: Gespräch mit Dankwart Guratzsch,” in Josef Paul Kleihues im Gespräch (Tübingen; Berlin: Wasmuth, 1996), 101.
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facades: one clad in tiles of unpolished granite, with strongly contoured bands of windows, and
the other constituting a glass curtain wall articulated by bands of metallic vents. From afar, the
stone façade strongly echoes the same commercial buildings of the 1920s (such as those by Max
Taut) (figs. 1.9-1.10) to which Kleihues and Stimmann commonly refer as stylistic touchstones,
but Kleihues allows this impression to dissolve as one draws nearer to the building: the square
elements of the stone cladding are each affixed by a decorative steel rivet set directly in the
center of the tile. This detail gives even the stone façade of the building a strikingly high-tech
look from the perspective of a pedestrian on the sidewalk.
An even more stunning example of how Kleihues’s architecture refuses to confine itself
to historicism is the much-discussed “Kant Triangle” building in the West Berlin neighborhood
of Charlottenburg (1992-1995) (figs. 3.5-3.6). Built on a triangular plot bordered by the elevated
tracks of the S-Bahn (inner-city rail) and Kantstrasse, the building features a cubic tower rising
from a stone-clad, low-rise base. Partly in response to zoning decisions that limited the original
intended height of the building, the tower is topped by a distinctive metal “coxcomb” – a
playfully overscaled wind vane that slightly exceeds the width of the building itself. Kleihues
describes the exterior as being divided into three “image fields”: a stone base, a metallic body,
and the wind vane, which he also describes as a “shark fin.” Though it almost verges on the
playful post-modernism of architects like Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown, Kleihues sees
his design as falling directly in the Germanic, continental lineage of such designers as Schinkel
and Loos.65 This example serves as a forceful counterpoint to critics’ later accusations (discussed
in Chapter 4) of Kleihues as leader of an architectural cartel that espoused a rigid and possibly
proto-fascist historicism based around the idea of the Berlin block.
65

Josef Paul Kleihues and Claus Baldus, “Das die Alltagswelt Relativierende: Gespräch mit Claus Baldus,” in Josef
Paul Kleihues im Gespräch (Tübingen; Berlin: Wasmuth, 1996), 123.
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Stimmann’s Differentiated Commercial Blocks
Kleihues was also involved in two of the three developments in Mitte that Stimmann
considered to be the best examples of his favored method of differentiated development within a
large block. The Hofgarten am Gendarmenmarkt and the Kontorhaus Mitte were both designed
according to master plans by Kleihues, with contributions from other architects in the designs of
individual buildings. The third example lauded by Stimmann was Aldo Rossi’s Quartier
Schützenstrasse which featured differentiated façades stretching over – but not necessarily
contiguous with – a handful of separate buildings, all backing onto a central courtyard space.
Stimmann saw these three designs as representing the best that he could do with the given
situation: economically and politically unable to sell off land in smaller pieces, he was proud of
having worked with developers and architects to create designs that at least emulated this
approach on the typological and aesthetic levels.
The Hofgarten am Gendarmenmarkt complex (1992-1996), which occupies the block
directly north of the Friedrichstadt Passagen, consists of both renewed historic buildings and new
construction.66 Each building has a separate entrance and separate usage, but all open in the back
onto a shared green courtyard space in the center of the block (fig. 3.7). All of the buildings
conform to the typology of the mixed-use commercial and residential building that Stimmann
argues is typical of Mitte. Four historic buildings were extant on the block: a red sandstone
building along Französische Strasse, on the southern side of the block, was built in 1900 as a
wine shop and delicatessen adjoining the well-known Borchardt Restaurant. Müller Riemann
Scholz Architects renovated it into a restaurant of the same name, topped by office and
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residential spaces (fig. 3.8).67 The other three historic buildings are found on the western side of
the block, along Friedrichstrasse: one near the corner of Französische Strasse, and the other two
adjoining each other on the northern corner of Behrenstrasse. The southernmost of these
buildings was structurally unsound and collapsed during construction of Kollhoff’s new
buildings that were designed to flank it; its façade was reconstructed to preserve the continuity of
the original design.
In addition to creating the overall design for the Hofgarten block, Kleihues designed both
the Four Seasons Hotel on the rear side of the block facing Charlottenstrasse, and the narrow
“atelier” building that neighbors it on the northern side of the block, along Behrenstrasse. The
hotel, faced with light-colored Roman travertine limestone, combines the traditional, stone-clad
Berlin block form with typical Kleihuesian abstractions such as geometrically curved window
bays (fig. 3.9-3.10). The neighboring atelier building, by contrast, which also houses two shops
on the ground level, allows its interiors maximum light by utilizing almost solely glass in its
façade, accented by metallic balcony railings and window frames (fig. 3.11). Kleihues’s choice
of material for this smaller building can also be read as a commentary on the architectural
controversy over stone building that was taking place during its design. This conflict will be
examined closely in Chapter 4, but it stemmed from statements by a handful of prominent
architects and architectural historians who insisted that the most appropriate building material for
Berlin architecture was, because of Berlin’s specific built heritage as well as the current needs of
its population, explicitly stone. Architectural historian Gerwin Zohlen contends that Kleihues
was annoyed with the reduction of the professional conversation to the conflict between stone
and glass, and that “this banalization motivated him to an almost anarchistic revolt against the
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attempt to make stone in itself into the only true way and law of architecture.”68 Thus, despite
Kleihues’s cooperation with Stimmann, this building could be read as a small, impudent gesture
that not only continues Kleihues’s own practice of combining the traditional Berlin building
typologies with new building materials and rational, simplified, yet playful forms; it also signals
that Kleihues refuses to be implicated in Stimmann’s conflicts. Unfortunately, as will be
discussed in Chapter 4, such small aesthetic distinctions were totally lost in the larger
Architecture Debates, wherein Kleihues and Stimmann were both construed as belonging to, or
even leading, a conservative architectural cartel.
The other buildings in the complex are designed by three students of Ungers: the Swiss
architect Max Dudler, and Germans Kollhoff and Jürgen Sawade. Dudler’s residential building
echoes canonical Modernist housing designs in its organization of stacked, interlocking
maisonettes with “functional rooms” such as baths and kitchens located in the center of the
building, allowing the living rooms to face outward toward the street or courtyard, respectively
(figs. 3.12-3.13). Kollhoff’s pair of matching buildings along Friedrichstrasse was originally
designed to wrap around the existing, landmarked structure; now, due to that building’s collapse
during construction, it actually constitutes a single building with varying façades (figs. 3.143.15). The façades of Kollhoff’s two newly designed portions are almost identical, both using a
grey-green granite in a “flat relief” design drawn from prewar Berlin architectural tradition. This
tradition is also echoed in the three-tiered vertical differentiation of the building: the ground-
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level and first floors constitute a “monolithic configuration” of large, tight-fitted masonry, on
whose solid base the middle section of four floors use narrower rectangular stone elements to
delineate the vertical matrix of windows. Finally, the upper two stories are set back and feature
wider window openings. “The buildings,” according to Kollhoff, “aspire to be conventional, in
the best sense of the word: along with similar constructions they set out to give form to a street, a
city. Only when looked at more closely do they draw attention to themselves.”69 The opposite
could be said of Sawade’s design, which is often cited as “noticeable” because of its almost
perfectly-flat, polished grey-black granite façade containing wide window bays framed with
narrow metal strips. A self-proclaimed “purist, rationalist, and increasingly also a minimalist,”
Sawade designed a “logically precise construction” whose appeal lies in its technical
perfection.70 However, especially on bright days, the building itself is actually hard to see due to
its highly reflective surface. Rather, one sees clearly the curving glass lines of Jean Nouvel’s
Galeries Lafayette, which stands across the street (fig. 3.16). Thus Sawade’s building achieves,
as do the rest of the buildings in the Hofgarten complex, the paradoxical goal of being both
daring and conventional, unique but conformist, by letting its simple form reflect the streetscape
around it.
Kontorhaus Mitte (1994-1997) takes a similar approach to the Hofgarten complex.
Kleihues called the design a set of “building blocks” that found “diversity in unity” through the
involvement of four other architects (Vittorio Magnago Lampugnani, Klaus Theo Brenner,
Marlene Dörrie, and Walther Stepp), who were each responsible for a separate structure. Rather
than “thinking in parcels,” Kleihues stated, diversity was to be achieved through formal
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differentiation and a mix of uses within the block, culminating in a shared covered courtyard or
“winter garden” in the center (figs. 3.17-3.20).71 Kleihues’s own comments on the work echo
Stimmann’s realization that small-parcel development was an ultimately impractical goal in
Mitte:
The discussion about dividing building plots into smaller units … risks
degenerating into a “yearning for an ideal world.” Where small plots no longer
exist as individual property or where modern functions demand larger units, an
artificial division into small plots cannot be adequately justified, not even with the
argument of “obligation to history.” But the justifiable aspiration to architectural
variety or, to be more precise, to variety in uniformity is understandable. … That
is why we should be talking here about using a philosophy of modular building
systems, whose functional and formal set of rules is based on the principle of
combining a number of individual building units. … However, Friedrichstrasse
needs to be re-established as the very lively place it always was. One factor that
can contribute to that is the extraordinary variety of functions within this new
kind of commercial building.72
Kleihues also enthusiastically insists that the building offers Friedrichstrasse “a sense of
joie de vivre,” a term that is, however, not at all reflected in the restrained geometries of the
buildings by Brenner and Stepp (who designed the buildings on each corner of the block) or the
somber sandstone façade of the Berliner Bank building by Lampugnani and Dörrie along the
northern side of the block (figs. 3.21-3.23). Their own statements describe the structure as “solid
and durable … unpretentious and reticent because there is nothing behind it but a perfectly
normal office buildings and we did not want to create anything formally exceptional because that
was not matched by the function of the building.”73 The only “joy” to be found in the Kontorhaus
design is supplied by Kleihues’s three structures, especially the central building along
Friedrichstrasse, whose overtly playful geometry (in the form of a series of prominent oculi at
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street level, as well as Kleihues’s signature lozenge shape dividing the entrance), and its light,
warm-toned stone facing add, at the very least, some visual interest to the streetscape (fig. 3.24).
Whereas these two blocks overseen by Kleihues blend seamlessly – one might even say
monotonously – into the streetscape, Rossi’s colorful Quartier Schützenstrasse (1994-98) fully
embodies a joie de vivre, offering an ebullient and striking change of pace in Mitte’s mostly gray
and muted environment. The buildings consist of alternating vertical bays of various widths that
refer, in the form of playful, colorful abstractions, to both traditional nineteenth-century Berlin
architecture as well as Michelangelo’s Palazzo Farnese in Rome and previous buildings by Rossi
himself (figs. 3.25-3.28). The design is typical of the architect in that it reflects a deeply personal
experience of architecture, and in fact, as discussed in Chapter 1, it was largely Rossi’s own
internationally significant book, The Architecture of the City (1966), which had originally
inspired Kleihues to develop the theory of Critical Reconstruction. Quartier Schützenstrasse’s
overscaled and visibly superficial façade elements, along with its bright primary colors, present a
striking counterpoint to the Hofgarten and Kontorhaus blocks, blending more easily with the
more daring pre-1990 IBA designs in the neighboring Southern Friedrichstadt by architects like
Koolhaas, Eisenman, and Rossi himself.74 Still, the fact that Stimmann points to the
Schützenstrasse development as a Critical Reconstruction success reveals some of the
unexpected points of flexibility in his theory. Clearly a playful post-modernism was considered
permissible and even desirable, as long as it remained true to the idea of the “European city” in
its use of historical forms and typologies.
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Conclusion: Critical Reconstruction’s Conservative Turn under Stimmann
In his critique of the reconstruction of Mitte’s famous Pariser Platz, architectural
historian Matthias Pabsch bemoans the “simplification and standardization (Nivellierung) of
architectural history,” blaming Critical Reconstruction, which “tolerated neither breaks nor
contradictions.”75 Indeed, this view seemed to be the general critical and public perception of
Stimmann’s method: it came to be regarded as a type of reactionary traditionalism, a rigid,
historicist view that preferred harshness and discipline and was vehemently opposed to anything
new.76 This perspective permeated the popular media, as well as professional books and journals.
For instance, in an article titled “Local History Studies for New Teutonia,” which featured the
transcript of a contentious conversation between Stimmann and the architectural historian and
museum director Heinrich Klotz, the editors of the popular national new magazine Der Spiegel
published this introductory header:
The Architecture Debates in Berlin began when Senate Construction Director
Hans Stimmann said, upon taking office in 1991, “We don’t need to reinvent
Berlin” and called for the “return to the tradition of European city building.” …
As the “aesthetic conscience” of the Construction Senator, [he] makes sure that
the reconstruction of Berlin stays true to the historical ground plan and traditional
stone architecture. The Berlin architect Josef Paul Kleihues is also a defender of
these conservative construction politics. … He is accused of leading a “power
cartel” [of architects]. The art historian Heinrich Klotz … accuses the Berliners of
“affectations of power” (Machtallüren), limitation of building diversity and the
return to the classicism of the Nazis. The Berlin architecture debate is becoming
increasingly politicized and cannot be seen apart from the search for a new
national identity for Germany.77
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In looking at what Stimmann regarded as his “successes,” as well as his statements about the
approach of Critical Reconstruction itself, it is clear that some of this critique is warranted.
Stimmann’s deployment of Critical Reconstruction was, indeed, a dramatic reduction of the
experimental approach taken by Kleihues during the IBA – and, according to both him and
Kleihues, such a reduction was necessary.
However, although he may have lauded the Hofgarten, Kontorhaus, and Schützenstrasse
projects as “successes,” by his own measures, Stimmann’s deployment of Critical
Reconstruction was, for the most part, a dismal failure. He was able to emulate small-scale
development within block-sized buildings, but this solution did nothing to satisfy the needs that
originally founded Stimmann’s interest in this type of growth: namely, the return of a middle
class to central Berlin, based in the economic realities of small-scale property ownership. No
amount of physical differentiation amongst various buildings on one block could counteract the
economic and social ramifications of their ownership by large, faceless, multinational companies
that have little interest in creating or supporting a close-knit network of local interests. Working
with limited political, administrative, and economic power to affect decisions about land sales or
to create a master plan for Mitte, Stimmann saw himself forced to collaborate with large real
estate investors to formally emulate this type of small-scale construction. In order to do so, he
also felt compelled to constrain developers aesthetically so that the cityscape that arose out of
this public-private partnership did not result in a collection of “fashionable experiments,” but
took on the look of a “normal” urban landscape. Seen in the context of the Historikerstreit, this
effort at “normalization” itself appeared dangerously conservative to many observers.

Klassizismus der Nazis vor. Der Berliner Architekturstreit wird zunehmend politisiert und ist von der Suche nach der neuen
nationalen Identität der Deutschen nicht zu trennen.” Bornhöft and Mönninger, “Heimatkunde Für Neuteutonia,” 48.
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Certainly Stimmann himself was not a “fascist,” either in his politics or in his aesthetics.
A more banal explanation for Stimmann’s preferences lies in the fact that, like Kleihues, he was
aware that the commercialism of American or “Global” high-tech architecture did not offer
Berlin the singular aesthetic qualities that it desperately needed in order to differentiate itself as a
desirable location. But in trying to both attract and rein in investors on an aesthetic level,
Stimmann proved himself supremely incapable of navigating a conversation about the
connotations of neo-historicist styles that spanned – as will be discussed at length in the
following chapter – public and professional media and which was rooted in the complexities of
architectural theory and history. Stimmann’s background in Marxist theory and in the practice of
participatory city planning during the 1970s and 1980s could not have prepared him to
successfully rebuff accusations that his particular form of traditional Berlin architecture
represented something that linked problematically to Nazi forms, or that sought to “normalize”
that history in the manner of contemporary conservative politicians and thinkers like Helmut
Kohl or Ernst Nolte. Stimmann’s choice of a highly reductive set of rules, based on just a few
statements about zoning, density, massing, materials, and façades, reveals a supreme naïveté
with regard to the ways in which Berlin architecture would be interpreted, especially in the
international community, as a problematic statement about German history with ties to the
conservative side of the Historikerstreit. The problems that this naïveté generated in tandem with
the Architecture Debates, as well as Stimmann’s continued engagement with planning in East
Berlin, shaped, in crucial ways, Critical Reconstruction’s fraught relationship to the discourse of
German identity. These issues will be explored at length in the following two chapters.
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CHAPTER 4
Critical Reconstruction and the Berlin Architecture Debates

Hans Stimmann’s reductive revisions to Critical Reconstruction, his crafting of a brash
and autocratic public persona, his reliance on a problematic and undifferentiated notion of
“history,” and his rhetorical allusions to the idea that only a preferred group of architects
working in a particular style would be awarded contracts in Berlin’s post-Wall reconstruction did
much to shape the general perception of his method as conservative. However, his deployment of
Critical Reconstruction also took place within a much larger context of public debate about the
relationships between German history, national identity, and the built environment. This chapter
documents and analyzes the key facets of the controversy over Berlin architecture and Critical
Reconstruction that has come to be known as the “Berlin Architecture Debates” (sometimes also
called the “Architects’ Debates”): a series of written exchanges about architecture published in
the popular and professional press between 1993 and 1995.1 Appearing alongside Stimmann’s
various statements about Berlin’s historical culture of “stone architecture,” the arguments put
forth during the Architecture Debates furthered the impression that Critical Reconstruction
constituted a dangerously conservative architectural style. As I will show, the fact that some of
the protagonists in these debates were also involved in prominent construction projects at the
time, including the rehabilitation of former Nazi buildings in the city center, gives unfortunate
credence to these critiques. Thus, instead of constituting an approach rooted deeply in the
profession, discourse, and history of architecture, or even an attempt to reclaim a politically
acceptable architectural heritage for Germany, Critical Reconstruction in the post-Wall era was
1
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perceived as a hypocritical ally of big business that touted a conservative set of assumptions
about history and identity in reunified Germany. Specifically, it came across as being in line with
Ernst Nolte’s position in the Historikerstreit in the 1980s, which encouraged the “normalization”
of Nazi history as an error that Germans had superseded and could effectively now forget as a
thing of the past. For many on the left, including some combatants in the Architecture Debates,
this position was unacceptable and represented a dangerous step backward toward the very
conditions that had given rise to fascism in the first place.
The Berlin Architecture Debates began in earnest in late 1993 with an essay published by
Vittorio Magnano Lampugnani, then director of the German Architecture Museum, in the
national magazine Der Spiegel.2 Involving a large number of architects, theorists, critics, and
journalists, neither the disciplinary nor the temporal boundaries of the debates are clear. The
contributions were dispersed and wide-ranging, taking place across various journals, magazines,
and newspapers, as well as disciplinary and national boundaries, and involving a large number of
authors.3 While the initial set of heated arguments dissipated by 1995, the same issues resurfaced
again in the late 1990s in the debate over the rebuilding of the Prussian City Palace or “Schloss,”
as well as in the public discussions over Stimmann’s plans for East Berlin embodied in the
Planwerk Innenstadt, both of which will be examined in Chapter 5. The conversation reached
back in time, as well: Lampugnani’s essay acted as a moment of crystallization for many voices
and opinions that had already surfaced in architectural journals and the national press in 1991
and 1992. It also resonated with a similar conflict that had taken place more than a decade
earlier, in 1977, with the unveiling of the designs by James Stirling for the Neue Staatsgalerie in
2
Different historians cite different dates; some date it to 1992, but with no clear origin point. Hertweck cites
Lampugnani’s essay as the initial sally.
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Stadtbau, Geschichte und Identität in der Berliner Republik 1989-1999 (Berlin: Gebr. Mann, 2010); and Kähler, Einfach
schwierig.

154

Stuttgart (the first post-modernist design commissioned in West Germany), which unleashed a
storm of criticism concerning its overt classicist references, deemed by some to be too close to
fascist forms.4 The fact that the post-Wall Architecture Debates, couched in the vocabulary and
knowledge base of the architectural profession, garnered so much attention from the national,
popular media, demonstrates how directly the issue of Critical Reconstruction refracted and
related to larger questions of emergent, reunified German identity at this time. As architectural
historian Florian Hertweck states, the Architecture Debates can thus be understood as a
“corroboration of the societal role of architecture,” revealing its deep imbrication in social,
political, moral, and cultural issues for the new nation.5
The combatants in the debates fall into two main camps: those who advocated for a
prescriptive architectural concept for Berlin, based on a historical image of the “European city”
(represented most prominently by Lampugnani and Hans Kollhoff), and thus associated directly
to the aesthetics of Stimmann’s Critical Reconstruction; and those who, for one reason or
another, strongly opposed Lampugnani and his colleagues (including Daniel Libeskind, Heinrich
Klotz, and, counterintuitively, Stimmann’s main collaborator Dieter Hoffmann-Axthelm). Many
of the battle lines had already been drawn during the Potsdamer Platz competition (see Chapter
2), where the proponents of the traditional “European city” eventually triumphed over
representatives of the “urban archipelago” planning model. But whereas the Potsdamer Platz
debates had centered around the issues of typology and zoning – specifically skyscrapers,
density, and planned green space – the Architecture Debates focused much more on the
aesthetics of the buildings themselves, especially their façades and materials, and the extent to
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which they referred to specific moments in German history. As the editors of Der Spiegel wrote
in the introduction to a November 1995 article titled “New Dictates for Construction?”:
The debate over the future of Berlin architecture has become a national trench
war. A strange coalition of the old left and neo-modernists sees a reactionary turn
towards Nazi architecture. The fight between modern and traditional architecture
has developed into an urban-development Historikerstreit.6
Thus, as this chapter demonstrates, Critical Reconstruction became further implicated in a host
of negative public perceptions about how Berlin’s new architecture reflected German identity,
from articles and editorials in the German popular press, to critical assessments by architectural
critics and historians on both sides of the Atlantic. As architectural historian Barry Bergdoll
observed, “anyone with the slightest knowledge of the politics and symbols in modern German
… architectural history can scarcely be convinced that reconstruction can avoid playing a role in
reintroducing many of the very passions meant to be calmed.”7

“New Simplicity” and Critical Reconstruction: Drawing the Battle Lines
Lampugnani’s Manifesto
Most observers agree that the Architecture Debates were kicked off by the publication of
two almost identical essays by Lampugnani in late 1993. The first, titled “The New Simplicity:
Speculations on the Architecture of the New Millennium,” was published as an accompanying
text to a yearbook for the German Architectural Museum.8 He then submitted a slightly edited
6
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version to the national magazine Der Spiegel, where it was published in December of 1993 under
the title “The Challenge of the Everyday: Towards a New Building Convention.”9 Even though
Lampugnani’s essay never directly mentions Berlin, Critical Reconstruction, Kleihues, or
Stimmann, his suggestion that modern urban life requires an architecture of “calm solidity” was
read by many as a direct statement about Stimmann’s plans. Hertweck even calls it a “manifesto
for Critical Reconstruction.”10
Born in Rome in 1951, Lampugnani studied architectural theory and practice in Rome,
Switzerland, and Germany, holding fellowships and professorships at Harvard, Columbia, and
the ETH Zürich. During the 1980s, he also served as editor for the Italian design magazine
Casabella before moving to head the publication of Domus. Because of his expertise in Italian
neo-rationalism, Kleihues called on his help for exhibitions and other projects associated with the
IBA-Neubau (the “new construction” portion of the International Building Exhibition or IBA,
headed by Kleihues during the 1980s), where Lampugnani was able to put his stamp on
numerous publications and shows. In 1990, he succeeded art historian Heinrich Klotz as director
of the national German Architectural Museum in Frankfurt. Whereas Klotz had used this
institutional platform to champion a playful, diverse, and global post-modernism, Lampugnani
immediately took a contrasting approach, sponsoring a series of three exhibitions that looked to
revive an awareness of, and appreciation for, German architects and movements that had been
considered taboo during the post-war years in West Germany. These included the neo-classical
and regionalist strands of pre-war Modernism that were later associated with fascism. “Not since
the war,” wrote architecture critic Falk Jäger, “has the traditional and conservative architecture”
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associated with National Socialism “been presented and celebrated so impartially (some would
say uncritically).”11 With this move, Lampugnani became widely considered as a “conservative
architectural historian,” despite the fact that he simultaneously curated an exhibition on German
Expressionist architecture, as well the stylistically inclusive “Berlin Tomorrow” exhibition
(discussed in Chapter 2).12
Hertweck suggests that Lampugnani’s Spiegel manifesto may have been an attempt to
respond to the controversies over Potsdamer Platz, which had already brought issues of
architecture and city planning in Berlin forcefully into the public eye.13 This is certainly the case,
but I argue that even more important at this time in 1993 was the master planning competition
for Alexanderplatz, for which Lampugnani served as a juror. His manifesto is undoubtedly a
commentary on the kind of architecture he sees as fitting for the new capital city. Its implicit
connection to the Alexanderplatz competition is borne out by the fact that two of the other most
involved participants in the Architecture Debates were the winner and runner-up in this
competition, Kollhoff and Libeskind, whose designs and arguments are discussed at length
below.
This context for the debates is far from explicit in the writings themselves, however.
Lampugnani’s essay remains loftily at the level of theory rather than addressing any particular
project, competition, or site. Like Stimmann, Lampugnani links his ideas to German identity by
relying on the vague idea of the “European city” (discussed in Chapter 3), beginning his essay
with an attack on the two sides of post-modern architecture that he deems inappropriate for the
contemporary continental urban landscape: American post-modernism and Deconstructivism. He
11
“Noch nie nach den Krieg war die in Deutschland durch den Nationalsozialismus stigmatisierte traditionalistische
und konservative Architektur so vorurteilsfrei (viele sagten: unkritisch) präsentiert und gefeiert worden.” Quoted in ibid., 68.
12

Ibid.

13

Ibid., 23.
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contends that playful, American post-modernism too easily becomes banal: “A joke, told barely
a couple of times, loses its punch and becomes boring. …What should have been architecture
parlante soon becomes blithering and fatigued by repetition.”14 Deconstructivism, on the other
hand, dangerously reproduces the societal conditions that Lampugnani thinks users of
architecture should be trying to escape: “Architecture means, fundamentally, the creation of
protected space, and in order to create such spaces … walls and supports should be vertical. If
one puts them diagonally,” he claims, then they “tend to do what they suggest: … namely fall
down.”15 Furthermore, Deconstructivism’s “philosophical and aesthetic claim to illustrate
destruction and fleetingness is lost in our cities,” because, he argues, these are already so full of
this same confusion that the style’s aesthetic critique cannot even be heard over the existing
noise. “In a world which is actually succumbing to chaos, artificial chaos is more calming than
shocking,” he claims.16
Having painted these two stylistic approaches as totally untenable for the future of
European urban design, Lampugnani predictably proposes the Modernism of the Weimar era as a
starting point for a new, more appropriate style: “A return to the Modern offers a way, at least,
out of the unbearable alternatives between post-modernism and Deconstructivism, between
populist wish fulfillment and arrogant ‘epatez le bourgeois,’ between the fuddy-duddy and the

14

“Ein Wirz verliert, kaum wird er ein paarmal erzählt, die Pointe und langweilt … Was sprechende Architektur hätte
sein sollen, wurde bald geschwätzig und in der Wiederholung enervierend.” Vittorio Magnago Lampugnani, “Die Neue
Einfachheit: Mutmassungen über die Architektur der Jahrtausendwende,” in Einfach Schwierig: Eine Deutsche
Architekturdebatte. Ausgewählte Beiträge 1993-1995, ed. Gert Kähler (Braunschweig: Vieweg, 1995), 22.
15

“Architektur bedeutet in erster Linie das Schaffen von geschützten Räumen, und um solche Räume zu konstruieren,
empfiehlt es sich aus ganz simplen (und im übrigen unverrückbaren) statischen Gründen, Wände und Stützen sekrecht zu stellen.
Stellt man sie schräg, neigen sie dazu, das zu tun, was si suggerieren, nämlich zusammenzustürzen.” Ibid.
16

“Hinzu kam, daß ihr philosophischer und ästhetischer Anspruch, das Zusammenbrechen und Zerfließen zur
Darstellung zu bringen, im Wildwuchs unserer Städte zunichte gemacht wurde. … In einer Welt, die tatsächlich im Chaos
untergeht, wirkt artifizielles Chaos eher beruhigend als schockierend.” Ibid., 22–23.
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cabinet of horrors. It is the way of neutrality.”17 Echoing Stimmann and Kleihues, Lampugnani
points to pre-war Modernism as the ideal example of good design and construction: “The mass
housing projects of the Weimar Republic tried for standardization and rationalization, but still
put much stock in aesthetics and handicraft.”18 But there is danger in this functional Modernist
strand of architecture as well, he thinks: the heritage of rational forms and technologically
advanced materials of the Weimar Modernists, as expressed today, for example, in the work of
contemporary architects like Norman Foster or Jean Nouvel (both of whom had just received
highly prominent commissions in Berlin) are, in Lampugnani’s mind, still inadequate to address
the needs of society. With their glass facades and high-tech detailing, they are too fleeting, too
aesthetically ephemeral. In what almost appears as a response to the observations of such early
theorists of modernity as Georg Simmel, who noted the barrage of images and sensations
confronting the modern urban dweller,19 Lampugnani avers that architecture must offer a sense
of permanence and tranquility to the viewer:
If one can’t erase a building from the screen as soon as one gets tired of it, then a
fresh quality must be sought which does not repeat the tired but also not the
simply fashionable. That can only be an aesthetics of simplicity, clarity, and
peacefulness. An aesthetic of order, into whose emptiness every individual can
project his or her own dreams.20

17

“Immerhin weist die Rückbesinnung auf die Moderne einen Weg aus der unerträglichen Alternative zwischen
Postmoderne und Dekonstruktivismus, zwischen populistischer Bedürfniserfüllung und arrogantem ‘épatez le bourgeois,’
zwischen Betulichkeit und Horrorkabinett. Est ist der Weg der Neutralität.” Ibid., 23.
18

“Die großen Massenwohnungsbauprojekte der Weimarer Republik bemühten sich um Standardisierung und
Rationalisierung, legten aber noch großen Wert auf Ästhetik und Handwerk.” Lampugnani, “Die Provokation Des Alltäglichen,”
143, translation mine; Karin Lenhart, Berliner Metropoly: Stadtentwicklungspolitik Im Berliner Bezirk Mitte Nach Der Wende
(Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 2001), 206–209.
19

Georg Simmel, “The Metropolis and Mental Life,” in Simmel On Culture: Selected Writings (Thousand Oaks: Sage
Publications, 1997).
20
“Wenn man ein Gebäude nicht schnell wieder von der Bildfläche verschwinden lassen kann, sobald man es leid
geworden ist, muß eine frische Qualität gesucht werden, die nicht ermüdet und gleichwohl nicht dem bloß Modischen huldigt.
Das kann nur eine Ästhetik der Einfachheit, der Klarheit, der Ruhe sein. Eine Ästhetik der Ordnung, in deren Leere jeder einzelne
seine eigenen Träume projizieren kann.” Lampugnani, “Die Provokation Des Alltäglichen,” 147.

160

In order to do this, Lampugnani suggests, architecture must provide the “masses” with
surroundings that are “comprehensible”: architectural aesthetics grounded in “tradition,” so that
they can be easily digested. “That which seamlessly develops out of tradition can also be
explained by it. Everyone can ‘read’ an old building, just as everyone understands an old
painting: in both there is a naturalized motif that the author individually varies.” He sees this
comprehensibility as fulfilling architecture’s “public responsibility” of creating an architecture
“appropriate” to its “uninitiated,” everyday audience.21
Thus far, Lampugnani may be read as promoting a potentially nostalgic – or populist –
neo-historicism: architecture, he seems to be arguing, must look back to the glory days of prewar Modernism, but it must also allude to the longer historical traditions of German citybuilding, becoming recognizably ordinary so that it can soothe today’s harried urban dwellers.
But then Lampugnani dares to go further than either Kleihues or Stimmann, to state outright
what they have carefully avoided:
The Nazi period, which, of course, in public representational buildings showed a
preference for wooden, megalomaniacal classicism … otherwise brought forth an
excellently solid and detailed construction. This tradition broke off abruptly in
1945. Along with the Nazi dictatorship, the architecture that had represented it
was rejected across the board, and unfortunately also traditional solidity.22
To be clear, Lampugnani is not arguing here for a direct rehabilitation of Nazi aesthetics, but for
a lifting of the tacit ban on the neo-classical style of stone building that began in the early
twentieth century and eventually became one strand of the monumental classicism that the
regime preferred. Lampugnani feels this is unfair:

21
“Was sich bruchlos aus der Tradition entwickelt, läßt sich auch durch sie erklären. Ein altes Haus ‘liest’ jeder, wie
auch jeder ein altes Gemälde versteht: Dort wie hier gibt es ein eingebürgertes Motiv, das der Autor individuell variiert.” Ibid.
22

“… die Architektur in der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus, die zwar in den öffentlichen Repräsentationsbauten einem
hölzernen, megalomanen Klassizismus huldigte, aber sonst ausgesprochen solide detaillierte Bauten hervorbrachte. Diese
Tradition riß 1945 abrupt ab.” Ibid., 143.
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The “Nazi”-verdict is still at work today. Whoever builds with older materials like
natural stone or wood is seen as reactionary. If he builds something solid and well
detailed out of it, he is almost totalitarian. And if the outlines are clearly
geometric and the façade uniformly and rigidly distributed, it’s not long before he
is denounced as a fascist. On the other hand, anyone can afford to bring together
the most diagonal facades into which damage is pre-programmed; if it looks
picturesque and cheerful, then it is also democratic and acceptable. Perhaps this is
also the nemesis of German architecture: as punishment for the terror that it
represented and beautified in the thirties and forties, it is refused the whole
tradition.23
What Lampugnani is trying to argue is that architecture itself is essentially without moral
or ethical values, i.e. he attempts to employ the rationalist, Adornian argument for aesthetic
autonomy (discussed in Chapter 1) in order to justify the use of the same forms as employed in
Nazi architecture, stripping them of their negative connotations. However, he immediately
commits a logical fallacy, for it becomes apparent that he actually believes strongly in
architecture’s ability to signify and to influence human life on multiple levels; in fact, he sees
architectural solutions as a necessary part of tackling society’s current ills. He thus very clearly
does not buy his own argument that architecture is autonomous or without implicit values; on the
contrary, contemporary architecture’s current stylistic tendencies are, in his opinion, failed
“attempts to deal with a world that is running off its rails.” Through building a more
homogenous architecture, Lampugnani promises “social cohesiveness.”24 “With this,” Hertweck
rightly observes, “architecture – specifically, architectural form – is accorded not just a cultural,

23

“Das "Nazi-Verdikt" wirkt bis heute nach. Wer im Bauen altbewährte Materialien wie Naturstein oder Holz
verwendet, gilt als reaktionär. Wenn er daraus solide, gut detaillierte Bauten konstruiert, ist er fast schon totalitär. Und wenn die
Grundrisse klar geometrisch angelegt und die Fassaden einheitlich und streng gegliedert sind, dauert es nicht lange, bis er als
Faschist diffamiert wird. Demgegenüber kann es sich jeder leisten, die absurdesten Tragkonstruktionen mit den schrägsten
Fassaden so zusammenzubringen, daß die Bauschäden programmiert sind; wenn es nur pittoresk und heiter aussieht, ist es auch
demokratisch und akzeptabel. Vielleicht ist dies die Nemesis der deutschen Architektur: als Strafe für den Terror, den sie in den
dreißiger und vierziger Jahren repräsentiert und beschönigt hat, wird ihr gleich die gesamte eigene Tradition verwehrt.” Ibid.,
143–144.
24

Lampugnani, “Die Neue Einfachheit: Mutmassungen über die Architektur der Jahrtausendwende,” 21.
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but a highly social, even ‘socio-therapeutic,’ role.”25 Therefore his proposed return to an
architecture of solidity – even by his own measures – cannot rightfully be seen apart from its
historical connections to fascism. In this framework, as Hertweck notes, Lampugnani’s position
essentially constitutes the explicit architectural equivalent to the rhetoric of conservatives like
Ernst Nolte during the Historikerstreit, who argued for the normalization of the nation and its
violent history, claiming that Germany had done enough penance for its crimes and did not need
to do anything further.26 Whereas Stimmann, as shown in Chapter 3, had only alluded to such a
logic, Lampugnani put it directly into print.
Daniel Libeskind and the Defense of Deconstructivism
Arguably the most vehement and internationally noted reaction to Lampugnani’s essay
came from the Polish-American architect Daniel Libeskind. With construction already underway
on his highly-acclaimed design for the Jewish Museum on the southeastern edge of Mitte,
Libeskind was a formidable opponent: he represented – not only in the content of his critique,
but in his identity as the Jewish architect of the institution that most prominently embodied the
memory of Holocaust in Berlin at the time – the international expectation that Germany, as a
Western, democratic nation, would continue to publicly do penance for the crimes of the Nazis.27
In an essay titled “The Banality of Order,” which appeared in German in the architectural journal
Arch+ in March of 1994 and was simultaneously published in English in ANY: Architecture New

25

“Damit wird der Architektur – vielmehr: der architektonischen Form – nicht nur eine kulturelle, sondern eine in
hohem Grade gesellschaftliche, ja ‘sozialtherapeutische’ Rolle zugesprochen.” Hertweck, Der Berliner Architekturstreit, 79.
26

Ibid., 81.

27

The museum design was part of the IBA and had been approved for construction before the fall of the Wall. Paul
Jaskot has argued that the building became, in the post-Wall period, a site of discursive negotiation of neo-Nazi sentiments and
debates over national identity in reunited Germany. See Chapter 4 of Paul B. Jaskot, The Nazi Perpetrator Postwar German Art
and the Politics of the Right (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012).
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York,28 Libeskind recalls a recent architecture conference in Magdeburg where Lampugnani gave
a lecture on the future of architecture:
His proposed set of rules called for a rigid and reactionary order that employs a
seductive simplicity in attacking complex problems; in short, he demanded iron
discipline during a time of transition. Lampugnani instructed the delegates on the
various points of the new order: no new ideas were needed in architecture or
urban planning, no dreams, no thoughts, no vision – only silence and conformity.
As I sat there amidst the architects and planners of the former DDR, listening with
an increasing sense of dismay, I felt a sense of outrage that what was being
advocated was a reactionary call to order: be silent, don’t dream, relinquish
vision, forget individual creativity, follow the rules of the game if you want to
build.29
Libeskind sees in Lampugnani not only “reactionary tendencies” that threaten Berlin’s and
Germany’s potential to remain fertile ground for the future of architectural practice as a whole,
but, on a more abstract level, “a dangerous and authoritarian political sensibility” in the author’s
manifesto.30 Libeskind refuses to see design and politics as separate things, as Lampugnani
attempts to do; instead, he is committed to the idea that architectural aesthetics are inextricable
from the regimes they represent.
Like Stimmann, Kleihues, and Lampugnani, Libeskind, too, tries to claim the lineage of
Weimar Modernism for his side of the argument:
The call for “solidity” and the praise that Lampugnani bestows on the architecture
from the Third Reich is extremely frightening. It is impossible to separate Nazi
ideology from that which it has produced. … German fascist ideology built
solidity into its political policy in opposition to the openness and transparency of
the short-lived Weimar Republic.31

28
The English-language article was preceded by a translation of an exchange of letters between Libeskind and the
editors of Der Spiegel, who turned down his submission. Daniel Libeskind, “Letter from Berlin,” ANY: Architecture New York 1,
no. 6 (May 1994): 48–51.
29

Ibid., 48. See also Daniel Libeskind, “Die Banalität der Ordnung,” in Einfach Schwierig: Eine Deutsche
Architekturdebatte. Ausgewählte Beiträge 1993-1995, ed. Gert Kähler (Braunschweig: Vieweg, 1995), 36.
30

Libeskind, “Letter from Berlin,” 48.

31

Ibid., 49. Libeskind also relies on a quote from Behrens to prove one of his points. See Libeskind, “Die Banalität der
Ordnung,” 39.
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Then, conflating Lampugnani’s position with Berlin city planning policy under Stimmann,
Libeskind goes on to paint Critical Reconstruction as another politically authoritarian and
reactionary method that is, in essence, proto-fascist:
The current criteria of the Senatsbau [sic] administration of Berlin are not just
basic guidelines to guarantee responsible future development but are authoritarian
and repressive edicts. … In using stone façades, gable roofs, punched-in
windows, invariable grids, unrelenting symmetries, and closed blocks, the
buildings and streets conform to one bureaucrat’s idea of the good. … In certain
circles in Berlin and elsewhere there is an ugly atmosphere that resembles the
pathology of a time in which the notion of “degenerate art” was born. It is an
atmosphere of defamation, in which those kinds of architecture and planning that
do not fall into a prescribed parameter are excluded from consideration by not
being invited to compete or to build. Countless architects who refuse to toe the
line have been blacklisted and removed from participation.32
Having just lost both the Potsdamer Platz and the Alexanderplatz competitions, Libeskind surely
counted himself as one of these “blacklisted” architects. His implication that Lampugnani’s ideas
indicated a preference for fascist aesthetics, and that Stimmann was embodying these very
aesthetics in his politics, was provocative and added fuel to the international suspicion that
Lampugnani’s and Stimmann’s ideas were, at their root, on the wrong side of history.
Defending Lampugnani: Fritz Neumeyer and the Cooption of Modernist History
Libeskind’s sentiments were supported by other German critics, notably Rudolf Stegers,33
but they were also strongly rebuffed by, among others, architectural historian and critic Fritz
Neumeyer, who had been another frequent contributor to exhibition catalogs and other
publications on IBA-era Critical Reconstruction with Kleihues and Lampugnani. In October of
1992 he, too, had already published a long editorial in Berlin’s daily Tagesspiegel newspaper,
calling for a style that looked to “the conventional, the typical, the Berlinisch.” Like Stimmann,
Neumeyer expressed concern that Berlin would become a “gigantic exhibition vitrine” for the
32

Libeskind, “Letter from Berlin,” 48.

33

See, for instance, Rudolf Stegers, “Aus Dem Geist von Block Und Stein,” Die Zeit, March 11, 1994.
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“demonstration of all kinds of architectural styles.”34 Then, in a piece written for (but not
published in) Der Spiegel in May of 1994 (it subsequently appeared in the Spanish journal A&V),
Neumeyer neatly shores up Lampugnani’s side of the argument.35 Titled “The Architecture
Debates in Berlin: Backslide into the Cold War,” he argues that Critical Reconstruction is just a
“red flag for the bull of architectural criticism,” a chimera that attracts aggressive behavior but
that obscures the real stakes of rebuilding the city.36
Behind the attempt [by Stimmann] to head off the uncontrolled growth of the city
and the self-staging desires of architects and investors, people detect artistic
dictatorship and other dark intrigues. The politicization of the aesthetic and the
aestheticization of politics have in the meantime come so far that certain
architectural styles are alleged to have specific political positions and politics is
alleged to be shutting out particular architectural positions.37
Neumeyer thinks that these accusations are unfair and overblown, and he blames the media for
unfairly playing the Nazi card. In fact, Neumeyer contends, if Lampugnani were not seen as a
“foreigner” in Germany (since he is a native Italian), then Berlin’s scandal-hungry daily press
“would have quite surely labeled him a ‘skinhead in a tie.’”38 Thus, instead of delving seriously
into matters of architecture and city planning, the conversation about Berlin has, in Neumeyer’s
mind, been reduced to two overly simplistic and diametrically opposed ideologies:

34

The article was reprinted in the 1993 Centrium Jahrbuch. See Fritz Neumeyer, “Zwischen Tradition Und
Innovation,” Centrum: Jahrbuch Architektur Und Stadt, 1993, 58.
35

Fritz Neumeyer, “Una Controversia En Berlin: Recaída En La Guerra Fría,” A & V, no. 50 (1994): 108–13.

36

Fritz Neumeyer, “Die Architekturkontroverse in Berlin: Rückfall in den Kalten Krieg,” in Einfach schwierig: eine
deutsche Architekturdebatte. Ausgewählte Beiträge 1993-1995, ed. Gert Kähler (Braunschweig: Vieweg, 1995), 60.
37
“Hinter dem Versuch, auf diesem Weg dem Wildwuchs der Stadt und den Selbstinszenierungsgelüsten von
Architekten und Investoren einen Riegel vorzuschieben, wittert man inzwischen Kunstdiktatur und andere üble Machenschaften.
Die Politisierung des Ästhetischen und die Ästhetisierung der Politik sind inzwischen soweit fortgeschritten, daß bestimmten
Architekturen ganz bestimmte politische Haltungen unterstellt werden und der Politik die Absicht, bestimmte
Architekturhaltungen auszusperren.” Ibid., 60–61.
38

“Man darf nur froh sein, daß es ein ‘Ausländer,’ ein Gastarbeiter war, der für die Qualität der Tradition und die
Tradition der Qualität das Wort erhoben hat. Ansonsten hätte Lampugnani, der gebürtige Italiener, sich von der Berliner
Tagespresse mit ziemlicher Sicherheit den Vorwurf eines ‘Skinhead mit Krawatte’ eingehandelt.” Ibid., 63–64. Neumeyer
mentions that the leftist taz [sic] newspaper recently used this label against Wolf Jobst Siedler when he dared to critique a design
for a new, mirror-shaped Holocaust memorial.
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Berlin is again on the front lines and has, at least in terms of the Architecture
Debates, a new Cold War. … The culture of discussion in the field of architecture,
and with this the architectural culture itself, falls by the wayside. If one believes
the mean-spirited labels with which the parties oppose themselves using the socalled “Berliner Schnauze” [Berlin’s cheeky local dialect], the “Block Wardens”
[Blockwarte] and the “Chaotics” [Chaoten] stand on either side of this new Wall.
The one party does not want to give up the grid of urban blocks, ground plans and
elevations that constitute European city building, and thus they promote a
reorientation to traditional urban conventions. The other side idealizes the
overscaled, the fragmentary, the colorful mix of contradictory elements that
characterizes contemporary world metropolises, and they see in this their planning
model for the city of the future.39
Instead of proposing a way of tearing down this new “Berlin Wall,” however, Neumeyer
goes on to side with the traditionalists.40 His first argument for this viewpoint is socio-political:
the city, after all, “needs rules, just as a society needs a constitution.”41 Secondly, echoing
Lampugnani, he denies that particular forms must always be associated with particular histories.
He laments that German architectural discourse and criticism is locked into an anachronistic,
Cold War way of thinking that is committed to the “towers in the park” model as a synonym for
democratic design, whereas “the innocent medium of stone is again made into a ‘thousand-year
material’” that supposedly comes with “a spirit to match.”42 After all, he argues, Mussolini also
used “transparency” – one of West Germany’s treasured symbols of democratic architecture – as
an instrument of his own fascist politics.43 Thus no forms or materials are, in themselves, good or

39
“Es ist also erreicht: Berlin ist wieder Frontstadt und hat, jedenfalls auf dem Schauplatz der Architekturkontroverse,
einen neuen kalten Krieg. … Die Diskussionskultur in Sachen Architektur, und somit die architektonische Kultur selbst, bleiben
auf die Strecke. Böswilligen Etiketten zufolge, mit denen die sprichwörtliche ‘Berliner Schnauze’ die Parteien auseinanderhält,
stehen sich ‘Blockwarte’ und “Chaoten’ an der neuen Mauer gegenüber. Die einen wollen das Raster des städtischen Blocks, die
Planfigure von Grundriß und Aufriß als Grundlage des europäischen Städtebaus nicht noch einmal preisgeben und fordern
deshalb eine Reorientierung an traditionellen städtischen Konventionen. Die andere Seite idealisiert den Maßstabsbruch, das
fragmentarische, bunte Gemisch von widersprüchlichen Elementen, das die heutigen Metropolen der Welt kennzeichnet, und
sieht darin ihr Planungsmodell für die zukünftige Stadt.” Ibid., 63.
40

Perhaps his implication is that New Simplicity’s critics are to be equated with East Germany and must undergo a
similar “friendly takeover,” though one hesitates to take his metaphor too far.
41
“Die Stadt braucht Regeln wie die Gesellschaft eine Verfassung.” Neumeyer, “Die Architekturkontroverse in Berlin:
Rückfall in den Kalten Krieg,” 61.
42

Ibid., 65.

43

Ibid.
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evil. As he continues with this line of reasoning, Neumeyer navigates the argument much better
than Lampugnani does. Instead of denying architecture’s ability to carry social meaning, and
then hypocritically reifying that very ability, Neumeyer avoids this subject altogether, and simply
asks readers to distinguish between the rehabilitation of fascist forms and the revival of longerstanding traditions: “in architecture a return to roots and a revival of traditions does not
automatically mean a slipping back into conservatism. Renaissance is not reactionary.”44 Thus,
he argues, the use of neo-classical formal language by the Nazis was one small divergence from
a much longer and larger stream of stylistic development, into which German architects should
now feel free to reinsert themselves.45
At this point, like the other combatants in the debates, Neumeyer invokes specific
examples of pre-war Modernism to prove his case, but again, in contrast to Lampugnani, he is
able to avoid empty statements about whether or not the German Modernist masters constitute
the architectural forefathers of one or another current architectural style. Instead, he turns to the
popular continental leftist critique of capitalism in order to deny the suitability of
Deconstructivist or High-Tech forms for the new Berlin:
It is one of the ironies of architectural history that the utopian glass architecture of
Frühlicht [Bruno Taut’s Expressionist periodical] has found its expression today
in, of all things, the capitalist cathedrals of commerce. In the arena of the world of
sales, what counts is stimulating diversity and that which temptingly glitters. The
traditional city cannot keep up with the scales and sensations of the media age.
The city thus reaches a new level, as consumer spectacle simulates the urban
landscape, in disembodied, high-tech architectural flickerings, with glazed-over
plazas and shopping malls whose spatial wonders are mostly only accessible

44

Ibid., 64.

45

As noted in a footnote in Chapter 3 (find in final draft), the pre-war Modernist, mid-century Modernist, and neoclassical styles are not at all clearly differentiated in reality; many German architects practiced all three at one time or another. I
have chosen not to complicate my analysis with a look at how these various schools are deeply imbricated in one another, though
the discussion of the Reichsbank below alludes to some of this.
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during business hours. Those who are against such modernity find themselves
immediately denounced as conservative philistines.46
Essentially, then, according to Neumeyer, the glass and steel experiments of Libeskind or
Richard Rogers are not just unacceptable because they break with Berlin tradition; they represent
a dangerous “selling-out” to capitalism that goes against German intellectuals’ commitment to
art as being separate from commerce, as well as the traditional model of the “European city” as
providing publicly accessible space amidst private development. Thus, Neumeyer implies (but,
wisely, avoids stating explicitly), the only reasonable way forward for Berlin is a return to the
architectural traditions of the historical city itself, regardless of whether they were subsequently
coopted by the Nazis; as the example of Italy shows, any architecture can be turned towards
political ends, so there is no reason to believe the fear-mongering of those who think stone is in
essence a fascist material.

Hans Kollhoff and the Case for “Urban” Stone Architecture
If Lampugnani and Neumeyer were the most visible of the New Simplicity’s (and thus
also Critical Reconstruction’s) theoretical supporters in the Architecture Debates, Hans Kollhoff
is undoubtedly the most prominent architect representing this point of view. Although Josef Paul
Kleihues was responsible for the highest number of projects underway in Berlin at the time, and
sat on the jury for almost every important new contract, Kollhoff’s designs were in more
conspicuous locations (Potsdamer Platz and Alexanderplatz), and his solemn, restrained aesthetic
embodies Lampugnani’s tenets in a much more literal way than Kleihues’s continued adherence
46

“Es gehört zu den Ironien der Architekturgeschichte, daß die utopische Glasarchitektur des ‘Frühlicht’ ausgerechnet
in den spätkapitalistischen Kathedralen des Kommerzes ihre Fortsetzung gefunden hat. In der Arena der Warenwelt zählt
berauschende Vielfalt und das, was verheißungsvoll glitzert. Die traditionelle Stadt kann mit den Maßstäben des Sensationellen
im Medienzeitalter längst nicht mehr mithalten. Stadt wird folglich auf neuem Niveau, als Konsumspektakel der City simuliert:
im körperlosen Flimmern transparenter High-Tech-Architekturen, mit glasüberdachten Plazas und Shopping Malls, deren
Raumwunder meist nur zu Büro- und Geschäftszeiten zugänglich sind. Wer gegen solche Modernität ist, sieht sich rasch als
konservativer Banause angeprangert.” Neumeyer, “Die Architekturkontroverse in Berlin: Rückfall in den Kalten Krieg,” 67–68.
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to his more eclectic Poetic Rationalism. Kollhoff’s numerous written contributions to the
Architecture Debates worked in tandem with his designs to espouse a return to what he termed
“urban” European commercial building – which should be clad, Kollhoff argued, in the
traditional, “solid” materials of stone or brick. Kollhoff’s position as a proponent of stone
architecture in Berlin became one of the cornerstones of Critical Reconstruction’s conservatism.
The restrictive aesthetics of Kollhoff’s post-Wall designs for Berlin took many critics by
surprise. He had begun his architecture studies in 1968 at the University of Karlsruhe, spent a
year in the atelier of Hans Hollein in Vienna, and in 1975 received a scholarship to pursue postgraduate studies at Cornell. While there, he became a close colleague of Rem Koolhaas, studying
and working under Oswald Matthias Ungers. Kollhoff returned to West Berlin to found his own
architectural practice in 1978 (running it with partner Helga Timmerman since 1984),47 and the
firm has been very successful, especially in Germany, Switzerland, and the Netherlands. He has
also held numerous prestigious academic positions, including one at the ETH Zürich.48
Kollhoff’s first major project in Berlin was a group of residential buildings on Luisenplatz
(1982-1987) in the West Berlin neighborhood of Charlottenburg.49 Designed as infill on three
irregularly-shaped plots, the design is an overt homage to the Modernist masters: taking the form
of two Zeilenbau blocks (one bisected by an existing building), they sport massive glass curtain
walls that echo the gridded form of Walter Gropius’s iconic Bauhaus façade and Alvar Aalto’s
curving block for the dorms at MIT; additionally, they are topped by sweeping, wing-shaped
attic rooflines that visually quote Le Corbusier’s expressionist turn in his post-war work at
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Though Timmerman partnered with him on all of his Berlin designs, she is rarely mentioned in the literature. This
exclusion, I argue, points to a larger problem of women’s positions in the architectural profession and discourse.
48
See Hans Kollhoff, Hans Kollhoff: Kollhoff & Timmerman Architects (Milano: Electaarchitecture, 2004); and
“Bürochronologie,” Kollhoff Architekten, accessed July 7, 2015, http://kollhoff.de/.
49

“Wohnbebauung Am Luisenplatz,” Kollhoff Architekten, accessed July 7, 2015, http://kollhoff.de/.
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Chandigarh and elsewhere (figs. 4.1-4.5). These references are subtly blended with elements of
the typical Charlottenburg tenement in their brick cladding and semi-enclosed balconies.
In his early work in Berlin, therefore, Kollhoff demonstrated himself to be open to both
the material of glass and to a certain amount of formal experimentation that drew on post-war
expressionist trends. His later design for the “Piraeus” housing complex, part of the KNSM
Island development in Amsterdam (1989-1995), is also startlingly abstract and playful,
comprising two large sloping, intersecting forms and using the geometry of the exterior fire
escape and balconies as playful adornments (figs. 4.6-4.9). His first submission for the
Potsdamer Platz master planning competition in 1991 was based in the urban archipelago model:
a series of loosely grouped skyscrapers set in a large, open, landscape of greenery (figs. 4.104.12). However, following the controversies over the site, which resulted in his colleague
Koolhaas being effectively banned from building in Berlin, Kollhoff revised his approach to
architecture for the new capital city: as architectural historian Andreas Ruby observes, Kollhoff
“learned his lesson more thoroughly than any other Berlin architect,” resubmitting (after his
initial rejection) a design for the square that conformed to the “neo-Prussian” aesthetic of what
Lampugnani would term “New Simplicity.”50 His design for a skyscraper as part of the DaimlerBenz development (completed 2000), despite its height, is stone-clad and starkly disciplined in
the gridded distribution of the façade (figs. 4.13-4.15).51

50
Andreas Ruby, “The Eternal Return of the Void: German Architecture after German Reunification,” in New German
Architecture: A Reflexive Modernism, by Ullrich Schwarz (Ostfildern-Ruit: Hatje Cantz, 2002), 297. On the Potsdamer Platz
competition entry, see Vittorio Magnago Lampugnani, An Urban Experiment in Central Berlin: Planning Potsdamer Platz, trans.
Romana Schneider (Frankfurt am Main: DAM, 1997), 146–147. Kollhoff’s early designs for the Berlin Morgen competition can
be found in Vittorio Magnago Lampugnani, Berlin morgen: Ideen für das Herz einer Groszstadt (Stuttgart: G. Hatje, 1991), 130–
131.
51
I don’t agree with Ruby entirely. Kollhoff’s Alexanderplatz proposal clearly draws on his earlier work for Berlin
Morgen and the Potsdamer Platz competition. As discussed further below, Kollhoff’s understanding of the “urban” is a little
different from Kleihues’s or Lampugnani’s understanding of the Berlin block, though he does introduce a much clearer “Berlin
block” form as the basis for the skyscrapers at Alexanderplatz, and emphasizes more of the stone cladding.
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Vying for the Future of the City: The Master Plan Competition for Alexanderplatz
At the time of the Architecture Debates in 1993-4, Kollhoff was in the midst of several
notable projects, including the design for Potsdamer Platz, his contribution to the Hofgarten am
Gendarmenmarkt development planned by Kleihues, discussed in Chapter 3, and a submission to
the planning competition for the former Reichsbank (discussed below). Most importantly, he had
just competed directly with Libeskind in the master plan competition for Alexanderplatz. There
is some irony in the fact that the two had already literally crossed paths at Libeskind’s Jewish
Museum, where Kollhoff had, during the IBA, done the master planning for an adjacent park and
residential area (Wohnpark am Berlin Museum, 1984-1986) (fig. 4.16).52 In the open green space
behind the museum, the simple tubular form of a long, gridded steel arbor surrounded by sparse
plantings and concrete walls blends seamlessly with the striking, fragmented Deconstructivism
of Libeskind’s design. By the time of the Alexanderplatz competition in 1993, however, the
gaping disparity between their two urban visions was starkly apparent. A close look at their
designs for this area provides an illuminating subtext to the opposing positions of many of the
Architecture Debates’ participants.
As the easternmost square in Mitte and a major focus of East Berlin government planning
and construction in the 1960s, Alexanderplatz was one of the first areas of the city to be slated
for redevelopment after reunification. Located at the crossroads of several commercial
thoroughfares that met just outside the eastern medieval city gate, it had emerged organically as a
market square early on in Berlin's history, and by the 1920s had grown into the bustling
commercial and transportation hub featured in Alfred Döblin’s famous novel. A 1929 plan
52
Designed in collaboration with Arthur Ovaska, the park is part of a master plan for a series of residential buildings
designed by various architects. See Gerwin Zohlen, “Die Gesellschaft der Häuser,” in Die Baumeister des neuen Berlin: Porträts,
Gebäude, Konzepte, by Christina Haberlik and Gerwin Zohlen (Berlin: Nicolai, 1997), 93; “Wohnpark Am Berlin Museum,
Block 33,” F-IBA: Forschungsinitiative IBA 87, accessed July 7, 2015, http://f-iba.de/wohnpark-am-berlin-museum-block-33/;
and “Wohnpark Am Berlin Museum,” Berlin.de, accessed July 7, 2015,
https://www.berlin.de/orte/sehenswuerdigkeiten/wohnpark-am-berlin-museum/.
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intended to resolve traffic problems was never fully realized, but did result in the construction of
two large buildings designed by Peter Behrens on the western side of the square (fig. 4.174.19).53 Following the destruction wrought by World War II, which spared the Behrens buildings
but ruined the gigantic Tietz Department Store that filled the majority of the surrounding blocks
(figs. 4.20-4.21), the East Berlin government undertook an extensive and highly technical
reworking of the area, creating a truly massive public space that could serve as both a recreation
and demonstration venue. (The “emptiness” of this vast, windswept area was later the object of
vehement critique by post-Wall planners and architects.) New construction on the square, done
throughout the 1950s and 1960s, incorporated several office towers, a high-rise hotel,
restaurants, and the Warenhaus Centrum (Centrum Emporium), the largest department store in
East Germany. In 1993, the Berlin Department of Urban Development and Environment
announced a master plan competition for the entire site.54 Though this was not Stimmann’s
department (he worked for the Department of Construction and Housing), he did serve on the
jury.55 After short deliberations and one revisionary round, it awarded first prize to Kollhoff,
with Libeskind as the runner-up.56
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Dorothea Tscheschner, “Alexanderplatz - Seine Entwicklung Nach 1945,” in Alexanderplatz: Städtebaulicher
Ideenwettbewerb, ed. Kristin Feireiss (Berlin: Ernst & Sohn, 1994), 42.
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Many of the large buildings around Alexanderplatz had been the headquarters for GDR Kombinate and thus fell to
the Treuhandanstalt (THA, discussed in Chapter 2) after reunification. Under pressure from investors, who were especially
interested in the property because of its potential for high-rise development, Hassemer wrested control of the site from the city
authorities and forced the staging of a competition. Over the intervening years, many of the plots have been sold off; the
American Hines is now the only original company still working on developing the site. See Elizabeth A Strom, Building the New
Berlin: The Politics of Urban Development in Germany’s Capital City (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2001), 209–210.
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The jury also included, among others, the architects Jürgen Sawade and Albert Speer (Jr.), Hans Stimmann, Dorothee
Dubrau (the head of urban planning for the district of Mitte) and Hassemer. See Kristin Feireiss, ed., Alexanderplatz:
Städtebaulicher Ideenwettbewerb, trans. Michael Robinson and Hans H. Harbort (Berlin: Ernst & Sohn, 1994), 244.
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For a detailed account of the planning process, media coverage, and public involvement, see Lenhart, Berliner
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The stated aim of Kollhoff’s design was “to stop the city from drifting apart” by restoring
the “block-like structure of the city” (figs. 4.22-4.26).57 The large open space at the heart of the
square was to remain a pedestrian area, surrounded by cafes and restaurants that would give it a
lively character during day and night. This open space was to be embellished by a large glazed
circular area (replacing the extant, East German fountain) that could double as an “illuminated
fountain with a program of waterworks” at night.58 Infill on the surrounding blocks, responding
to Behrens’s two buildings in their height, massing, and the horizontal emphasis of their façades,
were to provide a visual and physical base for thirteen soaring high-rises that would spring from
the outer street-edges of the development. Some infill on the western side of the S-Bahn tracks,
around the iconic Fernsehturm (TV tower) and extensive new construction on the large block to
the east (between Alexanderstrasse and Mollstrasse) would restore a dense, gridded structure to
the neighborhood. In the perspective renderings, the buildings’ facades are clearly stone, with
filigreed detailing, taking some of their visual cues from the art deco skyscrapers of New York
City, but also echoing the grandiose Stalinist “wedding-cake” neo-classicism of the nearby
Stalinallee, which had been constructed along Socialist Realist lines in the 1950s.59 Kollhoff also
added what he called a “sentimental proposal” to reconstruct the statue of the mythical female
figure of Berolina that once stood on the square and is mentioned in Döblin’s novel: the firm’s
57

Kollhoff Architects, “Explanatory Report 1,” in Alexanderplatz: Städtebaulicher Ideenwettbewerb, ed. Kristin
Feireiss (Berlin: Ernst & Sohn, 1994), 85.
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This thoroughfare was much praised by proponents of Critical Reconstruction and the New Simplicity. Kleihues
included a long section about it in his essay for the collection Berlin – New York that also includes an essay on art deco in New
York City. See Josef Paul Kleihues, “From the Destruction to the Critical Reconstruction of the City: Urban Design in Berlin
after 1945,” in Berlin/New York: Like and Unlike  : Essays on Architecture and Art from 1870 to the Present, ed. Josef Paul
Kleihues and Christina Rathgeber (New York: Rizzoli, 1993); Rosemarie Haag Bletter, “Art Deco Skyscapers: Towers of
Modern Babel,” in Berlin/New York: Like and Unlike  : Essays on Architecture and Art from 1870 to the Present, ed. Josef Paul
Kleihues and Christina Rathgeber (New York: Rizzoli, 1993); see also Francesca Rogier, “The Monumentality of Rhetoric: The
Will to Rebuild in Postwar Berlin,” in Anxious Modernisms  : Experimentation in Postwar Architectural Culture, by Sarah
Williams Goldhagen and Réjean Legault (Montréal: Canadian Centre for Architecture  ; Cambridge, Mass, 2000). The association
between Stalinallee and “good” urban design still persists in the current discourse on Berlin: Stalinallee was referenced in several
talks at a 2013 symposium on Berlin at Yale University, which included many of the main players in the Architecture Debates.
“Achtung Berlin” (Yale University, February 14, 2013).
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description of the design includes a quote from the book’s main character, who is watching the
statue being “melted down to make medals.”60 This poetic detail suggests that Kollhoff saw his
design at least partly as a redemptive gesture that would restore Berlin to its former commercial
glory while transcending – rather than reifying – Germany’s militaristic history.
Clearly Kollhoff’s plan did not fully conform to the typical medium-rise “Berlin block”
type that Kleihues and Stimmann proposed as infill for the rest of Mitte; along with Kleihues,
Kollhoff had long been a supporter of the judicious use of high-rises in Berlin’s rebuilding,
envisioning Potsdamer Platz and Alexanderplatz as two skyscraper-adorned gateways into the
capital’s commercial center.61 Still, in their detailing, distribution, and massing, as well as in the
largely orthogonal ground plan, the structures depicted in Kollhoff’s design conform to the
stone-clad solemnity of the New Simplicity and Critical Reconstruction. Libeskind’s design, by
contrast, could not be more opposed to these approaches in both its aesthetics and its layout.
Loaded with a preponderance of poetic and historical references, with names like “The Book,”
“The Window,” “The Compass,” “Dostoyevsky Passage,” “Tatlin Elevator,” and “Kafka Lane,”
and with visual references to such icons of Constructivist experimentation as the Vesnin
Brothers’ Pravda Building, Libeskind’s plan proposed the creation of a new and “tightly
compressed center with its own history and identity,” which nonetheless preserved much more of
the existing fabric of the East German square than Kollhoff’s design did (figs. 4.27-4.30).62 Like
Kollhoff, Libeskind incorporated several high-rises, but these were to be clustered to the east
rather than evenly encompassing the square. In the perspective views, it becomes clear that
Libeskind envisioned a set of highly experimental forms that splinter, fragment, and contradict
60
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Lampugnani, Berlin morgen, 130–131.
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Alexanderplatz Master Plan Competition Jury, “Jury’s Assessment Second Phase,” in Alexanderplatz:
Städtebaulicher Ideenwettbewerb, ed. Kristin Feireiss (Berlin: Ernst & Sohn, 1994), 108.
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one another. This approach sought to embody the fact that Alexanderplatz “was and still is a
place of hit and miss, of uncertain connections, of encounters which fail to take place between
east and west, and of other such encounters which are full of promise, a place of successes and
failures; and who will have the last laugh may remain an open question.”63 While the jury
appreciated his will to preserve many of the existing structures on the site, they found his
“electrical linking of shapes” to constitute “a kind of Disneyland.” They called his reconstruction
of the Pravda building “incomprehensible” and, foreshadowing Lampugnani’s manifesto (he
was, in fact, on the jury), they stated that “this chaos, which simulates the chaos that is the
distinguishing feature of the contemporary city today, is not a suitable basis for a building plan
which was intended to place limits on the chaos.” While conceding that the plan “is a mine of
ideas which might take shape as individual buildings,” the only redeeming quality the jury
seemed to agree upon regarding Libeskind’s design was the fact that the Behrens buildings were
left intact.64
These two much-discussed master plans for the square came to be seen by many critics as
illustrations of the opposing sides of the Architecture Debates: Gerwin Zohlen states that
Kollhoff and Libeskind danced a “skillful pas de deux” through the debates, representing “the
good old conflict of the old guard against the new, the avant-gardistes against the realists.”65 But
their opposition represents much more than a simple competition between the regressive and the
experimental: their aesthetic “Cold War” (to use Neumeyer’s term) reflects, ultimately, two
fundamentally different visions for the future of Berlin that, in 1993, seemed like two disparate
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“Im Bellett der Formeln und Statements vollführten die beiden einen gekonnten Pas de deux .. zwischen den beiden
war der alte, so schön alte Konflikt der Altvorderen gegen die Neuerer, der Avantgardisten gegen die Realisten aufgebrochen.”
Zohlen, “Die Gesellschaft der Häuser,” 92–93.
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possible paths to the reconstruction of the entire rest of the city. The critic Rudolf Stegers stated,
in the national weekly newspaper Die Zeit, that Kollhoff’s design seemed “set on liquidation,
simplicity, homogeneity, totality,” whereas “Libeskind looks for transformation, complexity,
heterogeneity, plurality. … The models are easily imagined as models of a repressive society
with Kollhoff, a liberal society with Libeskind.”66 Though Libeskind’s symbolicallyoverburdened design may appear hackneyed or heavy-handed today, at the time it represented
the expectations of the global community that Berlin would not only symbolize a futuristic,
visionary metropolis, but that it would do so by acknowledging and working through its
traumatic past. Kollhoff’s design, on the other hand, attempts to quietly and seamlessly insert
Berlin into the ranks of global, capitalist metropolises by mixing high-rise commercial
typologies with the European tradition of the medium-rise block form clad in stone – appearing
as if, in a way, the years between 1945 and 1989 had never occurred at all.
Kollhoff’s Argument for Urban Stone Architecture
Kollhoff’s “about-face” in Berlin was not only aesthetic but rhetorical. Zohlen contends
that it was not his buildings but his words that made him notorious, and that he used the platform
of the Berlin Architecture Debates to his own advantage, turning into an effective “coup
d’état.”67 Kollhoff’s written contributions to the debates actually began before Lampugnani’s
opening manifesto, in an essay first published in Berlin’s newspaper Der Tagesspiegel in
October of 1992, reprinted in the journal Centrum’s 1993 yearbook.68 (Also included in this
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“Kollhoff setzt auf Liquidation, Simplizität, Homogenität, Totalität; Libeskind setzt auf Transformation,
Komplexität, Heterogenität, Pluralität. … Mühelos lassen sich die Modelle auch als Modelle einer repressiven Gesellschaft bei
Kollhoff, einer liberalen Gesellschaft bei Libeskind vorstellen.” Stegers, “Aus Dem Geist von Block Und Stein,” np.
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collection were essays by Kleihues, Libeskind, and Neumeyer.69) In the essay, titled “Boredom
and Public Opinion Making,” Kollhoff begins by lamenting the disregard shown for historical
buildings today, arguing for the importance of craftsmanship and quality: traditions of Berlin’s
past that, he claims, arose from care, economy, and attention to detail. These characteristics are
especially present, he thinks, in buildings that use stone: “Stone as a building material was, in
Berlin, something special. … Accordingly, they worked it sparingly and carefully.”70 But, he
complains, “functional brutalism after the war left the dictum of constructive honesty … on the
junkpile, instead choosing an ‘honest’ but cold collection of apparatuses off of which our
emotional needs unhappily slide.”71 As in Lampugnani’s manifesto, what seems at first to simply
be a plea for “quality” or “good craftsmanship” in architecture becomes instead an argument
about the connections between architectural form and the state of contemporary society. And
again like Lampugnani, Kollhoff draws on a Simmel-esque critique of the sensory excesses of
modern urban life in order to argue that today’s architecture is too fleeting and impermanent:
Why is it that we don’t notice these drawbacks [of lack of craftsmanship]? Do we
go through the city with TV-vision, where the limited resolution blurs the details,
or because we’re so hungry for the next image that we find the present
uninteresting? Or do we already expect the devaluation of the environment that
we produce and consume, so that we have become accustomed not to linger,
because the next image promises hope? We have become “channel-surfers” in the
treatment of our city. … Everything is exchangeable, everything is equally
important, everything is just a matter of taste and one’s mood at the moment. Are
there even still categories besides “awesome” and “awful”?72
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It also included an essay by Wolf Jobst Siedler. The table of contents is available online at
http://www.zvab.com/Centrum-Jahrbuch-Architektur-Stadt-1993-Peter/231286248/buch.
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Kollhoff sees the media as complicit in this populist devaluation of architecture: “architecture
has become commonplace. Everyone is an architect. The newspapers constantly steamroll what
architecture is. How can you sell papers when you’re not touting the latest fad?”73 Instead of this
parade of fashionable styles, Kollhoff avers, “We should focus on our great and, in its simplicity
and solidity, appropriate building tradition,” in order to find “a lineage” or “tendency.”74
This tendency, for Kollhoff, can be summarized in the term “urban”: his shorthand for the
idea that the “European city” requires a return to a particular (i.e. “urban”) typology – that of the
pre-war commercial block – and that, consequently, stone, in its “solidity,” is the only
appropriate building material for this task.
The architecture of the city is one of stone. The permanence which Aldo Rossi
talks of does not manifest itself in glass and aluminum. If we think urban
architecture should do more than simply please the eye but should also transcend
its time, Gottfried Semper’s reservations about iron architecture have evidently
not lost their relevance. It is in stone that our collective memory is concentrated.75
Taken alone, this call for a return to particular typologies and materials could appear as a
mere personal preference or a nostalgic wish to return to the forms of the nineteenth century, but
Kollhoff chooses instead to align himself with Lampugnani in the problematic defense of Nazi
architecture as a set of forms that can be divorced from their historical context. The 1993
Centrum yearbook also included an interview with Kollhoff by the far-left author and architect

Umgang mit unserer Stadt (Zapping = nervöses Hin-und Herschalten der Fernsehprogramme mit Fernbedienung). Alles wird
austauschbar, alles ist gleich wichtig, alles ist nur noch dem Geschmacksurteil und der momentanen Laune unterworden. Gibt es
überhaupt noch Entscheidungskategorien jenseits von ‘toll’ und ‘öde’?” Ibid., 89.
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wird?” Ibid., 91.
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Peter Neitzke, in which Kollhoff defends Lampugnani’s exhibition featuring Nazi architects at
the German Architecture Museum:
Insofar as architecture is an art … I can only judge it outside of its political
context. Your question implicates the old misunderstanding of the ideological
worth of an artistic endeavor. … For me it is ever clearer that one must
differentiate between the political positioning of the architects of the Third Reich,
or the politically affirmative power of their architecture, and an intra-architectural
engagement which was a part of architectural history before the Third Reich,
which was repressed after the war for obvious reasons, and which is being taken
up today in thoughtful ways.76
Paving the way for Neumeyer and Lampugnani’s arguments during the Architecture Debates,
Kollhoff equates the “towers in the park” Modernism of the post-war era with the misplaced
desire for a “democratic” architecture that he sees devolving into to the chaotic and empty – and
thus potentially harmful – forms of Deconstructivism.77 While Kollhoff insists that he does not
support the revival of a Nazi architect like Paul Schmitthenner, who touted the vision of a return
to the medieval village in service of a “Blut und Boden” ideology, he does think it is important to
link back to German pre-World War II architectural traditions. Like every other author in the
debates, Kollhoff then invokes the likes of Behrens, Hans Poelzig, and Alfred Messel, asserting
that they belonged to “a tradition that was thinking about the metropolis and urban
architecture.”78 But this supposedly innocent return to the Modernist greats is, incomprehensibly
in Kollhoff eyes, met with suspicion by critics and the general public:
Every approach that is conscious of tradition, which relates itself to metropolitan
architecture, is slapped with a verdict and disqualified as potentially
76
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undemocratic. A solid building which arises out of the memory of an urban
commercial typology and feels itself bound to the conventions of urban life,
almost inevitably invites accusations of fascism. Lampugnani’s exhibition
therefore appears necessary to me. Indeed, it should have happened earlier, for
post-war architecture in Germany is in general a grotesque feat of repression.79
Heinrich Klotz and Accusations of Fascism
Kollhoff’s statements fed into those by Lampugnani and Neumeyer, and in July 1994,
directly after Libeskind’s polemic appeared in Arch+, the same journal released an entire issue
dedicated to the debates over Berlin’s reconstruction, titled “From Berlin to New Teutonia.” As
the moniker implies, the authors included were all critics of Kollhoff, Lampugnani, and their
fellow promoters of the New Simplicity.80 The only English text included in this volume was a
translation of an interview with Heinrich Klotz, former director of the German Architecture
Museum and Lampugnani’s direct predecessor, who had throughout the 1980s advocated for the
embrace of a stylistically diverse post-modernism.
The approach espoused by Lampugnani and exemplified clearly by Kollhoff’s designs,
Klotz argues in the interview, constitutes “a new rigor which might even imply more echoes of
fascist architecture than has even been the case before. For me, this is very disquieting.”81 In
Klotz’s eyes, the formal language of New Simplicity “contains an affectation of power
(Machtallüre) which we have not known since 1945.”82 Klotz’s argument is very similar to
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Libeskind’s, but with one important difference: whereas Libeskind is suspicious of New
Simplicity for its dictatorial politics and its limitations on style, Klotz is more concerned with the
rehabilitation of a very particular formal language (i.e. that of “stone” architecture) that, in his
mind, can – and, more importantly, should – never be disassociated from the Nazi regime. Just as
Habermas and others had argued in the Historikerstreit, Klotz feels that the crimes of the Nazis
are such that German history and identity can never be freed from that guilt; rather, Germans
must remain continually vigilant with respect to such tendencies, and, while embracing
innovation, diversity, and variety, must eschew any return to or revival of those things (including
building materials and forms) that were integral to Hitler’s regime.
Klotz states that he is opposed to any ideological or dogmatic approach to architecture: “I
don’t like to be too hasty to read political qualities into architecture. Transparency is not always
democracy and heavy stone is not the same as fascism.”83 Indeed, he observes, the architectural
culture of former West Germany had its own problematic relationship to architectural form and
political representation:
The old Federal Republic of Germany … had an ideology of its own, an ideology
of lightness, of transparency, of democracy, of open-mindedness. Those were all
epithets which had been assigned to the materials and the form in order prove that
we wanted to get rid of the representative Third-Reich type of building. … That
was okay. [However,] it was not okay that people became dogmatic about it and
wanted to forbid everything else. You can’t do that in the name of democracy. …
Politics do not mean harmony and renunciation of opposition.84
However, though “architecture is seldom unambiguous in its form,” i.e. Kollhoff and other
adherents of the New Simplicity may not be explicitly fascist in their intentions, the “nearest
relative” of a recent design by Kollhoff is, Klotz argues, Hitler’s Haus der Deutschen Kunst.85
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He also expresses concern over Kollhoff’s designs currently under construction at Potsdamer
Platz, for which he served as a jury member: “When I realized he was serious about it, the word
‘fascistic’ came out of my mouth,” he states.86
I was shocked. Kollhoff, an architect I like and who has, in the early years of his
career, been responsible for many convincing buildings in the city, buildings one
might describe as belonging to a second modernism, a person like him is now
turning to tectonics. … In the last analysis that means that power is made visible.
… But if the whole city looks like this, if this is the new era, I have less and less
reason to travel to Berlin and more and more reason to say: for God’s sake, not
this kind of a capital!87
Kollhoff is not Klotz’s only target. Stimmann and Kleihues are also, according to him,
guilty of power-mongering in the service of the New Simplicity. With this interview, Klotz adds
to the argument, also espoused by Libeskind and shared by Dieter Hoffmann-Axthelm (discussed
below), that Berlin’s reconstruction is now subject to the rigid dictates and conservative
aesthetics of a “cartel” of reactionary planners, theorists, and architects.
Kollhoff published a reply to Klotz the following month in the Frankfurter Rundschau
newspaper titled “Fiction or City: Against the Tabooization of an Urban Architecture,” arguing
that his designs emphatically did not constitute “a rehabilitation of a conservative Modernism or
the lifting of the taboo on Nazi architecture,” but, rather, were a return to the tradition of Weimar
Modernism in the form of urban typologies. This kind of urbanism, argues Kollhoff, was
wholeheartedly rejected by the Nazis, even as its surface aesthetics were appropriated by them.
Kollhoff accuses Klotz of dismissing “urban” architecture wholesale along with Nazi forms:
“According to Klotz’s criteria, everyone,” from Max Taut and Behrens to Mies van der Rohe and
Poelzig, “is without exception a fascistoid architect. These architects embody nothing less than
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German urban architecture! If we constrain these with a verdict, if we make taboo this great
tradition of modern building,” then, Kollhoff thinks, we continue the destruction of the inner city
that began with the bombs of World War II, where voids remain empty and urban life cannot
take place.88
Klotz made a rebuttal in the same newspaper a week later, titled “Berlin Blockade: An
Answer to Hans Kollhoff,” arguing that, on the contrary, Kollhoff cannot claim to be an heir to
Weimar Modernism, since he clads his buildings in stone and creates disciplined façades that,
Klotz notes, Kleihues has described as having a “rational clarity and pure simplicity” as well as a
“harsh [spröden] character” that is “typical for Berlin and Prussia.”89 Klotz argues that this is not
a question of, as Kollhoff would have it, recreating an urban architectural typology, although he
himself is a critic of the enormous size and density of the blocks being sold off and developed in
Mitte; instead,
What throws “Prussian harshness” [Sprödigkeit] into a very particular light is the
language of this architecture, its details, which are described as “New Simplicity.”
… Whoever Kollhoff’s guarantors of an early Modernism may be, from Mebes to
Mies – it not only shows a lack of instinct to decorate the recently rediscovered
Berlin block, blown up to the size of a metropolis, with classical details, but to do
this with such forms that cannot absolve themselves from historical guilt and
misuse. There is one kind of architecture which should be put aside for all time,
just as we can no longer use certain terms like “degenerate,” “volkisch,” “Aryan,”
etc. in a German context.90
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He goes on to, once again, compare Kollhoff’s architecture to the Nazis’ monumental halls; even
if Kollhoff says he is looking back to the early Moderns, Klotz says, Nazi architects like Albert
Speer and Paul Troost have sullied the language of even Modernist neo-classicism to the point of
making it unusable, for this architecture cannot be freed from its “ideological baggage” and
therefore simply become useable in an ahistorical manner.91 The German public, furthermore, is
not too stupid to detect the conservative tendencies that underlie such designs: “Germans should
not be assumed to be able to swallow something as if it were an innocent detail, which can never
again be associated with innocence. Cave canem! We can tell the difference!”92
The Rehabilitation of Nazi Architecture in Mitte
This exchange between Kollhoff and Klotz demonstrates the easy symbolic slippage that
can occur in architectural discourse. Certainly most of the German public was, contrary to
Klotz’s declaration, probably not educated enough in the history of architectural styles to be able
to differentiate between pre-war Modernist and Nazi buildings, but they were savvy enough to be
suspicious of anything that smacked of the “wrong” kind of history. Whatever the arguments of
Kollhoff and others in defense of a neo-classical or conservative pre-war Modernist aesthetic, the
preservation and further utilization of such iconic Nazi buildings as the Reichsbank, for which
Kollhoff designed the master renovation plan, demonstrate, at best, a denial of architecture’s
many possible historical connotations, and, at worst, a problematic celebration of fascist forms.
Post-Wall Mitte was not only slated to be Berlin’s newest commercial quarter; it was also
to become the main location for state and national government buildings (the federal
nicht mehr von aller historischen Schuld und ihrem Mißbrauch freisprechen lassen. Es gibt eben eine Architektur; die ein für
allemal erledigt sein sollte; so wie man auch bestimmte Begriffe wie etwa ‘entartet,’ ‘völkisch,’ ‘arisch,’ etc. nicht mehr in einem
deutschen Kontext gebrauchen kann.” Klotz, “Berliner Blockade: Eine Antwort auf Hans Kollhoff,” 124–125.
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government’s official move from Bonn to Berlin took place in 1999). Fortunately, there were
ample plots of land and numerous buildings that could be repurposed for national government
functions. But the existing structures were not treated equally: as will be discussed further in
Chapter 5, GDR buildings were, for the most part, demolished, whereas Gründerzeit and Naziera buildings were almost always reused without comment, despite their troubled history.93 One
example of this type of reuse is the Reichsbank, a gigantic building constructed between 1933
and 1939 along the Spree River canal, directly across from Schinkel’s Friedrichswerder Church
and adjacent to the Prussian Schloss (figs. 4.31-4.32). It was Hitler’s first showcase project and,
more importantly, marked the definitive end of the Bauhaus in Germany through the conspicuous
rejection of Mies van der Rohe’s competition entry. Following the war, it functioned as the
headquarters of the SED, East Germany’s ruling party.94 In 1994, amidst international criticism,
the German federal government decided to readopt and refurbish the building, supposedly for
financial reasons, and use it to house the German Foreign Ministry (Auswärtiges Amt). It held a
master planning competition for the site, and Kollhoff’s design was chosen as the winner.95
Architectural historian Hanno Rauterberg contends that the original Reichsbank building
is “not a typical example of the vulgarly monotonous architecture” of the Third Reich: designed
by Heinrich Wolff, it “exhibits elements of a conservative Modernism in such details as
horizontally divided windows.”96 Architectural historian Hans Wilderotter agrees that the
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Reichsbank is not a “typical” example of Nazi design (indeed, as Barbara Miller Lane has
shown, there was no one, unified Nazi architectural style, though Hitler’s “Führerbauten” did
demonstrate a particular preference for monumental stone neo-classicism97), which tended to
towards a more populist grandeur, but that it is representative of the “conservative Modern.”
Nevertheless, he says, the monumentality and restrained classicism of this and other conservative
Modernist designs, including some by figures like Behrens and Poelzig, who are generally
regarded as progressive architects, “embody a host of similarities with Nazi architecture.”98
Indeed, it is this very aspect of the Modernists’ pre-war work – i.e. their sober, stripped-down
references to neo-classicism – which Kollhoff, Klotz, and the other participants in the
Architecture Debates continually invoke in order to either exonerate or condemn the German
architecture of the 1930s.
According to Wilderotter, many representatives of the German federal government felt
that Nazi buildings had to be rehabilitated in order to show that the new nation was open to
dealing with its violent history:
Though tearing the building down would have removed the suspicion of a
[problematic] “continuity” with the Nazi regime through new or continued use, on
the other hand, it would have rightly garnered criticism in that it would have
destroyed an available marker of a history which, because it belongs to the most
pressing duties of [public] historical culture (Geschichtskultur) in Germany, must
be kept in the public conscience (im Bewusstsein gehalten werden muss).99
Kollhoff’s design addresses this perceived need for historical negotiation by emphasizing three
“layers” of the past throughout the building. Leaving the exterior virtually untouched except for
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a new rooftop garden, Kollhoff focused on the interior, removing a significant amount of the
GDR-era additions to reveal the original 1930s wood paneling and other detailing (fig. 4.33).
This first historical layer is augmented by two more – arguably very subtle – ones: the
preservation of two East German rooms, including the main meeting chambers of the SED (fig.
4.34), and the completely new addition, in collaboration with the artist Gerhard Merz, of large,
monochromatic surfaces on certain isolated walls and ceilings in important rooms (figs. 4.354.36). The master plan also called for a large additional structure, separated from the former
Reichsbank building by an inner courtyard, built along Französische Strasse. This new public
front to the complex was eventually constructed according to designs by Berlin architects
Thomas Müller and Ivan Reimann (figs. 4.37-4.38).
Because it preserves historical details without reverting to historicism, Wilderotter sees
the building as a successful embodiment of “the breaks and continuity of German history,” a
“successful political self-representation” of the new nation.100 Kollhoff, however, fails to take up
this argument in his writing about the building. Instead, echoing his statements elsewhere, he
denies the historical connotations of the structure and suggests instead that it should be seen
simply as “a document of style.” As Rauterberg contends, Kollhoff
took refuge in a supposedly neutral stance, deliberately refusing to comment on
Hitler’s decision that meant the beginning of the end for Mies and other
Modernist architects. This odd distinction between form and content, this
decoupling of history from its setting, amounts to an attempt to neutralize the
architectural structure. It is transported into a sphere in which only aesthetics
count and architects are absolved of all accountability.101
Despite all these attempts by Kollhoff to both aesthetically reframe a historically-burdened space
and to simultaneously claim that it is not burdened at all, Wilderotter contends that the
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Reichsbank building is nevertheless still seen as, quite simply, “a Nazi building” by most nonprofessional observers. The two-story row of columns on its monumental front and the strong
relief of its impossibly massive sandstone façade overshadow Modernist elements such as the
horizontal distribution of the windows.102 This impression is further heightened by the restrained
classicism of Müller and Reimann’s new addition, which is fronted by a series of massive, fourstory granite columns (fig. 4.38). Ultimately, as Wilderotter states, “the popular impression is
right: in the end the institution of the Reichsbank was a stronghold of the Nazi regime,” and thus
this structure is still “cursed” building in many ways.103 Kollhoff’s claims did nothing to
successfully counteract this impression; indeed, his careful restoration of many parts of the Naziera interior only serves to shore up the idea that he and the other proponents of the New
Simplicity and Critical Reconstruction were drawn to a dangerously revivalist version of fascist
aesthetics rather than promoting productive architectural dialogue about Germany’s traumatic
history.
Contemporary projects like Norman Foster’s renovation of the Reichstag (the German
federal parliament building, just a few blocks west of the Reichsbank) showed that such
structures could be adapted effectively for government use while also incorporating pointed
commentary on the layers of violent history embodied in the structure. In the case of the
Reichstag, graffiti added by the invading Russian army in 1945 was restored and openly
preserved in the hallways, artwork was added to contextualize the problematically ethnic
overtones of the inscription over the entrance, and, most prominently, Foster’s transparent dome
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symbolized the democratic and open nature of reunited Germany’s government.104 Kollhoff’s
restrained preservation of the historical layers of the Reichsbank building, with the only obvious
addition being the abstraction of Merz’s colored walls and ceilings, hardly evokes the same
critical engagement with the building’s troubling symbolism.

Dieter Hoffmann-Axthelm: The Devil’s Advocate
The easy “Cold War” division between participants in the Architecture Debates is
problematized by Dieter Hoffmann-Axthelm, who refused to join either camp. Instead, he
represented a stance that saw city planning as a tool of politics, rather than the other way around,
and he staunchly defended the position that architecture should only be regulated in the service
of the creation of a middle-class, self-governing populace. These ideas were very influential on
Stimmann, who regularly hired Hoffmann-Axthelm as a consultant on city planning measures
beginning in 1991.
Gruppe 9. Dezember and the Charter for the Center of Berlin
Like Stimmann, Hoffmann-Axthelm had been heavily involved in SPD politics in Berlin
during the 1970s, and had often critiqued Kleihues’s IBA-Neubau in his publications. A native
West Berliner, he trained as a sociologist and theologian during the 1960s. In the seventies he
grew increasingly interested in urban matters, becoming a regular contributor to various journals
and newspapers, and he worked closely with Hardt-Waltherr Hämer’s community-oriented IBAAltbau in Kreuzberg during the 1980s.105 Immediately following the fall of the Wall, he headed
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the Gruppe 9. Dezember (“The December 9th Group”), a ca. fifty-member association of planners
and architects from both East and West Berlin who came together to make polemical statements
and demands about city planning.106 In their manifesto, titled “Charter for the Center of Berlin,”
published in Bauwelt’s quarterly volume Stadtbauwelt in March of 1991, the group specified
twelve succinct demands for the reconstruction of Berlin that sounded much like (indeed, even
mentioned the term) Critical Reconstruction: these included the revision of the Modernist, autofriendly city; the promotion of densification; the eschewal of Mitte as an “experimental field of
utopian city building”; an attention to history; strict frontage lines and height limits; and mixed
uses.107
A companion essay by Hoffmann-Axthelm himself, clearly meant to provide readers with
the “correct” reading of the group’s manifesto, stated that the Charter was a direct reaction to the
planning failures at Potsdamer Platz, and argued for a return to the “historical” city, not
necessarily just in the realm of aesthetics, but also in the form of grassroots governance:
The insistence on historical structures has to do with neither historicism nor
nostalgia. These historical structures are a model. Berlin, in spite of all the
destruction, is a city that is already present and characterized by history. We do
not need to invent a new city, especially not the metropolis of the third
millennium. Moreover, these kinds of inventions are collective endeavors, they do
not belong to the city planning office nor its associated official (or senator), but
rather they are to be demanded from them. It is more a matter of giving back the
historically acquired ability for commerce and regeneration to a city that has been
violently damaged many times over.108
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In arguing for historical forms as a part of a new political planning culture, Hoffmann-Axthelm
judiciously avoids the question of movements and styles. For Hoffmann-Axthelm, history is not
easily reduced to single moments that can then be directly associated with (or dissociated from)
particular architectural motifs or forms; rather, architectural movements must be seen in the
context of the multifaceted and complex political, social, technological, and economic changes
that accompanied and gave rise to them. (In essence, following a Marxist line of reasoning, they
are the “superstructure” arising from the “base” of political and economic relationships, and it is
this base that interests Hoffmann-Axthelm.) Thus there is no way, he says, to reduce the
arguments over Berlin’s future to “Nazi” versus “democratic” aesthetics; indeed, these are the
least of Hoffmann-Axthelm’s concerns. For him, history must be judiciously employed in the
service of a collectively imagined future, and he is much more concerned with the mechanisms
of this communal vision. In order to create a city in which citizens have this power, HoffmannAxthelm argues, investors must be firmly hemmed in, government must become an instrument of
the common people rather than any individual actor (or corporation), and, most importantly, the
single, small-scale parcel of land must become the prime unit of scale for the development of the
city. Only if land ownership is distributed in such a way can “those affected” (die Betroffene – a
term often used in 1970s and 1980s neighborhood planning initiatives), i.e. everyday urban
dwellers in Berlin, create a city that truly fits their needs and desires. Hoffmann-Axthelm ends
his commentary by mentioning three other realms of concern for planners which he thinks must
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be discussed, and which are later conspicuously absent in the Architecture Debates: immigration
and social cohesion, ecology, and transportation.109
Stimmann’s Leftist Hand
Hoffmann-Axthelm’s positions embodied much of what Stimmann had formerly
advocated in his own opposition to the IBA-Neubau, and his admonition that “Berlin does not
need to be reinvented” soon became one of Stimmann’s own catchphrases. The particular mix of
historicism, zoning regulations, small-scale development, and grassroots planning represented in
the “Charter for the Center of Berlin” must have appealed greatly to Stimmann; directly after his
appointment as Senate Construction Director in April 1991, he hired Hoffmann-Axthelm as a
consultant to contribute reports, including building recommendations, for several areas of Mitte.
The first of these was Pariser Platz, home to the iconic Brandenburg Gate and the Academy of
Arts (discussed in Chapter 3). This square was seen as the western gateway to the historical inner
city of Berlin, often called the “entrée into Berlin’s living room [gute Stube].”110 As a wellknown and much-photographed point along the Berlin Wall, it was also a key symbol of the
city’s reintegration, and the site of many public reunification celebrations (figs. 4.39-4.40).
Though Hoffmann-Axthelm’s commissioned plan for the square, authored in late 1991 in
cooperation with architect Bernhard Strecker, was never carried out in its original form (it was
later modified and combined with another plan sponsored by the Department of Urban Planning
and Environment), Stimmann’s original intention was for Pariser Platz’s reconstruction to act as
the origin point for the application of Critical Reconstruction to the entire western portion of
Mitte.111
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As of 1991, Pariser Platz stood almost entirely empty aside from the Brandenburg Gate
and a small handful of remaining structures left after the clearance of World War II rubble (figs.
4.41-4.43). Hoffmann-Axthelm and Strecker recommended all new construction around the
perimeter of the square, with a maximum building height of 10 meters on the north and south
sides of the square and 22 meters on the eastern end, and the western side of left open on either
side of the Brandenburg Gate (fig. 4.44). New buildings were to be of the “palazzo” type with
punctuated facades of stucco or natural stone, supposedly linking back visually to a building by
Schinkel that formerly stood on the southern side of the plaza.112 However, the authors stated,
“the creation of historical replicas should be avoided. Such [literal] reconstructions of historical
architecture lead … to such a banalization of image, that this is not commensurate with the
desired qualities of the square.”113 Echoing the Charter, the authors argue that Critical
Reconstruction means the creation of an urban landscape in which “historical spaces and ways of
life [Lebensformen] (density, proximity, living in the inner city, walkability, etc.) still have a
chance,” and which not only represent the identity of the city, but encapsulate the history of the
dialectical process by which architecture has evolved throughout modernity.114 This means, too,
that nothing historical is newly formulated without being useful for the future of
the city. The recreation of historical proximity, density, and diversity is
cooperated on the new plan, but the bulk of it was based not on Stimmann, Hoffmann-Axthelm, and Strecker’s plan, but on the
other report commissioned by the Department of Urban Planning under Senator Volker Hassemer. A highly visible and wellfunded non-profit group representing the interests of preservationists called the Gesellschaft Historisches Berlin also played a key
role by putting public pressure on both departments to preserve the historical outlines and typologies on the square. See Matthias
Pabsch, Pariser Platz, Architektur und Technik: vom manuellen zum digitalen Zeitalter (Berlin: Reimer, 2002), 144–147; and
Bodenschatz and Altrock, Renaissance der Mitte, 239. For the full text of the approved plans, see Senatsverwaltung für
Stadtentwicklung und Umwelt, “Pariser Platz – Textliche Festsetzungen Bebauungsplan I-200,” May 9, 1995,
http://stadtentwicklung.berlin.de/planen/staedtebau-projekte/pariser_platz/de/b_plan/extra/text_bplan_i200.shtml.
112

Pabsch, Pariser Platz, Architektur und Technik, 142. The computer simulation of the rebuilt square, Bodenschatz
and Altrock argue, shows a clear relationship to the Kleihues/Grassi design from the “Berlin morgen” exhibition of 1990-1991.
Bodenschatz and Altrock, Renaissance der Mitte, 238.
113

“Die Anfertigung historischer Repliken ist auszuschließen. Jeder Nachbau historischer Architektur führt … zu einer
solchen Banalisierung des Erscheinungsbildes, daß dies mir der angestrebten Erscheinungsqualität des Platzes nicht vereinbar
ist.” Strecker and Hoffmann-Axthelm, “Pariser Platz: Kritische Rekonstruktion Des Bereichs,” 28–29.
114

Ibid., 8.
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appropriate when it is both a transportation concept and when it is not only seen
as ecologically justifiable, but essential. Critical Reconstruction in this sense
means recapitulating the past in order to care for the future, to use historical
structures for the formulation of an ecological city structure.115
Here, as in the Charter, Hoffmann-Axthelm clearly sees “traditional” Berlin aesthetics as
relevant only if they are deployed in service of a plan that takes urban functions – including the
economic function of land ownership – into account. For him, Critical Reconstruction is a means
to achieve these sociological and political ends, because it looks back to a time (around the turn
of the century) when ownership of plots was diversified and the city had a high population
density. As will become clear in Chapter 5, this attitude became highly problematic when it was
applied more generally to East Berlin through the city master plan that Hoffmann-Axthelm
authored along with Stimmann.
Sparring with Lampugnani in the Architecture Debates: The “End of the Discussion”
Though he worked for Stimmann, Hoffmann-Axthelm also tended to play devil’s
advocate to the Construction Director. He remained highly critical of the aesthetic aims of
Critical Reconstruction, as well as Stimmann’s partnerships with private interests and particular
architects. At the same time as he was authoring reports for the Senate Department of
Construction and Housing, Hoffmann-Axthelm was continuing to publish various critiques of
Berlin policy and architecture, and he made several contributions to the Architecture Debates.
His main target was Lampugnani, whose manifesto he mercilessly excoriated in an essay bitingly
titled “The Challenge of Yesterday” (in response to Lampugnani’s “Challenge of the Everyday”)
published in the national weekly newspaper Die Zeit in April of 1994 and reprinted in the journal

115

“Kritische Rekonstruktion heißt aber auch, daß nichts Historisches neuformuliert wird, ohne daß es nicht auch für
die Stadtzukunft brauchbar ist. Die Wiederherstellung historischer Enge, Dichte und Differenziertheit stimmt dann, wenn sie
zugleich Verkehrskonzept ist und wenn sie ökologisch nicht nur rechtfertigbar, sondern auch erforderlich ist. Kritische
Rekonstruktion in diesem Sinne heißt, Vergangenheit aus der Sorge um die Zukunft zu rekapitulieren, historische Strukturen zu
benutzen zur Formulierung einer ökologischen Stadtstruktur.” Ibid.
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Werk, Bauen & Wohnen the following month.116 The main tone of the essay is that of indignant
astonishment. According to Lampugnani, Hoffmann-Axthelm writes,
In 1945, the “extremely high quality” (thanks to its aesthetics and craftsmanship)
of German architecture was, with the Nazi regime, abruptly broken off, after
which only cheap mass-productions [Massenware] were built. This is, in light of
the very thoroughly researched building culture of the Nazi regime, such insanity
that one really cannot imagine that he is serious. … [Then Lampugnani claims
that] those who today build still on honest and solid stone and wood are defamed
as fascists, while everything that is slanted and suffers from construction faults is
seen as democratic.117
These statements are such exaggerations that, Hoffmann-Axthelm suspects, Lampugnani must
have an ulterior motive: namely, acting as the publicist for Kleihues’s conservative aesthetics, in
the service of their own capitalist business interests.
Kleihues’s self-styling as an architect of human proportions and Lampugnani’s
attendant invocation of aesthetic permanence denote an apparent strategy. And
because we find ourselves amongst architects, it is one of ensuring market
interests. They are free to do so. But what one cannot condone is that the whole
architectural discussion is implicated.118
Hoffmann-Axthelm thus joins the ranks of those who accuse various figures in Berlin of
belonging to a “cartel” of favored architects who are forced to adhere to a set of rigid standards:
What differentiates Kleihues is that he understands his language of orderly,
normal architecture to be a dictate. … If an architect wants to become something
in the higher realms of the profession in Berlin, he must present himself
accordingly (sich schon ein bisschen einordnen), or else he has little chance in the
116
See Dieter Hoffmann-Axthelm, “Die Provokation Des Gestrigen,” Die Zeit, April 1, 1994; and Dieter HoffmannAxthelm, “Die Provokation Des Gestrigen,” Werk, Bauen + Wohnen, no. 5 (May 1994): 45–48; also reprinted in Kähler’s
collection: Dieter Hoffmann-Axthelm, “Die Provokation des Gestrigen,” in Einfach Schwierig: Eine Deutsche
Architekturdebatte. Ausgewählte Beiträge 1993-1995, ed. Gert Kähler (Braunschweig: Vieweg, 1995), 43–50.
117
“1945 sei, mit dem Nazireich, die dank Ästhetik und Handwerk ‘extrem hohe Qualität’ der deutschen Architektur
abrupt abgebrochen, danach sei nur noch billige Massenware gebaut worden. Das ist, angesichts der wahrlich ausreichend
erforschten Baukultur des Nazireiches, ein so extremer Unsinn, daß man sich eigentlich nicht vorstellen kann, er meine das ernst.
… Und siehe, im dritten Teil der Polemik erfährt man, worum es geht: Wer heute noch ehrlich und solide in Stein und Holz baue,
werde als Faschist diffamiert, während alles, was schräg sei und unter Bauschäden litte, als demokratisch gelte.” HoffmannAxthelm, “Die Provokation Des Gestrigen,” April 1, 1994, np.
118
“Kleihues’ Selbstinszenierung als ein Architekt menschlichen Maßes und Lampugnanis dazu gehörende
Beschwörung der ästhetischen Dauer stellen offenbar eine Strategie dar. Und da wir uns unter Architekten befinden, ist es eine
zur Sicherung von Marktanteilen. Der Versuch sei ihnen unbenommen. Was man aber nicht hinnehmen kann, ist, daß die ganze
Architekturdiskussion davon in Mitleidenschaft gezogen wird.” Ibid.
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competitions or direct contracts. Kleihues is the most comprehensible pole in a
field cemented by power dynamics, which one could call the Berlin Cartel.119
Hoffmann-Axthelm also accuses Lampugnani of appropriating his leftist positions on
governance, even though Lampugnani had been diametrically opposed to them during the IBA:
“He takes up, unbelievably, my theses … : land use, density, ecology, block, and so forth. With
this he pats all of us who for fifteen years have occupied ourselves with Kreuzberg’s demolition,
on the back: it was not all in vain. Only he forgets to tell us that he was also, at the time, on the
other side.”120 In other words, he thinks that Lampugnani is hypocritically appropriating and
deploying left-critical concepts from seventies-era planning in service of his conservative
aesthetics.
Typical for that which Lampugnani is doing here is the title of his essay. The
“everyday” was once the catchword of the counterculture of the seventies.
Amongst architects this was the attempt to situate the needs of the normal person
against the official high gloss architecture. … [Rather], what he means [in his
essay], when he turns this left-alternative concept to his own uses, is the
passepartout-character of Kleihuesian architecture.121
This is Lampugnani’s biggest mistake, Hoffmann-Axthelm argues. For “no one concept of
architecture, be it that of urban chaos or Berlin block architecture, can provide the framework
from which the material city is built.” Instead, as he has already argued in numerous essays,
including the one that accompanied the Charter for the Center of Berlin, Hoffmann-Axthelm
declares that “we must create the qualities we seek in the city and in architecture – such as
119

“Was Kleihues unterscheidet, ist, daß er seine Parole von der ordnenden Normalarchitektur offenbar als
Führungsauftrag versteht. Wer in Berlin als Architekt in den oberen Etagen des Berufs etwas werden oder zu tun haben will, muß
sich schon ein bißchen einordnen, sonst hat er bei Wettbewerben und Direktaufträgen wenig Chancen. Kleihues ist der
greifbarste Pol in einem machtdynamisch zementierten Feld, das man das Berliner Kartell nennen kann.” Ibid.
120
“Er schließt sich, es ist nicht zu glauben, meinen Thesen aus dem grünen Suhrkamp-Bändchen an:
Flächensparsamkeit, Verdichtung, Ökologie, Block und so weiter. Nebenbei schlägt er uns allen, die wir uns fünfzehn Jahre lang
im Kreuzberger Abrißstaub abgemüht haben, auf die Schulter: Es sei nicht umsonst gewesen. Er vergißt nur, uns zu erwähnen,
und auch, daß er, damals, auf der anderen Seite war.” Ibid.
121
“Typisch für das, was Lampugnani hier betreibt, ist der Titel seines Essays. „Alltäglichkeit“ war ja einmal die Parole
der Gegenkultur in den siebziger Jahren. Unter Architekten war das der Versuch, gegen die offizielle Hochglanzarchitektur die
Bedürfnisse der normalen Menschen zu stellen … Was er meint, wenn er den linksalternativen Begriff für seine Zwecke umdreht,
ist der Passepartout-Charakter der Kleihuesschen Architektur.” Ibid.
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permanence, everydayness, beauty, usability and so forth – first as societal qualities, and then set
the architects to work.” This prioritization means, fundamentally, a return to the single parcel of
land as the building block of the city, “on which, at one time, the builder-owner built his
building, cheap or expensive, small or big, factory or tenement, cinema, villa, or all together. If
one has such a structural unit, the city can hold any architecture, from the most extravagant to the
most traditional.”122 Anyone who builds quality architecture, which for Hoffmann-Axthelm
includes firms ranging from Coop Himmelblau and Zaha Hadid to Richard Rogers, Norman
Foster, or Rem Koolhaas, can and should be allowed to build in Berlin, he says. And though he
claims he is not accusing anyone of having fascist tendencies, he still links the stylistic traits of
conservative pre-war Modernism with certain reprehensible political movements:
The accusation [of fascism], in my mind, is a form of insanity. That stone
architects however imitate in general the style of the period is unmistakable. One
only has to compare the designs of the thirties with today’s – one can barely come
nearer at the distance of two generations. It is the authoritarian architectural
tendencies at the beginning of the thirties – the late Poelzig, the everyday
residential building in the Nazi empire, Asplund in Sweden, the classical turn in
the Soviet Union, Perret in France, the Milan metaphysicists around Muzio – who
are making a comeback today, as if it were still about building a societal destiny,
rather than to satisfy requirements for insulation.123
For him, then, the erroneous and megalomaniacal qualities of both Nazi architecture and the
“New Simplicity” have to do with the fact that their proponents believe in architecture’s ability
to change that “societal destiny.” Hoffmann-Axthelm, on the other hand, is willing to accept any

122

“Es geht darum, daß nicht eine bestimmte Architekturauffassung, sei es die des Stadtchaos, sei es die der Berliner
Blockarchitektur, den Rahmen abgeben kann, in dem die materielle Stadt gebaut ist. Der Rahmen muß woanders herkommen,
und er muß so liberal beschaffen sein, daß er für jegliche Architektur Platz hat. … Wir müssen die gesellschaftlichen Qualitäten
wie Dauer, Alltäglichkeit, Schönheit, Brauchbarkeit und so weiter, die wir von Stadt und Architektur fordern, auch als
gesellschaftliche Qualitäten schaffen – und dann die Architekten an die Arbeit setzen.” Ibid.
123
“Den Vorwurf halte ich in der Form für Unsinn. Daß die steinernen Architekten aber generell den damaligen Zeitstil
nachahmen, ist unverkennbar. Man muß nur Entwürfe der dreißiger Jahre mit heutigen vergleichen – näher kann man sich über
den Abstand von zwei Generationen kaum kommen. Es sind die autoritären Architekturtendenzen Anfang der dreißiger Jahre –
der späte Poelzig, der gewöhnliche Wohnungsbau im Nazireich, Asplund in Schweden, die klassizistische Wende in der
Sowjetunion , Perret in Frankreich, die Mailänder Metaphysiker um Muzio –, die heute wiederkehren, als ginge es noch darum,
Gesellschaftsschicksale zu bauen, statt der Wärmedämmungsverordnung zu genügen.” Ibid.
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style of building that arises from the “right” structural relationships between property ownership
and city governance. His utilization of the discourse of Critical Reconstruction is solely in
service of achieving this end: his version of this method has little to do with materials or the
formal qualities of façades, and is rather focused on restoring small-scale development, healthy
density, and a mix of uses to the city center.
The Berlin Architecture Cartel
Though he clearly knows that Stimmann is also committed to his way of thinking,
(indeed, it is most likely that Stimmann adopted these ideas directly from Hoffmann-Axthelm
himself), Hoffmann-Axthelm is not above accusing him of being part of the supposed Berlin
architecture “cartel”:
Berlin has in the person of Senate Building Director Hans Stimmann an
administrative commissioner for architecture who, because of his job description,
must see his way through construction capital, politics, and architects. So he has
entered into a coalition. Its tabernacle is Berlin stone architecture, an ideological
construct from various sources. An architectural triumvirate, Kleihues at the front,
Jürgen Sawade as associate, and Hans Kollhoff as junior partner, have come to
live with Stimmann under this roof. This coalition now has a truce with the big
investors, whose requirements would be unpleasant if dictated from above. What
Lampugnani wrote in Der Spiegel is thus nothing less than a manifesto of this
architectural cartel. It is not about culture and politics, but about market
interests.124
Despite his own use of Critical Reconstruction as a concept, Hoffmann-Axthelm therefore
simultaneously represents the far-left critique of this method’s aesthetics and way of doing
business. Under Stimmann and his “triumvirate,” he argues, Berlin has gained “an architectonic
desire without grounding in politics,” and it is thus at risk of not only mismanaging its own
124

“Berlin hat zudem in der Person des Senatsbaudirektors Hans Stimmann einen Verwaltungskommissar für
Architektur, der von der Konstruktion seines Jobs her zusehen muß, wie er zwischen Baukapital, Politik und Architekten
zurechtkommt. Er ist also ein Bündnis eingegangen. Dessen Stiftshütte ist die Berliner steinerne Architektur, ein ideologisches
Konstrukt aus unterschiedlichen Quellen. Ein Architekten-Triumvirat, Kleihues an der Spitze, Jürgen Sawade als Associé, Hans
Kollhoff als Juniorpartner, hat sich unter diesem Dach zu Stimmann gesellt. Über das Architekturbündnis läuft nun aber auch der
Burgfrieden mit den großen Investoren, deren Ansprüche sonst als politischer Druck von oben unangenehm würden. Was
Lampugnani im Spiegel geschrieben hat, ist also nichts anderes als das Manifest dieses Architekturkartells. Es geht nicht um
Kultur und Politik, sondern um Marktanteile.” Ibid.
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transformation, but backsliding into a planning culture that is both dangerously authoritarian –
perhaps even fascist – and slave to corporate, capitalist interests:
The quasi-monopoly of this architectural party will lead, if it is put through, not
only to the accumulation of a certain kind of architecture in the north German
metropolises, but to the creation of a culturally and politically concerning image.
… They are nostalgics for uniformed times, and moreover they cluster around an
excellent businessman.125
While Kleihues and Stimmann refrained from replying to Hoffmann-Axthelm’s
statements, Lampugnani immediately published a rebuttal in Die Zeit with the optimistic
headline “The Berlin Architects’ Debates: Classic or Modern? The Director of the German
Architecture Museum Answers. End of the Discussion.”126 His tone is almost desperate in its
defensiveness:
A flat façade with many rows of identical rectangular windows is thought of as
boring. … Can you imagine how much work that [designing such a façade] is?
And how much creativity it demands? Much more than to artistically arrange a
pair of pastel colored plaster half-columns or to weld two steel beams crookedly
together.127
The kind of “simplicity, convention, permanence, and appropriateness” that the New Simplicity
espouses, Lampugnani writes, emphatically does not appeal to market interests, which prefer
flashy, ephemeral experiments. “They are the opposite of that of which you accuse them: a

125
“Das Quasimonopol der Architekturpartei führte, würde es weiter durchgesetzt, nicht nur zur Anhäufung einer
bestimmten Sorte Architektur in den norddeutschen Großstädten, sondern zur Herstellung eines kulturell wie politisch gleich
bedenklichen Bildes …Es sind Nostalgiker uniformierter Zeiten, und im übrigen scharen sie sich um einen exzellenten
Geschäftsmann.” Ibid.
126
Vittorio Magnago Lampugnani, “Der Berliner Architektenstreit: Klassik Oder Moderne? Der Direktor Des
Deutschen Architektur-Museums Antwortet. Ende Der Diskussion,” Die Zeit, April 15, 1994. This essay was also reprinted in the
Summer 1994 issue of Werk, Bauen + Wohnen with the title “Discuss Rather than Discredit”: Vittorio Magnago Lampugnani,
“Diskutieren Stadt Diskreditieren,” Werk, Bauen + Wohnen, no. 7–8 (August 1994): 45–48; see also Vittorio Magnago
Lampugnani, “Diskutieren stadt diskreditieren,” in Einfach Schwierig: Eine Deutsche Architekturdebatte. Ausgewählte Beiträge
1993-1995, ed. Gert Kähler (Braunschweig: Vieweg, 1995), 51–55.
127
“Eine glatte Fassade mit vielen Reihen von gleichen rechteckigen Fenstern gilt als langweilig. Aber, lieber Dieter,
haben Sie einmal versucht, eine solche Fassade zu entwerfen? … Können Sie sich vorstellen, wieviel Arbeit das ist? Und wieviel
Kreativität das erfordert? Viel mehr, als ein paar pastellfarbene Halbsäulen aus Stuck malerisch zu arrangieren oder zwie
Stahlträger schräg aneinander zu schweißen.” Lampugnani, “Diskutieren stadt diskreditieren,” 51–52.
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utopia which goes against the Zeitgeist.”128 Lampugnani then points out (correctly) that he
organized not only the diverse and inclusive “Berlin Tomorrow” event, to whose exhibition
catalog Hoffmann-Axthelm himself contributed an essay, but that he also served as the editor for
Domus, which supported many of the architects Hoffmann-Axthelm claims Lampugnani abhors.
Lampugnani also takes issue with the idea of a cartel, arguing that he does not have anything to
do with market interests, but simply wants to “spread his philosophy,” to “articulate his
theoretical position” and offer it up for much-needed discussion.129
This response was not, as Lampugnani had hoped, the “end of the discussion”;
Hoffmann-Axthelm published a reply in the June 1994 “From Berlin to New Teutonia” issue of
Arch+ mentioned above, under the title, “The City Needs Rules, Architecture Needs Fantasy.”130
Here he reiterates his position that architecture in itself does not constitute an effective aid to the
problems of the city: “In a situation where the social instrument of the city is breaking apart, the
solution cannot be simply about how a few architecturally irresponsible singular pieces are
decorated, with glass or stone.” Rather, the problem lies in planning and zoning, in “stuffing the
entire city center full of offices and push ever more urban functions out into the green space”
surrounding the city.131 And because facades really do not matter for the city in the long run, this
whole set of debates is, in Hoffmann-Axthelm’s eyes, a circus staged in service of “contracts,
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“Sie sind das Gegenteil dessen, was Sie ihnen unterstellen: eine Utopie, die es gegen den Zeitgeist, die
ökonomischen Verhältnisse und das von Ihnen beschworene gesund Volksempinden zu vertreten gilt.” Ibid., 52.
129

Ibid., 54.
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Dieter Hoffmann-Axthelm, “Die Stadt braucht Regeln, die Architektur Phantasie,” Arch+, no. 122 (June 1994): 12;
see also Dieter Hoffmann-Axthelm, “Die Stadt braucht Regeln, die Architektur Phantasie,” in Einfach Schwierig: Eine Deutsche
Architekturdebatte. Ausgewählte Beiträge 1993-1995, ed. Gert Kähler (Braunschweig: Vieweg, 1995), 56–59.
131
“In einer Situation, wo das soziale Instrument Stadt nach allen Himmelsrichtungen auseinanderfliegt, kann es nicht
bloß darum gehen, wie die rücksichtslosen Einzelteile architektonisch dekoriert werden, mit Glas oder Stein.” Rather, the
problem lies in “immer mehr städtische Funktionen in Standorte draußen auf der grünen Wiese ausweichen.” HoffmannAxthelm, “Die Stadt braucht Regeln, die Architektur Phantasie,” 12.
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professorships, and being able to influence public opinion,” and with the explicit goal of limiting
Berlin’s new architecture to a style that verges on the fascist:
It was the exact aim of my protest to point out that the legitimization of
conservative architecture of the twenties through the forties, including the Nazi
period, is not a subject of academic debate, but, in a fatally instrumental way, has
influence on the decisions that are being made in Berlin by architects, institutions,
and investors.132
Even Lampugnani’s other main critic cannot escape rebuke: Hoffmann-Axthelm sees
Libeskind’s argument as equally weak, since it relies on aesthetics rather than socio-political
frameworks. “Nothing would be achieved by replacing contemporary Berlin architecture with
another, more experimental type. The problem is not architecture, but the ability of the city to
develop principles of ordering urban development.”133 Thus, Hoffmann-Axthelm concedes,
Stimmann’s approach seems to be the only workable way forward, even though it serves
corporate interests, because Stimmann at least represents a bulwark against a completely
aesthetic view of planning: “If he weren’t there, it would in fact not make way for reasonable
planning, but for the destruction of the city that has been so commonplace” in the past.134
With his commitment to small-scale, community-based planning and advocacy, as well
as a solid knowledge of architectural history and a prolific body of writing under his belt,
Hoffmann-Axthelm contributes a truly leftist viewpoint to the Architecture Debates. Though
employed regularly by Stimmann, he adamantly refuses public allegiance to anyone, seeming to
consider Stimmann as the “least worst” of a group of planners and architects who are willfully
132
“Vielmehr war es ja gerade der Kern meines Protestes, darauf hinzuweisen, daß die Legitimierung der konservativen
Architektur der zwanziger bis vierziger Jahre einschließlich NS keine akademische Debatte ist, sondern auf eine fatal nützliche
Weise eingeht in die Ausscheidungskämpfe, die in Berlin unter Architekten, Verwaltungen und Investoren ausgetragen werden.”
Ibid., 12. Ibid.
133
“Es ware nicht das geringste damit gewonnen, die augenblickliche Berliner Architektur durch eine andere,
experimentellere zu ersetzen. Das Problem ist nicht die Architektur, sondern die Fähigkeit einer Stadt, städtebauliche
Ordnungsvorstellungen zu entwickeln.” Hoffmann-Axthelm, “Die Stadt braucht Regeln, die Architektur Phantasie,” 12.
134

“Gäbe es ihn nicht, würde das nämlich keineswegs den Weg für planerische Vernunft freimachen, sondern nur für
die übliche Stadtzerstörung.” Ibid.
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ignoring what he values most: namely land use policy and structures of governance. As
discussed in Chapter 3, Stimmann was interested in following Hoffmann-Axthelm’s line of
thinking, but was severely limited by pressures from both investors and the government bodies
that oversaw land sales. Thus, he pursued Kleihues’s suggested path of creating individuated
buildings on single blocks, funded by just a few large-scale developers, and utilized the aesthetic
strictures of Critical Reconstruction to attempt rein in their flashy, overly-capitalist visions. As
we shall see in Chapter 5, Stimmann’s and Hoffmann-Axthelm’s goals aligned more clearly after
1996, when they worked together to author the Planwerk Innenstadt.

Conclusion: The Architecture Debates and the Cracks in the Post-Modern Façade
Though it played only a side role in the debates themselves, these exchanges pushed
Critical Reconstruction onto center stage in terms of the public’s ideas about Berlin’s rebuilding.
This result was due in large part to the fact that, while remaining staunchly allied with the leftist,
socio-economic interests of the type represented by Hoffmann-Axthelm and relying on
Kleihues’s original work from the 1980s, Stimmann also freely and openly adopted the
conservative aesthetic ideas and arguments of Lampugnani and Kollhoff. For example,
Stimmann, collaborating with architectural historian Annegret Burg in 2006, averred:
Office and commercial buildings must free themselves from an all too frequent
triviality. They must be more than just a vehicle for fleeting messages and a
surrogate reflection of consumer images; they must regain their urban dignity,
developing into a city architecture with carefully composed spatial and tectonic
relationships, both in terms of inner structure and, on a larger scale, as building
volumes in the wide urban environment. Special attention must be given to the
transition areas between inside and outside – the entrance, the foyer, the façade –
and to those elements in a building which interact with the town – the arcade, the
covered mall, the tower, the corner and the inner structure. If these factors are
overlooked, then the urban image will come to be dominated by everyday, or even
run-of-the-mill consumer architecture, driven more by a need to reflect transitory
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visual fashions and façade treatments than a concern for a longer-lasting overall
urban quality and architectural composition.135
Stimmann’s and Critical Reconstruction’s most lasting contribution to the new Berlin,
however, was undoubtedly the partnership with large-scale investors and developers and the
marked preference to dole out these mammoth contracts to a small number of favored architects.
Thus the oft-repeated accusation of the existence of a “cartel” is completely valid; indeed it was
often corroborated by Stimmann himself, though he resented the term. Authors like Gert Kähler,
therefore, who voice a “suspicion” that market interests were behind such decisions, are missing
the point.136 Such critiques belie a firmly ingrained set of beliefs in the architectural community,
reaching back to the strong influence of the continental philosophy of the 1960s, that somehow
design in a European context should remain separate from commerce. Clearly, in a situation like
the one in post-Wall Berlin, the continued leadership of an architectural avant-garde that
remained separate from the “popular,” commercial world, was logistically and technically
impossible. As Hoffmann-Axthelm rightly noted at the time, Stimmann had to make a series of
unpleasant but necessary compromises in the service of public-private partnerships.
Counterintuitively, however, another remnant of Modernist and mid-twentieth-century
architectural thinking that surfaces in the Architecture Debates is the idea that the architect is not
just a designer of buildings, but of society itself. As Lampugnani’s essay suggests, while
remaining comfortably distanced from commercial interests, architects thought they should delve
deeply into the everyday lives of their users in order to remedy those conditions which they see
as plaguing society – “chaos,” “noise,” lack of attention span, and so on. The participants in the
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Annegret Burg, Berlin Mitte: die Entstehung einer urbanen Architektur, ed. Hans Stimmann (Berlin; Berlin; Boston:
Bauwelt  ; Birkhäuser Verlag, 1995), 209. See also Hans Stimmann, “For the city to become concrete matter,” in Neue
Steinarchitektur in Deutschland, ed. Vincenzo Pavan (Basel: Birkhäuser-Verlag für Architektur, 2005), 94–97.
136
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debates, and, by association, Critical Reconstruction as well, thus found themselves in the midst
of a set of requirements for architecture that the medium and discipline were conceptually,
aesthetically, and politically unable to fulfill.
Turning Tides in Post-Modern Architecture
This crisis of architectural representation was not unique to Critical Reconstruction and
Berlin; it was, in many ways, built into the post-modern movement itself. Architects since the
1960s had been wrestling with the question of how to take history and context into account
without cheapening it (an aim seen clearly in Rossi’s work, for instance); others had simply
accepted that the representative qualities of architecture made it intrinsically shallow, and sought
answers in the self-reflexive play of signs, a position exemplified by Robert Venturi and Denise
Scott Brown. Still others saw outright historicism as a valid way of creating “place,” as in the
work of Léon Krier. As discussed in Chapter 1, Kleihues’s Critical Reconstruction had been an
attempt to map a course for German architects within this range of possible responses – one that
would allow them to access and respond to history without explicitly reproducing or referring to
it. Stimmann’s attempt to codify Critical Reconstruction, then, can be seen as an exposure of the
infeasibility of this project. His appropriation of Kleihues’s theory came at a time, furthermore,
when these various strands of post-modernism were beginning to lose favor – even if the
architects themselves were still considered prominent practitioners. By the early 1990s, a
younger generation of architects, historians, and theorists were turning the conversation towards
more formal and explicitly theoretical concerns. Koolhaas and OMA, Peter Eisenman, Frank
Gehry, Hadid, and Libeskind, for instance, offered equally ambitious approaches to Rossi,
Venturi, or Kleihues, but were less intent on providing clear answers to issues such as how one
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should treat regional history and context. Rather than searching for a solution to the problem of
architectural representation, they began to ask different questions.
Some of the differences between Stimmann and Kleihues also exemplify the generational
divisions that some scholars observe within mid-century West German society. As discussed in
Chapter 1, Kleihues, who was born in 1933, belonged to what has been called the “skeptical
generation,” who vividly remembered the war and were reticent to discuss it. Those who were
about ten years younger, however – the generation to which Stimmann, born in 1941, belonged –
resented this silence. Known in Germany as the “68ers,” this cohort came to prominence during
the widespread student protests of the late 1960s. Their demands and viewpoints ranged widely,
but they were generally associated with a critique of capitalist or consumer society, with the
approach of grassroots activism, and with a cultural shift away from what were seen as
traditional “German” values of punctuality, propriety, and order. They also had no qualms about
openly discussing the Holocaust, and they often resented their parents’ and older siblings’ silence
on the topic.137 By 1998, when Gerhard Schröder (SPD, born in 1944) became Chancellor, the
‘68ers were clearly the leading generation in German society and politics, but many (very much
including Schröder himself) had also become far more centrist. Their younger peers now saw
them as sellouts, disconnected from the “real” problems of society, who, as German scholar Ingo
Cornils puts it, had “imbued them [the younger generation] with a rebellious spirit whilst taking
off to Tuscany and the fleshpots of tenured university posts.”138
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Stimmann and Hoffmann-Axthelm in many ways embody this problematic: their focus,
during the 1980s, on grassroots organization in city planning, which had led them to critique
Kleihues’s approach as purely “aesthetic,” was quickly revised once they found themselves in
positions of power. In order to steer a course through the shoals of institutional, political, and
economic confusion in reunited Berlin, they found that they needed, first and foremost, to attract
and help guide big real estate investors. As shown throughout this study, it was mainly out of
necessity that they became closely allied with these corporate interests, but this put them in a
difficult position politically. Paired with their inability to successfully address how their formal
preferences related to German identity and history, this alliance with capitalist interests made
them look not only like sellouts, but also like conservatives.139
Berlin’s financial infrastructure began to crumble in 1993 with the collapse of one of its
major banks.140 By 1995, real estate investment in the city had changed from a barrage to a
trickle, and many large-scale projects, including Kollhoff’s master plan for Alexanderplatz, had
to be shelved.141 Following the 1995 elections, when SPD Construction Senator Wolfgang Nagel
lost his seat, Stimmann was removed from the office of Construction Director, moving to work
under the new Senator for Urban Development, Peter Strieder (SPD). Thus, after 1995, the
discourse surrounding Critical Reconstruction moved away from the question of façades and
fascism, leaning more toward a negotiation of the East German city and its troubled past. This
139
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shift also meant that the scope of the debate, which had heretofore mainly included architects and
theorists from the former West Germany and the Western international community, grew to
include critics, politicians, and historians from the former GDR. This new phase will be
discussed in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 5
Gentrifying the GDR: Critical Reconstruction as a Colonial Move

Debates over the national symbolism of Berlin’s built landscape took place on two
different fronts after the fall of the Wall. While one side of the discussion focused on the legacy
of the Nazi era and the potential “normalization” of that regime’s crimes, represented most
forcefully in the Architecture Debates, another equally important strand of the conversation had
to do with the marginalization of East German cultural identity. This process was a sensitive and
difficult topic in the midst of what many observers argued was less a “reunification” than a
“takeover” of the former GDR (German Democratic Republic, or East Germany) by the West.1
Many East Berliners felt that the built history and memory of their former nation was being
consciously and systematically erased in the capital: Western planners replaced many Eastern
buildings in the formerly Communist districts of the city; many East Berlin streets were given
back their pre-socialist – or even anti-socialist – names; prominent monuments (such as those
honoring Lenin or other leading Soviet or Communist figures) were removed or “renovated” to
downplay their prominence; and numerous GDR buildings in the city center were demolished.2
As cultural critic Andreas Huyssen observed, East Germans tended to see this as more than just
“tinkering with the communist city-text.” Rather, they experienced it as “a strategy of power and
humiliation, a final burst of Cold War ideology, pursued via a politics of signs.”3
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This chapter looks at the ways that Critical Reconstruction was complicit in the
marginalization of East German history and collective memory through its destructive
interventions in the built environment. The first half of the chapter examines how, amidst the
ideological struggles over the cultural legacy of the East, the proposed removals or renovations
of buildings tended to become flashpoints that could mobilize local residents and attract media
attention for short periods of time, but, in most cases, such battles were ultimately lost to the
more powerful interests of investment companies and developers. This phenomenon is
exemplified by the remodeling of the prominent East German Centrum department store on
Alexanderplatz, completed between 2004 and 2006 according to plans by Critical
Reconstruction’s original author, Josef Paul Kleihues. A close look at this case reveals efforts on
the part of planners, the architect, and corporate investors to reshape East Berlin as a place that
would appeal to contemporary bourgeois consumers. Though officials made repeated efforts to
involve the public in the planning process, their final decisions constituted a complete denial of
the community’s calls for the building’s preservation.
The second half of the chapter looks at the destruction of the GDR landscape through
more general city planning measures, specifically the Planwerk Innenstadt (“Inner-City Plan”)
proposed by Hans Stimmann and authored chiefly in collaboration with the urban critic Dieter
Hoffmann-Axthelm. This section shows that, whereas during the 1980s, Stimmann and
Hoffmann-Axthelm had both been vocal critics of Kleihues’s IBA model of Critical
Reconstruction because it constituted a purely “aesthetic” mode of city planning that supposedly
ignored the needs of everyday citizens, in the post-Wall era, their own Planwerk Innenstadt used
Critical Reconstruction to actually legitimate a disregard for these same community interests.
Want to Preserve the Past, but Without the Memories,” in New German Architecture: A Reflexive Modernism, by Ullrich
Schwarz (Ostfildern-Ruit: Hatje Cantz, 2002), 314; Strom, Building the New Berlin, 72–73.
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In both cases, Critical Reconstruction’s sidelining and destruction of GDR architecture
was discursively justified through the rhetoric of the “void”: the idea that East Berlin represented
various kinds of emptiness – social, political, aesthetic, and urban – that needed to be “filled” by
new construction and new residents. A central argument of this chapter is that this move was
essentially colonial: this purported “lack” was used to justify the top-down dictation of largescale plans and dramatic changes to the landscape of the former GDR capital. In terms of
specific buildings, GDR residents and their architecture were viewed as incapable of possessing
a legitimate “history” that would make particular structures worthy of preservation, a logic that
undergirded the decision to remove or renovate certain prominent buildings and urban spaces.
However problematic or even loathed by residents, many of these structures were important
touchstones for former East Berliners’ collective memory and history. The most problematic
aspect of this urban erasure was that the logic used by Stimmann, Hoffmann-Axthelm, and other
planners to justify their removal was a strange correlate of that which had been used to support
the renovation and preservation of former Nazi buildings. In the case of Nazi architecture,
planners argued that despite – or even because of – their association with the crimes of the
regime, the structures were key witnesses to this part of Germany’s troubled history and thus
needed to remain in the public consciousness. GDR buildings, on the other hand, were not
accorded this status as witnesses to history; rather, by being portrayed as having no history at all
– and, in conjunction, being depicted as hindrances to “good” urban development – they were
instead allowed to disappear under new construction.
This elision of East German history, identity, and memory in the built environment
paralleled what was happening in the social and political spheres in reunified Germany, where
East Germans were expected to simply suddenly conform to West German ways of life and
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governance, and where their memories of life in the GDR were characterized by dominant
discourse condescendingly as “nostalgic” rather than “historical.” In terms of city planning
specifically, particularly in Hoffmann-Axthelm’s contributions to the Planwerk Innenstadt, East
Berliners were also portrayed as lacking the requisite skills and political attitudes to adequately
self-govern. Hoffmann-Axthelm believed that since they did not have the economic “ties to the
land” that, according to his logic, small-scale ownership of individual parcels would produce,
city planners and developers needed to therapeutically intervene in the cityscape in order to
create neighborhoods that would attract middle-class, educated property owners who could
adequately advocate for themselves. Despite the plethora of East Berlin citizens’ groups that
formed in response to the city’s plans, the rhetoric of the Planwerk Innenstadt and its authors
continually infantilized this population, using their supposed inabilities to justify the
appropriation and development of properties in ways they saw fit. However, as demonstrated in
Chapters 2 and 3, this most often meant actually cooperating with large-scale investors rather
than restoring small-scale ownership conditions.
This chapter thus demonstrates that, despite Stimmann’s and Hoffmann-Axthelm’s
political affiliations with the left, by 1999, when the Planwerk Innenstadt was officially
approved by the Berlin government, Critical Reconstruction had essentially become an elitist and
politically conservative tool of neo-liberal, capitalist development that willingly ignored both
important historical traces of mid-twentieth-century architecture in the former Communist
cityscape, and citizens’ calls to preserve that architecture. As discussed in the previous chapter,
the Critical Reconstructionists’ penchant for preserving and, in many cases, lauding Nazi and
Stalinist architecture had already pigeonholed them as supporters of conservative – even neofascist – styles and planning philosophies. This conservatism was further underscored by
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Hoffmann-Axthelm’s proposal of the theoretical relationship between “ties to the land” and
residents’ ability to self-govern, which can also be seen as a problematic echo of the ethnocentric
ideologies of the Nazis. Nevertheless, Stimmann, Hoffmann-Axthelm, and the other proponents
of Critical Reconstruction appear to have remained blind to the conservative pitfalls of their
policies and rhetoric, continuing to view themselves as social democrats who cared about the
lives of “everyday” citizens. This blind spot, I argue, stems from the fact that their deliberate
targeting of GDR architecture and urban planning had very little to do with an actual or direct
negotiation of history, identity, or memory. In other words, they did not see themselves first and
foremost as creators of national symbols via architecture. Instead, I contend, their willful
destruction of East Berlin architecture had much more to do with two more mundane and
profession-specific facets of post-modern architecture and planning culture: the backlash against
the “towers in the park” model of functionalist, mid-century Modernism, and the fetishization of
the model of the “European city” as the basis for a liberal, bourgeois society. While Stimmann,
Hoffmann-Axthelm, Kleihues, and other planners and investors certainly failed to integrate the
wishes and voices of the various neighborhood constituents in East Berlin into their planning
policy, their marginalization of what might be termed these citizens’ “urban collective memory”
was as in many ways as unwitting as it was, ultimately, politically and economically inept.

The Concept of the Void as a Colonial Tool in Berlin
Berlin as a City of Voids
Planners’ interventions in East Berlin were supported by the widespread characterization
(in the popular media as well as in publications and statements by planners) of central East
Berlin as “empty” in myriad ways. Western city planners often referred to East Berlin as an
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“ideational wasteland,” a “tabula rasa” without history.4 With its history of destruction, Berlin
has long been characterized as containing various kinds of “voids.” In the early twentieth
century, the philosopher Ernst Bloch noted the social void created by what he and others saw as
the collapse of bourgeois, nineteenth-century culture after the First World War.5 This was
followed by the creation of physical voids by Nazi demolition crews in service of Albert Speer’s
plans for Hitler’s new capital city, and Allied bombs added to these voids soon after, as wartime
destruction devastated much of the city center. But for the proponents of Critical Reconstruction,
the most important and extreme source of destruction was not World War II, but post-war
“Sanierung” measures – literally translated as “renovation,” but denoting clearance and
rebuilding according to the mid-century Modernist principles of dispersed, auto-friendly urban
planning and functionalist architecture – a familiar post-modern critique made by architects and
planners around the globe at the time. In Berlin specifically, however, yet another layer of voids
was created by the Berlin Wall, beginning with its construction in 1961 (which resulted in large
swaths of demolition and clearance, most famously at Potsdamer Platz), and continuing with its
removal after 1989.
After the Wall fell, as anthropologist Gisa Weszkalnys observes, talk about what Berlin
would become in the post-Wall era was thus very often talk about “how to fill Berlin’s
emptiness.”6 For some authors (mainly those outside of Berlin), Berlin’s voids constituted spaces
that were physically empty but symbolically laden, and which should ideally be preserved as a
kind of urban memorial to the tragedies and violence of Berlin’s previous half-century. Some felt
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that this approach was a particularly appealing solution for Potsdamer Platz. Huyssen famously
suggested in his seminal 1997 essay “The Voids of Berlin” that this empty area should be
preserved as what Berliners “affectionately” called their “‘wonderful city steppes,’ their ‘prairie
of history.’”7 For Huyssen, this space was “a void saturated with invisible history, with
memories of architecture both built and unbuilt. It gave rise to the desire to leave it as it was, the
memorial as empty page right in the center of the reunified city.”8 He quoted a proposal by
Daniel Libeskind, who originally suggested
a wilderness, one kilometer long, within which everything can stay as it is. The
street simply ends in the bushes. Wonderful. After all, this area is the result of
today's divine natural law: nobody wanted it, nobody planned it, and yet it is
firmly implanted in all our minds. And there in our minds, this image of the
Potsdamer Platz void will remain for decades.9
Huyssen feared that these “invisible” memories, which he saw as key for the understanding of
German history as expressed in Berlin’s built landscape, would be erased if the area were
redeveloped.10
As should be clear from the previous chapter, however, Berlin’s leading city planners and
the proponents of Critical Reconstruction emphatically did not see things this way. Instead, they
viewed Berlin’s center as littered with terrible, gaping holes that desperately needed to be
refilled. This tendency toward horror vacui was expressed in the Department of Urban
Development and Environment’s program for “Baulückenmanagement” (the “management of
construction gaps”) whereby every empty lot in the city center was given a “passport”
documenting its characteristics and its projected future uses. Planners often referred to such areas
7
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in the city center as “wastelands” or “deserts,” or simply as “Leerstellen” – “empty spaces.”11 As
urban historian Stefanie Hennecke contends, even planners’ use of the word “reconstruction”
seemingly denotes the absence of adequate built substance.12
This supposed lack was often also expressed as the city needing a “heart”: a “cultural and
emotional middle point” based in a “founding place,” not only for Berliners, but for the entire
nation as a “political point of reference.”13 This objective paired nicely with Stimmann’s and
other Critical Reconstructionists’ commitment to the “historical,” “European city,” based on the
model of the Altstadt or Stadtkrone as the centerpiece of the city (something that, as discussed in
Chapter 3, Berlin had never actually possessed). The discourse of the “heart” is a direct
expression of their belief that certain older architectural forms would have both a palliative and a
growth-promoting effect on the formerly divided population by creating for them a sense of
shared history on which they, presumably, could rebuild a new, unified city and nation. The
Planwerk Innenstadt, for example, proposed that the central district of Mitte become a “core” for
the city that would anchor all subsequent development by providing it with a “visible”
touchstone.14
Weszkalnys and others also argue that this rhetoric helped to construe Berlin as
“belonging to a specific pedigree of cities thought to have evolved within Europe over
centuries,” corresponding with the notion of the city as situated at the heart of the European
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Union, and, importantly, as existing in opposition to the eastern European “other.” This
discourse, she argues, reifies Cold War oppositions of Europe as “Western” – rational,
democratic, politically stable and urban, and distinct from an irrational, communist, rural East.
Using this logic, the results of socialist urban planning are easily construed as “something alien,
imposed on the supposedly ‘organic’ structures of the European city.”15 The model of the
continental “European city” also offered Berlin a way to market itself as a desirable location for
companies and residents amidst an ever more competitive global economy. As noted in Chapter
2, planners and government leaders in the late twentieth century increasingly felt pressure to
structure their cities to emphasize supposedly unique, “local” qualities in order to attract
investment and promote growth. Even if Berlin had never possessed a true, “historical” city core
in the ways that other urban spaces did, it seemed that now was the perfect time to create one.16
Much of Berlin’s GDR architecture did not fit this bill. Having been constructed in the
1960s and 1970s, it was considered too recent to be deemed “historical,” too international and
quotidian to be “local,” and, quite simply, too kitschy to be appealing to investors or clients. For
the Critical Reconstructionists, especially, this style of architecture and planning constituted the
worst kind of spatial void in Berlin: dispersed, car-friendly planning, with wide avenues,
sweeping green spaces, and unadorned white towers of offices and apartments. “The European
and especially the West German urban landscape,” stated Critical Reconstruction proponent
Vittorio Magnago Lampugnani, for example, “has clearly been destroyed less by the war then by
the planners who, because of their abstract, biased, and global conception of a city which in their
view is an addition of quantitative functions, have turned [these spaces] mostly into cheerless
15
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and desolate places.”17 Stimmann and Hoffmann-Axthelm had also long been critics of this style
of planning, calling it the “anti-city,” a “disaster” of planning that had utterly failed to deliver on
its promises.18 And although Critical Reconstruction’s various advocates were equally critical of
post-war Modernism in both East and West Berlin, the state’s ownership of land in the former
East allowed them much more influence on that part of the city. As a result, mid-century
Modernist GDR architecture became Critical Reconstruction’s main target of destruction.
This impression was furthered by the frequent characterization of East Berlin
architecture, especially Alexanderplatz, as a “totalitarian” space that was somehow devoid of
symbols of democracy. Essays in the official publications concerning the 1993 planning
competition for Alexanderplatz emphasize the “socialist” nature of the square, calling it the
product of “a contemptible, bloodless, post-war Modernism” that resulted in “a yawning
emptiness.” Critics likened it to the “no man’s land of Potsdamer Platz after the fall of the Berlin
Wall,” and “the result of highly debatable totalitarian planning in the 1960s and 1970s under the
socialist regime.”19 The historical importance of Alexanderplatz as one of the main sites of the
resistance movement that led to the Wende was also ignored in all official rhetoric. In this way,
as Weszkalnys notes, many spaces in East Berlin “were reconceptualized as [having] a specific
kind of emptiness typical of the socialist system.”20 Her ethnography of the re-planning of
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Alexanderplatz in the early 1990s reveals multiple instances of this attitude. For example, she
recounts,
The need for restructuring Alexanderplatz, as an East German SenStadt [Senate
Department for Urban Development and Environment] administrator explained,
had been an outcome of Germany’s reunification. “This oasis of socialist
planning,” he suggested, “doesn’t match the requirements of contemporary
society. Even though some of the existing buildings have been recently renovated,
they are not designed for the long-term future.” In light of the various guiding
images for Berlin – the metropolis, the global city, or the European city –
Alexanderplatz had come to appear inadequate.21
In addition to having spatial voids, East Berlin was frequently portrayed as socially
empty. As noted above, Hoffmann-Axthelm, in particular, was convinced that because it lacked
the conditions of small-scale land ownership, East Berlin possessed no middle class and was
devoid of citizens who were capable of self-governance. This demeaning and paternalistic belief
drew on general Western conceptions of East Germans as inferior. As Weszkalnys demonstrates
in her work, even the term “Ostalgie,” a marriage of the term “East” (“Ost”) and “nostalgia”
(“Nostalgie”), contributes to the portrayal of East Berliners as emotional and irrational: the
emphasis on a foolish “nostalgia” for a “lost past,” rather than the sensible possession of a
legitimate “history,” rhetorically deprives East Germans of the capability to comprehend their
past and legitimates the more “official” understanding of history put forward by Critical
Reconstruction’s proponents.22 Alexanderplatz in particular was often depicted as a social void
because it harbored the “wrong” kind of people, such as immigrants, vagrants, and criminals.
Numerous news reports throughout the 1990s represented Alexanderplatz as dangerous, further
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underscoring the need for its renovation and renewal as a space of capitalist leisure geared
towards a bourgeois public who would possess the “right” kinds of values and lifestyles.23
Voids and Colonial Discourse
Scholars who work in the transdisciplinary field of post-colonial studies have identified
several tactics commonly used by colonizing societies in order to suppress and subjugate native
colonial populations. In his seminal work Orientalism (1979), for example, literary scholar
Edward Said argues that Western Europeans have a history of discursively constructing
colonized cultures as backward, without history, illiterate, emotional, and even violent – in other
words, as lacking the trappings of a supposedly “civilized” Western society – in order to
legitimize the appropriation of their lands and labor.24 Māori scholar Linda Tuhiwai Smith notes
how “primitive” peoples are often portrayed as not being able to use their minds or intellects:
“We could not invent things, we could not create institutions or history, we could not imagine,
we could not produce anything of value, we did not know how to use land and other
resources.”25 The logic of colonization depends on the idea that, since the people of a colonized
nation are incapable of self-governance or of economic prosperity, colonizers are not only free to
pursue the seizure and “proper” utilization of resources, but they see themselves as morally
responsible for doing so. Having subjugated a people, colonizers, as literary scholar Henry
Schwarz argues, then “tend to implant modern structures on their territories,” including capitalist
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economic practices, Western European political structures, and, importantly, the writing of
“official” historical accounts.26
Though East Germany was, in many ways, already “modern” when the Wall fell, and its
residents were mainly ethnic Germans who would not normally be considered “indigenous” in
the post-colonial sense, East Germans were made subject to many of these practices by the
mainly West German-led reunified government after 1990. As noted above, the merging of the
two countries was not based on mutual compromise, but on the imposition of West German
political and economic structures on the East. Of course, given the failure of the Soviet system,
much of this change was both practically necessary and welcomed by former East Germans,
however difficult it made the transition. Unemployment skyrocketed in the Eastern states after
reunification, and many areas have still not caught up economically with the former Western
states after more than 25 years. But as many historians of Germany’s reunification have noted,
along with this political and economic takeover came the assumption that East Germany would
also be culturally and socially subsumed by the West. Despite their forty years of individual
development as a nation, East Germans were regularly portrayed as being without “actual”
history, as emotionally swayed by a “nostalgia” for the anachronistic ways of life that they had
had during the time of division, and as being unable to self-govern because they lacked
experience with land ownership. This attitude is neatly summed up in a quote from none other
than Karl Marx, which serves as the epigraph to Said’s book: “They cannot represent
themselves; they must be represented.”27 This line from one of the progenitors of socialist
thought is, when applied to the case of reunified Berlin, both ironic and very fitting, in that the
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planners who most thoroughly perpetrated this form of colonial marginalization on the former
Communist residents and landscape were themselves members of the radical left who held to the
utopian belief that they were responsible for creating a new, more just and prosperous society
that would benefit the “everyday” residents of the city.28
The supposed “voids” in East Berlin were often rendered tangible through visuals,
particularly maps, which appeared to plainly illustrate the “emptiness” of the city and to project
its “completion” through infill. Such maps appeared frequently in government publications (both
ones produced internally and ones produced for “public” consumption, such as pamphlets and
books), on the Berlin.de website, and in city-sponsored exhibitions.29 Here it is useful to once
again draw on the work of geographer David Harvey, who, in his 1990 book The Condition of
Postmodernity, traces the history of map-making as a tool of political power that allows for the
“conquest and control of space” by portraying it as something easily “malleable, and therefore
capable of domination through human action.”30 The map view, he argues, also allows for the
reductive “homogenization and reification of the rich diversity of spatial stories,” and the
production of the invisibility of the map-maker, who, because his or her gaze is constructed from
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the very beginning as outside the realm of vision, remains aloof and unimplicated in the scene.31
This type of map view thus allows the planner both total control and total invisibility in the
shaping of spaces. In doing so, as Harvey emphasizes, the map or plan necessarily cuts out
nuances and details, rendering space legible through the erasure of its lived realities. As will be
discussed in detail below, these characteristics pervade the visuals used by Stimmann and other
planners to remake East Berlin, especially the aesthetically reductive map form of the Planwerk
Innenstadt.
Gentrification and the “Urban Frontier”
Another useful framework for understanding what happened in central East Berlin under
Critical Reconstruction is provided by the concept of “gentrification.” First introduced by the
sociologist Ruth Glass to describe the process of inner-city renewal by upper-class residents in
London in the 1960s, it has become a common term for describing neighborhood change in terms
of social class, typically describing the ways in which more wealthy residents or businesses
displace working-class ones.32 Coinciding with the post-modern return to the “historical” or
“European city” discussed in the previous chapters, gentrification grew from a relatively limited
and sporadic phenomenon in the mid-1960s to a global phenomenon in the 1990s, supported and
sponsored by city planning and marketing departments as well as corporate real estate interests.
But despite its positive connotations for particular planners or constituents, the term implies not
simply the refashioning of a given district from an architectural or urban design perspective, but
the concomitant marginalization and, often, displacement, of working-class populations.
Geographer Neil Smith describes it as “the class remake of the central urban landscape” that

31

Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity, 246, 253.

32

See Ruth Glass, “Aspects of Change,” in The Gentrification Debates, ed. Japonica Brown-Saracino, Metropolis and
Modern Life (New York: Routledge, 2010), 19–29.

223

represents “a struggle not just for new and old urban spaces but for the symbolic political power
to determine the urban future.”33
As sociologist Sharon Zukin argues, gentrification can be seen as a form of urban
colonialism, and as such it dovetails perfectly with the discourse of the “void,” as described
above. Amplifying arguments also made by Smith, Zukin points to the “pioneer” mentality that
underlies gentrification:
Regardless of topography, building stock, and even existing populations,
gentrification persists as a collective effort to appropriate the center for elements
of a new urban middle class. The notion of gentrifiers as “urban pioneers” is
properly viewed as an ideological justification of middle-class appropriation. Just
as white settlers in the nineteenth century forced Native Americans from their
traditional grounds, so gentrifiers, developers, and new commercial uses have
cleared the downtown “frontier” of existing populations. This appropriation is
coordinated, logically enough, with a local expansion of jobs and facilities in
businesses services.34
Zukin also sees gentrification as a mode of specifically privileging cultural consumers, rather
than existing working-class or small-scale manufacturing interests.
Gentrification joins the economic claim to space with a cultural claim that gives
priority to the demands of historic preservationists and arts producers. In this
view, “historic” buildings can only be appreciated to their maximum value if they
are explained, analyzed, and understood as part of an aesthetic discourse, such as
the history of architecture and art. Such buildings rightfully “belong” to people
who have the resources to search for the original building plans and study their
house in the context of the architect’s career. They belong to residents who restore
mahogany paneling and buy copies of nineteenth-century faucets instead of those
who prefer aluminum siding. Gentrifiers’ capital for attaching themselves to
history gives them license to “reclaim” the downtown for their own uses. … By
means of the building stock, they identify with an earlier group of builders rather
than with the existing lower class population, with the “ladies’ Mile” of earlytwentieth-century department stores instead of the discount stores that have
replaced them.35
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Clearly, Critical Reconstruction, seen in this context, was a strong force behind the gentrification
of central Berlin. Relying on the idea that East Berlin, in particular, was a “frontier” devoid of
the “proper” uses or residents, Stimmann and the other proponents of this method made a
concerted effort to convert its landscape into a center of cultural consumption. As such, it
constituted what I would call a “soft” or “subversive” form of colonialism that attempted to mask
its classist and Western-centric intentions with claims about the need for economic growth and
the supposedly objective importance of Berlin’s “historical” urban forms.

Erasing the GDR’s Modernist Buildings
The Schloss as a Structuring Element of GDR Memory Discourse
Few observers of Berlin’s post-Wall rebuilding could miss the contentious dispute over
the demolition of the Palast der Republik, which, alongside Libeskind’s Jewish Museum, was
undoubtedly the most internationally-discussed facet of the city’s reconstruction. Standing at the
eastern end of Berlin’s via triumphalis, this gigantic building inhabited the site of the former
baroque Prussian imperial “city palace,” or “Stadtschloss” (commonly referred to simply as the
“Schloss”). This earlier structure had sustained considerable damage during World War II, and in
1950 its remains were dynamited by the East German regime (fig. 5.1).36 The space was paved
and used as a parade ground until the early 1970s, when Erich Honecker’s government
sponsored the construction of a massive building in the style of “high-gloss international
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Modernism” that was named the Palast der Republik – an allusion to the historical significance
of the space, but also to the GDR’s opposition to the idea of monarchy and supposed status as a
democratic “republic” (fig. 5.2).37 It was a multipurpose building, with spaces for parliamentary
and party meetings, but it was chiefly meant as a site of entertainment and consumerism for
GDR citizens, housing three restaurants, a post office, a bowling alley, a movie theater, a concert
hall, and numerous shops.
This shift in use from national parade ground to space of private consumption was an
explicit gesture meant to suggest that the leaders of the GDR, however misguidedly or
hypocritically, were interested in citizens’ everyday welfare and happiness.38 As with most
realities of life in the GDR, the Palast’s users were not deluded by these propagandistic gestures;
though the site became a tourist destination for East Germans, and its events, especially concerts,
were heavily attended, the building quickly acquired nicknames such as “Ballast der Republik,”
“Palazzo Prozzi” (“Chateau Show”) and “Erich’s Lamp Shop.”39 These names reveal the
capacity that East Germans had developed for “doublethink,” i.e. separating state ideology from
private life and fulfillment: for them, the Palast symbolized the GDR’s hypocrisy, but it also
presented them with opportunities for personal enjoyment, which they eagerly accepted. Even
after unification, the Palast remained an ambivalent symbol, but one, nevertheless, around which
groups eventually rallied in order to preserve the memory of their heritage, however fraught.40
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When, in 1993, the building was declared contaminated with asbestos and the reunited federal
government voted to tear it down for health reasons, the decision was met with heated protest by
citizens’ groups, intellectuals, and politicians, and a decade of public debate ensued. The final
parliamentary decision to demolish the Palast der Republik and replace it with a replica of the
Schloss was made in 2003 in accordance with the recommendation of a “commission of
experts.”41 The new building, now finally under construction as of 2013, will house the
“ethnological” collection of the Prussian Cultural Heritage Foundation, which comprises objects
from non-Western cultures including Africa, Latin America, East Asia, India, and Polynesia.42
The new palace will thus complete “Museum Island,” the cluster of museums to the north of the
Schlossplatz, one of Berlin’s biggest tourist attractions.
Like the extant Nazi buildings in the city center, the Palast der Republik represented a
violent and repressive regime, a fact that had never been lost on East Berliners. Yet many of
them rallied around this formerly despised building as a reminder of that very regime and of the
forty-year history, society, and culture that it represented. The assertions of historians like Brian
Ladd, who characterizes the Schloss debate as being based in “competing nostalgias,” thus do
East Berliners an injustice.43 Their bid to preserve the structure, I would argue, did not grow out
of a simple wish to continue to live out a set of outdated and innocently ignorant mores, or to
whitewash a troubled history with kitschy remembrances, but out of a wish to draw attention to
the contradictions of their own history and to publicly think through and situate this history
amidst a new socio-political moment. Perhaps because of a lack of international pressure to
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publicly contextualize or memorialize this part of Germany’s past in any meaningful way (as
there was with regard to the Holocaust and the Nazi regime), as architectural historian Florian
Hertweck contends, “the motives for a reconstruction of the Berlin palace façade … are above all
based in a supposedly collective need to find cultural normality” through simply refusing to deal
with the history of the GDR.44
The Marginalization of Public Input at Alexanderplatz
This problematic elision of East Germany’s built heritage in the service of a new
“normality” took place at Alexanderplatz, as well. As discussed in Chapter 4, Alexanderplatz had
grown up naturally as a market square on the eastern edge of Berlin’s center, and by the 1920s it
was a major transportation and commercial hub. One of the most notable buildings on the prewar square was the Warenhaus Tietz, a massive department store built around the turn of the
century by the Tietz family.45 In the typical style of the day, the store’s skylights and open
floorplans provided a theatrical space where goods were “staged” amidst an atmosphere of
opulence.46 The two office buildings added to the square by Peter Behrens in the late 1920s
created a pedestrian plaza bordered on the other side by the façade of the Tietz store, creating an
intentional spatial dialogue between the three structures (fig. 4.19). World War II bombing
resulted in the ruination of the Tietz store and most of the surrounding area, and the subsequent
division of the city landed Alexanderplatz in the zone of Communist East Berlin. Then, in the
1960s, the GDR government sponsored the renovation of the space as a large public square that
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could serve as both a recreation and demonstration venue, complete with a “Fountain of
International Friendship” and a “World Time Clock” that physically expressed the GDR’s
embeddedness in international socialism (figs. 5.3-5.4).47 But the square’s refurbishment was
meant to symbolize consumption and commerce, as well: the open pedestrian space was
surrounded by a cluster of buildings that included several office towers, a high-rise hotel,
restaurants, and, echoing the former presence of the Tietz store, the Warenhaus Centrum, the
largest department store in East Germany (fig. 5.5).
Barely two decades after the square’s completion under the GDR plan, the fall of the
Berlin Wall marked the beginning of a whole new era in the square’s development. As
Wezkalnys notes, “Alexanderplatz became an apt vehicle for talking about the demise of the
GDR state and the future it once embodied.”48 A statement by the Department of Urban
Development and Environment during the 1993 master plan competition (discussed in Chapter 4)
declared that Alexanderplatz was to be reconstituted as a symbol of Berlin’s “inner
unification.”49 This lofty goal was validated by the widespread portrayal of post-Wall
Alexanderplatz as a spatial void: an unwelcoming wasteland that embodied the worst kind of
socialist design that appealed only to backward East Germans who were not able to embrace the
West. It was also seen as a social void, full of the “wrong” kinds of people – “dangerous gypsies,
eastern European con men, violent Yugoslavian youth gangs, and illegal moneychangers.”50
As recounted in Chapter 4, the master plan competition for the square was won by Hans
Kollhoff, whose design featured stone-clad commercial buildings surrounded by a ring of high47
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rises with detailing that echoed both American art deco and late-nineteenth century commercial
European architecture (figs. 4.22-4.26). This decision was followed by several years of
negotiations with private investors and the public.51 The investors funded a publicity campaign
that included newspaper supplements, public discussions, storefront exhibitions, leaflets, and an
“Alex-Info-Bus” where people could receive details on the plans. Residents and users of the
square were also invited by planners to “mitgestalten” (“co-design”) and “mitbestimmen” (“have
a say”) in the design process through questionnaires and mail-in response forms, with the
promise that officials and developers would incorporate these suggestions. The pamphlets stated,
“Your design suggestions and the results of the survey will be evaluated and will flower into the
planning, for nothing ought to be built over Berliners’ heads.”52 The planning process also
resulted in the grassroots organization of citizens’ groups such as the “Bürgervertretung
Alexanderplatz” (“Citizens’ Representation Alexanderplatz”). This group did not oppose the idea
of changing the square, but rather “development on a grand scale,” and they acted as a critical
voice throughout the negotiations.53 However, the promised “flowering” of public opinion into
actual design solutions never actually took place; instead, as Wezkalnys clearly documents,
public comments and critiques were meticulously filed away but never used to make changes to
the plans. Instead, officials seemed to trust themselves in their role as the “experts” that are so
often favored in German planning culture, assuming that they simply “knew better” than the
public did.54 Because their input was solicited and yet completely ignored, many of those
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participating in these public discussions and surveys rightly felt themselves to be “exploited to
legitimize the decisions of influential politicians.”55
The planners’ choice to ignore public input was bolstered by the perceived lack of
cultural or historical savvy amongst former East Germans. Wezkalnys reports that administrators
frequently thought of these citizens in terms of
the image of an activist who was East German first and citizen [of reunited
Germany] second, who had lived in the area for years, if not decades, and who
was now anxious not to lose his privileged living space. Sometimes, such a person
was believed to be backward-looking socialist or an elderly member of the
[Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus, the successor to the East German
Communist party] the socialist party, rejecting everything “Western” and wishing
“to preserve Alexanderplatz as a GDR museum.”56
Another particularly telling example of this attitude appears in a text produced by the section of
the Department of Urban Development dedicated to evaluating citizens’ letters:
[The letters] mirror, aside from a general rejection of radical changes, worries
about a loss of identity. … Alexanderplatz is regarded by “East Berliners” as the
center of East Berlin. The redesign of East Berlin’s center in the sixties and
seventies is understood as part of both an individual and a collective history of the
citizens of the former GDR. … [But] the rebuilding of Alexanderplatz in the
sixties and seventies also consciously destroyed and changed numerous old
structures. … [The proposed design] attaches itself to the layers of the older urban
design history. … Decisions concerning how to deal with existing buildings are
never right or wrong; rather they are oriented towards different design
objectives.57
This view was shared by the various proponents of Critical Reconstruction: that mid-century
Modernism, especially as it was expressed in the architecture of East Germany, was both in itself
ahistorical, and was the result of a heedless destruction of “actual” historical structures from
earlier in the century. This double lack – a lack of historical import paired with a lack of
55
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supposed respect for history – was used to justify the reconstruction of “layers of the older urban
design history” through the demolition of the existing GDR buildings and the adherence to the
styles outlined in Kollhoff’s master plan. Paired with the idea that the individuals and groups
who opposed this development represented a social “lack” in terms of their political and cultural
knowledge (that they were “nostalgic,” backward, or even die-hard communists, and that they
were unable to understand what constituted a legitimate “history”), the Critical Reconstruction of
Alexanderplatz seemed, in the planners’ eyes, to be a necessary step towards the creation of a
cityscape that reflected reunited Germany’s (Western-centric) cohesion and prowess.
Kleihues’s Redesign of the Centrum Department Store
In a manner similar to the Palast der Republik, the East Berlin government’s redesign of
Alexanderplatz during the 1960s and 1970s had been intended to reinforce the image of the state
as a provider of material contentment to its own inhabitants, and this image was embodied
especially well by the Centrum store, constructed between 1967 and 1970 (figs. 5.5-5.14).
Designed by a collective of architects headed by Josef Kaiser, the Centrum was a simple box
sheathed in a distinctive, honeycomb-patterned aluminum façade that became one of the most
remarkable and memorable facets of Alexanderplatz. Inside the store, state-of-the-art fluorescent
lights illuminated the four open sales floors, surrounding dual service cores housing elevators,
escalators, and restrooms. The Centrum housed cafes and restaurants, and it created a dialogue
with the open square through an exterior mezzanine level that provided shoppers and diners with
views of the activities on the plaza (figs. 5.5 and 5.14). The store thus represented both
technological advancement and aesthetic savvy in a building that also connoted a certain
standard of living.58 Its air of leisure and consumerism was directed both inwardly, at the GDR’s
58
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citizens, and outwardly, representing the advancement of the GDR's society and government to
international visitors and acting as a “show window to the West.”59 As Joachim Palutzki
remarks in his history of East German architecture, the Centrum building in particular was
intended to furnish “proof that the international standard of consumption could also be reached
under socialist conditions.”60 (For instance, it was, according to a former employee, the only
place in the GDR where one could buy coveted denim jeans.)61 Fittingly, the building’s formal
language clearly mirrors Western commercial designs from the same period (fig. 5.15).62 The
plan also took the square’s earlier history into account, harking back to Weimar-era plans for the
square (never completed), and Behrens’s buildings, having survived the war, also provided a
clear physical basis for the Centrum in their height and massing (fig. 5.16).
The Centrum chain was bought out by the large West German Kaufhof Corporation in
1990, and the company hired Josef Paul Kleihues to redesign the Alexanderplatz store, which
was renamed “Galeria Kaufhof.”63 The most controversial aspect of the design was the complete
removal of the striking honeycomb façade, which, after significant construction delays, was
removed beginning in 2004. (The Kaufhof corporation planned to complete the renovations –
while keeping the store open – in time for Berlin’s hosting of the World Cup in 2006.64) The
stripping of the façade elicited a “cry of outrage” from the public, but despite demonstrations,
online petitions, and calls for preservation from members of the Berlin parliament, the head of
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the Kaufhof corporation declared the façade “too deteriorated to be restored” (figs. 5.17-5.18).65
The art and architecture collective atelier für alles [sic] was one of the most prominent agitators
in favor of preserving the façade.66 They saw its destruction as part of the “rampant destruction,
deprecation, and elimination of GDR Modernism” across the former East Germany, and noted its
importance both for residents (for whom the façade had long been a part of daily life), and local
institutions such as historical museums, who saw it as a key artifact to be preserved.67 Many
observers rightly attributed the conflict over the façade to a shift in generational tastes: the
national paper Die Welt noted that while the “parent generation” was tearing down the Centrum
façade, younger people were creating a cult out of reusing and reconstructing East German midcentury Modernist architecture to create things like trendy clubs – even on Alexanderplatz
itself.68 “As it did to many other architects, [the Centrum’s] unique aesthetic really appealed to
us,” write atelier für alles members Tilman Weitz and Olaf Gerecke. “Buildings whose
appearance is so angular and distinctive have become quite rare. Even for one-time visitors to the
square, the Centrum building is still today one of the main images [they remember].”69 The
authors are clear that their appreciation for the building has nothing to do with “Ostalgie,” since
their group comprises designers from both former East and West, and in any case they were all
“too young to connect the GDR with the image of an enemy, political intrigues, or a lost
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childhood.”70 In response to the atelier für alles inititative, the construction company in charge
of removing the façade did allow about half of the remains to be auctioned, and many of the twometer pieces were subsequently acquired by local institutions, artists, and residents.71 The
company’s promise to use the remaining pieces to cover the elevated walkway between the
department store and the neighboring Park Hotel, however, was never fulfilled.72
Kleihues’s design made absolutely no effort to preserve or even allude to any aspects of
the GDR design. As the original author of the theory of Critical Reconstruction, Kleihues
encouraged a return to historical forms while making use of cutting-edge materials and
techniques. His firm stated that the design of the new Kaufhof makes reference to the “great
department store tradition at Alexanderplatz” exemplified by the former Warenhaus Tietz, and
simultaneously continues the “European urban planning tradition” by linking to the the idea of
“urban architecture,” i.e. the dense urban configurations envisioned by Martin Wagner in the
1920s (figs. 5.19-5.21).73 The design uses the structural shell of the Centrum store, but
fundamentally reconfigures both the interior and the façade. Like the Tietz department store of
the 1920s, Kleihues’s design comprises a clearly marked entrance and a façade punctuated by
vertical strips of windows, and it includes shop windows along the bottom two floors that tie it
directly to the foot traffic on the square. Kleihues’s design also looks “historical” in that it
responds in a very literal way to Behrens’s structures, using a matching travertine for its
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façade.74 The interior of the new store also recalls the historic opulence and carefully
choreographed circulation of classic department stores through a large atrium that pierces the
building from top to bottom, letting in natural light, and the theatrical staging of commerce
encouraged by escalators that smoothly shuttle visitors from floor to floor, affording them a
series of views through the space at both the products and other shoppers. Gold-colored metallic
accents against gleaming white surfaces create a luxurious color palette, and though the aesthetic
is pared down, emphasizing smooth surfaces and geometric forms, the design clearly echoes neoclassical rationalism in its axiality and grandeur. Nothing could be further from the experience of
the Centrum, with its horizontally oriented, isolated, and fluorescent-lit sales floors.
The new design for the store foregrounds the experiential quality of shopping as
spectacle: a spectacle that involves, at least in the minds of architects and planners, a particular
kind of spatial encounter with history, through visual references to the past and through the
recreation of the kind of luxurious space of the turn-of-the-century department store, which itself
emphasized spectacle. A large atrium pierces the building from top to bottom, letting in natural
light, a precedent set by the very first department store, Paris’s Au Bon Marché, which was
emulated in many turn-of-the-century designs in Berlin and elsewhere. As a quintessentially
industrial and wholly novel building type in the late nineteenth century, the department store
presented an escape from everyday life into realms of comparative fantasy by enabling
customers to browse through items amidst opulent surroundings. Emile Zola’s novel Au Bonheur
des Dames (1883) famously summed up the reverence inspired by these new commercial venues
by calling them “cathedrals of consumption.” In the case of the Kaufhof, Kleihues was
consciously referencing this historical typology in order not only to evoke a similar aura of
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extravagance, but, on top of that, to suggest a historical provenance for the space that lent it yet
more import and grandeur. In removing the memorable aluminum exterior and referencing the
early history of department store architecture on the interior of the building, Kleihues and his
clients thus seem to have both complied with Berlin planners’ wishes to counteract “socialist” or
Modernist planning, and made what they viewed as a necessary and commercially savvy update
to the store’s image.
The many threads of built history at Alexanderplatz illustrate architecture’s role as bearer
of representational meaning or “identity,” and the role of public discourse in framing that
identity by attaching meanings to form; however, the nature of that meaning is often slippery or
counterintuitive. Listening to current planning rhetoric, one might conclude that the Centrum’s
association with specifically “socialist” planning made it unappealing to its new owners;
certainly the logic of the “socialist void” figured heavily in the publications and statements by
city planners. However, this rhetoric was applied unevenly: there are examples of successful
adaptive reuse of landmarked GDR buildings even on Alexanderplatz itself. For instance, the
Haus des Lehrers (“House of the Teacher,” a name honoring a destroyed pre-war building that
was home to the Teachers’ Guild), designed in 1962 by the well-known East German architect
Hermann Henselmann, has been successfully converted into fashionable office and convention
spaces (figs. 5.22-5.23).75 The “socialist” associations of such a structure does not seem to have
hindered its transition into a useful and marketable space. Thus, despite the bandying of the term
“totalitarian” in relationship to Alexanderplatz, its “socialist” political associations were
ultimately probably not the prime impetus for the demolition or renovation of GDR-era
buildings; rather, it was the Centrum’s and other buildings’ perceived lack of “historical” value
75
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or, even more simply, their overt outdatedness, that precipitated their removal. Here, “history,”
in its most simplistic form – a travertine façade – has become simply another tool of commerce.
There was no profit to be found in preserving the Centrum as a marker of East German “history,”
and, unlike that which was felt over the Nazi past, there was little international or national
pressure to aggressively memorialize or “work through” the legacies of the GDR in the built
environment. Critical Reconstruction, in this case, conveniently provided the Kaufhof
corporation with a trendy and opulent new design that referenced the glory days of department
stores a century ago and erased the kitschy, fluorescent-lit memories of the Centrum, shoring up
the company’s desired image for the store as a “cathedral of consumption” rather than a
potentially laughable relic of the recent past. After all, what could an East German building have
to do with capitalist commerce? Just as East Berliners themselves were looked down on by
planners as “backward” or “Ostalgic,” so too was the architecture of their capital city swept away
as if it were a mere aberration, so that the threads of what officials considered “legitimate”
history – i.e. structures from the time before World War II – could be picked up again, or, in this
case, be practically re-fabricated.

Remaking East Berlin via the Planwerk Innenstadt
What Kleihues and the Kaufhof Corporation achieved on Alexanderplatz was attempted
on a much larger and more conceptual scale in Stimmann’s planning work from 1996 to 1999.
Having held the position of Senate Construction Director since 1991, Stimmann was forced to
vacate the post in 1995 when his supervisor Wolfgang Nagel lost his seat in the Berlin Senate.
Stimmann was then reinstated as State Secretary for Planning under Senator Peter Strieder
(SPD), the newly elected Senator for Urban Development, Environmental Protection, and
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Technology (the post formerly held by CDU politician Volker Hassemer, with whom Stimmann
had competed and uneasily collaborated since 1991).76 Stimmann used this new position as a
platform to draft – and ultimately pass into law – the Planwerk Innenstadt (“Inner-city Plan,”
often referred to simply as “the Planwerk”), authored chiefly in collaboration with HoffmannAxthelm (fig. 5.24).77 Its stated goal was “to create a total, identity-supporting urban planning
concept for the inner city area” while encouraging densification “on the basis of historical
[urban] structures, where the emphasis would be on the eastern center.”78 The plan also expanded
the power of city officials to make decisions over land sales: as Senate Construction Director
from 1991-1995, Stimmann’s reach had been limited to the district of Mitte, and the Planwerk
greatly expanded his influence, which would now encompass several of Berlin’s central
districts.79 Though this area spanned both East and West Berlin neighborhoods, the majority of
the saleable – and thus development-ready – land lay in the East, since so much of that property
had formerly been owned by the GDR government.
The creation of the Planwerk did not stem from a simple desire on Stimmann’s part for
power or influence; it was, rather, as Hennecke argues, an ambitious “socio-political project”
grounded in the belief that a shift in land ownership policies paired with the formal approach of
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Critical Reconstruction would attract educated, middle-class, politically-active residents to
central Berlin, and that these people would become an important and necessary driving force
behind a successful reunited city and nation.80 The implication, of course, was that the area
covered by the Planwerk – especially the eastern half of the central region of Berlin – was at
present devoid of such residents, even though, as stated in the plans, 300,000 people already
lived or worked there.81 In a manner very similar to what took place at Alexanderplatz and the
Schlossplatz, the three-year process whereby the Planwerk was vetted, edited, and then
eventually passed into law was one of supposed public involvement, but in actuality its authors
took little of this public input into account – partly because they felt that the public lacked the
required expertise to make good planning decisions, and partly because their private-public
partnership development model meant that their most important constituents and discussants
were investors, not residents.82 Thus, debates about the Planwerk in the Stadtforum (a body
created by Senator Hassemer in the early 1990s as a way to “involve” the public in planning, but
also critiqued by many as a group that existed simply for public show83) and on the floor of
Berlin’s state parliament, where the plans were vehemently opposed by the PDS (the former East
German Communist party), resulted in only a few minor changes. Specific neighborhood plans
were somewhat reworked via a set of intensive, regional “workshops” (“Werkstatten”) before
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being officially approved by the Berlin Senate in 1999, but for the most part these did not
succeed in preserving specific GDR buildings or ensembles slated for demolition or renovation.84
However, as many observers have noted, the “official” approval of the Planwerk
ultimately meant very little for the concrete future of the city; its power was much more political
and rhetorical than physically effectual. Political scientist Elizabeth Strom, for instance, rightly
observes that the Planwerk does not guarantee
whether anyone wants to buy [the land] under those conditions, and whether once
it is bought it will actually be developed as the planners hope. … For this to truly
happen, Berlin’s planners will have to become very adept at managing real estate
and its development … [and] this has not, historically, been an area in which
Berlin’s planning officials have excelled.85
Indeed, since its approval, the plan has experienced significant delays, as well as continued
changes.86 Given that Berlin has been in the grip of a major recession for the last two decades,
the plan has had few of the sweeping effects that Stimmann and Hoffmann-Axthelm envisioned.
Rather, it has functioned more distinctly as a discursive tool that, in its marginalization of East
Berlin history, identity, and local interests in favor of a particular attachment to the aesthetics of
the “European city” and small-scale, bourgeois land ownership, has become the ultimate
expression of its authors’ highly conservative, capitalist, and colonialist ideals.
The Content of the Planwerk: Visualizing Voids, Projecting Wholeness
Stimmann and others who had been involved in planning politics in Berlin since the
1970s had witnessed the SPD’s planning tactics during that era, which were based in quantitative
data analysis and top-down planning techniques, resulting in reams of text that, Stimmann and
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others recognized, was as inaccessible to the public as it was ineffective for guiding policy. A
graphic plan, Hennecke observes, “had the potential, in Stimmann’s eyes, to accomplish the
necessary translation of general societal goals into the real space of city life.”87 Stimmann
therefore joined the ranks of post-modern urban designers like Kleihues and many others (such
as Aldo Rossi) who had developed a rhetoric the relied heavily on images beginning in the late
1960s, deftly deploying plans, drawings, maps, and photographs in tandem with text in order to
support their arguments and theories.88 Accordingly, the Planwerk is not primarily a text, but a
series of visual documents, primarily in large-scale map form (the German word “Plan” actually
means both “map” and “plan”).89 The main image – literally called the Leitbild, or “guiding
image” –is a map of the city center that, in a manner very similar to Kleihues’s 1984 plan for the
IBA (fig. 1.25, discussed in Chapter 1), shows the built substance of the city in grey, existing
plans in orange, and proposed infill in red (fig. 5.24). The target development area, which falls
roughly inside the former boundary of Berlin’s historical baroque Excise Wall, covers about 30
square kilometers and includes the districts of Mitte, Friedrichshain, Kreuzberg, Tiergarten,
Schöneberg, and Charlottenburg.90
With its easy color-coding and simple lines, the Planwerk, though quite large in scale,
initially appears clear and readable. However, any attempt to use it to understand the city’s plans
instantly mystifies the reader, in that it cannot actually function alone: unless one is a city
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planner oneself, or intimately involved in the planning process, one has to rely (ironically,
perhaps, given Stimmann’s critique of written plans) on the accompanying text or on further
research in order to understand how the plans will affect the city. This is because the Planwerk
includes no street names, no district borders, and does not mark inner-city train lines or other
mass transit routes; the former path of the Berlin Wall, i.e. the division between East and West,
is also completely invisible. An interactive version of the map on the city’s website shows the
eight “sectors” slated for more detailed discussion in the neighborhood “workshops” highlighted
in red, but includes no further details regarding what streets, plazas, or other identifying
landmarks are included.91 Visually, then, the Planwerk exudes the desired “cohesion” and
“wholeness” of Berlin in much the same way that Harvey describes in his critique of colonial
map-making. The map’s elision of district divisions and other familiar markers, reducing the
urban landscape to an ensemble of shapes and colors, presents the physical re-joining of the two
halves of the city as a fait accompli.
Because of the lack of identifying information on the Leitbild itself, we are left to rely on
other various texts, images, and statements by planners in order to understand exactly what the
image is attempting to communicate. Far from operating on its own, the Planwerk works
dialectically with these other media to create an overall impression of what it will accomplish.
The planning goals stated in the published materials include “sustainable city development
through densification,”; “reurbanization” and the “mixing of functions” based on the Leitbild of
the “European city”; the improvement of public transit and traffic infrastructure (especially hard
to see on the map, since public transit is not marked); better inner-city parks and green spaces;
“modernization and completion” of existing structures, especially through building types that are
91
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“eigentumsfähig” (“able to be privately owned”); “a new formulation of Berlin’s city form
through a common identity-supporting inner city and with critical respect for all historical layers
of city development”; and the knitting together of individually planned parts of the city.92 But
understanding the Planwerk in this way, too, is a dubious undertaking. For instance, the text
states that areas “not characterized by an urban mix of functions and inner-city densities” exist in
the districts of Tiergarten, Kreuzberg (both former West), Mitte, and Friedrichshain (former
East), where “monofunctional Siedlungen” and open spaces like Alexanderplatz characterize
large swaths of the city.93 However, if one superimposes street names and district lines onto the
map, it immediately becomes clear that this proposed redevelopment and infill is not equally
distributed between former East and West, nor amongst the various districts; the overwhelming
majority of it is slated for the eastern portion of Mitte, in areas where GDR development had
followed mid-century Modernist planning models, and where property ownership was now in the
hands of the state.
The Planwerk was often accompanied (for instance, on the Berlin planning department’s
website) by a series of chronological maps called the Schwarzpläne (figure-ground plans),
showing the unbuilt areas of the city as white voids, with built regions in black (figs. 5.255.29).94 A tool used by many post-modern urban theorists (including Kleihues), these maps
provide an easy illustration of how urban density has decreased since the 1940s, thus presenting
historical “evidence” for the need for redevelopment. Stimmann relied on the visual rhetoric of
the Schwarzpläne throughout his earlier tenure as Senate Construction Director (1991-1995), and
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they continued to be used throughout the 1990s on Berlin’s city planning website, in publications
about new construction, and they were even included as part of Germany’s installation at the
2000 Venice Biennale.95 Stimmann’s own written statements shored up the visual rhetoric of
voids that the Schwarzpläne clearly utilized. Invoking the city-as-text metaphor employed by
post-structuralist thinkers like Michel de Certeau, Henri Lefebvre, Roland Barthes, and many
others, as well as the idea of the city as a site of memory made popular by Rossi, Stimmann
stated that these maps reveal “the memory of the city,” articulating in easy-to-read black and
white the “letters” that “build words and sentences and tell stories.”96
Reading the urban texture means understanding the city as text. The planner,
Städtebauer (“city designer”) and architect, therefore, needs to continually edit his
city, examine it for orthographic mistakes, add new chapters in some places and
cut in others, view the text from the perspective of current societal and political
Leitbilder (‘guiding images’) without writing it completely anew. The city builder
is the editor of the urban texture.97
As Harvey suggests, Stimmann here presents the Schwarzpläne as offering a god’s-eye-view of
the city, over which the planner can then wield his power to “edit.”
In addition to Schwarzpläne, photos and perspectival visualizations were also used to
illustrate the supposed need for redevelopment at particular sites. For instance, in the report on
the Spittelmarkt, a square in southeastern Mitte that was redeveloped by the GDR government in
the 1960s, photos from the turn of the century were used alongside contemporary ones in order
to, as Hennecke argues, “act as proof of the ‘inappropriateness’ of the current built substance.”
Captions describe the crossing avenue of Leipziger Strasse as once constituting the “most elegant
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street in Berlin” with “spectacular shops,” now degraded by the “absolute dominance” of
traffic.98 As the planning materials stated,
The Planwerk exists in the city-building tradition of the European city and relates
itself to the historical traces of the destroyed Berlin ground plan (Stadtgrundriß),
without obscuring the history of this destruction. The goal is not a nostalgic return
to that which is irretrievably lost, but a dialogical and also tension-filled
completion of the existing structures which are now assessed as inadequate (often
results of post-war city planning measures), oriented towards contemporary needs
for urban visiting, dwelling, and quality of life.99
As Hennecke argues, the Schwarzpläne and their accompanying interpretive statements
(including also, often, captions that describe them as depicting “destruction”) make the case that
the city has been ruined by post-war building and planning measures: “The illustrations mislead
(verführen) [the reader] to the knee-jerk conclusion (Kurzschluss) that every demolition was a
destructive undertaking and only the ‘filling back up’ [of these voids] would be an appropriate
answer.”100 The accompanying text to the Planwerk states that “demolitions should generally be
avoided. [But] at the same time it should be ensured that the traces of the historical image of the
city that were lost in post-war developments … should be taken up again, in consideration of
today’s requirements (Ansprüche) for quality of life (Lebensqualität).101 To this end, the
Planwerk supposedly “uses the method of Critical Reconstruction in order to uncover the lost
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traces of city development in the inner city.”102 But this “uncovering” ultimately does mean
demolitions – of existing GDR architecture. Urban historian Harald Bodenschatz argues that, in
this respect, Critical Reconstruction revealed itself as a “crusade against GDR city planning,”
which was written off a priori as having meant “destruction” of the city structure
(Stadtgrundriss).103 Again, as in the case of the Centrum at Alexanderplatz, mid-century GDR
Modernism was simply written off as having no historical value. Critical Reconstruction, here,
meant editing out as much of that Modernist legacy as possible in order to restore the “true”
DNA of the pre-war street plan and building typologies.
Thus, despite statements to the effect that “the superimposition of different historical
layers … includes the history of wartime destruction and the reconstruction of the post-war
period” and that “no historical phase should be negated,” the Planwerk slated several areas in the
eastern portion of Mitte for complete redevelopment.104 One of these was the Fischerinsel
neighborhood on the southern portion of what is now known as Museum Island, the site of the
original medieval settlement in Berlin. It had been subject to slum-clearance measures in the late
nineteenth century, and, in GDR times, had been redeveloped with several high-rise towers set
amongst ample green space. The Planwerk proposed block-edge infill, focused along the major
avenue of Gertraudenstrasse, and the “renewed identifiability (Kenntlichmachung) of the
historical core” of Cölln (the name of one of Berlin’s two original medieval villages) through
traffic-quieting measures and added architectural references to the medieval Petrikirche (Church
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of St. Peter) that used to stand on the site.105 One of the most contentious facets of the plan was
the proposed removal of the “Maple-Leaf” (Ahornblatt) Restaurant, built by the GDR in the
early 1970s and named for its distinctive star-shaped plan that culminated in a set of peaked
rooflines (fig. 5.30). Used as a dance club after the fall of the Wall, it was eventually demolished
and replaced by a hotel, against vehement protests by the Berlin Architects’ Chamber.106 The city
stated that this replacement was necessary “in order to achieve a convincing formulation of the
Cölln city core.”107
Like the Centrum store, the Maple-Leaf Restaurant was neither universally liked nor
appreciated by either former residents of the GDR or by contemporary critics, but it – and the
neighborhood surrounding it –nevertheless represented an important and longstanding aspect of
Berlin’s architectural and urban development. However, Critical Reconstruction’s basis in the
reaction against mid-century Modernist planning meant, essentially, no chance for the
preservation of these buildings; an attention to the supposed “layers of history” on the site meant
an aggressively negative stance toward buildings like the Maple-Leaf, which had themselves,
according to the proponents of Critical Reconstruction, committed the error of erasing earlier
structures. No matter that the gigantic Reichsbank building, which lay just a block to the north,
had also erased earlier traces of the medieval city; because of its restrained neo-classical
Modernism and its ties to Nazi history, it was subjected to rehabilitation rather than demolition.
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Mid-century structures and ensembles that represented densities that were too low, forms that
were too experimental, looked kitschy or outdated, or which did not sufficiently hug the edges of
the street, were deemed blights on the cityscape. As mentioned above, such structures existed in
both East and West Berlin, and the Planwerk looked to remedy this kind of planning on both
sides of the former Wall. But existing private property ownership in the West made it much more
difficult for the city to achieve these ends there, resulting in a lopsided and seemingly GDRfocused campaign to “remedy” the results of the supposed mid-century “destruction” of the
historical cityscape through yet more (this time purportedly salutary) demolitions of and
incursions on the urban fabric.
The Planwerk as a Mechanism of Social Change
This one-sided focus on the remains of GDR planning and construction – motivated by
both the realities of state property ownership and an aesthetic reaction against mid-century
planning and architecture – blended with the socio-political theories of Hoffmann-Axthelm,
which were also adopted wholeheartedly by Stimmann, to create a discursive position for the
Planwerk that reduced former GDR residents to, essentially, colonial subjects. Even the
Leitbild’s accompanying text points to the reunification of not just the city structure, but its
social fabric, targeting the proverbial “Wall in the head”: the continued cultural division between
former East and West Germans.108 But the difference between the two populations was more
than cultural, in the sense of different tastes, preferences, styles, or ways of interacting; it was
also very much a set of differences based in social class. Thus along with the wish for a cohesive
merging of two formerly separate populations, the Planwerk’s text also expresses an anxiety over
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the potential suburbanization of the city through the flight of wealthier, more highly-educated
residents to larger, more luxurious housing outside the urban center:
If we are to stop the emigration of integrative [social] layers (Schichten) out of the
inner city, then the residential landscape must be appropriate for families,
children, old, and young, public space must again be brought back into
consciousness as a worthy space, possibilities for wealth accrual
(Eigentumsbildung) must be created and requirements for mobility be satisfied.109
This view jibes with more general and longstanding discussions within the architectural and
urban planning professions over “shrinking cities” and deurbanization that was seen widely in
North American and European cities in the 1970s and early 1980s. Post-modern architects and
theorists such as Stimmann, Hoffmann-Axthelm, and Kleihues had been among those voices
advocating for a restoration of and return to the mixed-use inner city as a place to live. But the
Planwerk’s goal of attracting middle-class residents also stemmed directly from the prolific
writings and theories of Hoffmann-Axthelm, who, since the 1980s, had been formulating his own
idea of participatory organization based on “local processes of mediation,” i.e. door-to-door,
intimately engaged planning. Through this method, he believed, residents themselves would
learn to advocate for their own interests and, eventually, make it possible for the city to do away
with top-down planning altogether.110 However, he recognized that this goal would only be
possible if residents and owners were educated in the “right” way of advocating for themselves;
this task necessitated that the city planner act as a “therapist-pedagog” who could teach them
these skills. This mode of self-governance was also only possible if the “right” mix of property
owners and residents existed in a neighborhood – if residents had what he called
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“Bodenbindung,” or “attachment to land.”111 Therefore the cornerstone of Hoffmann-Axthelm’s
theories became the idea of the individual, small-scale parcel of land, owned by a private party:
something he related to the “historical” Berlin of the nineteenth century and earlier, before the
advent of large-scale, state-sponsored development à la Modernism.112 The Planwerk takes up
this goal of “initiating a new urban-civic consciousness (stadtbürgerliches Bewusstsein)” by
encouraging – in word, at least – small-scale real-estate investment at the level of individual
plots of land.113
Hoffmann-Axthelm’s theory has the goal of eventually liberating the general populace
from government oversight, by fostering the growth of an educated, self-governing citizenry.
However, the darker implication of this aim is the idea that the existing social and economic
structures in the former East Berlin are so malformed that they must be cleared away – literally
and figuratively – in order to start afresh with a new set of residents and ownership structures.114
This reasoning paired perfectly with the aesthetic tenets of Critical Reconstruction, which looked
to restore pre-war traffic patterns, lots, and zoning (thus enabling Hoffmann-Axthelm’s focus on
the individual parcel), and to do away with mid-century planning and architecture, especially in
former East Berlin. Furthermore, as Hennecke also points out, with the idea of Bodenbindung,
Hoffmann-Axthelm’s theories demonstrate a problematic reliance on the notion of “rootedness”
in land itself (he uses the word “Verwürzelung,” a term that has its own tainted history in
conservative German political discourse).115 As discussed in Chapter 1, one of Kleihues’s goals
for the creation of the theory of Critical Reconstruction was the re-establishment of a specifically
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German tradition of architecture. By taking up the threads of “good” architectural styles – styles
that represented the “best moments of Germany’s history” (i.e. the era of Schinkel and Weimar
Modernism), Kleihues thought Critical Reconstruction could help restore the nation’s prowess as
a center of cutting-edge design. This focus on indigeneity, however, easily slides into, at best,
cultural nationalism, and at worst, ethnocentrism.116 When paired with the idea of intervening in
the social fabric and creating a new national identity, as in Hoffmann-Axthelm’s formulation of
Critical Reconstruction via the Planwerk, it has the potential to look downright xenophobic: as if
only the “right” kind of people can produce the “right” kind of society through their attachment
to the land, using the “right” kind of architecture and planning which arises organically from
German history and identity. Seen in the larger context of Critical Reconstruction’s reliance on
the “European city” model, as well as its many methods of “Othering” the residents and
architecture of the former East, Hoffmann-Axthelm’s theories reveal themselves as, if not
intentionally, then by their myriad associations, deeply ethnocentric and troublingly colonialist
with regard to the former GDR.
Critical Reconstruction and the Planwerk Innenstadt as a Colonial Move
Stimmann’s shift in roles within the Berlin planning administration in 1995 allowed him
to implement Critical Reconstruction on a larger scale than he had as Senate Construction
Director, where he had only wielded influence over particular parcels and sites, and in many
cases had to compete with other planning departments for jurisdiction. As a state secretary under
the Senator for Urban Development, he was able to address the entire inner city at once. The
Planwerk was, at its root, a totalizing act, resting on the belief that planners (led by Stimmann
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and Hoffmann-Axthelm) could – and should – intervene in the city at this macro level in order
to, as the accompanying text stated, create an urban environment that was “appropriate” for
certain kinds of residents, to create “possibilities for wealth accrual,” and to reunite the city not
only physically, but socially, economically, politically, and culturally.117 The supposed
involvement of the public in these plans – which was imperative, since Stimmann’s and
Hoffmann-Axthelm’s logic rested on the idea that residents should govern themselves – served,
in reality, to obscure their implicit wish for near total control over city planning decisions: their
plans to create a self-governing urban public simultaneously denied that same public the very
ability to self-govern. Just as it had at Alexanderplatz, public involvement in the process of the
Planwerk’s development was essentially a way to legitimize their own plans, since they could
listen to residents without actually changing the content of the Planwerk in any substantial
way.118
There was considerable critique of the Planwerk by former East German architectural
professionals and politicians in both parliamentary discussions and in the media. Architectural
historian Simone Hain called the “media staging” of the Planwerk “an attack on democratic
principles and the republican constitution of society.”119 The Berlin PDS also criticized the
Planwerk in parliamentary sessions as trying to circumvent the “democratic planning process.”
The ironic result of this protest was that their language was, in a brazen show of hypocrisy on the
parts of the leading centrist parties, turned around and used to direct parliamentary discussion of
the Planwerk itself as a supposedly democratic city planning tool. As Hennecke puts it, “if the
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allusion to a ‘democratic process’ in the PDS parliamentary motion was meant to point to an
alternative to what they saw as the undemocratic process of the Planwerk, that very same line
was changed, in the course of subsequent motions by the SPD and CDU fractions, into a label for
the ‘democratic process’ of the Planwerk.”120
The Planwerk’s disregard for dissenting voices was underpinned by Stimmann’s and
Hoffmann-Axtelm’s view of residents of the former East as subjects needing to be educated in
proper self-governance. As Hoffmann-Axthelm had written along with Bernhard Strecker in an
earlier report on the city, “The main problem is the situation created by GDR planning. Here the
emptying-out of the urban landscape and the concept of an entirely new city meant the complete
public ownership of the reconstruction. There was, in essence, only one developer” – the state.
This problem resulted, they argued, in a city based on abstract notions of “function” rather than
“individual social powers,” with no “responsible parties” (Träger, also translatable as “bearers”).
“National Socialism, the emigration and destruction of Berlin’s Jewish population, and the
history of division with its isolation and disappropriation in East Berlin have largely destroyed
the urban middle class (Bürgertum, also often translated as “bourgeoisie”).”121 Stimmann also
adopted this rhetoric, declaring in a podium discussion that East Berlin’s lack of a bourgeois
class with “elevated tastes” meant that there were no “appropriate interlocutors” with whom city
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planners and developers could discuss aesthetic or other planning issues.122 East Berlin was thus
construed as a social “void” that could only rightly be filled with the results of Critical
Reconstruction, which would attract a bourgeois public who could then advocate for
neighborhood interests. Essentially, this deeply colonial discourse implied that former East
Berliners were simply interlopers in their own homes – that they did not own them, nor did they
possess the skills to change them in the right ways; the only people who had the skills to
“correctly” inhabit these spaces were the educated middle-class from the former West.
Because of the reliance on the tenets of Critical Reconstruction, the Planwerk’s filling of
voids looked to be physical as well as social. Here, the overt visual politics of both the Leitbild
and the Schwarzpläne served as the markers of their own success – the filling in of the literal
“blanks” in the cityscape meant the remediation of former “mistakes” in planning. In
Stimmann’s words, the “text” of the city needed to be rewritten.123 As Hain commented, “this
plan is based on a concept of history which sees the post-war historical period as abnormal,
ahistorical and ultimately destructive. It thus … ignores forty years of an urban double existence
– which was after all of major historical and international importance.”124 The PDS called
regularly for the protection of mid-century planning ensembles and buildings such as the MapleLeaf Restaurant through landmarking, but their requests were denied in favor of Critical
Reconstruction. As Hennecke rightly observes, the developments of mid-century Modernism are
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seen by the Critical Reconstructionists as a “mistake” which hinders “normal” and “continuitycentered” development.125
As discussed in Chapter 3, Stimmann and Hoffmann-Axthelm had both been critics of
Kleihues’s Critical Reconstruction during the 1980s, and yet, in the post-Wall era, they both
suddenly threw their political weight entirely behind it. While it might be tempting to interpret
Stimmann’s and Hoffmann-Axthelm’s turnabout as a purely cynical move calculated to
manipulate the city planning apparatus and wield control over investors, it is also important to
recall that neither of them had ever previously opposed dense, block-edge development per se.
This was not a drastic shift in their stylistic preferences. Rather, it constituted a significant shift
in their planning models, from one that had focused on the process of community involvement to
one that more clearly emphasized aesthetic restrictions and top-down zoning decisions as the
solution to Berlin’s problems. Their about-face with regard to Kleihues’s theory, I argue, was the
result of their realization that Critical Reconstruction was exactly what they needed, from a
practical perspective, in order to achieve their planning goals. It allowed them to create
maximum revenue for the city by utilizing as much of the state-owned land in the former East as
possible for development, and to guide investors toward particular typologies and densities in
order to both limit “flashy experiments” and to attract the “right” kind of bourgeois public to live
and work in the city center. Critical Reconstruction’s focus on moderately dense, mixed-use,
block-edge development, as well as its loose references to “historical” (i.e. pre-war) architecture,
was both economically viable and conveniently trendy. Within this model, mid-century
Modernism, particularly those examples associated with the GDR, was declared unviable for
theoretical, political, or aesthetic reasons: it not only represented a history that Stimmann and
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others were not willing (or forced) to engage with, but, most importantly, it was a style that was,
basically, commercially unfashionable.

Conclusion: Gentrifying the GDR
Since the early 1990s, Berlin has been in the grip of a major recession: in 2003 its longtime mayor, Klaus Wowereit, coined the phrase “Arm aber sexy” (“poor but sexy”) to describe
its dire financial situation, and it soon became the city’s unofficial motto. The physical outcomes
of the Planwerk Innenstadt have therefore been less drastic than its authors first dreamed. Still,
seen alongside individual examples like Kleihues’s Kaufhof renovation and the demolition of the
Maple-Leaf Restaurant, as well as the rhetoric of its authors and other planners, critics, and
politicians who support the idea of Critical Reconstruction, it is clear that the Planwerk has
functioned as a way to marginalize the voices and “collective urban memory” of East Berliners.
Justified as a left-leaning move toward the creation of a functional and socially cohesive
urban society, the Planwerk and Critical Reconstruction were in actuality extremely conservative
ideas that sought to repress anything that did not fit their image of the “historical” or “European
city.” In essence, Critical Reconstruction became tool of the most direct kind of gentrification, a
classist and colonial claiming of a space deemed “empty” of the “proper” kinds of residents, to
the detriment of the existing population. Rather than engaging with the complexities of the midcentury Modernist cityscape and the memory of the GDR, the Planwerk tried to erase and
replace them with a new utopia based in bourgeois ideals of cultural consumption. And, though
they formerly had been critics of Kleihues, Stimmann and Hoffmann-Axthelm in particular
ended up not only harking back to Kleihues’s call for a “good” German architecture, but they
proposed this as the required basis for a new society that is properly educated and “tied to the
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land.” Seen alongside the Architecture Debates, which helped to characterize Critical
Reconstruction as harboring conservative or even fascist tendencies in its restrictive aesthetics,
this all begins to look a little too close to problematic facets of German history, specifically the
Nazi period.
However, although it is tempting to paint Stimmann and Hoffmann-Axthelm as “fascist”
in their formal preferences, their discursive treatment of East Berliners, and in their desire to
consolidate political power, such a comparison is much too reductive. These problematic facets
of their policy are not unique to Berlin, to Germany, or to Europe, but are blind spots inherent in
the work of planners in cities across the globe. Given their particular situation in reunited
Germany during the 1990s, however, Stimmann and Hoffmann-Axthelm had an added
responsibility to discursively situate themselves not only as distinctively anti-Nazi, but as
symbolically representative of reunited Berlin and Germany in a way that was politically viable.
Though they certainly could have done a better job of managing this aspect of their work, it was
also an impossibly tall order. Stimmann’s and Hoffmann-Axthelm’s struggles – and failures – to
recreate Berlin’s urban landscape in the way they desired therefore points to the larger pitfalls of
urban planning in the post-modern era: the impossibility of getting architecture or other city
forms to “mean” something specific, and to achieve particular political or social ends through
that meaning. As Rossi articulated so well decades earlier in The Architecture of the City,
buildings and urban ensembles emphatically signify, but people become attached to them in
different ways; they evoke different memories and have different connotations for every
individual. Sites where these diverse significations conflict become contested ones where
residents, officials, and members of institutions battle for the right to their own interpretations.126
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The formulation of the Planwerk Innenstadt happened, for instance, alongside another decadelong political battle in Berlin: the decision on the design for the Memorial to the Murdered Jews
of Europe on a block-sized plot next to the Brandenburg Gate. The eventual selection of a design
by Peter Eisenman, with the addition – opposed by the architect – of an underground
“information center,” was a messy process involving all manner of problematic statements and
sub-optimal compromises by government officials, the projects’ sponsors, and the contestants
and judges in its multiple design competitions.127 Though Eisenman’s field of concrete stele has
been generally well-received by the public and by the architectural community, it still entailed
the drastic reduction of a complex history into a singular architectural form, and that form still
potentially generates a whole range of “improper” readings and uses (the city has hired security
guards to attempt to curb unwanted behavior, which frequently consists of kids playing tag or
jumping between the rectangular slabs). Ultimately, then, while Stimmann and HoffmannAxthelm can certainly be taken to task for many of the specifics of their views and operations, as
I have done above, we must also acknowledge the enormity of the task they took on: the
mediation of history through the semiotics of the built environment. This language of
architectural signs proved impossible to control.
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CONCLUSION
Critical Reconstruction in the Post-Modern Age

This project began in 2004 when, while studying abroad in Berlin, I became interested in
what exactly Critical Reconstruction was and how it was being used to reconstruct the city’s
tortured landscape. But the further I delved into the literature, the more confusing it all became.
How could Kleihues, who had designed the glass-fronted Triangel building on Friedrichstrasse,
have authored a theory that only allowed for stone façades? And if he saw Critical
Reconstruction as the marriage of Modernist rationalism and personal poetry, how did that
conception relate to Stimmann’s claims about representing Berlin’s history? Why was Stimmann
in charge of city planning, and not Kleihues? Why were only a small number of architects
seemingly designing all the new buildings? Why did those buildings look so anonymous and, for
lack of a better word, boring? And why was everyone debating with each other so vehemently
over what amounted to malls and empty office space?
As a colleague of mine observed, Critical Reconstruction is confusing because “it means
so many different things to so many different people.” Indeed, it is baffling precisely because it
is not simply one city planning approach, but a constantly shifting discursive formation that
includes the many statements, debates, designs, scandals, documents, images, data, and stories
exchanged among planners, architects, the media, and the public. As such, though it was actually
only one of the approaches being applied in the city center (Stimmann only ever ran one of the
city’s two planning departments, and the federal government also controlled much of the land in
Mitte), it became the most visible way in which architectural theory and discourse, in addition to
buildings themselves, publicly intersected with questions of memory and identity in Berlin.
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Critical Reconstruction’s numerous problems and failures, as I have shown in the previous five
chapters, thus point most clearly to the difficulties inherent in using architectural form to mold a
society or to make specific statements about its identity.

Post-Modernism and the Global Turn
Berlin as a Global City
Throughout the Cold War era, West Germany had been at pains to represent itself
politically and culturally as integrated with the larger trans-Atlantic “West.” This goal affected
the structure of its governing institutions, its cultural affiliations (the adoption of the
International architectural style, for instance, as discussed in Chapter 1), and the formation of a
self-critical historical narrative with regard to the crimes of the Nazis. More than four decades
after the war, in the 1990s, the new, reunited Germany still struggled with these questions, but
now it did so in very different global context. No longer a bulwark against the threat of
Communism, Germany (and Berlin in particular) now needed to assert its prowess as both an
independent economic power and as part of the emerging coalition of the European Union.
International attention was focused tightly on the country’s new epicenter, the formerly divided
capital, as representative of how Germany would operate amidst this new global order.
However, as historian Janet Ward has so astutely observed, whereas cities may once have
stood in for nations, globalization has also made it so that any actual given city may no longer
hold the national significance that it once did: “Hence the reclamation of Berlin’s capital status
and the re-branding of Berlin’s image on the urban, regional, and international levels have been
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(at times uneasy) partners since reunification.”1 The designation of Berlin as capital, in other
words, was not enough to make it a global metropolis or even a national or regional hub; it still
had to compete for investment and for residents on the global market. “The process of recapitalizing a city for its national audience nowadays,” Ward contends, “involves at least a
staging of the globalizing turn in order to catch up with other leading capitals and global cities.”2
But to look “global,” as discussed in Chapter 3, cities ironically have to also find an appealing
and unique “local” identity. Stimmann’s Critical Reconstruction sought to resolve this localglobal tension in its call for the reproduction of certain formal qualities of “traditional” Berlin
architecture married with typologies and zoning meant to attract international investors – largescale malls, office complexes, and small numbers of high-end apartments. Though HoffmannAxthelm and even Stimmann himself gave lip service to the idea of the “small parcel,” or
middle-class property ownership, this model proved impossible given the state of Berlin’s real
estate market and the realities of global commerce. The goal was to put Berlin back on the map
as the seat not only of the government, as Bonn had been, but as an economic and cultural hub,
as it had been in the 1920s, and this ambition meant a necessary partnership with big business.
Monumentality and the Modernist Project
By the end of the 1980s, post-modernism in the narrow sense – formal play, pastiche, pop
– was losing momentum, and was being surpassed by other approaches to design, especially
Deconstructivist architecture, which received special attention in the MoMA show of the same
name in 1988.3 Cultural critic Andreas Huyssen sees this shift as coinciding with a theoretical
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Janet Ward, Post-Wall Berlin: Borders, Space and Identity (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 279.
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MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 154.
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turn from the idea of the “city as text” to the treatment of the “city as spectacle”: from a largely
academic or intellectual conversation to one driven by raw capitalist interests and mass tourism.4
Indeed, the 1990s saw the rise of the “starchitect” as a key way that the public understood and
interacted with architecture as a profession, with signature buildings such as Frank Gehry’s
Guggenheim Bilbao or, later, OMA’s Seattle Public Library drawing unprecedented media
attention and becoming tourist attractions in their own right. Libeskind’s Jewish Museum in
Berlin, designed in 1989, is in fact one of the first examples of such a building in the post-Cold
War era. Such a preference for spectacularity is of course not uniquely post- (or post-post-)
modern. The seminal post-war Modernist document “Nine Points on Monumentality,” published
in 1943 by architectural historian Sigfried Giedion, architect José Luis Sert, and painter Fernand
Léger, also encouraged the use of new materials, of light and color, and of the synthesis of the
arts, to create freestanding monuments that would embody communities’ values, shared
narratives, and aspirations. Perhaps one reason that the “starchitectural” monuments of the 1990s
have been the subject of critique – by the Critical Reconstructionists as well as others – is that
those shared values now seem to have to do mostly with the flows and importance of global
capital, rather than with more traditional local or national ideals.
As discussed throughout this dissertation, Stimmann implemented Critical
Reconstruction explicitly to counteract the growing tendency toward spectacularity in
commercial architecture. However, another look back at the “Nine Points” reveals close ties
between the Critical Reconstructionist project and the concept of monumentality as formulated
by Giedion, Sert, and Léger:
Monuments are human landmarks which men have created as symbols for their
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ideals, for their aims, and for their actions. They are intended to outlive the period
which originated them, and constitute a heritage for future generations. … They
have to satisfy the eternal demand of the people for translation of their collective
force into symbols. … A new step lies ahead. Postwar changes in the whole
economic structure of nations may bring with them the organization of
community life in the city which has been practically neglected up to date. The
people want the buildings that represent their social and community life to give
more than functional fulfillment. They want their aspiration for monumentality,
JOY, pride, and excitement to be satisfied. … [But] those who govern and
administer the countries … are not able to recognize the creative forces of our
period, which alone could build the monuments or public buildings that should be
integrated into new urban centers which can form a true expression for our
epoch.5
This “true expression” of Berlin’s new identity in built form was exactly that to which Stimmann
and others – especially architects like Kollhoff – aspired. Monumentality, then, clearly played an
important role in Stimmann’s Critical Reconstruction, but the changing role of monumentality
itself amidst the global architectural scene – as mainly an expression of corporate, rather than
community, interests – created a difficult point of tension for him.
An additional theoretical aspect links Critical Reconstruction with the likes of Giedion.
Both Stimmann’s and Kleihues’s versions of Critical Reconstruction were very “Modernist” in
their totalizing tendencies and, in the case of Stimmann’s, in its social aims. As became clear in
the Architecture Debates, whether or not they could prove beyond a doubt that Critical
Reconstruction only tied back to pre-war Modernism, its authors saw themselves as seriously
invested in the same ideals as figures like Giedion and Le Corbusier had been: top-down
planning, an insistence on rationality, and ambitious, universalizing theories, all of which were
intended to support the growth of an ideal society. Critical Reconstruction as a case study
obviously points to the absurdity of such a utopian project. More importantly, though, Critical
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Reconstruction’s status as in many ways “Modernist” reveals that at least some strands of postmodernism were really a continuation, rather than a rejection, of Modernism itself.
In 1979, the philosopher Jean-François Lyotard described post-modernity as a state in
which the “metanarratives” or “grand narratives,” which had previously been used to legitimate
things like scientific research in the service of Enlightenment progress, would be thrown into
question, critiqued, and deconstructed.6 Certainly many facets of post-modern architectural
theory (such as those put forward, for instance, by Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown, or by
Peter Eisenman) took this reasoning to heart, focusing instead on formal or semiotic elements of
architecture, on pastiche, or on the treatment of forms as a “language” to be manipulated, played
with, or questioned. But there were still quite a few thinkers, including Kleihues, who, despite
their acknowledgement that CIAM Modernism must be superseded, still retained an implicit
faith in architecture as a larger societal project. Thus, the failure of Critical Reconstruction in
Berlin allows us to see both the futile utopianism of Kleihues’s and Stimmann’s approaches and
the ways in which post-modernism was not necessarily a reaction against Modernism so much as
an extension of it. Indeed, even today, architecture and planning in themselves may never escape
the Modernist conundrum: they will always strive to both serve and to represent the functions
and users that they are built to house, and they may always fall short of this lofty goal.

Critical Reconstruction as a Discourse
Words, Images, and Buildings
In his well-known essay “The Voids of Berlin,” Huyssen argues that in the Berlin
Architecture Debates, the perceived “dichotomy of stone age versus cyber age is misleading: the
6
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fight is over image and image alone on both sides of the issue. The new nationally coded
simplicity” – by which he means the New Simplicity or Critical Reconstruction – “is just as
image-driven” as the spectacular “ecstasies” of architects like Libeskind.7 In other words,
Huyssen claims, what mattered in the reconstruction of Berlin were not the actual forms of new
buildings, but what those buildings connoted, both for other architects and for the public. For
him, because global capital was the driving force behind these new constructions, they were
ultimately only empty symbols of financial power and mass consumption, whether they were
made from stone or glass. However, as discussed throughout this dissertation, Stimmann and his
colleagues were still called upon to justify this commercial architecture with regard to reunited
Germany’s national identity. Berlin in the 1990s, then, was a space where architecture’s ability
to signify was being stretched to its limit. Stimmann needed the new cityscape to be at once
“monumental” in the “Nine Points” sense, appropriate for a global city, and to signify the
country’s own self-reflexivity about its violent and divided past. Perhaps the real problem was
not that the built results of Critical Reconstruction were empty “images,” as Huyssen asserted,
but that what they sought to represent was simply too complex, too nuanced, and too
contradictory for architecture itself to embody.
And so the planners and architects involved in Berlin’s rebuilding relied on discursive as
well as physical constructions to “rebuild” the city. Since classical times, architects have sought
to create, explain, or critique the built environment using the conceptual tool of language;
indeed, amidst multiple recessions, language – in the form of theory – has become one of the
main ways that post-modern architects have contributed to the world of design. Throughout the
Architecture Debates, architects and critics attempted to shape Berlin’s built future, as well as the
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public’s opinion about that future, using these same rhetorical tools. But as I have demonstrated,
they were not able to do this successfully, sometimes because the arguments themselves were
unsound, and at other times because their words begin to mean something else when read
alongside the actual designs. Words and buildings cannot and do not always operate in the same
manner, but they do intersect in influential and sometimes unexpected ways. Architectural forms
can be recast by discourse and can function in the service of divergent or even diametrically
opposed arguments. One example of this divergence, as I have shown, is the repeated
mobilization of pre-war Modernist design to justify authors’ theoretical positions during the
Architecture Debates.8 The various buildings I have discussed also demonstrate how architecture
can work to contradict or undermine the words of the architects. Viewers may continue to see the
Reichsbank, for instance, as a “Nazi” building even if Kollhoff wants them to contextualize this
history through his redesign of the space. Another kind of contradiction appears in the many
buildings by Kleihues himself, which continually resist the rigid strictures of Stimmann’s
Critical Reconstruction, and which I found so confusing as I began my research.
One could argue that this disconnect between buildings and ideas has to do with the fact
that architecture has its own history and professional knowledge base that makes it – perhaps
necessarily – inaccessible to the uninitiated. And if one of post-modern architecture’s stated
goals was to communicate to that same, uninitiated, public audience, then the application of
Critical Reconstruction in Berlin reveals the ultimate futility of this aim. For, as I have shown,
even architecture that explicitly attempts to supply its users with a preponderance of historical
meaning often must be “explained” using text. Perhaps the most telling example can be found,
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ironically, in what became cast as the most explicitly non-Critical Reconstruction building9:
Libeskind’s Jewish Museum, where large printed placards direct users as to how they should
experience the symbolically-laden architecture. Given a situation in which all architecture is
willingly “read” by the public, but where this activity often results in misreadings, anything that
smacks of the “wrong” side of history in Berlin has been ultimately condemned as too
conservative – and the subtle arguments of the architects and planners responsible are not enough
to counteract this impression.
German Identity in the Global Spotlight
In terms of its economic aspirations, Berlin was no different from many other cities in the
West where the post-modern rediscovery of historic urban centers was driving up prices and
spurring rampant, high-end construction in formerly blighted downtowns (San Francisco and
New York are two other prominent examples). However, planners in the United States or
elsewhere in the EU did not have to deal with the difficult burden of correctly representing
German history on top of the already challenging task of guiding such development. As
discussed throughout this dissertation, ideas of German collective memory and national or
cultural identity were points of intense discussion and debate even before the Wall fell. This was
most clearly illustrated by the Historikerstreit in the 1980s, where conservative thinkers and
politicians argued for the “normalization” of Nazi history – its relativization with regard to other
crimes, such as those of Stalin, and for, if not an acquittal, then at least a release of current
German citizens from the responsibility of dealing with the crimes of the Nazis from the
perspective of the “perpetrators.” This wish for closure was summed up in the idea of a
Schlussstrich: a “closing line” drawn under that chapter of German history. The fall of the Wall
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only served to reinvigorate these debates as the country strived to culturally and economically
integrate an East German population that had been brought up with a very different World War II
narrative, one that painted them as the victims of Nazi violence, rather than the criminals. NeoNazism was on the rise in many former Eastern states, and the large population of Turkish
immigrants who had moved to Germany after the war added even more complexity to
discussions about what it meant to be “German.” And even today, more than twenty-five years
after the Wende, issues of how to remember and talk about the Holocaust and how to integrate
immigrants are regularly discussed and debated in the German media.10
But what does a Schlussstrich look like in the built environment? Does it look like the
revival and reconstruction of forms associated with the Nazis? What about those of the GDR –
are East German buildings “totalitarian,” kitschy, or both? Even if buildings did harbor violent
memories or messages, are people today even able to recognize those forms as such? And can
forms themselves be held responsible for the crimes of the regimes that appropriated them? The
answer depends on how those buildings are discursively situated and collectively remembered,
and the destruction or preservation of particular buildings has the potential to send strong
messages to certain groups of people. The fact that the discourse around architecture and
urbanism is in many ways image-based, then, does not mean that buildings themselves don’t
have real effects. Architecture, in fact, does matter profoundly. It may not be able to completely
recreate a society or reprogram a population. But it is certainly, as Rossi argued in The
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Architecture of the City, something to which people can and do attach meaning, through which
they form bonds, and about which they can feel a sense of community and belonging.
Like it or not, Critical Reconstruction’s “conservative” architecture is now Berlin’s physical
inheritance. Thus, in a similar manner to the Historikerstreit, in which the argument petered out
but the result was a kind of de facto “normalization” of Nazi history, the debates about new
architecture in the center of reunited Berlin never reached a formal conclusion. Their presence,
though, has achieved a kind of “smoothing out” of that history anyway; they are now simply a
part of Berliners’ everyday lives. Two decades after the fall of the Wall, Berlin’s new city
planning officials are focused mainly on issues like economic inequality, jobs, and
environmental sustainability, rather than the stylistic architectural identity of the city. But a few
traces of the intense conflicts of the 1990s remain: in the center of Mitte, the much-debated
reconstruction of the Stadtschloss is just now beginning to take shape. And just a little further to
the East, along the Spree River, corporate partnerships and the role of large-scale capitalist
development continue to be points of intense conflict and community activism. Berlin, in reality,
will continue to, and indeed already has, “become” something different after Kleihues and
Stimmann made their marks on it.
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FIGURES

Figure 1.1 Map of central Berlin with medieval city walls, 1710. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

Figure 1.2 Karl Friedrich Schinkel, Altes Museum, Berlin, 1825-1830. Source: Wikimedia
Commons, photograph by Jean-Pierre Dalbéra, 2011.
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Figure 1.3 Karl Friedrich Schinkel, Berlin Lustgarten and Altes Museum, perspective, 1823.
Source: SMPK Berlin.

Figure 1.4 Berlin Mietskaserne around 1900, aerial view. Source: Stadtentwicklung.berlin.de.
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Figure 1.5 Berlin Mietskaserne in Kreuzberg. Photograph by author, 2005.

Figure 1.6 Albert Schwartz, Gertraudenbrücke, Berlin, 1895. Source: Landesarchiv Berlin.
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Figure 1.7 Hof am Krogel, Berlin, 1912. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

Figure 1.8. Erich Mendelsohn, Columbushaus, Berlin, 1932. Source: Potsdamerplatz.org.
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Figure 1.9 Max Taut, Verbandshaus des Deutschen Verkehrsbundes, Berlin, 1927-32. Source:
Wikimedia Commons, photographed 2009.

Figure 1.10 Max Taut and Franz Hoffmann, Warenhaus der Konsumgenossenschaft (now MaxTaut-Haus), Berlin, 1931-33. Source: Wikimedia Commons, photographed 2012.
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Figure 1.11 Mietskaserne with façades scraped off. Source: Google Street View.

Figure 1.12 Berlin Interbau 1957, perspective plan. Source: Wikimedia Commons.
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Figure 1.13 Interbau buildings, Hansaviertel, Berlin, 1957. Source: Wikimedia Commons,
photographed 2005.

Figure 1.14 BBPR, Torre Velasca, Milan, 1956-8. Source: Flickr, photograph by Daniel Rich.
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Figure 1.15 Rob Krier, Luxembourg Block rendering, 1978. Source: Robert L. Delevoy, ed.,
Architecture rationelle: La reconstruction de la ville européenne (Bruxelles: Archives
d’Architecture Moderne, 1978), 100.

Figure 1.16 Map of the Berlin Wall in central Berlin. Source: rbb-online.de.
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Figure 1.17 Josef Paul Kleihues and Hans Moldenschart, plan for Ruhwald, 1967. Source: Josef
Paul Kleihues: Works 1966-1980, ed. Thorsten Scheer, trans. Geoffrey Steinherz, vol. 1
(Ostfildern: Hatje Cantz, 2008), 8.

Figure 1.18 Josef Paul Kleihues, Plan for Perlach area of Munich, 1969. Source: Kahlfedt, Paul,
Lepik, Andres, and Schätzke, Andreas, eds., Josef Paul Kleihues: Stadt, Bau, Kunst (Berlin:
Nicolai, 2003), 156.
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Figure 1.19 Josef Paul Kleihues, Berlin Department of Sanitation, 1969. Source: Kahlfedt, Paul,
Lepik, Andres, and Schätzke, Andreas, eds., Josef Paul Kleihues: Stadt, Bau, Kunst (Berlin:
Nicolai, 2003), 14.

Figure 1.20 Josef Paul Kleihues, Neukölln Hospital, 1973. Source: Flickr, photograph by
Bergfels.
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Figure 1.21 Josef Paul Kleihues, Vinetaplatz, Berlin, 1971-77, perspective view. Source: Josef
Paul Kleihues, “Closed and Open Housing Blocks,” Lotus International 19 (1978), 71.

Figure 1.22 Josef Paul Kleihues, Vinetaplatz, Berlin, 1971-77, plan. Source: Josef Paul Kleihues,
“Closed and Open Housing Blocks,” Lotus International 19 (1978), 72.
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Figure 1.23 Josef Paul Kleihues, Vinetaplatz, Berlin, 1971-77, exterior. Source: Kleihues.com.

Figure 1.24 Giovanni Battista Nolli, Nuova Pianta di Roma (the “Nolli Plan”), 1748. Source:
Wikimedia Commons.
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Figure 1.25 Josef Paul Kleihues, “The Kleihues Plan,” 1984, originally shown in the IBAsponsored exhibition Idee, Prozess, Ergebnis. Source: 750 Jahre Architektur und Städtebau in
Berlin (Stuttgart: G. Hatje, 1987), 266.
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Figure 1.26 Checkpoint Charlie, Berlin, 1963. Source: Wikimedia Commons, photograph by
Roger Wollstadt.

Figure 1.27 Aldo Rossi, Kochstrasse 1-5 (IBA Block 10), Berlin, 1981-88. Source:
architectureinberlin.wordpress.com, photographed 2008 by Jim Hudson.
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Figure 1.28 Aldo Rossi, Kochstrasse 1-5 (IBA Block 10), 1981-88, courtyard view. Source:
Kleihues, Josef Paul, ed., Internationale Bauausstellung Berlin 1984/87, die Neubaugebiete:
Dokumente, Projekte (Stuttgart: G. Hatje, 1993), 84.

Figure 1.29 Rem Koolhaas and OMA, Haus am Checkpoint Charlie, 1981-89. Source:
Wikimedia Commons, photographed 2008.
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Figure 1.30 Zaha Hadid, IBA Block B, Stresemannstrasse, Berlin, 1987-1994. Source: zahahadid.com.

Figure 1.31 Zaha Hadid, IBA Block B, Stresemannstrasse, Berlin, 1987-1994. Source: Flickr,
photograph by Evgeniy Shchetinkin.
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Figure 2.1 Friedrich Gilly, plan for a monument to Frederick II of Prussia, Berlin, 1797. Source:
Wikimedia Commons.

Figure 2.2 Potsdamer Platz during the time of the Berlin Wall. Source: Lampugnani, Vittorio
Magnago, ed., An Urban Experiment in Central Berlin: Planning Potsdamer Platz (Frankfurt:
DAM, 1997), 62.

287

Figure 2.3 Observation deck in West Berlin with a view of Potsdamer Platz on the other side of
the Berlin Wall, 1977. Source: Wikipedia.

Figure 2.4 Daniel Libeskind, design for Berlin Morgen competition, 1991, model. Source:
Lampugnani, Vittorio Magnago, ed., Berlin morgen: Ideen für das Herz einer Groszstadt
(Stuttgart: G.Hatje, 1991), 138.
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Figure 2.5 Giorgio Grassi, design for Berlin Morgen competition, 1991, elevations. Source:
Lampugnani, Vittorio Magnago, ed., Berlin morgen: Ideen für das Herz einer Groszstadt
(Stuttgart: G.Hatje, 1991), 106-107.

Figure 2.6 Hans Kollhoff, design for Berlin Morgen competition, 1991, perspective view.
Source: Lampugnani, Vittorio Magnago, ed., Berlin morgen: Ideen für das Herz einer Groszstadt
(Stuttgart: G.Hatje, 1991), 132.
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Figure 2.7 Hans Kollhoff, design for Berlin Morgen competition, 1991, perspective view.
Source: Lampugnani, Vittorio Magnago, ed., Berlin morgen: Ideen für das Herz einer Groszstadt
(Stuttgart: G.Hatje, 1991), 135.

Figure 2.8 Hilmer and Sattler, 1991 Potsdamer Platz competition entry, perspective view.
Source: Lampugnani, Vittorio Magnago, ed., An Urban Experiment in Central Berlin: Planning
Potsdamer Platz (Frankfurt: DAM, 1997), 71.
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Figure 2.9 Hilmer and Sattler, 1991 Potsdamer Platz competition entry, plan. Source:
Lampugnani, Vittorio Magnago, ed., An Urban Experiment in Central Berlin: Planning
Potsdamer Platz (Frankfurt: DAM, 1997), 71.

Figure 2.10 Hilmer and Sattler, “Hof” typologies in 1991 Potsdamer Platz competition entry,
plan. Source: Lampugnani, Vittorio Magnago, ed., An Urban Experiment in Central Berlin:
Planning Potsdamer Platz (Frankfurt: DAM, 1997), 72.
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Figure 2.11 Richard Rogers, 1991 Potsdamer Platz competition entry, exhibition model. Source:
Rogers, Richard, “Potsdamer Platz,” Arch+ 109 (December 1991), 96.

Figure 2.12 Richard Rogers, 1991 Potsdamer Platz competition entry, exhibition model. Source:
Rogers, Richard, “Potsdamer Platz,” Arch+ 109 (December 1991), 99.
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Figure 2.13 Renzo Piano, 1992 competition entry for Daimler Benz site, plan. Source:
Lampugnani, Vittorio Magnago, ed., An Urban Experiment in Central Berlin: Planning
Potsdamer Platz (Frankfurt: DAM, 1997), 89.

Figure 2.14 Renzo Piano, 1992 competition entry for Daimler Benz site, exhibition model.
Source: Lampugnani, Vittorio Magnago, ed., An Urban Experiment in Central Berlin: Planning
Potsdamer Platz (Frankfurt: DAM, 1997), 89.
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Figure 2.15 Potsdamer Platz Arkaden, aerial view. Source: Bodenschatz, Harald, and Altrock,
Uwe, Renaissance der Mitte: Zentrumsumbau in London und Berlin (Berlin: Verlagshaus Braun,
2005), 216.
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Figure 2.16 Helmut Jahn, Sony Center, perspective rendering. Source: Bodenschatz, Harald, and
Altrock, Uwe, Renaissance der Mitte: Zentrumsumbau in London und Berlin (Berlin:
Verlagshaus Braun, 2005), 213.

Figure 2.17 Sony Center, interior view. Source: Wikimedia Commons.
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Figure 2.18 Günter Stahn, rendering of a design for the reconstruction of central Friedrichstrasse
with the Friedrichstadt Passagen, 1980s, never realized (the design included the reconstruction of
Andreas Schlüter’s Baroque-era Villa Kamecke, which earlier stood on a different site). Source:
Harald Bodenschatz and Uwe Altrock, Renaissance der Mitte: Zentrumsumbau in London und
Berlin (Berlin: Verlagshaus Braun, 2005), 228.

Figure 2.19 Oswald Mathias Ungers, Friedrichstadt Passagen, Block 205, Berlin, 1991-1996,
elevation, section, and plan. Source: Annegret Burg, Berlin Mitte: die Entstehung einer urbanen
Architektur, ed. Hans Stimmann (Berlin: Birkhäuser Verlag, 1995), 120-123.
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Figure 2.20 Oswald Mathias Ungers, Friedrichstadt Passagen, Block 205, Berlin, 1991-1996,
exterior. Photograph by author, 2006.

Figure 2.21 Pei Cobb Freed, Friedrichstadt Passagen, Block 206, Berlin, 1991-1996, exterior.
Photograph by author, 2006.
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Figure 2.22 Pei Cobb Freed, Friedrichstadt Passagen, Block 206, Berlin, 1991-1996, interior of
atrium (escalator is to the right, out of the frame). Photograph by author, 2006.

Figure 2.23 Jean Nouvel, Friedrichstadt Passagen, Block 206, Berlin, 1991-1996, exterior with
ticker-tape style light displays. Source: Dieter Bartetzko, “Friedrichstadtpassagen, Berlin: 19911996,” Architektur-Jahrbuch, 1996, 148.
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Figure 2.24 Jean Nouvel, Friedrichstadt Passagen, Block 206, Berlin, 1991-1996, exterior.
Photograph by author, 2006.

Figure 2.25 Jean Nouvel, Friedrichstadt Passagen, Block 206, Berlin, 1991-1996, interior.
Photograph by author, 2006.
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Figure 2.26 Jean Nouvel, Friedrichstadt Passagen, Block 206, Berlin, 1991-1996, section and
plan. Source: Peter Rumpf, “Die Friedrichstadtpassagen in Berlin Mitte,” Bauwelt 82, no. 18
(May 1991): 976.

Figure 3.1 Günter Behnisch and Partners, Akademie der Künste, Berlin, designed 1993, built
1999-2003. Source: Wikimedia Commons, photographed 2008.
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Figure 3.2 Günter Behnisch and Partners, Akademie der Künste, Berlin, designed 1993, plan and
section. Source: Matthias Pabsch, Pariser Platz, Architektur und Technik: vom manuellen zum
digitalen Zeitalter (Berlin: Reimer, 2002), 176.
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Figure 3.3 Josef Paul Kleihues, Triangel building, Berlin, 1994-97. Source: Kleihues.com.

Figure 3.4 Josef Paul Kleihues, Triangel building, Berlin, 1994-97, exterior detail. Source:
Kleihues.com.
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Figure 3.5 Josef Paul Kleihues, Kant Triangle building, 1992-95. Source: Kleihues.com.

Figure 3.6 Josef Paul Kleihues, Kant Triangle, 1992-95, detail of windvane. Source:
Kleihues.com.
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Figure 3.7 Josef Paul Kleihues, Hofgarten am Gendarmenmarkt, site plan concept. Source:
Annegret Burg, Berlin Mitte: die Entstehung einer urbanen Architektur, ed. Hans Stimmann
(Berlin: Birkhäuser Verlag, 1995), 35.

Figure 3.8 Borchhardt restaurant building. Photograph by author, 2006.
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Figure 3.9 Josef Paul Kleihues, Four Seasons Hotel, Hofgarten am Gendarmenmarkt complex,
1992-96, perspective rendering. Source: Annegret Burg, Berlin Mitte: die Entstehung einer
urbanen Architektur, ed. Hans Stimmann (Berlin: Birkhäuser Verlag, 1995), 38.

Figure 3.10 Josef Paul Kleihues, Four Seasons Hotel, Hofgarten am Gendarmenmarkt complex,
1992-96, window bays. Photograph by author, 2006.
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Figure 3.11 Josef Paul Kleihues, Atelier building, Hofgarten am Gendarmenmarkt complex,
1992-96. Photograph by author, 2006.

Figure 3.12 Max Dudler, residential building, Hofgarten am Gendarmenmarkt complex, 199296, section. Source: Source: Annegret Burg, Berlin Mitte: die Entstehung einer urbanen
Architektur, ed. Hans Stimmann (Berlin: Birkhäuser Verlag, 1995), 49.
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Figure 3.13 Max Dudler, residential building, Hofgarten am Gendarmenmarkt complex, 199296, façade. Photograph by author, 2006.

Figure 3.14 Hans Kollhoff, residential and office buildings, Hofgarten am Gendarmenmarkt
complex, 1992-96, model. Source: Annegret Burg, Berlin Mitte: die Entstehung einer urbanen
Architektur, ed. Hans Stimmann (Berlin: Birkhäuser Verlag, 1995), 44.
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Figure 3.15 Hans Kollhoff, residential and office buildings, Hofgarten am Gendarmenmarkt
complex, 1992-96. Photograph by author, 2006.

Figure 3.16 Jürgen Sawade, residential and office building, Hofgarten am Gendarmenmarkt
complex. Photograph by author, 2006.
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Figure 3.17 Josef Paul Kleihues, Kontorhaus Mitte, 1994-97, isometric view. Source: Annegret
Burg, Berlin Mitte: die Entstehung einer urbanen Architektur, ed. Hans Stimmann (Berlin:
Birkhäuser Verlag, 1995), 32.

Figure 3.18 Josef Paul Kleihues, Kontorhaus Mitte, 1994-97, perspective rendering. Source:
Martina Düttmann, “Die Neue Friedrichstrasse,” Bauwelt 84, no. 21 (May 1993): 1115.
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Figure 3.19 Josef Paul Kleihues, Kontorhaus Mitte, 1994-97, plan. Source: Martina Düttmann,
“Die Neue Friedrichstrasse,” Bauwelt 84, no. 21 (May 1993): 1114.

Figure 3.20 Josef Paul Kleihues, Kontorhaus Mitte, 1994-97, courtyard. Source:
Stadtentwicklung.berlin.de.
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Figure 3.21 Walther Stepp, Kontorhaus Mitte, residential and office building, 1994-97. Source:
Stadtentwicklung.berlin.de.

Figure 3.22 Klaus Theo Brenner, Kontorhaus Mitte, residential and office building, 1994-97.
Source: Stadtentwicklung.berlin.de.
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Figure 3.23 Vittorio Magnago Lampugnani and Marlene Dörrie, Kontorhaus Mitte, residential
and office building, 1994-97. Source: Google Street View.

Figure 3.24 Josef Paul Kleihues, Kontorhaus Mitte, residential and office building, 1994-97.
Source: Stadtentwicklung.berlin.de.
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Figure 3.25 Aldo Rossi, Quartier Schützenstrasse, 1994-98, plan. Source: Arcspace.com,
http://www.arcspace.com/features/aldo-rossi-/quartier-schutzenstrasse/.

Figure 3.26 Aldo Rossi, Quartier Schützenstrasse, 1994-98, elevation, sketch. Source: From the
Ground Up, https://arc90274.wordpress.com/2013/12/26/aldo-rossi/.
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Figure 3.27 Aldo Rossi, Quartier Schützenstrasse, 1994-98. Source: Wikimedia Commons,
photographed 2008.

Figure 3.28 Aldo Rossi, Quartier Schützenstrasse, 1994-98, detail of cornices. Source:
Wikimedia Commons, photographed 2008.
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Figure 4.1 Hans Kollhoff, residential buildings, Luisenplatz, Berlin, 1982-87, plan. Source:
Kollhoff.de.

Figure 4.2 Hans Kollhoff, residential buildings, Luisenplatz, Berlin, 1982-87, perspective
rendering. Source: Kollhoff.de.
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Figure 4.3 Hans Kollhoff, residential buildings, Luisenplatz, Berlin, 1982-87, perspective
rendering. Source: Kollhoff.de.

Figure 4.4 Hans Kollhoff, residential buildings, Luisenplatz, Berlin, 1982-87. Source:
Kollhoff.de.
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Figure 4.5 Hans Kollhoff, residential buildings, Luisenplatz, Berlin, 1982-87, façade. Source:
Kollhoff.de.

Figure 4.6 Hans Kollhoff, KNSM development, 1989-1995, plan. Source: Kollhoff.de.
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Figure 4.7 Hans Kollhoff, KNSM development, 1989-1995. Source: Kollhoff.de.

Figure 4.8 Hans Kollhoff, KNSM development, 1989-1995, detail of doorway. Source:
Kollhoff.de.
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Figure 4.9 Hans Kollhoff, KNSM development, 1989-1995, detail of fire escape. Source:
Kollhoff.de.

Figure 4.10 Hans Kollhoff, Potsdamer Platz master plan competition entry, 1991, plan. Source:
Lampugnani, Vittorio Magnago, ed., An Urban Experiment in Central Berlin: Planning
Potsdamer Platz (Frankfurt: DAM, 1997), 83.
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Figure 4.11 Hans Kollhoff, Potsdamer Platz master plan competition entry, 1991, model. Source:
Lampugnani, Vittorio Magnago, ed., An Urban Experiment in Central Berlin: Planning
Potsdamer Platz (Frankfurt: DAM, 1997), 83.

Figure 4.12 Hans Kollhoff, Potsdamer Platz master plan competition entry, 1991, overall
perspective view with Leipziger Platz in the foreground. Source: Lampugnani, Vittorio
Magnago, ed., An Urban Experiment in Central Berlin: Planning Potsdamer Platz (Frankfurt:
DAM, 1997), 85.
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Figure 4.13 Hans Kollhoff, Daimler Benz tower, completed 2000, site plan. Source: Kollhoff.de.

Figure 4.14 Hans Kollhoff, Daimler Benz tower, completed 2000. Source: Kollhoff.de.
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Figure 4.15 Hans Kollhoff, Daimler Benz tower, completed 2000, façade detail. Source:
Kollhoff.de.

Figure 4.16 Hans Kollhoff and Arthur Ovaska, Wohnpark am Berlin Museum, aerial view.
Source: Wikimedia Commons, photograph by Gunter Schneider, 2007.
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Figure 4.17 Martin Wagner, traffic plan for Alexanderplatz, 1929 (never realized). Source:
Kleihues + Kleihues, Galeria Kaufhof Berlin-Alexanderplatz: Josef Paul Kleihues (Berlin: Jovis,
2007), 18.

Figure 4.18 Martin Wagner and Felix Unglaube, traffic plan for Alexanderplatz, perspective
sketch, 1929 (never realized). Source: Kleihues + Kleihues, Galeria Kaufhof BerlinAlexanderplatz: Josef Paul Kleihues (Berlin: Jovis, 2007), 18.
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Figure 4.19 Alexanderplatz ca. 1935. Source: Kleihues + Kleihues, Galeria Kaufhof BerlinAlexanderplatz: Josef Paul Kleihues (Berlin: Jovis, 2007), 17.

Figure 4.20 Warenhaus Tietz store façade with Berolina statue, 1906. Source: Tagesspiegel.de,
http://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/fraktur-berlin-bilder-aus-der-kaiserzeit-wolkenkratzer-amalexanderplatz/9806536.html.

324

Figure 4.21 Warenhaus Tietz, interior after 1911 renovations. Source: Peter Stürzebecher, Das
Berliner Warenhaus (Berlin: Archibook-Verlag, 1979), 111.

Figure 4.22 Hans Kollhoff master plan for Alexanderplatz, 1994, model. Source:
Stadtentwicklung.berlin.de.
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Figure 4.23 Hans Kollhoff and Helga Timmermann, master plan for Alexanderplatz, 1994,
perspective rendering, day. Source: Kristin Feireiss, ed., Alexanderplatz: Städtebaulicher
Ideenwettbewerb, trans. Michael Robinson and Hans H. Harbort (Berlin: Ernst & Sohn, 1994).

Figure 4.24 Hans Kollhoff and Helga Timmermann, master plan for Alexanderplatz, 1994,
perspective rendering, night. Source: Kristin Feireiss, ed., Alexanderplatz: Städtebaulicher
Ideenwettbewerb, trans. Michael Robinson and Hans H. Harbort (Berlin: Ernst & Sohn, 1994).
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Figure 4.25 Hans Kollhoff and Helga Timmermann, master plan for Alexanderplatz, 1994,
showing planned green space. Source: Stadtentwicklung.berlin.de.

Figure 4.26 Hans Kollhoff and Helga Timmermann, master plan for Alexanderplatz, 1994, use
concept. Source: Kristin Feireiss, ed., Alexanderplatz: Städtebaulicher Ideenwettbewerb, trans.
Michael Robinson and Hans H. Harbort (Berlin: Ernst & Sohn, 1994), 89.
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Figure 4.27 Daniel Libeskind, Alexanderplatz master plan competition entry, 1994, plan. Source:
Kristin Feireiss, ed., Alexanderplatz: Städtebaulicher Ideenwettbewerb, trans. Michael Robinson
and Hans H. Harbort (Berlin: Ernst & Sohn, 1994).
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Figure 4.28 Daniel Libeskind, Alexanderplatz master plan competition entry, 1994, plan for area.
Source: Kristin Feireiss, ed., Alexanderplatz: Städtebaulicher Ideenwettbewerb, trans. Michael
Robinson and Hans H. Harbort (Berlin: Ernst & Sohn, 1994).
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Figure 4.29 Daniel Libeskind, Alexanderplatz master plan competition entry, 1994, model.
Source: Stadtentwicklung.berlin.de.

Figure 4.30 Daniel Libeskind, Alexanderplatz master plan competition entry, 1994, model
showing Pravda building replica (left, abutting Kaufhof store). Source: Kristin Feireiss, ed.,
Alexanderplatz: Städtebaulicher Ideenwettbewerb, trans. Michael Robinson and Hans H. Harbort
(Berlin: Ernst & Sohn, 1994).
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Figure 4.31 Heinrich Wolff, Reichsbank building, 1934-40, west elevation. Source: Wikimedia
Commons, photographed 2009.

Figure 4.32 Heinrich Wolff, Reichsbank building, 1934-40, original entrance (now the courtyard
façade). Source: Wikimedia Commons, photographed 2007.
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Figure 4.33 Hans Kollhoff, Foreign Ministry (former Reichsbank) renovation, 1994-99, original
woodwork. Source: Auswaertiges-amt.de.

Figure 4.34 Hans Kollhoff, Foreign Ministry (former Reichsbank) renovation, 1994-99, SED
meeting chamber. Source: Auswaertiges-amt.de.
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Figure 4.35 Hans Kollhoff, Foreign Ministry (former Reichsbank) renovation, 1994-99,
monochrome wall by artist Gerhard Merz. Source: Auswaertiges-amt.de.

Figure 4.36 Hans Kollhoff, Foreign Ministry (former Reichsbank) renovation, 1994-99,
monochrome ceiling by artist Gerhard Merz. Source: Auswaertiges-amt.de.
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Figure 4.37 Thomas Müller and Ivan Reimann, Foreign Ministry (former Reichsbank)
renovation, 1995-99, elevation renderings. Source: Auswaertiges-amt.de.

Figure 4.38 Thomas Müller and Ivan Reimann, Foreign Ministry (former Reichsbank)
renovation, 1995-99, east elevation. Source: Auswaertiges-amt.de.
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Figure 4.39 People observing the Brandenburg Gate from the East Berlin side, 1984. Source:
Wikimedia Commons, photograph by George Garrigues.

Figure 4.40 The Brandenburg Gate behind the Berlin Wall, shortly before its fall in November,
1989. Source: Wikimedia Commons, photograph courtesy the Berlin Senate.
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Figure 4.41 Pariser Platz in 1945. Source: Bundesregierung.de.

Figure 4.42 Pariser Platz in the 1960s (on the eastern side of the Brandenburg Gate). Source:
Wikimedia Commons.
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Figure 4.43 Pariser Platz, aerial view, 1962. Source: Bernhard Strecker and Dieter HoffmannAxthelm, “Pariser Platz: Kritische Rekonstruktion Des Bereichs” (Senatsverwaltung für Bauund Wohnungswesen, September 1991), 11.

Figure 4.44 Dieter Hoffmann-Axthelm and Bernhard Strecker, plan for Pariser Platz plan as part
of their 1991 report. Source: Bernhard Strecker and Dieter Hoffmann-Axthelm, “Pariser Platz:
Kritische Rekonstruktion Des Bereichs” (Senatsverwaltung für Bau- und Wohnungswesen,
September 1991), 19.
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Figure 5.1 The Berlin Stadtschloss after World War II. Source: Bildarchiv Preussischer
Kulturbesitz, posted on Spiegel.de.

Figure 5.2 Palast der Republik with parking lot, ca. 1980. Source: Citysam.de.
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Figure 5.3 East Berlin government master plan for Alexanderplatz renovation, 1969. Source:
Kleihues + Kleihues, Galeria Kaufhof Berlin-Alexanderplatz: Josef Paul Kleihues (Berlin: Jovis,
2007), 20.

Figure 5.4 Alexanderplatz in 1980. Source: Wikimedia Commons, courtesy of the German
Federal Archives.
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Figure 5.5 Josef Kaiser et al., Centrum department store, 1967-70. Source: Wikimedia
Commons, courtesy German Federal Archives, photograph by Hubert Link, 1971.

Figure 5.6 Josef Kaiser et al, Centrum department store, 1967-70, model. Source: “Warenhaus,”
Deutsche Architektur (16: 1, January 1967), 38.
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Figure 5.7 Josef Kaiser et al, Centrum department store, 1967-70, section. Source: “Warenhaus
‘Centrum’ in Berlin,” Deutsche Architektur (20.8, August 1971), 468.

Figure 5.8 Josef Kaiser et al, Centrum department store, 1967-70, interior (photo 1971). Source:
“Warenhaus ‘Centrum’ in Berlin,” Deutsche Architektur (20.8, August 1971), 467.
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Figure 5.9 Josef Kaiser et al, Centrum department store, 1967-70, plan of one of the sales floors.
Source: “Warenhaus ‘Centrum’ in Berlin,” Deutsche Architektur (20.8, August 1971), 469.

Figure 5.10 Josef Kaiser et al, Centrum department store, 1967-70, interior (photo 1971). Source:
“Warenhaus ‘Centrum’ in Berlin,” Deutsche Architektur (20.8, August 1971), 468.
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Figure 5.11 Josef Kaiser et al, Centrum department store, 1967-70, interior (photo 1971). Source:
“Warenhaus ‘Centrum’ in Berlin,” Deutsche Architektur (20.8, August 1971), 470.

Figure 5.12 Josef Kaiser et al, Centrum department store, 1967-70, interior (photo 1971). Source:
“Warenhaus ‘Centrum’ in Berlin,” Deutsche Architektur (20.8, August 1971), 470.
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Figure 5.13 Josef Kaiser et al, Centrum department store, 1967-70, interior (photo 1971). Source:
“Warenhaus ‘Centrum’ in Berlin,” Deutsche Architektur (20.8, August 1971), 472.

Figure 5.14 Josef Kaiser et al, Centrum department store, 1967-70, exterior (photo 1971).
Source: “Warenhaus ‘Centrum’ in Berlin,” Deutsche Architektur (20.8, August 1971), 467.
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Figure 5.15 West German Horten department store in Nürnberg. This store, originally part of the
Schocken chain, was also bought by the Kaufhof corporation in the 1990s and was closed in
2011. Source: Suedstadtherz.de.

Figure 5.16 Alexanderplatz in 1977, aerial view showing the Centrum store (right) and the
Behrens buildings (left). Source: Wikimedia Commons, courtesy German Federal Archives.
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Figure 5.17 The former Centrum building shortly before façade demolition in 2006. Source:
Wikimedia Commons.

Figure 5.18 The former Centrum building during demolition and renovation, 2005. Source:
Wikimedia Commons.
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Figure 5.19 Josef Paul Kleihues, Galeria Kaufhof renovation, 2004-6, with one of the Behrens
buildings. Source: Kleihues + Kleihues, Galeria Kaufhof Berlin-Alexanderplatz: Josef Paul
Kleihues (Berlin: Jovis, 2007), 37.
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Figure 5.20 Josef Paul Kleihues, Kaufhof Alexanderplatz renovation, 2004, elevation and
section. Source: Kleihues + Kleihues, Galeria Kaufhof Berlin-Alexanderplatz: Josef Paul
Kleihues (Berlin: Jovis, 2007), 42.
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Figure 5.21 Josef Paul Kleihues, Kaufhof Alexanderplatz renovation, 2004-6, interior. Source:
Kleihues + Kleihues, Galeria Kaufhof Berlin-Alexanderplatz: Josef Paul Kleihues (Berlin: Jovis,
2007), 42.
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Figure 5.22 Hermann Henselmann, Haus des Lehrers, 1962-64. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

Figure 5.23 Haus des Lehrers, renovated interior, 2003. Source: Hausdeslehrers.de.
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Figure 5.24 Planwerk Innenstadt: Leitbild. Source: Stadtentwicklung.berlin.de.
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Figure 5.25 Berlin Schwarzplan, showing urban fabric in 1940 (created 1996). Source:
Stadtentwicklung.berlin.de.

Figure 5.26 Berlin Schwarzplan, showing urban fabric in 1953 (created 1996). Source:
Stadtentwicklung.berlin.de.
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Figure 5.27 Berlin Schwarzplan, showing urban fabric in 1989 (created 1996). Source:
Stadtentwicklung.berlin.de.

Figure 5.28 Berlin Schwarzplan, showing projected urban fabric in 2001 (created 1996). Source:
Stadtentwicklung.berlin.de.
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Figure 5.29 Berlin Schwarzplan, showing projected urban fabric in 2010 (created 1996). Source:
Stadtentwicklung.berlin.de.

Figure 5.30 Maple Leaf Restaurant shortly before demolition in 2000. Source: Wikimedia
Commons.
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